Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 718 J&K
Judgement Date : 13 February, 2026
Sr. No. 12
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CRM(M) No. 1052/2025
Haji Ghulam Qadir .... Petitioner/Appellant(s)
Through: - Mr. Farhan Mirza, Advocate
V/s
Charan Choudhary .... Respondent(s)
Through: - Mr. Vikram Sharma, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Zaheer Abhas Khan, Advocate
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
13.02.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the
Courts below.
2. The respondent-complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the "NI
Act") before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, alleging that the
petitioner had approached him for financial assistance in connection with a
"Handling Contract" allotted at PEG, Birpur on 10.05.2018. It was pleaded
that a sum of ₹18,86,000/- was advanced towards 50% of the bank guarantee
and other incidental expenses, with the assurance that the same would be
repaid through cheque.
3. In discharge of the aforesaid liability, the petitioner allegedly issued
Cheque No. 046630 dated 26.10.2022 for ₹16,36,000/- drawn on J&K Bank,
Shalamar Road, Jammu. The cheque, upon presentation, was dishonoured
with the endorsement "Account Blocked". A statutory demand notice was
served, however, despite lapse of the prescribed period, payment was not
made. Consequently, the complaint under Section 138 NI Act was filed.
4. The Trial Court, after recording the statement of the complainant on
affidavit and perusing the documents annexed with the complaint, took
cognizance of the offence in terms of order dated 19.12.2022 and directed
issuance of process against the petitioner. The petitioner assailed the said
order before the Sessions Court by way of Criminal Revision No. Cr.
Rev/1331/2024. The revisional court dismissed the revision vide order dated
03.10.2025 on the ground that the revision petition was barred by limitation
and that the petitioner had been appearing before the Trial Court without
objection for a considerable period.
5. The principal contention urged on behalf of the petitioner before this
Court is that the Trial Court failed to comply with the mandate of Section
202 Cr.P.C. as the petitioner was residing beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the Magistrate, and that the order taking cognizance reflects non-
application of mind. It was further contended that the revisional court erred
in dismissing the revision on the ground of limitation despite explanation of
delay.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that all
statutory requirements under Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act were duly
complied with, that the Magistrate recorded the sworn statement of the
complainant and examined the material placed on record before issuing
process, and that the petitioner's challenge is a belated attempt to stall trial
proceedings.
7. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the record, this
Court finds that the complaint discloses all essential ingredients of the
offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. The issuance of cheque in
discharge of a legally enforceable debt, its presentation within validity,
dishonour, issuance of statutory notice, and failure to make payment within
the stipulated period stand prima facie established from the averments in the
complaint and supporting documents.
8. In terms of Section 139 of the NI Act, there arises a statutory
presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally
enforceable debt or liability. The scope and ambit of such presumption have
been elaborately considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2018 (8) SCC
165, wherein it was held that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act,
includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt and the burden lies upon
the accused to rebut the same by raising a probable defence. Mere denial of
liability does not suffice. In the present case, the petitioner has not placed
any material on record at this stage to rebut the statutory presumption. The
challenge is essentially directed against the order of cognizance.
9. As regards the contention based on Section 202 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, it is evident from the record that Ld. Magistrate
examined the complaint, perused the documents placed on record, and
recorded the sworn statement of the complainant by way of affidavit prior to
issuance of process. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Expeditious Trial of
Cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, In Re,
(2021) 16 SCC 116, considered the scope and applicability of Section 202
Cr.P.C. in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The Court held that where the accused resides beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Magistrate, the inquiry contemplated under Section 202
Cr.P.C. before issuance of summons cannot be dispensed with. However, the
Apex Court further clarified that upon reading Section 145 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act conjointly with Section 202 Cr.P.C., the requirement of
examining witnesses on oath stands satisfied if the complainant's evidence is
tendered by way of affidavit. It was held that where the Magistrate conducts
the inquiry himself, it is not mandatory to examine witnesses orally in every
case, and in appropriate cases, perusal of documents may suffice for forming
satisfaction regarding sufficient grounds to proceed.
10. It is well settled that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act are governed by the special procedure prescribed under the
Act itself. Being a special statute, the Negotiable Instruments Act prevails
over the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the extent
of inconsistency. Wherever the Act prescribes a specific mode, such as
permitting evidence by affidavit under Section 145, the same governs the
field. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned
Magistrate has complied with the statutory mandate, and the order taking
cognizance does not suffer from any procedural irregularity, illegality, or
non-application of mind.
11. The revisional court dismissed the revision petition on the ground of
limitation, noting that the petitioner had been regularly appearing before the
Trial Court and did not challenge the cognizance order within the prescribed
time. Even assuming that the revisional court erred in dismissing the
revision petition of the petitioner but even then, once the order of cognizance
is found to be legally sustainable, no interference would be warranted in
exercise of supervisory or inherent jurisdiction.
12. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is to be exercised sparingly and only where there
is manifest illegality or abuse of process. No such circumstance is made out
in the present case. The complaint discloses a prima facie offence and the
petitioner shall have full opportunity during trial to rebut the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act by leading appropriate evidence.
13. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the petition. The order
dated 19.12.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court taking cognizance and
the order dated 03.10.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jammu
dismissing the revision petition do not warrant interference.
14. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. The parties shall appear
before the Trial Court on 10.03.2026 for further proceedings in accordance
with law. Interim directions, if any, shall stand vacated. Order accordingly.
(SANJAY PARIHAR) Judge JAMMU RAM MURTI 13.02.2026
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!