Jharkhand High Court

Priyaranjan Pathak vs The State Of Jharkhand on 27 September, 2022

       IN     THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                             Cr.M.P. No. 1761 of 2021
       Priyaranjan Pathak                               .....   ...   Petitioner
                                   Versus
      1. The State of Jharkhand.
      2. Asha Tigga                                  ..... ...       Opposite Parties
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Mahesh Tewari, Advocate.

      For the State             :        Mr. Gautam Rakesh, A.P.P.
      For the O.P. No. 2        :        Mr. Sheo Kumar Singh, Advocate.
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08/ 27.09.2022 Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding of Chatarpur P.S. Case No. 14 of 2020 (SC/ST Case No. 41 of 2020) including the order taking cognizance dated 17.12.2020, by which, cognizance for the offences under Sections 354, 504, 506/34 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act has been taken against the petitioner, pending in the court of learned Special Judge [SC/ST (POA) Act], Palamau.

3. The prosecution case is based on the written report of the informant Asha Tigga, stating therein that she is working in the college since 12.08.2010 as a clerk. Upon secret information on 01.07.2019, S.D.M. visited the college and received Rs. 19 lacs 26 thousands rupees and in the meantime she assisted S.D.M. then suddenly 07.07.2019 on holiday 9.00 A.M. Chief Assistant Manish Kumar called her but she did not receive call. Then he took her on his motorcycle to college. In college in-charge Principal Priyaranjan Pathak, the petitioner engaged her in official work till evening, on that day only these two persons were there. On that they in course of return they tried to molest her but she kept mum. She has further alleged that again on 23.09.2019 they insulted her for which she made complaint in Mahila Aayog, Ranchi and when they got knowledge about this case, they said to withdraw the complaint otherwise they will oust her from the college and due to that they did not allow her to go on leave and when she made attendance, she was shown absent. Again on 03.01.2020 when she came on time and made attendance but on the new attendance register they show her absent. Lastly they stopped her payment since December and ousted her from the college after abusing her by naming her caste. On the basis of above, the instant case has been registered against the petitioner and other accused namely Manish Kumar.

4. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the professor-in-charge of

Gulabchand Agrawal Inter College, Sadma, Chhattarpur, Palamau. He submits that the O.P. No. 2 is working as a clerk in that college and she was a habitual absentee, for that several show cause have been issued to her, which have been annexed as Annexure-1 series. He submits that the S.D.O., who happens to be the Secretary of the Governing Body of that college has also issued a show cause on 27.01.2020 to the O.P. No. 2. Learned counsel by way of referring the contents of the FIR, submits that no case under the SC/ST (POA) Act is made out, as the ingredients are not disclosed therein.

5. On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the cognizance order is bad in law and the same may kindly be quashed.

6. On the other hand, Mr. Sheo Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the O.P. No. 2 submits that there are serious allegation of misbehaving with the O.P. No. 2 and O.P. No. 2 has filed a complaint before the Women Commission at Ranchi, however, for withdrawing of that complaint, the pressure was being mounted by the petitioner and for that her attendance was also cut by the petitioner. He submits that no case of interference is made out.

7. In view of such submissions of the parties, the court has gone through the materials available on record and also gone through the contents of the FIR and finds that there are allegations against the petitioner and for that she has filed a complaint before the Women Commission at Ranchi. The allegation has also been made for withdrawing the complaint, the pressure was being mounted by the petitioner and the attendance of the O.P. No. 2 was interfered with. The Court has perused the further allegation made in the complaint with regard to SC/ST (POA)Act and the court finds that there is no averment in the complaint that the petitioner is not a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and she was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused.

8. Reference may be made in the case of "Gorige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others", reported in (2008) 12 SCC 531, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No.-6 held as follows:-

"6. In the instant case, the allegation of Respondent 3 in the entire complaint is that on 27-5-2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the appellant accused was not a member of the

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (Respondent 3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the appellant accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate Respondent 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."

9. The 'public view' has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Swaran Singh And Others v. State Through Standing Counsel and Another", (2008) 8 SCC 435. Paragraph No. 28 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:-

"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."

10. Vulnerability of society is required to be considered for proving of the ingredients in the said Act. In view of section 3(i)(r) of the said Act, intentionally insults or to intimidates with intent to humiliate in

a public view is one of the ingredients which is absent in the case in hand. Reference may be made in the case of "Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttrakhand and Anr.", reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710. Paragraph 13 and 15 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:-

"13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste.

15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be

present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet."

11. In view of section 3(i)(s) of the said Act, it is the requirement that the complaint ought to have alleged that the petitioner was not a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe and she was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused. The ingredients of section 3(i)(s) of the Act is not disclosed in the F.I.R. For making out the ingredients under section 3(i)(r) of the Act, intentional insult or intimidation of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in any place within public view is necessary. The vulnerable section of the society has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttrakhand and Anr." (supra).

12. In the light of Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the said Act, there is no disclosure of the caste of this informant by the petitioner and of the petitioner. It must be vulnerable section as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttrakhand and Anr." (supra). In the light of section 3(i)(s) of the Act, there is also no allegation of caste against the petitioner and the caste of the petitioner has not been disclosed.

13. In that view of the matter, the cognizance order under the SC/ST (POA) Act is not in accordance with law and that will not survive. Accordingly, that part of the cognizance order dated 17.12.2020 passed in connection with Chatarpur P.S. Case No. 14 of 2020 (SC/ST Case No. 41 of 2020), so far as under Section 3(1)(s) of SC/ST (POA) Act is concerned, is hereby, set aside. It is made clear that the cognizance with regard to IPC Sections are concerned, the same is in accordance with law, as such no interference is required and proceeding under the IPC Sections will continue.