Reserved On: 7/23.07.202 vs Union Territory J&K And Another
2021 Latest Caselaw 907 j&K/2

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
               AT SRINAGAR



                                     CRM(M) 186/2021,
                                     CrlM No. 704/2021,
                                     CRM(M) 187/2021,
                                     CrlM No. 705/2021,
                                     CRM(M) 192/2021,
                                     CrlM No. 722/2021,
                                     CRM(M) 163/2021
                                     CrlM No. 760/2021

                                     Reserved on: 7/23.07.2021
                                     Pronounced on: 16.08.2021
Hammid Ahmad Wani
Hammid Ahmad Wani
Feroz Ahmad Mir
Waseem Mushtaq and ors
                                                ... Petitioner(s)
                  Through: -Mr.R.A.Jan, Sr. Advocate with
                  Mr. Taha Khalil in CRM(M)
                  Nos.186/2021/187/2021 & 192/2021
                  Mr. Z.A.Shah Sr. Advocate with Mr. A. Hanan
                  Advocate & Mr. Prince Hamza Advocate in
                  CRM(M) 163/2021.

                  Vs.

Union Territory J&K and another

                                              Respondent(s)
                        Through: - Mr.B.A.Dar Sr. AAG


CORAM:      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR JUDGE



                          JUDGMENT

1 The petitioners in all these four petitions are accused in FIR

No. 12/2015 dated 21.02.2015 registered under Sections 5(1)(d) read

with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006

[„the Act‟] and 120-B RPC with the Police Station, Vigilance

Organization, Kashmir [„VOK‟]. Petitioner Hammid Ahmad Wani is

accused in FIR No. 11/2015 also. Although the petitioners have been

ascribed different role in the commission of alleged offences, yet,

they are aggrieved of registration of FIRs in question against them

almost on identical grounds. It is because of this reason, all the

petitions, though heard on different occasions, have been taken up

for disposal together by this common judgment.

2 CRM(M) No. 187/2021 has been filed by Hammid Ahmad

Wani, who, at the relevant time, was ex-officio Member Secretary of

Building Operation Control Authority [„BOCA‟] and had played

important role in grant of building permission in favour of

beneficiaries i.e. Waseem Mushtaq and others. He has filed another

petition i.e. CRM(M) 186/2021 wherein he has challenged FIR

11/2015 dated 20.02.2015 registered with Police Station, VOK.

CRM(M) 192/2021 has been filed by one Feroz Ahmad Mir, who at

the relevant time, was a Member representing Lakes and Waterways

Development Authority, Srinagar [„LAWDA‟] which cleared

Building Permission No. 58 of 2008 dated 28.04.2008 in favour of

beneficiaries Waseem Mushtaq and others. And CRM(M)

No. 163/2021 is a quashment petition filed by the beneficiaries of

Building permission i.e Waseem Mushtaq and ors.

Factual matrix of the matter

3 FIR No. 12/2015, impugned herein has arisen from Building

Permission No. 58/2008 dated 28.04.2008 granted in favour of the

beneficiaries Waseem Mushtaq and others on the allegation that the

petitioners-Public Servants Hammid Ahmed Wani and Feroz Ahmad

Mir who were Member Secretary and Member representing LAWDA

in the BOCA, abused their official position and in furtherance of

criminal conspiracy, granted Building Permission No. 58 of 2008

dated 28.04.2008 in favour of petitioners Waseen Mushtaq and

others for construction of four storeyed commercial complex with

revolving restaurant and basement for parking purpose on the plot of

land under Survey Nos. 885 min and 930 min situated opposite

Exhibition Ground, Srinagar. This permission, it is alleged, was

granted in supersession of earlier four building permissions i.e

permission No. 691/2002 dated 20.03.2002 in favour of Mushtaq

Ahmad Ganai and his two sons for construction of four storeyed

commercial building on land under survey No. 885 min, permission

No. 378/2002 dated 14.08.2002 in favour of Waseem Mushtaq and

Naseem Mushtaq for construction of three storeyed commercial

building on land under Survey No. 930 min, permission no.

