Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3726 Jhar
Judgement Date : 15 September, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Second Appeal No.343 of 2003
1. Most. Sarswati Kuar
2. Smt. Sushma Devi
3. Smt. Bela Devi
4. Smt. Nanha Devi @ Shila Devi ..... ..... ..... Appellants
Versus
1. Most. Fulkali Kuar
2. Malti Devi
3. Lakshmi Dubey
4. Arun Kumar Dubey
5. Awadesh Kumar Dubey
6. Dinesh Kumar Dubey
7. Jitendra Kumar Dubey
8. Kaushalya Devi
9. Geeta Pandey
10. Asha Devi
11. (i) Sumitra Kuar
(ii) Amresh Dubey
(iii) Pulast Kumar Dubey
(iv) Sanjay Kumar Dubey
(v) Champa Devi
12. Tila Devi
13. Surajdeo Dubey
14. Arjun Dubey
15. Nakul Dubey
16. (i) Sudhir Kumar Dubey
(ii) Subodh Kumar Dwivedi
(iii) Sujit Kumar Dubey
(iv) Pushpa Devi
(v) Usha Devi
(vi) Sujanti Devi
(vii) Suman Devi
(viii) Punam Devi
17. Mahabir Dubey
18. Balkesh Dubey
19 (i) Prabhat Ranjan Pandey
(ii) Prabin Ranjan Pandey
(iii) Prakash Ranjan Pandey
(iv) Saroj Tiwary
(v) Meena Tiwary
(vi) Indu Chaubey
20. Krishna Dubey ..... ..... ..... Respondents
...........
CORAM :HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY .........
For the Appellants : Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Manjul Prasad, Sr. Advocate Mr. Baban Prasad, Advocate ......
C.A.V. on 30.08.2022. Pronounced on 15.09.2022.
1. Appellants are the defendants, who have preferred the instant appeal against the Judgment and decree of reversal passed by the first appellate Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.
2. Since this is an old case, therefore the parties shall be referred by their original placement in the suit and shall include their legal representatives substituted from time to time.
3. The plaintiffs' suit is for partition of Schedule 'A' lands to the extent of 1/4th share each in favour of plaintiff no.1, plaintiff nos. 2 to 5 and plaintiff nos.6 to 9.
4. Plaintiffs' case in brief is for partition of properties of the common ancestor Dhanusdhari Dubey of properties that he had received on partition. Dhanushdhari died leaving behind four sons.
The plaintiffs represent the three sons whereas the defendants are the sons of fourth son of Dhanushdhari Dubey. The parties are joint and there has never been partition among the heirs and descendants of Dhanusdhari Dubey who died in the year 1969 leaving behind his three sons (i) Vidya Dubey (ii) Parmanand Dubey (iii) Dukhan Dubey who were the original plaintiffs and the defendants are the heirs and descendants of Gangeshwar Dubey who predeceased his father in 1962.
Plaintiffs Nos.2 to 5 have their separate house and plaintiff nos. 6 to 9 have their separate house, but there is unity of title and possession over the suit lands. The share of Dukhan Dubey, plaintiff nos.2 to 5 and plaintiff nos. 6 to 9 each have 1/4th share. The plaintiffs' case is that they were in separate cultivating possession by convenience of the suit land without any partition by metes and bound.
5. The defendants contested the suit by pleading that suit property has already been partitioned in the year 1945 i.e. during the life time of Dhanushdhari, and all the four sons had put their signature on the memo of partition dated 05.03.1945. After partition, the parties came into the possession over their respective share including Gangeshwar Dubey i.e. father of defendants in whose name the demand was opened.
6. After the death of Gangeshwar Dubey, his separate and exclusive property allotted in partition of 1945 as well as the property acquired was partitioned in partition suit registered as 41 of 1986 amongst the defendants. In this suit, plaintiff no.7 and son- in-law of Priya Ranjan Dubey admitted of previous partition.
7. Issues framed by the trial court :-
a. Is the suit framed as maintainable?
b. Have the plaintiffs got valid cause of action for the suit? c. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? d. Is there unity of title and jointness of possession of the parties over the suit properties?
e. Has there been previous partition by metes and bounds of the suit properties in the year 1945 amongst the son of Dhanushdhari Dubey? f. Are the plaintiffs entitled for the reliefs as prayed for?
