Jharkhand High Court
The State Project Director vs M/S National Printers on 11 September, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
(Letters Patent Appellate Jurisdiction)
LPA No. 505 of 2019
1. The State Project Director, through Umashankar Singh, aged about 40
years, son of Kailash Prasad Singh, Jharkhand Education Project
Council, having its Office at JSCA Stadium Road, Sector- III,
Dhurwa, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
2. Administrative officer- cum- Indenting Officer, through Jayant Kumar
Mishra, aged about 51 years, son of Sri R.C. Mishra; Jharkhand
Education Project Council, having its Office at JSCA Stadium Road,
Sector-III, Dhurwa, P.O. Jagannathpur, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
...... Respondent No. 2 & 3/ Appellants
Versus
1. M/s National Printers, proprietor Apex Products Private Limited
having its Office at 8H and 8I Industrial Area, Namkum, Ranchi
- 834 010 represented through its Director Sri Krishan Kant Kedia, son
of Sri Gopi Chand Kedia, resident of Lalpur, P.O. & P.S. Lalpur,
District Ranchi - 834 001 ... Writ Petitioner/Respondent
2. The State of Jharkhand through its Principal Secretary, HRD-cum-
State Project Director, Jharkhand Education Project Council, New
Cooperative Building, Shyamli Building, Doranda, P.O. Doranda, P.S.
Doranda, District Ranchi- 834 024.
Respondent no.1 /Respondent no.2
3. The Chairman, Jharkhand Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Facilitation Council, Directorate of Industries, 3rd Floor, Nepal House,
Doranda, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi- 834 002,
Jharkhand ... Respondent no.4 /Respondent no.3
---------------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
For the Appellants : Mr. Krishna Murari, Advocate
Mr. Raj Vardhan, Advocate
For the Resp. No. 1 : Mr. Rahul Lamba, Advocate
Mr. Aditya Mohan Khandelwal, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Amrit Raj Kisku, AC to GA-V
---------------
JUDGMENT
C.A.V. On 24th July 2023 Pronounced on 11th September 2023
Per, Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.
This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the judgment
dated 16th May 2019 passed by the learned writ Court whereby the writ
petition being W.P.(C) No. 3649 of 2016 has been disposed of and the
matter has been remanded to the Jharkhand Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Facilitation Council, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the
"Facilitation Council") for adjudication of the claim relating to interest
on delayed payment of bills raised by the writ petitioner.
2. In W.P.(C) No. 3649 of 2016, the following prayer had been made:
"I. For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of
certiorari for quashing the order dated 04.03.2016 (Annexure- 4) in Case
No. JHMSEFC 2/2016 passed by the learned Jharkhand Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council (JHMSEFC), Ranchi
wherein the learned Jharkhand Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Facilitation Council has dismissed the application made by the Petitioner
to the Council under section 18 of the Micro Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act (MSMED Act) 2006, holding it as non-
maintainable.
II. For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of
declaration that under Section 15 to 18 of the Micro Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act (MSMED Act) 2006, the petitioner is
entitled to make a reference to the Council, under Section 18(1) of the
MSMED Act, to claim interest alone.
III. For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of
mandamus to the respondents to make payment of interest amount to the
petitioner on the principal amount of Rs. 3,80,05,000/- in terms of section
16 of the MSMED Act 2006."
3. By an order dated 04th March 2016 which was impugned in the writ
petition the Facilitation Council dismissed the application made by the writ
petitioner under section 18 of the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as "MSMED Act, 2006"),
holding it as non-maintainable by observing that a claim only on account of
interest on delayed payment of bills is not maintainable.
4. Foundational facts.
I. On 07th August 2003, the writ petitioner was registered as a Small-
Scale Industrial unit (SSI Unit) for manufacture of printing of books,
magazines and stationeries. The writ petitioner participated in the
tender process pursuant to the notice inviting tender issued by the
appellants on 06th December 2012 for printing and supply of poster
and work order was issued to the writ petitioner on 08 th February
2013.
II. After completion of work, the bill was submitted by the writ
petitioner but an amount of Rs.3,80,05,000/- remained unpaid. The
writ petitioner made various representations to the appellants for
payment of outstanding amount of Rs.3,80,05,000/- towards supplies
made by the writ petitioner which was not paid and ultimately filed a
Writ Petition being W.P.(C) No. 1702 of 2014 seeking a direction
upon the appellants to make the payment of the outstanding dues.
III. On 13th January 2015 the principal amount of Rs. 3,80,05,000/- was
paid by the appellant no. 1 to the writ petitioner, but no payment was
made on account of interest on delayed payment.
IV. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the writ petitioner filed an
interlocutory application being I.A. No. 6515 of 2015 in W.P.(C)
No. 1702 of 2014 seeking withdrawal of the writ petition for
availing the alternate remedy for recovery of outstanding interest.
V. The order passed in W.P.(C) No. 1702 of 2014 is quoted as under:
"It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that
initially in this writ application, petitioner has prayed for payment of
principal as well as the interest amount relating to contractual dues.
It is submitted that during the pendency of this writ
application, principal amount has already been paid to the petitioner.
It is further submitted that so far the interest is concerned, petitioner
does not want to pursue this writ application because some alternative
remedy is available to him.
Therefore, by filing I.A. No. 6515 of 2015, petitioner seeks
permission to withdraw this writ application.
Accordingly, this writ application is permitted to be
withdrawn.
I.A. No.6515 of 2015 stands disposed of."
VI. Thus, the High Court vide its order dated 17th December 2015
passed in W.P.(C) No. 1702 of 2014 allowed the writ petitioner to
withdraw the writ petition so as to avail the alternative remedy.
