Jharkhand High Court

Union Of India vs Arati Pattanaik on 2 August, 2023

                           1




   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
               L.P.A. No. 112 of 2022

1.Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India, P.O and P.S-North Block
Distt.-New Delhi.
2.Director General, Central Industrial Security Force, Lodhi
Road, New Delhi, C.G.O Complex, P.O & P.S.-Lodhi Road,
Dist-New Delhi.
3.Inspector General/ES, Central Industrial Security Force,
Eastern Area, Patna, now at Dhurwa, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. -
Dhurwa, Distt-Ranchi.
4.Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security
Force, Bokaro, P.O.& P.S.-Sector-IV, Bokaro Steel City,
Distt. -Bokaro.
                       ...       ...   Appellants/Respondents
                  Versus

1.Arati Pattanaik, wife of Late Sukanta Patnaik,
2.Shivani Pattanaik, D/o Late Sukanta Kumar Patnaik
Both resident of Sriramchandrapur, Baghra Road, Ward
No. 16, Baripada Town, Mayurbhanj, P.O. & P.S. & District-
Mayurbhanj (Odhisha).
3.Suvendu Pattanaik, S/o Late Sukanta Kumar Patnaik,
Resident of Qtr. No. 3080, Sector 11/C, Welfare Centre,
CISF, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. + P.S. + District Bokaro.
                        ...     Respondents/Petitioners
                            -------

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR

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For the Appellants-UOI :Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the Respondents :Mrs. Jaswindar Mazumdar, Adv

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nd Order No. 14/Dated 2 August, 2023 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J:

1. The instant intra-court appeal, under Clause 10 of the

Letters Patent, is directed against order dated 20.09.2021

passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 3277 of

2009, whereby and whereunder the writ petition was

allowed passing following directions:

"9.Be that as it may. Since similarly situated co employees, whose writ applications has already been allowed by this Court and further they have been reinstated in service and also received back wages pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench; as such, there is no reason that these petitioners who are the legal heirs will not be entitled for consequential monetary benefits when the case of the original- petitioner is identical.

10. Having regard to the facts of the case, the instant writ application, is, hereby allowed and the impugned order as contained in Office Order No. 1552 dated 07.12.2007 & all subsequent orders, are hereby, quashed and set aside.

Since the original petitioner has died, as such the present petitioners will approach the respondent No.4 along with copy of this order by filing a joint representation for payment of monetary benefits within a period of three months.

The moment such representation will be filed by the present petitioners before the respondent No.4; he shall pass an order with respect to all consequential monetary benefits which has been given to the other similarly situated persons since the original-petitioner has died. The respondent No.4 is further directed to pass an appropriate order for retiral benefits so that the widow of the originalpetitioner can get the retiral benefits in accordance with law."

2. Brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in writ

petition, reads as under:

3. The original writ petitioner, who was an employee of

Central Industrial Security Force (in short 'CISF'), was put

under suspension vide order dated 27.06.2007 and

subsequently vide letter dated 05.07.2007, charge-sheet

was served upon him alleging therein that he was found

involved in incident of facilitating theft of scrap material

and copper from Bokaro Steel Plant on 23.06.2007.

Further, he gave instruction to Constable Rajender Singh to

allow Truck No. WB39-9954 to enter the premise of Relling

Mill Area of Bokaro Steel Plant which was carrying the theft

material. On the charges aforesaid, the original writ

petitioner was proceeded departmentally in which he was

found guilty by the enquiry officer, basis upon which the

disciplinary authority awarded punishment of dismissal

from service vide order dated 07.12.2007, against which,

the original petitioner preferred appeal which was also

dismissed vide order dated 31.07.2008. Against the order

passed by appellate authority, the petitioner preferred

revision which was also dismissed vide order dated

19.05.2009.

4. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the disciplinary,

appellate and revisional authority the petitioner

approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S)

No. 3277 of 2009, which was allowed vide order dated

20.09.2021 by which the order passed by the disciplinary

authority as well as by the appellate and revisional

authority was quashed and set aside with direction upon

the respondents-authorities to disburse all the monetary

benefit to the dependants of the original writ petitioner,

who died during pendency of the writ petition, within

stipulated period of time, against which, the instant intra-

court appeal has been preferred.