The trial Court dismissed the Suit by recording a finding that there had been previous partition amongst the sons of Dhanusdhari Dubey in 1945. The finding of partition was based on the following evidence:
I. P.W.1 deposed in para-3 that the sons of Dhanusdhari Dubey remained united from 1940-41 to 1943. After that there was separation of mess and living. They began separate business and have been cultivating the land as per convenience. The four brothers have got the land which is mutated separately and were being paid rents to the State. II. P.W.-2 also admits to separate cultivation of land by the four brothers and also of mutation and separate payment of rent. The sons cultivated the land separately since the lifetime of their father. III. P.W.4 is that Plaintiff no.2 deposed in para-7 that the house of Rashma?
Dubey and Dukhan Dubey were separate.
IV. Ext 4-is certified copy of application dated 23.09.1969 filed by Vidya Dubey in which it has been stated that that the land sold by his uncle Ramdhari Dubey had been received by him and he had been coming in possession over it. Ext.5 is the order sheet of Mutation Case No.10/1965- 66 of C.O wherein it is stated that there had been partition which was being opposed by the members of the family. Ext.7 is the C.C. of order sheet in Mutation Case No.451/1997-98 which was the order of entry in the names of Sarswati Devi w/o Krishna Dubey.
V. Ext. J is the letter addressed by Dukhan Dubey to the Circle Officer, Latehar wherein it has been stated that there had been previous partition on 05.08.1965 and 05.03.1945 between the four sons of Dhanusdhari Dube. Ext. J/1 is the report of the Circle Inspector wherein it has been stated that on spot verification parties were found to be in possession of the respective portion of land on the basis of partition by Panch. Ext. J/2 is letter of Surya Dev Dubey on behalf of his father Vidya Dubey to the Circle Officer in Mutation Case No. 386/82-83 wherein it has been stated that there had been family partition on 05.03.1945; Ext. K is the order of mutation passed in this mutation case. The land falling in the share of Gangeshwar Dubey did not constitute part of the schedule of land in this mutation order, meaning thereby the separate exclusive share of Gangeshwar Dubey.
VI. Plaintiff no.7 Mahabir Dubey admitted partition amongst the sons of Dhanushdhari Dubey in Case No. 41/86 (Ext L/4) and therefore, he was estopped from denying partition. There was separate entries in the name of Dukhan Dubey, Vidya Dubey and Raina Dubey.
VII. Ext.-11/F shows separate entries of the names of Dukhan Dubey, Parma Dubey and Vidya Dubey.
VIII. Different documentary evidence of mutation shows intention of parties to separate from 15.3.1945 like Exhibits B, C, D, E, J, J/2, K, M, P, Q, R, S.
8. The Court of appeal below reversed the findings of the trial on the following grounds:
a. According to Hindu law, there is strong presumption of joint Hindu family possessing the property jointly. Separation partition is an exception. The onus was on the defendants to bring the memorandum of partition on record to rebut the presumption of partition. b. In 1945, Dhanusdhari Dubey was alive and was entitled to 1/5th share which was not allotted to him in the said partition of 1945. Lawfully he could not have been debarred from the share in partition. c. Many of the properties were acquired jointly by the four sons of Dhanusdhari Dubey and himself after 1945 through sale deeds and settlements but the defendants are claiming partition of all these properties in the year 1945. Claim of defendants of partition of properties which were acquired after 1945, was ridiculous. The plea of the defendants that these properties were in possession of the parties but formally acquired after partition has been rejected. d. The compromise decree in the Title Appeal No. 73/1991 arising out of Partition Suit No.41/1986 (Ext. G) among the defendants (heirs of 3rd brother Gangeshwar) was collusive in nature.
e. The order of mutation relied upon by the trial Court are not evidence of title and can therefore be of no consequence.
f. The onus to prove partition is on the defendants.
g. With regard to the endorsement on Ext Q of Vidya Dubey dated 5.4.1946, there was overwriting and the original was not called for. h. In para-8 of the W.S., there is an admission that memorandum of partition was available with Gangeshwar Dubey till his death and after his Shradh they searched for it but it could not be made available. During the Sharadh period plaintiff were in full control of the house and properties.
9. The appeal has been admitted to be heard on the following substantial questions of law:
Whether the lower appellate Court misdirected itself in law in setting aside and reversing the judgement and decree of the trial court by misconstruing the memo of partition and other documents on records?
