Satendra Nath Shahdeo vs The State Of Jharkhand & Ors
2022 Latest Caselaw 2024 Jhar

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                  [Civil Writ Jurisdiction]
                        W.P.(C) No. 2318 of 2022
    Satendra Nath Shahdeo, S/o Late Amrendra Nath Shadeo .... .. ... Petitioner
                              Versus
    The State of Jharkhand & Ors.                               .. ... ... Respondents
                               ...........

CORAM :HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH PRASAD DEO .........

    For the Petitioner                 : Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, Advocate
    For the respondents/State          : Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, G.A.-I
                                       ......
02/ 20.05.2022.
           Heard, learned counsel for the parties.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has submitted, that petitioner- Satendra Nath Shahdeo, S/o Late Amrendra Nath Shadeo has preferred the instant Writ Petition on 18.05.2022, for quashing the order dated 01.12.2020 passed by Additional Collector, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 1 of 2020-21 (Annexure-5) whereby and whereunder the learned Additional Collector, Ranchi though has ordered for issuance of online rent receipts, but has simultaneously also directed initiation of proceedings under Section 4(h) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 and also prayer for quashing of subsequent proceeding based on such order dated 05.01.2022 registered as Miscellaneous Case (Sandigdh Jamabandi) No.09/2020-21, (Annexure-6) in purported exercise of powers conferred under Section 4(h) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 seeking cancellation of the settlement.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that the land of Khata No.149, within Village Lohri, P.S. Tamar within District Ranchi, with regard to Plot No.402 having an area 201.50 acres was recorded as gairmajarua Khas land of the landlord. The then landlord, namely, Pradhan Radha Mohan Nath Shahdeo vide Hukumnama dated 07.03.1946, settled 201.50 acres of Plot No.402 with his son, namely, Amrendra Nath Shahdeo. The said settlement coupled with grant of rent receipt was settled in favour of the settlee and since then the settlee and thereafter his legal heirs are in continuous possession of the said land. Photocopy of Khatiyan as well as Hukumnama dated 07.03.1946 are brought on record as Annexures- 1 and 2 to the writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, after vesting of the estate, the return was submitted by the erstwhile

landlord and thus, a proceeding was initiated which was registered as Case No.204 R8/ 1956-57 for determination of fair and equitable rent in terms of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950. After due verification by the State authorities, Rent Roll in M Form was issued in favour of the Settlee, namely, Amrendra Nath Shahdeo in terms of Rule 7 of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Rules, 1951 and the same has been brought on record as Annexure-3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that the name of Amrendra Nath Shahdeo was entered in Registered- II and thereafter he paid the rent to the State, which is also brought on record as Annexure-4 of the writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that said Amrendra Nath Shahdeo died in the year, 1980 leaving behind his son (petitioner) namely, Satendra Nath Shahdeo, but the rent receipt was not granted to the petitioner though he is legal heir and there was no legal impediment rather a Miscellaneous Case No.1 of 2020-21 has been instituted by the Circle Officer, Tamar. The Circle Officer, Tamar has also verified the fact and compared it with volume 1 page no.381 of Register II related to Mouza Lohri and which showed that an area of 201.50 acres of Plot No.402 within Khata No.149 was recorded in the name of Amrendra Nath Shahdeo and the Circle Officer has further mentioned that manual rent receipts have been issued which was prevalent at that time in favour of Amrendra Nath Shahdeo through petitioner with regard to the aforesaid land till the year, 2015-16 and it has further been noted that in Wasil Baaki Form, the land, in question has been mentioned and against the said land Malgujari of Rs.114/- was recorded. However, despite all these things, the Circle Officer, Tamar has forwarded the same to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Bundu for a direction into the matter, which was subsequently forwarded to the Additional Collector, Ranchi, who passed an order dated 01.12.2020, which is impugned herein though the Additional Collector, Ranchi, has passed an order to grant rent receipt, but has also recommended for initiation of a proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that it is a case of inheritance of the property by the son, as the property was standing in the name of his father, who died and thereafter the records ought to have been rectified as the same cannot stand in the name of

dead person and thus, it was a routine matter for the revenue authority, which the revenue authority has failed to consider.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that it is astonishing act of the State, where a proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 has been initiated after long 72 years of the enactment of the Act.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that under the provisions of Section 4(h) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950, there was provision to examine the sham / fraudulent transaction which has caused loss to the State between 01.01.1946 as the cut off date has been fixed in the Act till the enactment of the Act on 25.09.1950, but the same does not give an unfettered power to the State to initiate proceeding under Section 4(h) of Act, 1950.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta in support of his submissions has relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 187, especially in paragraphs 11 and 12 thereof, as under:

"11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.

12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961 i.e more than a year after the order and it seems to us that this order was passed too late."

(Emphasis Supplied)

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta in support of his submissions has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71, especially in paragraph 2 thereof, as under:

"2. Although Mr Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the appellant took a stand that under Section 63 of the Act aforesaid, there should not be any discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which such agriculturist belongs. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position

by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah disposed of on 1-3-1990, where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs." (Emphasis Supplied)

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta in support of his submissions has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Collector v. P. Mangamma, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 488, especially in paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof, as under :

"5. A reasonable period would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/ authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question.

6. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Prohibition Act, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child's toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what is "reasonable" in each particular case; but frequently reasonableness "belongs to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the courts". It was illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. [See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd.] As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case."

