Jharkhand High Court
Ashok Kumar Son Of Late Radheshyam ... vs Pyari Murmu Wife Of Late Premlal ... on 14 July, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
M.A. No. 44 of 2022
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Ashok Kumar son of Late Radheshyam Bhagat, resident of village
Narani, P.O. Narani, P.S. Mahagama, District Godda.
... Appellant
-versus-
1. Pyari Murmu wife of Late Premlal Soren
2. Sanjhli Murmu wife of Sheo Charan Soren
3. Khushboo Soren minor daughter of late Pram Lal Soren
4. Rohit Soren minor son of Late Prem Lal Soren
No.3 and 4 and represented through their natural guardian and
mother Pyari Murmu.
All are resident of village Chitra Kothi, P.O. and P.S. Lalmatia, District
Godda.
5. Anil Kumar Tibrewal son of Sheo Kumar Tibrewal, resident of village
Mahagama, P.O. and P.S. Mahagama, District Godda.
... Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANDA SEN
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For the Appellant : Mr. D.K. Chakraverty, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Nawin Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Ranjan Kumar Singh, Advocate
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4/ 14.07.2022 I.A. No. 3406 of 2022
This interlocutory application has been filed by the appellant,
praying therein to condone the delay of 1039 days (two months less than 3
years), in filing this appeal.
2. The appeal is filed challenging the judgment and award dated
23.02.2017 passed by the District Judge I-cum-M.A.C.T., Godda in M.A.C.T.
Case No.35 of 2011, whereby the appellant has been directed to make
payment of claim amount of Rs.6,21,500/-, along with interest as awarded in
the award, in favour of the claimants.
3. Counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was not
aware of the judgment and only when the distress warrant was issued by the
Executing Court, he could come to know about the judgment and, thus,
immediately rushed to this Court by filing this appeal. He submits that after
obtaining certified copy on 14.02.2022 only the appellant could come to know
that award was passed in the year 2017. He also takes a ground that due to
non-cooperation of the advocate, this entire delay has occurred. These are the
only grounds taken by the appellant to condone the delay of 1039 days.
Counsel for the appellant also referred to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan versus M. Krishnamurthy reported in
(1998) 7 SCC 123.
4. To condone a delay, Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be
invoked, which reads as under: -
5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases - Any appeal
or any application, other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or
the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period.
5. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also provides for
condoning delay in filing an appeal. It is necessary to quote the said provision
also, which reads as under: -
173. Appeals.- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),
any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may,
within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal
to the High Court;
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required
to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained
by the High Court, unless he has deposited with it twenty-five
thousand rupees or fifty per cent, of the amount so awarded,
whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court.
Provided further that the High Court may entertain the
appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims
Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten
thousand rupees.
6. From the both the provisions, I find that "sufficient cause" has to
be shown for condoning the delay, whatever may be the length of delay. What
are the "sufficient cause" are to be pleaded in the petition filed by the
appellant praying to condone the delay and the same should be convincing.
The Court has to see whether the cause is sufficient and acceptable or not. In
this case reasons for filing the appeal after 1039 days has been mentioned
above , i.e., he had no knowledge of the award as the lawyer did not inform
him.
7. After going through the judgment, I find that the appellant had
appeared before the Tribunal and had also filed written statement and
contested the case. It clearly suggests that the appellant was aware about
pendency of the case. Since he was aware of the case and contested it, it is
not acceptable that he was unaware of the award for nearly 3 years.
Explanation which has been given by the appellant is not at all acceptable. A
lawyer only fights a litigation on behalf of the litigant. The litigant should be
vigilant and cannot cast a blame upon the lawyer that the lawyer did not inform
him about the result of the litigation and/or date of the judgment.
8. In paragraph 11 of the judgment in the case of N. Balakrishnan
(supra), which has been relied upon by the appellant, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy properly. It has also been held
that law of limitation fixes a lifespan and this time span is precious and wasted
time would never revisit. Law of limitation is, thus, founded on public policy. In
the said judgment, it has been held that sufficient cause shown should not
smack malafide.
9. In this case, as held earlier, appellant had already appeared
before the Tribunal and had contested the case by filing written statement, but
filed this appeal nearly after 3 years of the award. Further, the appellant is the
owner of the vehicle, which caused accident, which is apparent from the First
Information Report itself, which is produced before me. Admittedly, the vehicle
is not insured. Thus, the appellant was directed to pay the amount of
compensation.
10. Aforesaid facts, coupled with the fact that the appeal was filed
only after distress warrant was issued against him, smacks some malafide.
Thus, I am not inclined to allow the prayer made in this interlocutory
application, which is bereft of any sufficient cause. This interlocutory
application is, accordingly, dismissed.
M.A. No.44 of 2022
11. As a consequence of dismissal of the interlocutory application,
this appeal, being barred by limitation, is also dismissed. The statutory amount
deposited by the appellant at the time of filing of this appeal should be
refunded to the appellant.
12. In view of the dismissal of the main appeal, another interlocutory
application being I.A. No. 3405 of 2022 also stands dismissed.
(Ananda Sen, J.)
Kumar/Cp-02