10. Dhanusdhari Dubey, who died in 1969, had four sons. Three of his sons and their heirs have brought their partition suit in 1995 against the heirs of their brother Gangeshwar Dubey who died in 1962. The main plank of the defence is that partition took place in 1945 resulting in complete severance of joint status and thereafter they were in separate cultivating possession of the suit land which had been duly mutated separately and they are paying rent to the state.
11. The trial Court has recorded a finding of fact regarding prior partition, whereas the first appellate court has recorded contrary findings.
12. Whenever the Court is confronted with assertion and denial of a material fact in issue, in order to arrive at a correct factual situation, it need to consider not only the contemporary events which are the attending circumstances at that particular point of time, but also the subsequent events that follow, as it gives an insight as to whether the said document was acted upon and how the parties treated the property subsequent to it.
13. It is the definite case of the defendants is that partition took place on 05.03.1945 signed by all the four sons and the memo of partition was prepared to that effect. This memorandum of partition has not been brought on record. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that it was in possession of Gangeshwar Dubey and subsequently lost. The question is whether the said memo of partition ever saw the light of the day and there was adjustment of shares, transfers, mutation or any other subsequent act which can lend credence to the claim of partition?
14. As discussed by the trial Court in Mutation Case No.10/1965-66(Ext 5) there had been admission of partition.
Dukhan Dubey (P1) admits in the letter (Ext. J) addressed to the Circle Officer, Latehar that there had been previous partition on 05.08.1965 and 05.03.1945 between the four sons of Dhanusdhari Dube. Ext. J/1 is the report of the circle inspector wherein it has been stated that on spot verification, parties were found to be in possession of the respective portion of land on the basis of partition by Panch. Ext.J/2 is letter of Surja Dev Dubey (P3) on behalf of his father Vidya Dubey to the Circle Officer in mutation case no. 386/82-83 wherein it has been stated that there had been family partition on 5.3.1945; Ext K is the order of mutation passed in this mutation case. Ext. H is the receipt of Rs 400/- dated 6.9.49 received by Vidya Dubey as Jethans. He was the elder son therefore as per custom this amount was given as a part of extra share in the partition on the principle of primogeniture. The land falling in the share of Gangeshwar Dubey did not constitute part of the schedule of land in this mutation order, meaning thereby the separate exclusive share of Gangeshwar Dubey. C.C. of order sheet in mutation case no. 1159 /1977-78 (Ext-M) between makes a specific reference to the memorandum of partition dated 05.03.1945 in which 2.28 acre of Khata No.80, Plot No.83/478 was
shown to be the share of Parma Dubey, but there had been over writing over it. This mutation case was initiated on the application of Nakul Dubey S/o Vidya Dubey. This was being opposed to by Parma Dubey Parma Dubey father of P6 to P8. Ext-P the order sheet of Mutation Case No. 34 of 1965-66 shows that the applicants Vidya Dubey and others had made partition. Ext. Q is the letter of Parma Dubey dated 05.04.1965 addressed to the Circle Officer, Latehar which acknowledges the partition of the property in 1945 by panch. From the order dated 22.9.1990 passed in this mutation case, it appears that due to ongoing dispute over share, application for mutation could not be allowed. The land was mutated in Mutation Case No.451/1997-98 in the names of Sarswati Devi w/o Krishna Dubey (Ext.-7). From these evidences there can be little doubt about the 1945 partition took place between the parties. The evidence also suggests that afterwards some differences and dispute did arise between the parties as mutation application was opposed and consequently rejected in one case.
15. There is no doubt a presumption of jointness of an undivided Hindu family, but that presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Partition can be oral or by a memorandum of partition and in order to arrive at a correct finding, the cumulative effect of the evidence is to be considered as to how the property has been dealt with. The evidences in favour of contesting defendants include evidentiary admissions in the applications of the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest to the revenue authorities, for mutation of their land on the basis of 1945 partition. It has been held in Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569 at page 572 The first appellate court had relied upon the admission of the decree-holder himself and normally there could be no better proof than the admission of a party.