VII. On 27th January 2016 the writ petitioner filed an application under
section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006, for recovery of the
outstanding interest amount of Rs. 2,78,33,503/- against the
appellants before the Facilitation Council. The said application was
registered as Case No. JHMSEFC 02/2016.
VIII. The proceedings before the Facilitation Council on various dates
may usefully be extracted hereinafter below:
"1. The applicant has filed reference to this council on 27.01.2016 for
realization of outstanding dues of Rs Zero plus interest of
Rs 2,78,33,503.00.
IFC Meeting date 1st party 2nd REMARKS
party
09.02.16 P A
04.03.16 P A
Decision on 09.02.2016. The first party was present and was heard. The
first party was informed that the case is not maintainable as principal
outstanding is Zero. The Advocate of the 1st party has pleaded that the
case is legally maintainable under section 15 of the MSMED Act 2006. In
support of the claim the Decision of the High Court of Madras dated
24.11.2015 was submitted. The first party was informed to submit a copy
of Agreement showing the liability of interest on delayed payment. The
case was deferred to next meeting scheduled to be held on 4th March
2016 on admission point.
Decision on 04.03.2016: The first party has appeared and was heard.
The first party has submitted supplementary Affidavit claiming therein
that the decision of Hon'ble Madras High Court will be binding over this
Council and the case is maintainable in this Facilitation Council. The
case was kept for order at admission point.
Decree/Award on 04.03.2016 under MSMED Act 2006
The question before the Council is whether the reference to Council for
realization of only interest, principal outstanding being Zero is allowable
u/s 17 of Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council Act 2006
which reads as under: -
"17. Recovery of amount due- For any goods supplied or services
rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with
interest thereon as provided u/s 16.
On perusal of the above provision the amount of interest is dependent
on the amount of principal. The emphasis on words is amount with
interest and not the amount or interest. So, the Council is of the
considered view that in the given case where outstanding principal is
Zero the claim only for interest is not maintainable and hence the case at
admission point is rejected."
IX. The writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3649 of 2016 was filed
challenging the said order dated 04th March 2016 passed by the
Facilitation Council in Case No. JHMSEFC 02/2016.
X. The learned writ Court vide its order dated 16th May 2019 passed in
W.P.(C) No. 3649 of 2016 quashed the order impugned
dated 04th March 2016 passed by the Facilitation Council and
remitted the matter to the Facilitation Council for adjudication of the
issue regarding the claim of the writ petitioner pertaining to interest.
The learned writ Court directed for adjudication of the issue at an
early date and preferably within a period of four months. Before the
learned writ Court the appellants had contested the case on the
maintainability of the writ petition.
Submissions of the appellants
5. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants
had raised three ground touching upon the maintainability of the writ
petition challenging the award passed by the Facilitation Council, but all the
three grounds have not been properly considered by the learned writ Court
and the award has been set aside and the matter has been remanded for fresh
consideration. The following points have been raised: -
a. Since there is statutory alternative remedy of appeal under section
19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 before the Commercial Court, the
writ petition was not maintainable.
b. The arbitral award impugned in the writ petition has been
misconstrued by the learned writ Court not to be an arbitral award
and otherwise also, such question of fact is to be examined by the
Commercial Court.
c. As per section 19 of MSMED Act, 2006, every order passed by
Facilitation Council is appealable and the dispute raised by writ
petitioner that since order impugned does not fall within the
definition of award and the writ petition is maintainable, is wholly
fallacious.
d. Section 19 of MSMED Act, 2006 comprehends not only decree
and award to be appealable but also "any order" passed by the
Council as being statutory/Institutional Arbitrator.
e. In arbitral jurisprudence, once the appeal is maintainable, the
remedy of writ petition is rendered otiose. On this proposition, the
learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "SBP & Co. Vs. Patel
Engineering Ltd. and another" reported in (2005) 8 SCC 618,
(paragraph 47) and "Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative
Limited Vs. Bhadra Products", reported in (2018) 2 SCC 534.
f. The judgement of "Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State
of Rajasthan and Others" reported in 2021 SCC online SC 1257,
relied upon by the respondent-writ petitioner was rendered in a
different fact situation, wherein the award for payment was passed
by the Facilitation Council without hearing the affected party,
which is not the case herein.
g. Even otherwise, the impugned judgment passed by the learned writ
Court is not sustainable as it has gone into merit of the case, while
remitting the matter to the Facilitation Council and nothing
remains to be adjudicated by the Facilitation Council. On this
point, reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Raj Kumar Shivhare Vs.
Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement", reported in
(2010) 4 SCC 772, to submit that when statutory forum is created
by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a
writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation.
h. In similar fact and circumstances, this Hon'ble Court vide judgment
dated 09th February 2023 passed in L.P.A No. 400 of 2022 (M/s
MECON Ltd. Vs. Jharkhand Micro and Small Scale Enterprises
Facilitation Council and another) (Paragraphs 25 & 29), has
held that writ petition shall normally be not entertained if the
aggrieved party has an alternative statutory remedy.