5. It is evident from the facts, as referred hereinabove,

based upon the pleading made in the writ petition, that the

original writ petitioner who was employee of CISF while

posted at one gate of Bokaro Steel Plant, a unit of Steel

Authority of India Limited, as Inspector (Crime) was found

to be not performing his duty with utmost sincerity since

one truck bearing Registration No. WB39-9954 was found

loaded with scrap material and copper near Weight Bridge

No. 5 inside the factory premises. The vehicle was seized by

the CISF personnel. Consequent upon seizure of the truck

from factory premises, the original-petitioner was placed

under suspension in contemplation of a departmental

proceeding. Thereafter, charge-sheet was served upon the

original petitioner alleging inter-alia that while he was

deployed on duty on 23.06.2007 he failed to detect

unauthorized entry of truck bearing Registration No.WB-

39-9954 which entered the premises of the plant without

any valid document and was loaded Scrap/Copper material

parked near Weight Bridge No.5. The original petitioner

submitted his reply to the charges leveled against him

denying and disputing all the allegations but the enquiry

officer found the charge proved based upon which the

disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal

from services. The original-writ petitioner, namely, Sukanta

Kumar Patnaik had preferred writ petition being W.P. (S)

No. 3277 of 2009 challenging the order passed by the

disciplinary authority and its confirmation by the appellate

and revisional authority but during pendency of the writ

petition, the original writ petition died, therefore, vide order

dated 14.09.2021 the legal heirs i.e., wife, the daughter and

son were impleaded as party to contest the case being

petitioner no. 1, 2 and 3.

6. The matter was heard by learned Single Judge and the

writ petition was decided on the basis of concession made

by Mr. Laxman Kumar, learned Central Government

Counsel who has conceded that the case of the original

petitioner is same and similar with the case of Hira Lal

Dubey, Dhananjoy Hansda and Jay Ram Manjhi and

accordingly, the writ petition was allowed by quashing the

order of dismissal and all consequential orders with

directions to pay all consequential monetary benefits as

extended to similarly situated persons.

7. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, learned Central Government

Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that

although the writ petition has been disposed of on the basis

of concession of Mr. Laxman Kumar, learned CGC but the

said concession has been given contrary to the law since

the case of the writ petitioner is not identical to that of Hira

Lal Dubey, Dhananjoy Hansda and Jay Ram Manjhi. It has

been submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have

taken into consideration the fact that the case of the

original writ petitioner is not identical with Hira Lal Dubey,

Dhananjoy Hansda and Jay Ram Manjhi by making

comparison with the memorandum of charge but only on

the basis of submission the impugned order has been

passed.

8. It has been contended by referring to the charge leveled

against Jay Ram Manjhi that though the charge leveled

against Jay Ram Manjhi and the original writ petitioner is

of same occurrence but that does not mean that it is

identical in nature as charges leveled against both are

different and distinct. But the learned Single Judge without

taking into consideration these facts into consideration has

passed the impugned order, which requires interference by

this Court.

9. Mrs. Jaswindar Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing

for the respondents-writ petitioners has submitted by

defending the order passed by learned Single Judge by

taking the ground that the nature of charge as leveled

against the original writ petitioner is lesser in gravity with

respect to said Jay Ram Manjhi. It has been submitted that

the allegation against the Jay Ram Manjhi is that he was

deputed on Gate on the date of occurrence as shift In-

charge and at that time the vehicle in question has entered

into the premises. Contention therefore has been raised

that the member of the security force who is having duty at

the gate is having more accountability in comparison to

that of others, who are discharging their duty in the office.

However, the learned Single Judge has gone into the

question of parity with case of Jay Ram Manjhi, Hira Lal

Dubey and Dhananjoy Hansda.

10. It has further been submitted that though the case

of Hira Lal Dubey and Dhananjoy Hansda is on different

footing but the case of original writ petitioner and Jay Ram

Manjhi is based upon same occurrence.

11. Therefore, the learned Single Judge if after taking

into consideration the allegation levelled against Jay Ram

Manjhi as per charge and treating it to be identical with the

case of original writ petitioner has quashed the order of

dismissal it cannot be said to suffer from error.