Here the partition is further buttressed by inter se partition among the members from the line of the defendant Gangeshwar Dubey in Title Appeal No.73/1991 (Ext.H). There is no dispute that parties had their own separate house and they were in separate cultivating possession over their land. In joint family separate possession by itself cannot be accepted to be an evidence of partition as it can be a case of possession by convenience. However, when the members themselves acknowledge previous partition, there can be no two view of cessation of status of jointness. Once there is evidence of partition which has been acted upon, there cannot be perpetual plea for claim of re- partition. It has been held in Kesharbai v. Tarabai Prabhakarrao Nalawade, (2014) 4 SCC 707 It is a settled principle of law that once a partition in the sense of division of right, title or status is proved or admitted, the presumption is that all joint property was partitioned or divided. Undoubtedly the joint and undivided family being the normal condition of a Hindu family, it is usually presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every Hindu family is joint and undivided and all its property is joint. This presumption, however, cannot be made once a partition (of status or property), whether general or partial, is shown to have taken place in a family.
16. On these evidences the appellate Court was in clear error to record a contrary finding that there was a presumption of jointness and the burden was on the defendants to prove partition. The logic of father having not received any share is also equally not tenable. It is not necessary that there should be equality of share and if the head of the family in order to avoid any future dispute refuses to receive any share, this cannot be a ground to hold that there had not been any partition. There can be circumstance that the head of the family having his other source of income, elects not to take any share in partition. When there was sufficient evidence on record then there was no point to draw adverse inference for non-production of memorandum of partition. It has been held in Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569 at page 572
11. In our opinion the question of drawing an adverse inference against Apte and Bavdekar on account of their absence from the court would arise only when there was no other evidence on the record on the point in issue.
17. Partition is a severance of joint status and all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of the intention of a member of joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty but this intention has to be communicated to other members of the family. A physical and actual division of property by metes and bounds follows from disruption of status and would be termed partition in broader sense. A disruption of joint family status by a definite and unequivocal intention to separate implies separation in interest and in right, although, not immediately followed by a de-facto actual division of the property. In case where an ancient partition is pleaded there can be no precise evidence regarding the actual partition. The evidence of partition has to be culled from the manner in which the parties have been living, how they have been dealing with the joint family property and the income arising therefrom. Separation in mess, income and dealing with the property independently can be an evidence of partition. Partition can be oral, it can be partial between the coparceners. Law on partition by family arrangement has been explained in Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 at page 125
9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put forward by the parties, we would like to discuss in general the effect and value of family arrangements entered into between the parties with a view to resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364 makes the following pertinent observations regarding the nature of the family arrangement which may be extracted thus:
"The principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements.
Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend."
The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long-drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family.................
10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:
"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;
(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;
(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;
(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;
(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;
(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."
18. On the basis of evidence on record and for the reasons discussed above, I find that there is sufficient and clinching evidence of partition in 1945, followed by separate mess and the parties were in separate cultivating possession of the land and were separately paying rent to the state and dealing with their portion of land separately. Learned trial Court rightly held that there had been previous partition and the Court of first appeal was in error to set it aside.
The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
The Judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.
Appeal is allowed.
I.A. No.6257 of 2019
Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the appellants under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the C.P.C., 1908, for disobedience of the order dated 10.12.2009 and order 18.01.2010 passed in I.A. No.3636 of 2009, whereby and whereunder the status-quo was granted by this Court with regard to the suit property, in question.
It is submitted that despite the order of status-quo, respondents have deliberately and intentionally violated the order either by way of leasing out or selling out portion of the property by Registered Sale Deeds It is further submitted that being fully aware of the order of the status quo, the respondent no.4 leased out a part of the suit property for 10 years in favour of Gyanchand Kumar Dubey and Murlidhar Dubey vide Registered Deed of Lease bearing No.938 dated 07.10.2017.
It is further submitted that respondent nos.5, 7 and 14 have also executed and transferred several plots of suit land vide Registered Sale Deed bearing Nos.1820, 1821 and 1822 dated 26.11.2018 and vide Registered Sale Deed bearing Nos.1983 dated 17.12.2018 and 283 dated 08.02.2019.
It is submitted that in view of the violation of the orders of status-quo, the parties are liable to be punished in terms of Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, 1908.
In reply to the I.A. No.6257 of 2019, counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent nos.4, 5, 7 and 14. It is contended that the answering respondents did not disobey the orders dated 10.12.2009 and 18.01.2010 passed by this Court.
With respect averment made in Para-4 of the said I.A., it is submitted that respondent no.4 was constrained to lease out the suit property for ten years for urgent need of money and for treatment of his daughter, as there was no other means to arrange money except to lease out that property and the documents regarding treatment have been annexed as Annexure-A Series.