Submissions of the Respondent no.1-writ petitioner
6. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 - writ petitioner has
submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court is a
well-reasoned order dealing with all the points raised by the parties and the
same does not call for any interference by this Court. The following points
have been raised: -
i. The Facilitation Council dismissed the petition filed for recovery
of outstanding interest amount of Rs. 2,78,33,503/- at the
threshold as not maintainable solely on the ground that no
application under section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 is
maintainable where the claim is only for interest and not for the
principal amount. This was done without initiating conciliation
proceedings as required under section 18(2) of the MSMED Act,
2006.
ii. Since there were no conciliation proceedings, there could not
have been any failure of conciliation and, therefore, no arbitration
proceeding was started in terms of section 18(3) of the Jharkhand
MSMED Act, 2006 by the Facilitation Council. Therefore, the
order impugned in the writ petition was not an award. The learned
counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of "Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam
Limited v. State of Rajasthan and Others" reported in 2021 SCC
online SC 1257 to submit that when an order is passed without
recourse to arbitration and in utter disregard to the provision of
the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, section 34 of the said
Act will not apply.
iii. The petition for claim of interest alone was maintainable in view
of the judgment in the case of "Modern Industries v. Steel
Authority of India Limited" reported in (2010) 5 SCC 44. In the
said judgement, it has been held that an application/ reference to
Industry Facilitation Council under section 6 of the Interest on
Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial
Undertakings Act, 1993 (repealed/superseded by the MSMED
Act, 2006) for recovery of interest alone is maintainable. A
similar view has been taken in the case of "Shanti Conductors
Private Limited Vs Assam State Electricity Board & Others"
reported in (2019) 19 SCC 529.
Therefore, it is submitted that the order dated 04th March 2016
passed by the Facilitation Council and impugned in the writ
petition refusing to entertain the claim only on account of interest
on delayed payment of bills has been rightly set-aside by the
learned writ Court.
Issues before this Court.
7. Following issues arise for consideration by this Court: -
A. Whether the learned writ Court was justified in entertaining the writ
petition?
The answer to this issue will essentially depend upon the answer to
the following point-
Whether the impugned order in the writ petition was an
award so as to be amenable to challenge under section 34 of
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996?
B. Whether the petition claiming interest was maintainable before the
Facilitation Council after withdrawal of the earlier writ petition
filed by the writ petitioner being W.P.(C) No. 1702 of 2014, during
the pendency of which only the principal amount was paid?
C. Whether a petition claiming only interest on delayed payment of
bills was maintainable before the Facilitation Council constituted
under MSMED Act, 2006?
Findings of this Court.
8. The foundational facts have been recorded in paragraph 4 above.
9. The appellants issued work order to the writ petitioner vide letter
dated 08th February 2013 for printing and supplying of posters, children's
magazines and CCE report cards for children in elementary school from
Class-I to Class-VIII in academic session 2012-13. On account of non-
payment of bills, the writ petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P.(C)
No. 1702 of 2014 and during its pendency received payment of only the
principal amount of Rs. 3,80,05,000/- on 13th January 2015. The writ
petitioner filed I.A. No. 6515 of 2015 in the pending writ petition seeking
withdrawal of the case by making a submission that so far as the interest is
concerned, the writ petitioner did not want to pursue the writ petition
because some alternative remedy was available to the writ petitioner. The
writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn vide order dated 17th December
2015.
10. Thereafter, the writ petitioner preferred an application before the
Facilitation Council under section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 on 27th January
2016 only for payment of outstanding amount on account of interest. On
04th March 2016 the Facilitation Council posted the matter for hearing on
the point of admission after framing a question i.e. whether the reference to
Council for realization of only interest, principal outstanding being Zero, is
allowable u/s 17 of Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council Act,
2006. The Facilitation Council held that the amount of interest is dependent
on the amount of principal and when the outstanding principal amount was
"Zero", claim for only interest was not maintainable and the case was
rejected at the stage of admission.
11. The writ petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the order of the
Facilitation Council refusing to entertain and admit the petition seeking
relief only on interest component and the learned writ Court remitted the
matter to the Facilitation Council for adjudication on the issue regarding
claim of the writ petitioner pertaining to interest.
Issue no. A
12. The learned counsel for the appellants raised serious objections
regarding maintainability of the writ petition in this Appeal also primarily on
the ground that the order impugned in the writ petition passed by the
Facilitation Council was amenable to challenge in terms of section 34 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and writ remedy was not available to
the writ petitioner.
13. This Court has also gone through the entire proceeding of the
Facilitation Council and apparently the Facilitation Council was not satisfied
with the maintainability of the application itself and the matter was posted
on the point of admission. However, the petition was not admitted by
holding that no claim can be filed only for interest when the principal
amount was already paid. Admittedly, even notice was not issued by the
Facilitation Council and the petition was dismissed at the threshold as not
maintainable. Thus, the occasion for entering into conciliation process also
did not arise. Once there was no conciliation, there was no occasion for the
Facilitation Council to enter into arbitral proceedings and consequently, the
order impugned in the writ petition refusing to admit the petition filed
before the Facilitation Council cannot be said to be an award in the eyes of
law.
14. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
"Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan and Others"
reported in 2021 SCC online SC 1257, order/award was passed by the
Facilitation Council of the State of Rajasthan under MSMED Act, 2006
without resorting to arbitral proceedings and such order/award was declared
to be a nullity and not an award. It has been categorically held that when an
order/award is passed by Facilitation Council without recourse to arbitration
such an order having been passed in utter disregard to the provision of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and also MSMED Act, 2006 cannot
be said to be an award in the eyes of law so as to attract applicability of
section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside the
order/award. A part of the said judgment relevant for the purposes of the
present case is quoted as under:
"9. Only on the ground that even after receipt of summons the appellant
has not appeared the Council has passed order/award on 06.08.2012. As
per Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, if conciliations is not successful, the
said proceedings stand terminated and thereafter Council is empowered to
take up the dispute for arbitration on its own or refer to any other
institution. The said Section itself makes it clear that when the arbitration
is initiated all the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
will apply, as if arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement
referred under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the said Act."