12. It has further been submitted that the said Hira Lal

Dubey, Dhananjoy Hansda and Jay Ram Manjhi preferred

writ petitions being W.P. (S) No. 3597 of 2009, W.P. (S) No.

4558 of 2008 and W.P. (S) No. 4613 of 2008, which were

heard together and disposed of vide common order dated

22.09.2017, by which, the impugned order of dismissal was

quashed and set aside. Even said Jay Ram Majhi preferred

appeal being L.P.A. No. 787 of 2018 only to the extent of

back wages since the same was denied by the writ Court,

which was allowed vide order dated 14.08.2019 directing

the respondents-authorities to grant all back wages, hence,

there is no reason not to extend the same benefit to the

petitioners.

13. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners-respondents

on the aforesaid premises has submitted that since the

learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the

aforesaid fact has passed the impugned order which

requires no interference by this Court.

14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties,

perused the documents available on record as also the

finding recorded by learned Single Judge in the impugned

order.

15. The fact, which is not in dispute in this case is that

the original writ petitioner, now deceased, was proceeded

departmentally by issuance of memorandum of charge

dated 05.07.2007, which is quoted as under:

" 1

cy la[;k 873390019 fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d] dsvkSlqc bdkbZ ch,l,y cksdkjks] dks] fujh{kd ¼vijk/k½ ds dk;ZHkkj ds nkSjku] fnukad 23-05-2007 dks Vªd la0 WB-39-9954 ij 'ksM ua0&17 ls LØSi eSVsfj;y ,oa rkacs dh lkexzh] dks] la;a= ls ckgj vukf/kd`r :i ls ys tkus ds edln ls yksM djkus dh ?kVuk esa lafyIr ik;k x;k gS fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d dk mDr d`R;] ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] nqjkpkj] Hkz"Vkpkj ,oa ,d l'kL= cy ds lnL; dh e;kZnk ds izfrdwy gSA vr% vkjksi gSA

cy la[;k 873390019 fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d] dsvkSlqc bdkbZ ch,l,y cksdkjks] us] fujh{kd ¼vijk/k½ ds dk;ZHkkj ds nkSjku]

fnukad 23-05-2007 dks] jksfyax fey xsV ij rSukr vkj{kd jktsUnz flag dks] fujh{kd@vijk/k ds in dk gokyk nsrs gq,] cxSj mfpr nLrkost ds] Vªd la0% WB-39-9954 dks] "ksM ua0&17 esa vukf/kd`r izos'k o ogka ls vukf/kd`r :i ls] mDr okgu ij lkeku yksM gksus ds mijkar] mls ckgj tkus nsus dk funsZ'k fn;kA bl izdkj fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d us] fujh{kd@vijk/k in ds "kfDr dk nq:i;ksx fd;k] tksfd ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] nqjkpkj ,oa ,d l"kL= cy ds lnL; dh e;kZnk ds izfrdwy gSA vr% vkjksi gSA

cy la[;k 873390019 fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d] dsvkSlqc bdkbZ ch,l,y cksdkjks] us] fujh{kd ¼vijk/k½ ds dk;ZHkkj ds nkSjku] Vªd la0% WB-39-9954 dks la;a= ds vanj vukf/kd`r LØSi eSVsfj;y ,oa rkacs dh lkexzh ds lkFk idM+s tkus ds mijkar] fnukad 23-05-07 dks yxHkx 15%30 cts jkSfyax fey ,fj;k es]a vkj{kd jktsUnz flag dks mDr Vªd ds laca/k es]a fdlh dks dqN u crkus gsrq dgk rFkk ikVhZ ds vkneh dk lgkjk ysdj] mDr vkj{kd dks /kedk;kA bl izdkj fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d us] vius dfu"B cy lnL; dks] Mjk&/kedk dj] mlls xyr xfrfof/k;ksa esa lg;ksx izkIr fd;k] tksfd ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] nqjkpkj ,oa ,d l"kL= cy ds lnL; dh e;kZnk ds izfrdwy gSA vr% vkjksi gSA