It has been admitted that respondent nos.5 & 6 have executed sale deeds as stated in Para-5 of the interlocutory application. In this regard, it is submitted that the sale deeds had to be executed by Respondent No.14, namely, Arjun Dubey in urgent need of money for treatment of his son, namely, Sonu Kumar, who had met with an accident and has suffered major injury and he was admitted in Hill View Hospital. The Photocopies of the prescription of the Doctor and money receipts have been annexed as Annexure-B Series.
It is further submitted that the instant Second Appeal arises out of a partition suit wherein the Trial Court had dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, but in appeal, the same has been allowed. The appellant(s) of the Second Appeal was the defendant(s) in the Trial Court and contested the suit on the ground of earlier partition.
On perusal of the written statement of the defendants/ respondents, it will transpire that a schedule had been mentioned therein which states that the land is in possession and share of the defendants. The said sale deeds and the leased out are not related with the land mentioned in the schedule of the written statement, as such, such execution of the sale deeds, these appellants have not been prejudiced by any manner. However, the respondents who have transferred the land shall not claim equity in case. the instant I.A. stands dismissed.
I.A. No.6225 of 2020
Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the appellants under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC, 1908 for disobedience of the order dated 10.12.2009 and order 18.01.2010.
It is submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that apart from conveyance of property on lease out and sale, the respondents are also going ahead with the construction over the suit property.
It is submitted that Respondent No.4 [Arun Kumar Dubey] is making construction over Plot No.51, corresponding to New Plot No.464 under Khata No.13.
It is further submitted that Respondent No.14 [Arjun Dubey] has also started his construction over Plot No.45/417 under Khata No.13 whereas Respondent No.15 [Nakul Dubey] has made construction over Plot No.45/418 under Khata No.13.
In reply to the above I.A., counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent nos.4, 14 and 15.
It is submitted that there is no intentional and wilful violation of the orders passed by this Court. It is submitted that the plaintiff's suit for partition has been decreed by the learned trial court, but the appeal has been reversed. Now the matter in second appeal is pending before this Hon'ble Court.
With regard to averment made regarding construction made by Respondent no.4, it is submitted that he has constructed his house over Old Plot No.51 [New Plot No.464] under Khata no.13 beyond the suit land. The total area of Plot No.51 of Khata No.13 is 80 decimals and suit land is only 38 decimals in the schedule of the plaint. Rest 42 decimals land is separate land of Respondent no.4 acquired through settlement.
With regard to averment made in Para-7, it is submitted that respondent no.14 is quite old person, aged about 73 years and waiting for partition of his share in the ancestral property. Some portion of his old residential house was in dilapidated condition and was urgently in need to repair and reconstruction. Under these circumstances, certain construction and certain repairs were made without changing the topographical condition of the suit property.
With regard to violation made by Respondent No.15 [Nakul Dubey], it is submitted that he did not construct the house over the suit land i.e. Plot No.45 [new Plot No.418] under Khata No.13. It is submitted that one cowshed/ Gosala of Sarita Devi was situated over the same and for betterment of her life and for increasing her income, she took Government aid and renovated Gosala and constructed Chicken Shed over the same.
After having considered the rival submissions made in the both the interlocutory application, I am of the considered view that this is not a fit case for passing order under O 39 R 2 A of the C.P.C Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in U.C. Surendranath v. Mambally's Bakery, (2019) 20 SCC 666
7. For finding a person guilty of wilful disobedience of the order under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC there has to be not mere "disobedience" but it should be a "wilful disobedience". The allegation of wilful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the disobedience was not mere "disobedience" but a "wilful disobedience". As pointed out earlier, during the second visit of the Commissioner to the appellant's shop, tea cakes and masala cakes were being sold without any wrappers/labels. The only thing which the Commissioner has noted is that "non-removal of the hoarding" displayed in front of the appellant's shop for which the appellant has offered an explanation which, in our considered view, is acceptable one.
In the present case disobedience to the order occasioned due to the hardship being faced by parties and the delay at the appellate stage. I am of the view that it will not come within the meaning of wilful disobedience and therefore there will be no order under Order 39 Rule 2 A. Principal of lis pendens will apply to pendent lite transfer of property. The aforesaid I.A. sands dismissed.
Pending I.A(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated the 15th September, 2022 AFR / Anit
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