"11. From a reading of Section 18 (2) and 18 (3) of the MSMED act it is
clear that the Council is obliged to conduct conciliation for which the
provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 would apply, as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of the
said Act. Under Section 18(3), when conciliations fails and stands
terminated, the dispute between the parties can be resolved by arbitration.
The Council is empowered either to take up arbitration on its own or to
refer the arbitration proceedings to any institution as specified in the said
Section. It is open to the Council to arbitrate and pass an award, after
following the procedure under the relevant provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Sections 20, 23, 24, 25.
15. The order dated 06.08.2012 is a nullity and runs contrary not only
to the provisions of MSMED Act but contrary to various mandatory
provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The order dated
06.08.2012 is patently illegal. There is no arbitral award in the eye of
law. It is true that under the scheme of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 an arbitral award can only be questioned by
way of application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. At the same time when an order is passed
without recourse to arbitration and is utter disregard to the provisions
of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34 of the said Act
will not apply. We cannot reject this appeal only on the ground that
appellant has not availed the remedy under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996..."
(emphasis supplied)
15. In the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
summons were issued by the Facilitation Council and the order/award was
passed on the ground that even after receipt of summons the appellant did
not appear. In the present case, even notices /summons were not issued to
the appellants by the Facilitation Council and the order impugned in the writ
petition was passed holding that application for only interest was not
maintainable. While applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the order impugned before the learned writ Court
cannot be said to be an award in the eyes of law so as to hold that the order
could have been challenged under section 34 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
16. The learned writ Court has also rejected the plea of applicability of
section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by holding that
jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is to be invoked in case of non-applicability of any
alternative remedy. It has been observed that although the restriction is not
absolute, but there are self-imposed restrictions upon the High Court not to
entertain the writ petition, if alternative remedy is available. The learned
writ Court, while rejecting the plea of alternative remedy, held as under:
"18. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that before resorting to
the arbitration part, there would be a conciliation to be made under the
provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and in case of
failure in conciliation, the question of adjudication will come.
Admittedly, herein there is no conciliation proceeding as warranted
under the provision of Section 18(3) of the Act, 2006 rather the
undisputed fact is that the respondent nos.2 and 3 in course of
pendency of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1702 of 2014 has
released the admitted principal amount denying the claim of the
interest, therefore, there is no conciliation as provided under the
provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in terms of the
provision of Section 18(3) of the Act, 2006.
19. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stipulates
that in case of any conciliation and if it fails, the matter would be
referred before the Arbitrator by following the procedure under the
provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and in case of any
award, if the parties are aggrieved with the arbitral award which
would be assailed before the appellate Forum by invoking the
jurisdiction under the provision of Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 but since there is no arbitral award under the
provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, therefore, there is
no question of preferring of an appeal under Section 34 of Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996."
17. So far as the judgment relied upon by the appellants passed in the case
of "Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited Vs. Bhadra Products"
reported in (2018) 2 SCC 534 is concerned, the learned writ Court has
distinguished the same by observing that in the present case, since there was
no conciliation proceedings as warranted under the provisions of section
18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 and, therefore, the judgment passed in the
case of Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited (Supra) was not
applicable as the same was dealing with the applicability of section 34 read
with section 16 and 31(6) of the Arbitration Act of 1996.
18. In view of the aforesaid findings by this Court and also the reasons
recorded by the learned writ Court regarding non applicability of section 34
of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the order impugned in the writ
petition, the plea of availability of alternative remedy in terms of section 34
of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is rejected. Thus, the argument of
the learned counsel for the appellants that the order impugned in the writ
petition ought to have been challenged in a petition under section 34 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and, therefore, the writ petition was
not maintainable is devoid of any merit and, hence rejected. Consequently,
the writ petition challenging the order of the Facilitation Council is held
maintainable and the writ petition was rightly entertained by the learned writ
Court.
19. The issue no. A is accordingly decided against the appellants and in
favour of the respondent-writ petitioner.
Issue no. B
20. Before the learned writ Court, the appellants had, interalia, raised a
point in connection with this issue by submitting that this Court had allowed
the writ petitioner to withdraw the earlier writ petition being W.P.(C) No.
1702 of 2014 by disposing off the interlocutory application being I.A. No.
6515 of 2015 seeking withdrawal of the writ petition. The claim before the
Facilitation Council was not maintainable as no liberty was granted by this
Court while disposing off the earlier writ petition to move the Facilitation
Council for remaining claim, if any, and consequently, the contention of the
writ petitioner that they had approached the Facilitation Council in
pursuance to the liberty granted by this Court in the earlier writ petition was
factually not correct.
21. On the other hand, the specific case of the writ petitioner was that so
far as the question of liberty granted or not by this Court in the earlier writ
petition being W.P.(C) No. 1702 of 2014 was concerned, the same could be
gathered from the averments made in the interlocutory application being
I.A. No. 6505 of 2015 pursuant to which the writ petition was allowed to be
withdrawn. It suggests that liberty was granted to agitate the claim before
the alternative forum for adjudication of the remaining claim.
22. The learned writ Court considered the aforesaid point vide paragraph
nos. 11 to 15 of the impugned order and the point raised by the appellants
regarding no liberty at the time of withdrawal of the earlier writ petition to
move the Facilitation Council has been rejected as under:
"14. It is evident from the aforesaid order that this Court has
considered the averments made in the interlocutory application
wherein, specific prayer has been made with the pleading that since
the principal amount has already been paid by denying the claim of
interest, therefore, he wants to withdraw the writ petition with a
liberty to file application before the Council, alternative Forum and
keeping the fact into consideration, the writ petition has been
permitted to be withdrawn by disposing of the interlocutory
application being I.A.No.6515 of 2015.