379/2002 dated 14.08.2002 in favour of Waseem Mushtaq and

Naseem Mushtaq for construction of three storeyed commercial

building on land under survey No. 885 min and permission No.

381/2002 dated 14.08.2002 in favour of Waseem and Naseem for

construction of three storeyed commercial building on land under

Survey No. 930 min.

4 The impugned FIR, it is claimed, was registered pursuant to

verification conducted by the VOK after it received written

complaint regarding various illegal structures coming up in Srinagar

city. During verification by the VOK, it came to light that BOCA of

Srinagar Municipal Corporation had granted building permissions to

some builders at Exhibition Ground and Bishamber Nagar in

contravention of norms in vogue for such building permission. One

such permission i.e Building Permission No. 58 dated 28.04.2008

issued in favour of petitioner Mushtaq Ahmad Ganai and his two

sons came under scrutiny of the VOK. In the preliminary enquiry,

VOK found that the officials of BOCA by issuing building

permission No. 58 dated 28.04.20085 had regularized gross

violations on the part of building owners, who, instead of raising four

separate commercial complexes in accordance with earlier four

building permissions, had constructed single mega commercial

complex in complete violation of building permission and in

contravention of approved Srinagar Master Plan 2000-21 and that the

provisions of Control of Building Operations Act [„COBA Act‟],

building byelaws/rules framed thereunder, had been thrown to wind.

It was, thus, concluded in the verification that the officials/officers of

BOCA by acting in this manner and issuing building permission No.

58 of 2008, had abused their official position and conferred undue

favour/advantage/benefit and wrongful gain to the building owners,

namely Mushtaq Ahmad Ganai and his two sons and this was done in

furtherance of conspiracy hatched by the officials/officers of the

BOCA and the accused-beneficiaries. The VOK, thus, found that the

officials/officers of the BOCA and the beneficiaries i.e Mushtaq

Ahmad Ganai and his two sons had committed the offences under

Sections 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act and 120-B RPC.

Based on the outcome of preliminary enquiry/verification, impugned

FIR was registered in the Police Station, VOK and the investigation

set in motion. The investigation has proceeded further, and as

submitted by Mr. Dar learned Sr. AAG, the investigation in the

matter is complete and even the sanction for prosecution of the

accused-public servants has been granted by the competent authority,

however, for the pendency of these petitions and the interim

directions issued therein, the VOK could not present the challan/final

report before the competent Court of law.

Grounds of challenge

5 All the petitioners are aggrieved of registration of impugned

FIR as also the investigation carried out by the Police Station, VOK

primarily on the following grounds:

(i) that the information received and the verification conducted by the VOK does not disclose commission of any cognizable offence and, therefore, VOK was berefit of authority to register the impugned FIRs;

(ii) that mere grant of building permission, may be in contravention of the provisions of COBA Act, building byelaws/rules or Srinagar Master Plan, does not ipso facto constitute any offence, much less the offences alleged in the impugned FIRs and that the public servants are completely immune from criminal prosecution for the acts done by them in official capacity;

(iii) that even on merits, neither in the verification, nor in the investigation conducted pursuant to registration of impugned FIRs, any incriminating evidence has emerged which is sufficient to connect the

petitioners with the offences alleged in the impugned FIRs; and

(iv) that, at one point of time, the Investigating Officer after concluding the investigation in the impugned FIRs, had prepared the closure report as he had found no evidence to connect the petitioners with the offences alleged, but, later on, for undisclosed reasons, VOK, instead of filing the formal closure reports before the competent Court of law, decided to reopen the investigation which action of the VOK is per se illegal and arbitrary.