(Emphasis Supplied)

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta in support of his submissions has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 667, especially in paragraph 9 thereof, as under:

"9. Even before the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ appeals, the appellants did not contend that the suo motu power could be exercised even after a long delay of 13-15 years because of the fraudulent acts of the non-official respondents. The focus of attention before the Division Bench was only on the language of sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act as to whether the suo motu power could be exercised at any time strictly sticking to the language of that sub-section or it could be exercised within reasonable time. In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation. (Emphasis Supplied)

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta in support of his submissions has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 211, especially in paragraphs 27 and 30 thereof, as under: "27.Now it is true that no period for revision is provided in the Act. It was, therefore, submitted on behalf of the landowners that when the legislature did not think it fit to prescribe period of limitation, such power can be exercised "at any time" and no court by a "judicial fiat" can usurp legislative power and prescribe period of limitation. It is no doubt true that the statute does not fix period of limitation within which revisional power should be exercised under Section 34 of the Act. The legislature, in its wisdom, has not fixed period of limitation as it had empowered the State Government to exercise revisional power suo motu. In our judgment, however, only in such cases i.e. where the period of limitation is not prescribed that the concept of "reasonable time" can be invoked and power must be exercised within such period.

30. The law laid down in Patel Raghav Natha has been reiterated by this Court in several cases. We do not intend to burden our judgment with all those cases. We may only state that broad contention of the landowners that when no period of limitation is prescribed, revisional jurisdiction can be exercised at any time cannot but be rejected. If the law prescribes period of limitation, the action must be taken within such period. But where the law does not prescribe limitation, the court would import the concept of "reasonable time". We may, however, hasten to add that what is the length of the reasonable time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down."

(Emphasis Supplied)

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta in support of his submissions has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352, especially in paragraphs 11 and 12 thereof, as under : "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.

12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30-3-1976 is flawed and legally not correct."

(Emphasis Supplied)

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that Section 4(h) of the Bihar/Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 cannot be invoked as per the wisdom of the administrative / revenue authorities. It must have some reasonable time. In this case this inquiry is also not sustainable in the eyes of law as this transaction is between landlord who settled the land of Gairmajarua khas land to his son, who is one of the raiyats of his estate, as such, such transaction is not void.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that after fixation of rent in Misc. Case No.204 R8 /1956-57, no appeal was preferred under Section 8 of the Bihar /Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 and thus, after fixation of the rent in the year 1956-57, it attains finality. Apart from that the legality and validity of a document cannot be assailed after such a long time and that too, without any specific provisions of law, as such, part of the impugned order whereby proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 has been ordered to be initiated is bad law, which may be quashed by this Hon'ble Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta has further submitted, that the State must fix the responsibility upon the officer for such transaction, where proceeding under Section 4 (h) of the Act, 1950 has been initiated, but without initiating any proceeding against the State officer, such provision of law cannot be invoked beyond the the reasonable time.

Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned G.A.-I for the State has submitted, that the petitioner should not aggrieve of the impugned order, as the rent receipt has already been issued in favour of the petitioner by on-line as per the impugned order issued by the Additional Collector, Ranchi. So far the enquiry is concerned,

that is only with regard to the illegal transfer made which came to the notice of the State Authority, as such, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner.

Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 only provides an inquiry with regard to suspicious transaction or sham transaction between 01.01.1946 to 25.09.1950, which cannot be enlarged by a subsequent notification issued by the State after this period. As such, the action of the respondent-authorities for initiating a proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 is bad in law.

Considering the rival submissions of the parties and having gone through the materials available on records, it appears that issuance of rent receipt passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi is not being assailed by any of the parties. Thus, it is valid as the same is in continuation of a proceeding, which was instituted as Misc. Case No.204 R8/ 1956-57 in the name of father of the petitioner. Now rent receipt is being issued to the son as Jamabandi was existing in the name of his father. The long jamabandi cannot be interfered in such a fanciful manner by the State. Since rent receipt is being issued to the petitioner online, the petitioner is at liberty to deposit the rent to the State.

However, the State through Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, is directed to file counter-affidavit within a period of six weeks in this case, as the land is situated within the District of Ranchi, in absence of any notification issued by the State regarding, who is authorized person to represent the State, this Court has reason to pass order that the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi should file affidavit after due approval from the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi and the Principal Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand as well as the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand as well as the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand.

This is an issue which has ramification upon several cases, as such, the State must come with a clear statement that what they mean by Section 4(h) of the Bihar/ Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950?

Further the State should explain that:-

(i) What does they mean by a reasonable time under Bihar/ Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 for initiating a proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950?

(ii) Whether Section 4 (h) of the Act, 1950, empowers the State to invoke the provisions after 72 years, in a continuous jamabandi, whereby the rent has

been issued till 2015?

(iii) Whether in view of the judgment passed by the Apex Court, it is not binding upon the State that proceeding under Section 4(h) under the Bihar/ Jharkhand Land Reforms Act, 1950 with respect to suspicious transaction made between 01.01.1946 to 25.09.1950, which shall be done within a reasonable time as the limitation is only for 3 years for cancellation of instrument as already been explained by the Apex Court ?

However, parties are at liberty to mention this case before the appropriate bench.

Till disposal of the Writ Petition, the operation of the impugned order i.e. for initiation of proceeding under Section 4(h) of Act, 1950 vide Misc. Case No.09/2020-21 is hereby stayed.

I.A. No.4377 of 2022 is disposed of.

Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, the Principal Secretary, Department of Forest, Environment & Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand, the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, the Additional Collector, Ranchi, Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Bundu as well as the Circle Officer, Tamar, Ranchi through FAX or e-mail at once.

Sandeep/R.S.                                               (Kailash Prasad Deo, J.)