15. It is not in dispute rather it is a settled position of law that if any
litigation has been filed by a party and if there is a simplicitor
withdrawal, the second litigation for the same issue is not permissible
unless the leave could be granted in the earlier litigation and keeping
that legal position into consideration, this Court is examining the issue
as has been raised by the learned counsel for the parties.
The question of liberty is to be seen from the pleading and
pleading here is a averment made in the interlocutory application
being I.A. No. 6515 of 2015 and therefrom it is evident that since the
admitted amount has been paid in favour of the petitioner but the
interest amount has been denied so the liberty to withdraw the writ
petition with a liberty to approach before the alternative Forum has
been made and this Court since has disposed of the interlocutory
application being I.A. No. 6515 of 2015 by allowing the petitioner to
withdraw the writ petition it will be said to be a liberty at the time of
withdrawal of the writ petition.
The matter would have been different if there could have been
any interlocutory application and the writ petition would not have
been withdrawn on the oral submission but the fact herein as would be
evident from the material available on record of W.P.(C) No. 1702 of
2014, wherein the record of the interlocutory application being I.A.
No. 6515 of 2015, is available."
23. This Court is of the considered view that the learned writ Court has
rightly rejected the aforesaid objection raised by the appellants on the point
of maintainability of the petition filed by the writ petition before the
Facilitation Council in view of the fact that the earlier writ petition was
withdrawn by filing interlocutory application giving reasons for withdrawal
i.e to avail the remedy before the alternative Forum. Admittedly neither any
payment was made by the appellants on account of interest on delayed
payment nor any adjudication was made by the writ Court on the point of
entitle of interest on delayed payment.
24. Thus, the argument of the appellants that the claim for payment of
interest was not maintainable before the Facilitation Council after
withdrawal of the earlier writ petition is devoid of any merits, hence
rejected.
25. The issue no.B is accordingly decided against the appellants and in
favour of the respondent-writ petitioner.
26. On the point of maintainability of the petition before the Facilitation
Council, it was also argued before the learned writ Court that section 16 of
the MSMED Act, 2006 will not be applicable as there was no condition
stipulated in the agreement with respect to the claim of interest and once the
parties had agreed and entered into a contract, the terms of the contract
would be binding upon them and they cannot deviate therefrom. This
principle would apply on the rate of interest also.
27. The point raised by the appellants regarding non-applicability of
section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006 was also rejected by the learned writ
Court. The learned writ Court, after going through the provisions of section
16 of MSMED Act 2006, found that the said provision stipulates regarding
question of determination of interest and the said provision was having non-
obstante clause and therefore, even if there is no condition stipulated in the
agreement, the claim for interest would be there. Thereafter, the learned writ
Court observed that the issue was not being decided by this Court leaving it
open to be decided by the Facilitation Council. The aforesaid observation of
the learned writ Court with regards to applicability of the rate of interest as
per section 16 of MSMED Act, 2006 even if there is no condition stipulated
in the inter-se agreement between the parties does not call for any
interference by this Court. However, it is relevant to refer to a recent
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Gujarat
State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited Vs. Mahakali Foods Private
Limited and another" reported in (2023) 6 SCC 401 where the Hon'ble
Supreme Court examined the scheme of the MSMED Act, 2006 and
recorded the salient features in paragraph no. 40 as under: -
"40. Having regard to the purpose, intention and objects as also the scheme
of the MSMED Act, 2006 and having regard to the unambiguous
expressions used in Chapter V thereof, following salient features emerge:
40.1. Chapter V is "party-specific", inasmuch as the party i.e. the "buyer"
and the "supplier" as defined in Sections 2(d) and 2(n), respectively are
covered under the said Chapter.
40.2. A specific provision is made fastening a liability on the buyer to
make payment of the dues to the supplier in respect of the goods supplied
or services rendered to the buyer, as also a liability to pay compound
interest at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank, if the
buyer fails to make payment within the prescribed time-limit. The said
liability to pay compound interest is irrespective of any agreement between
the parties or of any law for the time being in force.
40.3. A dedicated statutory forum i.e. Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council is provided to enable any party to a dispute with
regard to any amount due under Section 17, to make reference to such
Council.
40.4. A specific procedure has been prescribed to be followed by the
Facilitation Council after the reference is made to it by any party to the
dispute.
40.5. The Facilitation Council or the centres providing alternative dispute
resolution services have been conferred with the jurisdiction to act as an
arbitrator or conciliator under Section 18(4), notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force, in a dispute between the
suppliers located within its jurisdiction.
40.6. The provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 have been made
applicable to the dispute only after the conciliation initiated under sub-
section (2) does not succeed and stands terminated without any settlement
between the parties.
40.7. Sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of Section 18 starting with non
obstante clauses have an effect overriding the other laws for the time being
in force.
40.8. As per Section 24, the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 have an effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law
for the time being in force."
Issue no. C
28. It is the case of the appellants that an application under section 18 (1)
of the MSMED Act, 2006, for recovery of only interest amount and not the
principal amount, is not maintainable. This submission is being disputed by
the respondent-writ petitioner by submitting that the provisions of the
MSMED Act, 2006, specifically section 15 to section 18, categorically
provide that an application for recovery of only the interest amount is also
very much maintainable in law. For this, the respondent-writ petitioner has
relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of "Modern Industries v. Steel Authority of India Limited" reported in (2010)
5 SCC 44 and also "Shanti Conductors Private Limited Vs Assam State
Electricity Board & Others" reported in (2019) 19 SCC 529 which were
decided in the context of the earlier Act namely, Interest on Delayed
Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993
(repealed/superseded by the MSMED Act, 2006) .