Stand of respondent-VOK

6 On being put on notice, VOK now Anti Corruption Bureau

(ACB) has filed the status report. It is submitted that during the

course of investigation, relevant records were obtained from the

concerned quarters and on examination thereof, following evidences

emerged:

(i) "Section 4 of Control of Building Operations (COBO) Act 1988 provides that any building construction or development activity within the limits of Municipal / Local / Town / Notified area has to be carried out with the prior permission of Building Operation controlling Authority (BOCA) to be constituted u/s 3(2) of COBO Act. Thereafter, Government has constituted different BOCAs for different areas vide various SROs issued from time to time.

    (ii)     In the exercise of powers vested u/s 3(2) of Control
            of Building        Operations (COBO) Act 1988,

Government vide SRO-152 dated 31.05.2005 has constituted Building Operation Controlling Authority (BOCA) for Srinagar Municipal area comprising of (i) Municipal Commissioner as Chairman, (ii) Senior own Planner, Srinagar Development Authority as Member, (iii) Assistant Commissioner Nazool as Member, (iv) Executive Engineer, Public Health

Engineering as Member, (v) Executive Engineer, Power Development Department as Member, (vi) Executive Engineer, Sewerage & Drainage as Member, (vii) Secretary LAWDA as Member and

(viii) Joint Municipal Commissioner as Member Secretary.

(iii) The first Master Plan 1971-1991 for Srinagar was approved by Government of J&K vide SRO-754 dated 22.11.1976. The preparation of second Master Plan remained in deep freeze due to turbulence in the valley in 1990s and the Government extended the life of Master Plan 1971-1991 from time to time. Finally, preparation of second Master Plan 2000-2021 was assigned to Town Planning Organisation Kashmir on behalf of Srinagar Development Authority. The Master Plan Srinagar 2000-2021 prepared and submitted by Town Planning Organisation Kashmir was given final nod by SDA Board in its 65th Meeting on 04.01.2001. Thereafter, it was approved by Government vide Cabinet decision No. 11/1 dated 16.01.2003 and became in operation vide SRO-28 dated 30.0 1.2003.

(iv) Governments vide order No. RC(LAK) 100 of 2001 dated 28-05- 2001 provided land measuring two (02) kanal, ten (10) marla belonging to J&K CONFED at Punjabi Mohalla Hari Singh High Street Srinagar to one Mushtaq Ahmad Ganie & his two sons Waseem Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq in lieu of their proprietary land acquired by Government for expansion of Government B. Ed. College at Moulana Azad Road Srinagar. Later, Waseem Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq jointly purchased further two (02) kanal, thirteen (13) marla land adjacent to above mentioned land. So father & two sons had a total five (05) kanal and three (03) marla land on site at Punjabi Mohalla Hari Singh High Street Srinagar.

Subsequently in the year 2002, the three parties applied separately to Building Operation Controlling Authority (BOCA) for permission to construct four separate buildings over the said place of land.

(v) The Building Operation Controlling Authority (BOCA) for Srinagar Municipal area had issued following four building permissions in favour of petitioners Mushtaq Ahmad Ganie @Chaya & his

sons Waseem Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq S/A Hari Singh High Street opposite Exhibition Ground Srinagar :-

(a) Building permission order No.691 of 2002 dated 20.03.2002 in favour of petitioners Mushtaq Ahmad Ganale, Wasim Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq for construction of four storey commercial building with basement floor exclusively for parking S/A Exhibition Crossing on land under survey No.885 mm. of Estate Nursingh Garh.

(b) Building permission order No.378 of 2002 dated 14.08.2002 in favour of petitioners Wasim Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq for reconstruction of three storey commercial building S/A Hari Singh High Street Srinagar on land under Survey No.930 mm. of Estate Nursingh Garh.

(c) Building permission order No.379 of 2002 dated 14.08-2002 in favour of petitioners Waseem Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq for construction of three storey commercial building after dismantling the two storey existing house and single storey Bathroom/kitchen S/A Punjabi Mohalla Hari Singh High Street Srinagar on land under survey No. 885 mm. of Estate Nursingh Garh.

