Jharkhand High Court
Ramjee Prasad Singh Son Of Late ... vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... on 17 November, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 4428 of 2017
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1. Ramjee Prasad Singh son of Late Lakhan Singh, resident of Village
& P.O. Chhotipali, PS Narhat, District Nawada (Bihar).
2. Nagina Ram son of late Chhangur Ram, resident of Village
Madanpatti, PO Eadilpur, PS Aatarauliya, District Azamgarh (U.P.).
3. Purushottam Kumar Pathak son of Krishna Kant Pathak, resident of
Village Lawagarha, PO Unta, PS Sadar, District Chatra.
4. Om Prakash Prasad son of Shri Lakhi Narayan Prasad, resident of
Village Deodar, PO Joga, PS Rehla, District Palamau.
5. Jarad Hussain son of Jaan Mohammad, resident of Mohalla
Faruknagar, near Petrol Pump, Dandilakhurd, PO PS Rehla, District
Palamau.
6. Ram Snehi Ram, son of Sri Bulaki Ram, resident of Village Kuchila,
PO PS Chhipadohar, District Latehar.
7. Ashok Vishwakarma son of Shri Bhagwan Vishwakarma, resident of
Village Deori Khurd, PO Japla Cement Factory, PS Hussainabad,
District Palamau.
... Petitioners
-versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary / Principal Secretary,
School Education and Literacy Department, Project Building,
Dhurwa, Ranchi.
2. The Director, Secondary Education, School Education & Literacy
Department, Secondary Education Directorate, Project Building,
Dhurwa, Ranchi.
3. The District Education Officer, Garhwa.
... Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANDA SEN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Kishore Kumar Singh, SC V
Mr. Krishna Prajapati, AC to SC V
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9/ 17.11.2022 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for
the respondents.
2. Petitioners are teachers, who have approached this Court,
challenging the order of punishment dated 30.01.2017 (Annexure 2 to this writ
petition). The increments of the petitioners were withheld without cumulative
effect on the ground that the students of the school where the petitioners were
teaching did not fair well in the Board / Intermediate / Secondary School
Examination.
3. Counsel for the petitioners submits that there was no
consideration as to whether petitioners were at fault. Further, no notice or any
enquiry was initiated, which makes the entire proceeding including the order of
punishment bad in law.
4. Counsel appearing for the State submits that since the petitioners
did not teach properly, students failed. Thus, rational decision was taken by
the authorities to punish the teachers, which will later on improve the quality of
teachers and teaching.
5. Similarly situated teachers had approached this Court in W.P.(S)
No. 5198 of 2017 wherein same resolution was taken into consideration by this
Court. This Court, considering the similar facts in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the
aforesaid judgment, has held as follows: -
7. From the impugned order, there is nothing to suggest as
to whether the case of the petitioner and his reply were
considered or not. Once the show cause is issued and reply
to the said show cause is filed, thereafter a decision should
be taken considering the aforesaid show cause. The
authority who passes an order is duty bound to consider all
the grounds/defence, which have been taken by the
petitioner in the said show cause. The authority should have
considered the points raised by the petitioner while
considering the case of the petitioner. The word 'consider'
has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India &
Others versus A. Masilamani reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530.
In paragraph 19 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that an opinion has to be formed by the
statutory authority, which should be reflected on the
records itself. The order of the appellate authority should
reflect the application of mind and the appellate authority
cannot simply adopt the language of disciplinary authority
and proceed to affirm the order. Paragraph 19 of the said
judgment reads as under:-
19. The word "consider" is of great significance.
The dictionary meaning of the same is, "to think
over", "to regard as", or "deem to be". Hence,
there is a clear connotation to the effect that there
must be active application of mind. In other words,
the term "consider" postulates consideration of all
relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of
opinion by the statutory authority should reflect
intense application of mind with reference to the
material available on record. The order of the
authority itself should reveal such application of
mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt
the language employed by the disciplinary
authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar and
Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat).
Proposition has now been settled by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. Considering the order of the authority, I find
that the same is cryptic. It does not even touch, far less deal
with the points raised by the petitioner.
8. Further it is admitted fact that forfeiture of three annual
increments without cumulative effect as well as censure is
the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner. A punishment
can only be inflicted if there is misconduct. It is well settled
law that mere error and omission will not be construed as a
misconduct. Some negligence may come within the purview
of misconduct, but in the instant case, there is nothing to
suggest as to whether the petitioner was negligent or did
not perform his duly diligently. Merely the fact that the
students have not passed in matriculation and intermediate
examination cannot be a ground to conclude that the
petitioner has not taught the students properly or has
neglected his work of teaching. There is no allegation
against the petitioner that he has not attended the duty or
has remained absent for considerable period of time and
has not taken any interest in teaching. Even if this was the
allegation, the matter would have been something else. But
from the show cause notice as well as from the impugned
order, it is quite clear that since the students have not
passed in the examination of matriculation and intermediate,
this petitioner, who happens to be a teacher in the school,
was punished. In absence of any specific charge of
misconduct, the petitioner should not have been punished.
6. Admittedly, in this case also there is no specific charge of any
misconduct against the petitioners. Charge is general in nature and
punishment has been imposed not particular to any petitioner. Thus,
considering what has been held above, impugned order of punishment dated
30.01.2017 (Annexure 2 to this writ petition), so far as it relates to the
petitioners, is set aside. The petitioners are entitled for the consequential
benefits including restoration of pay scale after granting them the increments
which have been forfeited by the impugned order of punishment. If this
punishment has been recorded in the service book of the petitioners, the said
entry be struck off from their service books.
7. This writ petition stands allowed.
(Ananda Sen, J.)
Kumar/Cp-02