29. Section 18 (1) of MSMED Act, 2006 provides that notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to
a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a
reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.
Section 17 provides that the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with
interest thereon as provided under Section 16.
Section 16 provides that where any buyer fails to make payment of the
amount as required under section 15 to the supplier, the buyer shall be liable
to pay compound interest with monthly rests on that amount from the
appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following
the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve
Bank.
Section 15 provides that where any supplier supplies any goods or renders
any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or
before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or,
where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day and in
no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in
writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of
deemed acceptance.
The term 'appointed day' has been defined as the day following
immediately after the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the day of
acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by
a buyer from a supplier. The term 'acceptance' and 'deemed acceptance'
have also been defined.
30. Therefore, the buyer has a liability to pay the principal amount and the
interest amount as well in terms of the MSMED Act, 2006 and liability to
pay crystalizes in terms of the timelines provided in the Act itself and both
principal and interest are recoverable by filing a petition under section 18 of
the MSMED Act, 2006.
31. Thus, section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 provides that the buyer
shall be liable to pay the amount with interest, as provided in section 16, to
the supplier for the goods supplied. Accordingly, as per section 17, the buyer
is under the statutory duty to pay the principal amount as well as the interest
amount to the supplier. Further, section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006
provides that any party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under
section 17, which would include interest, may make an application/reference
to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.
32. This Court is of the considered view that a supplier can maintain an
application, under section 18 (1), before the Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council for recovery of only interest amount, which is an
amount due under section 17 even if the principal amount has been paid,
though belatedly. The liability to pay crystallizes on default in timely
payment of principal amount followed by consequence of payment of
interest. The liability of payment of interest under the MSMED Act, 2006 is
not erased merely by payment of principal amount on a date beyond the
stipulated time frame to pay under the MSMED Act, 2006. The words or
expression "with regard to any amount due under section 17" used in
section 18 (1) enable a supplier to recover only interest also from the buyer
when principal amount is paid belatedly.
33. Upon a plain reading of the provisions of MSMED Act, 2006 even
where the principal amount has already been paid, the claimant party can
make a reference under section 18 (1) of the Act to claim interest alone, as
section 18 (1) clearly provides that any party to a dispute may, with regard
to "any amount due under section 17", make a reference to the Facilitation
Council. The MSMED Act, 2006 is a beneficial legislation with an object to
promote and develop micro, small and/or medium enterprises and the
aforesaid interpretation regarding a reference for the interest component
alone would be in consonance with the object of the Act.
34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Modern Industries v. Steel
Authority of India Limited" reported in (2010) 5 SCC 44, while deciding the
issue whether an application/ reference to Industry Facilitation Council
under section 6 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and
Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 for recovery of interest alone
was maintainable or not, held that an application for recovery of only
interest was also maintainable. The relevant part of the said judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court is reproduced herein below for ready reference:
"45. It is true that word "together" ordinarily means conjointly or
simultaneously but this ordinary meaning put upon the said word may not
be apt in the context of Section 6. Can it be said that the action
contemplated in Section 6 by way of suit or other legal proceeding under
sub-section (1) or by making reference to IFC under sub-section (2) is
maintainable only if it is for recovery of principal sum along with interest
as per Sections 4 and 5 and not for interest alone? The answer has to be
in negative.
46. We approve the view of the Gauhati High Court in Assam SEB that
word "together" in Section 6(1) would mean "along with" or "as well as".
Seen thus, the action under Section 6(2) could be maintained for recovery
of principal amount and interest or only for interest where liability is
admitted or has been disputed in respect of goods supplied or services
rendered."
35. In a three Judge Bench judgment passed in the case of "Shanti
Conductors Private Limited Vs Assam State Electricity Board & Others"
reported in (2019) 19 SCC 529, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has confirmed
the ratio laid down in the case of Modern Industries (Supra) that an
application for recovery of mere interest is also maintainable. The relevant
part of the said judgment is quoted as under:
"89. The question as to whether the suit filed only for interest is maintainable
has been considered in detail by this Court. In para 17, the following has been
laid down in Purbanchal Cables (SCCp.474)
"17. The decision of the Full Bench of the Gahuhati High Court which has
been approved by this Court in Modern Industries is impugned before us in
one of the appeals. Since a Division Bench of this Court has already
approved the dictum of the Full Bench of the High Court with regard to the
maintainability of a suit only for interest, that question is no longer res
integra. Therefore, the suppliers may file a suit only for a higher rate of
interest on delayed payments made by the buyer from the commencement
of the Act."
90. Section 6 of the 1993 Act provides that-
"the amount due from the buyer, together with amount of interest
calculated in accordance with provisions of Sections 4 and 5, shall be
recoverable."
Section 6 uses the expression-
"together with the amount of interest with the amount due from the buyer".
The interpretation put by the learned counsel for the Board is that proceeding
for recovery of interest can be undertaken only when any amount is due. He
submits that amount due used in Section 6 is principal amount. In the event we
accept the interpretation put by the counsel for the Board, then buyer will very
easily get away from payment of interest only after making payment of
principal amount. This interpretation shall defeat the very purposes of the 1993
Act. It is well settled that the provisions of the Act have to be interpreted in the
manner so as to advance the object of the act. We thus fully approve the view
taken by this Court in Purbanchal Cables that the suit by the supplier for
recovery of only interest is maintainable......"