(d) Building permission order No.381 of 2002 dated 14.08.2002 in favour of petitioners Waseem Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq for construction of three storey commercial building S/A Punjabi Mohalla Hari Singh High Street Srinagar on land under survey No.930 mm. of Estate Nursingh Garh.

(vi) The three land owners being father & sons in relation, had integrated four building permissions and constructed a huge single commercial complex instead of four separate buildings in gross violation of the plans approved by BOCA in the above mentioned building permissions.

(vii) The Srinagar Municipal Corporation had served notice to the land owners for violation of building permissions and demolition of the building raised illegally. The land owners had filed an appeal before J&K Special Tribunal (Appellate Authority) against the notice of Srinagar Municipal Corporation.

(viii) A Public Interest Litigation (WPPIL No.13 /2006 & CMP No. 47/2006) titled Peoples Welfare Society

J&K v/s State of J&K was also filed in the Hon'ble High Court of J&K in the year 2006 against allotment of above mentioned J&K CONFED land to private persons and stopping of illegal construction activities over it. This PIL was dismissed on 30.10.2007 by the single bench of Hon'ble Mr. J.P. Singh for the reason that the PIL doesn't project any public interest cause and the matter of raising construction . against Municipal laws is already in the appeal before J&K Special Tribunal Srinagar. The Hon'ble Justice had directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal expeditiously.

(ix) The BOCA instead of contesting the appeal of builders in J&K Special Tribunal, has approved the revised plans of the builders in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and issued fresh Building Permission order No. 58 of 2008 dated 28.04.2008 in order to regularize their deviations. In this way, the appeal has been made infructuous. Accordingly, it was consigned to records by J&K Special Tribunal Srinagar on 30.04.2008. This Building Permission order No. 58 of 2008 dated 28.04.2008 of BOCA issued on the revised site & building plans of the builders was found in violation of Srinagar Master Plan 2000-2021.

(x) Building Permission file examination revealed that one set of the revised plans submitted by above mentioned builders has been sent to Senior Town Planner, Srinagar Development Authority by Building Section of Srinagar Municipal Corporation and second set was sent to Town Planning Section of Srinagar Municipal Corporation for spot inspection and report.

(xi) The Senior Town Planner, Srinagar Development Authority has conveyed his no objection to the revised plans. The Senior Town Planner has not given any details about the site inspection nor about the compatibility of revised plans with Master Plan in vogue. The site & building plans returned from Srinagar Development Authority bore seal & signatures of Divisional Town Planner (SDA), but they too are silent about any specific details.

(xii) Processing file of SMC reveals that the Town Planning Section of Srinagar Municipal Corporation

has raised various observations to the revised plans in detailed report vide Note para 03 to 10 after conducting inspection of the Site. The draftsman of the Section has observed that the Site falls under Zone C-36 and total plot area was 28016 sfts wherein existing plinth area was 21288 sfts and permissible as per the provisions of Master Plan was 18172 sfts. The permissible Ground Coverage as per the Master Plan in vogue was 60%, but the Ground Coverage proposed in the revised plans was 64.86% and 75.98% was already covered at Site. Similarly, the permissible Floor Space Index (FSI) or Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as per Master Plan was 1.20, but FSI proposed in the revised plans was 3.24 and 3.41 already existing at the Site. The setbacks found existing at the Site were 86' in the Front from the central line of the road towards West, 6' in the rear from central line of the lane towards East, partly 4'-6" & partly blind in one side towards North and partly 16' & partly blind in other side towards South. The proposed setbacks in the revised plans were 86' in the Front towards West, 37'/17'-6" in the rear from the centre of lane towards East after dismantling the existing slab portion, in one side partly 4'-6" & partly blind towards North and in other side partly 15' from the edge of plot towards South after dismantling the existing slab portion.