cy la[;k 873390019 fujh{kd@dk;Z ,l ds iVuk;d] dsvkSlqc bdkbZ ch,l,y cksdkjks] us fnukad 28-05-2007 dks] vijk/k o vklwpuk vuqHkkx dsvkSlqc bdkbZ ch,l,y cksdkjks esa] izkFkfed tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk] vkj{kd jktsUnz flag ls djk;s x;s igpku ijsM ds mijkar] igpku ijsM dh izfØ;k izksflfMax ij] gLrk{kj fd;s tkus ls] badkj dj ljdkjh dk;Zokgh esa O;o/kku mRiUu djus dk iz;kl fd;kA bl izdkj fujh{kd@dk;Z ,-l ds iVuk;d us] ljdkjh dk;Z esa vlg;ksx fd;k] tksfd ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] nqjkpkj ,oa ,d l'kL= cy ds lnL; dh e;kZnk ds izfrdwy gSA vr% vkjksi gSA

16. It is evident from the aforesaid charge that while

the original writ petitioner was posted as Inspector in the

Bokaro Steel Plant he alleged to have instructed one CISF

Personnel Rajendra Singh to let the entry of the vehicle in

without any valid document and assisted in loading of the

scrap materials.

17. On the aforesaid charge, the enquiry officer

proceeded with the enquiry and submitted enquiry report.

It is evident from the enquiry report that the said Rajendra

Singh was examined as P.W. 5 wherein he has disclosed

that he was instructed by one crime inspector to allow the

said vehicle to enter into the premises and he has given the

physique of said crime inspector and claimed to have

identified the said crime inspector to be the original writ

petitioner, namely, Sukanta Kumar Patnaik. Likewise other

witnesses were examined and based upon their testimoies

charges have been found to be proved and accordingly, the

order of punishment of dismissal from service has been

passed.

18. From the pleading available on record, the moot

question that requires consideration by this Court is as to

whether the charge framed against the original writ

petitioner vis-à-vis said Jay Ram Manjhi was similar or not?

19. This Court, therefore, requires to refer herein the

charge leveled against the said Jay Ram Majhi, which reads

as under:

v/kksgLrk{kjh }kjk cy la[;k 741310194 in lgk;d mifujh{kd@dk;Z ts-vkj- ek¡>h] ds fo:) dsvkSlqc fu;ekoyh&2001 ¼la"kksf/kr fu;ekoyh&2003½ ds fu;e&35 ds rgr tk¡p djus dk izLrko gSA nqjkpkj ,oa nks'kkjksi.k ds vkjksi] ftlds ckjs esa tk¡p djus dk izLrko gS] dk lkj layXu vkjksi ds vuqPNsn fooj.k ifjf"k"V&I esa fn;k x;k gSA vkjksi ds izR;sd vuqPNsn dks iqf"V esa nqjkpkj ,oa nks'kkjksi.k ds vkjksiksa dk C;ksjk Hkh ¼ifjf"k'V&10½ layXu gSA nLrkosth ,oa xokgksa dh lwph Hkh ftlds }kjk vkjksiksa ds vuqPNsnksa dks izekf.kr djus dk izLrko gS ¼ifjf"k'V&III ,oa 4½ esa layXu gSA 02- cy la[;k 741310194 in lgk;d mifujh{kd@dk;Z] ts-vkj- ek¡>h] dks funsZ"k fn;k tkrk gS fd og vius cpko esa bl Kkiu ds izkfIr ds 10 fnuksa ds vUnj fyf[kr c;ku bl dk;kZy; dks izLrqr djsa vkSj ;g Hkh mYys[k djsa fd D;k og O;fDrxr :i ls mifLFkr gksdj vkjksi ls lacaf/kr lquokbZ djkus dh bPNqd gSaA 03- cy la[;k 741310194 in lgk;d mifujh{kd@dk;Z] ts-vkj- ek¡>h] dks ;g Hkh lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkjksi ds dsoy mUgha vuqPNsnksa ds ckjs esa tk¡p dh tk,xh] tks mUgsa ekU; ugha gksxa As vr% mUgsa vkjksi ds vuqPNsn dks Li"V :i ls Lohdkj ;k vLohdkj djuk pkfg,A 04- cy la[;k 741310194 in lgk;d mi fujh{kd@dk;Z] ts-vkj- ek¡>h] dks vkxs ;g Hkh lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn og iSjk&2 esa fn;s x;s le;kof/k ;k mlls igys vius cpko i{k esa fyf[kr fooj.k izLrqr ugha djrk gS ;k tk¡p izkf/kdkjh ds le{k O;fDrxr :i ls mifLFkr ugha gksrk gS ;k dsvkSlqc fu;ekoyh&2001 ¼la"kksf/kr fu;ekoyh&2003½ ds fu;e&35 mica/kksa ;k mDr fu;e ds vuqlj.k esa tkjh fd;s x;s vkns'kksa@vuqn's kksa ds vuqikyu esa vlQy jgrk gS rks tk¡p vf/kdkjh mlds fo:) ,d&i{kh; tk¡p dj ldrk gSA 05- ifjf"k'V&3 esa n'kkZ, x;s lHkh nLrkostksa dh izfr bl Kkiu ds lkFk layXu gSA 06- Kkiu dh ikorh Hksth tk,A