36. The Interest on Delayed Payments in Small Scale and Ancillary
Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 has been repealed vide the MSMED Act,
2006 but most of the provisions of the said 1993 Act have been suitability
incorporated in the MSMED Act, 2006. This would be apparent from the
following comparative chart of the two enactments: -
The Interest on Delayed Payments to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Development Act, 2006 (ACT NO. 27 OF
Undertakings Act, 1993 2006)
(32 of 1993) [2nd April, 1993] [16th June, 2006]
Section 2(b). "Appointed day" means the Section 2(b). "Appointed day" means the
day following immediately after the expiry day following immediately after the expiry
of the period of thirty days from the day of of the period of fifteen days from the day
acceptance or the day of deemed of acceptance or the day of deemed
acceptance of any goods or any services by acceptance of any goods or any services by
a buyer from a supplier; a buyer from a supplier.
Explanation- For the purposes of this Explanation. --For the purposes of this
clause- clause, --
(i) "the day of acceptance" means, - (i) "the day of acceptance" means, --
(a) the day of the actual delivery of goods (a) the day of the actual delivery of goods
or the rendering of services; or or the rendering of services; or
(b) where any objection is made in writing
(b) where any objection is made in writing
by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods
by the buyer regarding, acceptance of
or services within fifteen days from the day
goods or services within thirty days from
of the delivery of goods or the rendering of
the day of the delivery, of goods or the
services, the day on which such objection
rendering of services, the day on which
such objection is removed by the supplier; is removed by the supplier;
(ii) "the day of deemed acceptance"
means, where no objection is made in (ii) "the day of deemed acceptance"
writing by the buyer regarding acceptance means, where no objection is made in
of goods or services within thirty days writing by the buyer regarding acceptance
from the day of the delivery of goods or the of goods or services within fifteen days
rendering of services, the day of the actual from the day of the delivery of goods or the
delivery of goods or the rendering of rendering of services, the day of the actual
services; delivery of goods or the rendering of
services;
Section 2(c) "buyer" means whoever buys Section 2(d). "buyer" means whoever
any goods or receives any services from a buys any goods or receives any services
supplier for consideration; from a supplier for consideration;
Section 2 (f) "supplier" means an Section 2(n). "supplier" means a micro or
ancillary industrial undertaking or a small small enterprise, which has filed a
scale industrial undertaking holding a memorandum with the authority referred to
permanent registration certificate issued by in sub-section (1) of section 8, and includes
the Directorate of Industries of a State or --
[Union territory and includes,-
(i) the National Small Industries (i) the National Small Industries
Corporation, being a company, registered Corporation, being a company, registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
1956)]; 1956);
(ii) the Small Industries Development (ii) the Small Industries Development
Corporation of a State or a Union territory, Corporation of a State or a Union territory,
by whatever name called, being a company by whatever name called, being a company
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 registered under the Companies Act, 1956
(1 of 1956). (1 of 1956);
(iii) any company, co-operative society,
trust or a body, by whatever name called,
registered or constituted under any law for
the time being in force and engaged in
selling goods produced by micro or small
enterprises and rendering services which
are provided by such enterprises;
Section 3. Liability of buyer to make Section 15. Liability of buyer to make
payment- payment-
Where any supplier supplies any goods or Where any supplier supplies any goods or
renders any services to any buyer, the renders any services to any buyer, the
buyer shall make payment therefor on or buyer shall make payment therefor on or
before the date agreed upon between him before the date agreed upon between him
and the supplier in writing or, where there and the supplier in writing or, where there
is no agreement in this behalf, before the is no agreement in this behalf, before the
appointed day: appointed day:
Provided that in no case the period agreed Provided that in no case the period agreed
upon between the supplier and the buyer in upon between the supplier and the buyer in
writing shall exceed one hundred and writing shall exceed forty-five days from
the day of acceptance or the day of deemed
twenty days from the day of acceptance or acceptance.
the day of deemed acceptance.
Section 4. Date from which and rate at Section 16. Date from which and rate
which interest is payable- at which interest is payable-
Where any buyer fails to make payment of Where any buyer fails to make payment of
the amount to the supplier, as required the amount to the supplier, as required
under section 3, the buyer shall, under section 15, the buyer shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any notwithstanding anything contained in any
agreement between the buyer and the agreement between the buyer and the
supplier or in any law for the time being in supplier or in any law for the time being in
force, be liable to pay interest to the force, be liable to pay compound interest
supplier on that amount from the appointed with monthly rests to the supplier on that
day or, as the case may be, from the date amount from the appointed day or, as the
immediately following the date agreed case may be, from the date immediately
upon, at one and a half time of Prime following the date agreed upon, at three
Lending Rate charged by the State Bank of times of the bank rate notified by the
India. Reserve Bank.
Explanation .-For the purposes of this
section, "Prime Lending Rate" means the
Prime Lending Rate of the State Bank of
India which is available to the best
borrowers of the bank.
Section 5. Liability of buyer to pay
compound interest--
Notwithstanding anything contained in any
agreement between a supplier and a buyer
or in any law for the time being in force,
the buyer shall be liable to pay compound
interest (with monthly rests) at the rate
mentioned in Section 4 on the amount due
to the supplier.
Section 6. Recovery of amount due- Section 17. Recovery of amount due-
(1) The amount due from a buyer, together For any goods supplied or services
with the amount of interest calculated in rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be
accordance with the provisions of Sections liable to pay the amount with interest
4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the thereon as provided under Section 16.
supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or
other proceeding under any law for the
time being in force.
