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Ramchandra Rungta vs The State Of Jharkhand
2023 Latest Caselaw 3497 Jhar

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 3497 Jhar
Judgement Date : 14 September, 2023

Jharkhand High Court
Ramchandra Rungta vs The State Of Jharkhand on 14 September, 2023
                                                       1                   Cr.M.P. No. 760 of 2014


                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                                Cr.M.P. No. 760 of 2014
                 Ramchandra Rungta, Director of M/s Jharkhand Ispat Pvt. Ltd.,
                 Ramgarh, Jharkhand                       ... Petitioner
                                       -Versus-
            1.   The State of Jharkhand
            2.   Sri Ravindra Prasad, Regional Officer, Jharkhand State Pollution
                 Control Board, Ranchi                  ... Opposite Parties
                                              -----

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

-----

            For the Petitioner          : Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, Advocate
            For the State               : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, A.P.P.
            For O.P. No.2               : Mr. Rahul Saboo, Advocate
                                               -----
06/14.09.2023        Heard Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner,

Mr. Rahul Saboo, learned counsel for the Jharkhand State Pollution Control

Board-opposite party no.2 and Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the

State.

2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal

proceeding arising out of the Complaint Case No.331/2013 including the

order taking cognizance dated 15.01.2014, pending in the court of the

learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh.

3. The complaint case was filed alleging therein that the petitioner is the

Director of the accused unit M/s Jharkhand Ispat Pvt. Ltd. located at

District- Ramgarh, Jharkhand. It was further alleged that the accused unit

has established 2 x 100 TPA DRI Kiln and 2 x 12 T induction furnace (Billet

Caster) in November, 2006 and put them in operation without obtaining

Environmental clearance from the Ministry of Environment and Forest,

Government of India, New Delhi in violation of the EIA Notification, 2006.

The Office Memorandum no. J-11013/41/2006-IA-II(I) dated 12.12.2012

and letter no. J-11011/41/2013-IA II (I) dated 12.06.2013 of MoEF,

Government of India, New Delhi direct to take creditable action against the

accused unit under Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

4. Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

petitioner had established Company in the name and style of M/s Jharkhand

Ispat Pvt. Ltd. in the year 2003 after taking no objection from the

Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board. Subsequently, no objection was

taken in the year 2005 when there was an expansion of the unit. Thereafter,

the petitioner went on having no objection from the Jharkhand State

Pollution Control Board every year. He further submits that when an

application was filed for having no objection in the year 2012-13, an

objection was raised to the effect that the petitioner since had expansion of

the unit, need to have environmental clearance in terms of the Notification

dated 14.09.2006 issued by the Central Government. Since it had not been

taken, an order was passed for closer of the expanded unit. That order was

challenged before this Court and this Court vide its order dated 24.03.2014

passed in W.P.(C) No.1125 of 2014 stayed that part of the order. He further

submits that in spite of that, a complaint was filed, wherein, allegation is

made against the company and the company is not made accused. He

submits that the cognizance has been taken under Section 15 of the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 against the petitioner, who is the

Director of the said Company. He refers to Section 16 of the said Act, 1986

and submits that the person can be prosecuted looking to his day-to-day

affairs of the company. He submits that vicarious liability in absence of any

averment cannot be made against the petitioner, who happens to be the

Director of the said company.

5. Mr. Rahul Saboo, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 justified the

order and submits that since the petitioner is the Director of the company,

he is vicariously liable.

6. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the

parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record. It appears that

the allegation in the complaint is made against the company and the

company is not made an accused. Section 16 of the Environment

(Protection) Act, 1986 speaks as under:

"16. Offences by companies.- (1) Where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-

(a) "company" means any body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and

(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."

7. Looking to the above section, it appears that the person who is

looking to the day-to-day affairs of the company, can only be liable to be

prosecuted under the said Act and this section is identical to the other

statute like Negotiable Instruments Act, Contract Labour Act and Minimum

Wages Act and this aspect of the matter has been settled by several

judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. A

reference may be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P)

Ltd., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661. Paragraph 59 of the said judgment is

quoted hereinbelow:

"59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove."

8. In view of the above and considering that there is no allegation

against the petitioner that he was looking to the day-to-day affairs of the

company and he is said to be the Director of the said company and the

company is not made an accused in the complaint petition and in view of

that, the submission of learned counsel for opposite party no.2 is not

accepted by this court.

9. In view of the above facts, the entire criminal proceeding arising out

of the Complaint Case No.331/2013 including the order taking cognizance

dated 15.01.2014, pending in the court of the learned Sub Divisional Judicial

Magistrate, Hazaribagh is quashed.

10. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and disposed of.

11. Pending I.A., if any, is disposed of.

12. Interim order, if any granted by this Court, stands vacated.

(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Ajay/

 
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