20. It is evident from the aforesaid imputation of charge

that said Jay Ram Manjhi was deputed at Mansa Singh

Gate as Shift In-charge and it is who against whom the

allegation is that he allowed the entry of the said vehicle

without any valid document. The said vehicle subsequently

has been found to be loaded with scrap material and

copper material and accordingly, the charge of gross

indiscipline, misconduct and dereliction from duty has

been framed.

21. Learned counsel for the appellants-authorities has

though tried to impress upon the Court that the nature of

allegation against the writ petitioner and the said Jay Ram

Manjhi is different but we are not in agreement with the

said submission for the reason that the charge against the

original writ petitioner is that while he was posted as

Inspector in the Unit of Bokaro Steel Plant he allowed the

entry of said vehicle which subsequently was found to be

loaded with scrap materials and copper scrap. Further he

instructed constable, Rajendra Singh to let the vehicle go

outside of the premises whereas said Jay Ram Majhi was

posted as Shift In-charge at Mansa Singh Gate, who

allowed the said truck to enter into the premises.

22. In our considered view the accountability upon the

personnel who is posted at entry gate, being shift In-charge

as the case herein, is more in quantum in comparison to

that of the personnel posted and was discharging his duty

inside the unit, it is for the reason that if the personnel

posted at Gate would have performed its duty with utmost

sincerity and restricted the said vehicle in entry into the

premises there would not have been any occurrence of

alleged theft, as alleged against the original writ petitioner.

Hence, the accountability upon the personnel posted at

entry level gate is having more.

23. Further the allegation against the writ petitioner is

that he has instructed constable Rajendra Singh not to

interrupt the loading of the scrap into the said vehicle as

also instructed that let the said vehicle go outside the

premises but the very identity of the writ petitioner has not

been given by said Rajendra Singh to whom the original

writ petitioner had instructed not to interrupt in loading of

scrap material, save and except giving description of his

physique by length and width.

24. However, on conducting T.I.P. he identified the

original writ petitioner. Then the question arises that when

the said constable Rajendra Singh is also of the same Unit

and when he was instructed by the original writ petitioner,

the Inspector, how can it be believed that the said constable

namely, Rajendra Singh did not recognize the said

inspector by face, which itself is clear from the fact that he

has not disclosed the name of inspector, the deceased-writ

petitioner, rather, he has only disclosed the physique, as

would appear from the testimony of said Rajendra Singh.

25. Be that as it may, we are not scrutinizing the

finding recorded by the enquiry officer since the finding of

enquiry officer is not an issue in this case rather the only

issue that why the benefit which has been granted to Hira

Lal Dubey, Dhananjoy Hansda and Jay Ram Manjhi be not

extended to the original writ petitioner, as the view has

been taken by the learned Single Judge.

26. It is admitted fact herein that the said Hira Lal

Dubey, Dhananjoy Hansda and Jay Ram Manjhi, who were

continuing as Head Constable, Constable and Assistant

Sub Inspector (Shift In-charge) respectively preferred writ

petitions being W.P. (S) No. 3597 of 2009, W.P. (S) No. 4558

of 2008 and W.P. (S) No. 4613 of 2008, challenging inter

alia impugned orders of punishment passed by disciplinary

authority which was confirmed by the appellate and

revisional authority with further prayer for reinstatement in

service with all consequential benefits.