Section 6(2). Notwithstanding anything Section 18. Reference to Micro and small
contained in sub-section (1), any party to a Enterprises Facilitation Council-
dispute may make a reference to the
Industry Facilitation Council for acting as (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force,
an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the
any party to a dispute may, with regard to
matters referred to in that sub-section and any amount due under section 17, make a
the provisions of the Arbitration and reference to the Micro and Small
Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall Enterprises Facilitation Council.
apply to such dispute as if the arbitration or (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-
conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration section (1), the Council shall either itself
agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of conduct conciliation in the matter or seek
Section 7 of that Act. the assistance of any institution or centre
providing alternate dispute resolution
services by making a reference to such an
institution or centre, for conducting
conciliation and the provisions of sections
65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such
a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated
under Part III of that Act.
(3) Where the conciliation initiated under
sub-section (2) is not successful and stands
terminated without any settlement between
the parties, the Council shall either itself
take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it
to any institution or centre providing
alternate dispute resolution services for
such arbitration and the provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26
of 1996) shall then apply to the dispute as
if the arbitration was in pursuance of an
arbitration agreement referred to in sub-
section(1) of section 7 of that Act.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force,
the Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council or the centre providing
alternate dispute resolution services shall
have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or
Conciliator under this section in a dispute
between the supplier located within its
jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere
in India.
(5) Every reference made under this
section shall be decided within a period of
ninety days from the date of making such a
reference.
Section 8. Requirement to specify unpaid Section 22. Requirement to specify
amount with interest in the annual unpaid amount with interest in the
statement of accounts- annual statement of accounts-
Where any buyer is required to get his Where any buyer is required to get his
annual accounts audited under any law for annual accounts audited under any law for
the time being in force, such buyer shall the time being in force, such buyer shall
specify the amount together with the furnish the following additional
interest in his annual statement of accounts information in his annual statement of
as remains unpaid to any supplier at the accounts, namely:-
end of each accounting year.
(i)the principal amount and the interest due
thereon (to be shown separately) remaining
unpaid to any supplier as at the end of each
accounting year;
(ii) the amount of interest paid by the buyer
in terms of section 16, along with the
amount of the payment made to the
supplier beyond the appointed day during
each accounting year;
(iii) the amount of interest due and payable
for the period of delay in making payment
(which have been paid but beyond the
appointed day during the year) but without
adding the interest specified under this Act;
(iv) the amount of interest accrued and
remaining unpaid at the end of each
accounting year; and
(v) the amount of further interest remaining
due and payable even in the succeeding
years, until such date when the interest
dues as above are actually paid to the small
enterprise, for the purpose of disallowance
as a deductible expenditure under section
Section 10. Overriding effect- Section 24. Overriding effect--
The provisions of this Act shall have effect The provisions of Sections 15 to 23 shall
notwithstanding anything inconsistent have effect notwithstanding anything
therewith contained in any other law for inconsistent therewith contained in any
the time being in force. other law for the time being in force.
37. Upon a comparison of section 6 of the 1993 Act with section 18(1) of
the MSMED Act, 2006, it is apparent that they are pari materia.
38. Thus, not only upon interpretation of the provisions of MSMED Act,
2006 but also on the basis of the judgements in "Modern Industries v. Steel
Authority of India Limited" reported in (2010) 5 SCC 44 and "Shanti
Conductors Private Limited Vs Assam State Electricity Board & Others"
reported in (2019) 19 SCC 529 which deal with a pari materia provision
under the Act of 1993 , this Court is of the considered view that a petition
for claim of only interest, principal amount having been paid, would be
maintainable before the Facilitation Council and upon filing of such an
application the Facilitation Council is under a duty to deal with the same
step by step as per the mandate of section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 as
explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam
Limited v. State of Rajasthan and Others" reported in 2021 SCC online SC
1257 and the scheme of the Act as explained in "Gujarat State Civil
Supplies Corporation Limited Vs. Mahakali Foods Private Limited and
another" reported in (2023) 6 SCC 401.
39. The learned writ Court has held that the question was that the amount
with interest or the amount or interest needs an adjudication and therefore,
the Facilitation Council, in not adjudicating and rejecting the claim at
admission stage failed in discharging the statutory duty and committed
jurisdictional error. The learned writ Court held that the order impugned
required interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Consequently, the impugned order in the writ petition dated 04th March 2016
passed by the Facilitation Council was quashed and the matter was remitted
to the Facilitation Council for adjudication on the issue regarding the claim
of the writ petitioner pertaining to interest.
40. This Court finds no illegality with the aforesaid findings and reasons
assigned by the learned writ Court holding that the Facilitation Council has
failed in discharging the statutory duty and committed jurisdictional error in
not entertaining the petition filed by the writ petitioner claiming only
interest on delayed payment.
41. Issue no. C is accordingly decided against the appellants and in
favour of the respondent- writ petitioner.
42. However, this Court finds that the learned writ Court, while remitting
the matter to the Facilitation Council, has directed the Facilitation Council
to adjudicate on the issue regarding claim of the writ petitioner pertaining to
interest. The said direction of the learned writ Court calls for modification in
view of the fact that the stage of adjudication would come only after the
conciliation fails. Accordingly, the case before the Facilitation Council is
required to be restored so that the Facilitation Council shall proceed in
accordance with law.
43. Consequently, Case No. JHMSEFC 02/2016 is restored to the original
file of the Facilitation Council which shall proceed with the matter step by step
in terms of section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 as indicated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (Supra).
44. This Letters Patent Appeal is accordingly disposed of, in the aforesaid
terms.
(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)
I Agree.
(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Pankaj/-