27. The writ petitions were heard together and disposed

of vide common order dated 22.09.2017, by which, the

impugned order of dismissal was quashed and set aside.

Since there was no order for back wages, said Jay Ram

Majhi preferred appeal being L.P.A. No. 787 of 2018 only to

the extent of grant of back wages, which was allowed vide

order dated 14.08.2019 directing the respondents-

authorities to grant all back wages.

28. For this reason also that the order passed by the

writ Court quashing the impugned order of punishment

has not been challenged by the respondents-authorities

and further for grant of back wages the said Jay Ram Majhi

preferred which was allowed directing for grant of full back

wages, we are of the view that there is no reason to take a

different view and deny the benefit which has granted to

similarly situated employee i.e., Jay Ram Majhi.

29. This Court having discussed the fact that the

gravity of charge leveled against the original writ petitioner

vis-à-vis Jay Ram Manjhi is similar and even the case of the

petitioner is on better footing, is proceeding to discuss

about the concession given by learned CGC, Mr. Laxman

Kumar, who had represented the Union of India before the

writ Court.

30. In view of discussion made hereinabove, we are of

the view that it cannot be said to be a wrong concession in

view of the fact that the nature of allegation against the Jay

Ram Manjhi and original writ petitioner are identical which

cannot be denied rather as per the discussion made by us,

the gravity of nature of offence in case of Jay Ram Manjhi is

more than that of original writ petitioner.

31. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant

therefore, the case of the appellant is not treated to be

identical to said Jay Ram Manjhi according to our

considered view has no substance.

32. Accordingly, the same is hereby rejected.

33. Contention has been raised on behalf of appellants

that the original writ petitioner is not entitled for the back

wages since he has not performed the duty as such

applying the principle of 'no work no pay', the writ

petitioners are not entitled for back wages.

34. In response, it has been submitted on behalf of writ

petitioners-respondents that the said Jay Ram Manjhi has

already been extended with the benefit of full back wages,

after passing of order in intra-court appeal, hence, there is

no reason to deny the same.

35. This Court taking into consideration the order

passed in L.P.A. No. 787 of 2018, [Jay Ram Majhi Vs.

Union of India & Ors] whereby the appellant Jay Ram

Manjhi has been directed to be paid all consequential

benefits for the period he was out of service treating it to be

on duty period, is of the view that same benefit is to be

extended to the original writ petitioner.

36. Furthermore, since the question of 'no work no pay'

has been agitated on behalf of appellants as such at this

juncture reference of provision of dies non is required to be

made as provided under Rule 55 of the C.I.S.F. Rules,

which speaks that the period will not be treated to be on

duty if the finding recorded by the enquiry officer remain

in-tact, meaning thereby if the order of dismissal has been

passed by the original authority and if the same has been

reversed to that of another punishment consequence of

which if will be reinstatement in service then in that

circumstance the delinquent employee will not be entitled

for the wages for the intervening period. But in case of

exoneration from the charges, the period will be treated to

be on duty and hence, the wages will be taken into

consideration.

For ready reference, Rule 55 of the CISF Rules is

quoted hereunder as:

"55.Dies-non - Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules a disciplinary authority while passing final order to impose a penalty upon an enrolled member of the Force or an appellate authority or a revising authority may, on reinstatement of an enrolled member of the Force in service after setting aside a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement without exonerating such enrolled member of the Force of the charges which resulted in any of these penalties, after giving an opportunity to the enrolled member of the Force concerned to show cause against such action and for reasons to be recorded in writing, order that the intervening period between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement as the case may be and the date of reinstatement be treated as dies-non for purposes of service.

37. Herein, the facts of the case is that the learned

Single Judge has quashed the order of dismissal by

considering the case at par with the Jay Ram Manjhi,

which itself clarifies that the finding recorded by the

enquiry officer has merged with the order of punishment on

its acceptance basis upon which the order of dismissal has

been passed and the moment the order of dismissal has

been quashed and set aside the implied meaning of that

will be that the finding of the enquiry has also been said to

be not in existence.

38. This Court, in view of discussion made hereinabove,

is of the view that the original writ petitioner will be treated