(xiii) The Draftsman of Town Planning Section (SMC) has submitted her detailed report (Note para No. 03-10) to Divisional Town Planner (SMC) despite NOC conveyed by Senior Town Planner (SDA) vide 26.03.2008, the Draftsman of Town Planning Section

9)f (MC) has expressly conveyed with facts & figures that the revised ' plans are not within permissible limits and will need relaxations in Ground Coverage, FSI and setbacks.

(xiv) The Divisional Town Planner (SMC) has put up the same report to Joint Commissioner Planning (SMC) vide his note para No.11. The Joint Commissioner Planning being Member Secretary of BOCA has got Agenda Memo prepared in the building section for BOCA meeting scheduled on 19.04.2008.The observations of Town Planning Section (SMC) have been reflected in the Agenda Memo by Building Section wherein proposed Ground Coverage, Floor

Index (FSI) and Setbacks have been clearly shown exceeding the permissible limits. But Joint Commissioner Planning (Member Secretary BOCA) has ignored these observations in his personal rate on the Agenda Memo and recommended restoration of previous building permissions after minor relaxation of setbacks. He has not even mentioned Floor Space Index (FSI) and Ground Coverage in his personal note. He has mentioned NOC of Senior Town Planner (SDA). He willfully concealed the observations of his own Town Planning Section of SMC.

(xv) The Building Operations Controlling Authority (BOCA) has met on 19.04.2008 and approved the revised plans in the meeting on the basis of NOC received from Srinagar Development Authority. The observations of Town Planning Section (SMC) were completely overlooked by Building Operations Controlling Authority (BOCA). These observations were expressly mentioned with facts & figures on the Agenda Memo placed before the participants of the BOCA meeting. Pursuant to the approval of BOCA in its meeting on 19.04.2008, building permission order No. 58 dated 28.04.2008 has been issued in favour of Mushtaq Ahmad Ganie @ Chaya & his two sons for construction of four storey commercial complex with revolving Restaurant cum basement for parking purposes on the basis of revised plans under the signature of Secretary BOCA. 16. During investigation a joint inspection of the Site was conducted by the experts of Town Planning Organization Kashmir and Architect Organization Kashmir. The Joint Inspection Report thereof received vide letter No.ACB/ NK/CTPK/2020/2080 dated 31.12.2020 of Chief Town Planner Kashmir revealed that the revised plans approved by Building Operations Controlling Authority (BOCA) in its meeting on 19.04.2008 were not permissible as per Master Plan Srinagar 2000-2021 in vogue at that period of time. During inspection it was found that BOCA has violated the provisions of Master Plan Srinagar 2000-202 1 and the land owners have further violated the building permission of the BOCA. The observation of the Joint team of Town Planning Experts also reveals that Plinth area, Ground

Coverage, Floor Area Ratio, number of Floors and North side setback permitted by BOCA in its meeting on 19.04.2008 were beyond the permissible limits of Master Plan Srinagar 2000-2021 and as such, the Authority has granted undue favour to the private beneficiaries in the shape of Building Permission Order No. 58 of 2008 dated 28.04.2008. The builders have even exceeded the already availed Building Permission limits at the Site and five storey complex is in commercial use of accused beneficiaries in the name & style "Sara City Centre."

(xvi) The Building Permission Order No. 58 of 2008 dated 28.04.2008 along with plans, Agenda Memo No. 19 of 19.04.2008, file notes, attendance register etc were seized from Srinagar Municipal Corporation and sent to Forensic Science Laboratory Srinagar for ascertaining signatures/ handwritings of the concerned public servants. The FSL Report thereof received has confirmed signatures and handwritings of all the accused persons and other concerned officials of Srinagar Municipal Corporation.

(xvii) Statements of all the officials of Srinagar Municipal Corporation who have remained associated with the process of the building permission file have been recorded under Section 161 CrPC . Statements of Town Planning Experts have also been recorded under Section 161 CrPC who have conducted inspection of the site during investigation. Al the witnesses have corroborated the facts of the case.

(xviii) During investigation accused public servants were provided ample opportunities to explain their positions and provide anything in defence of their culpabilities. All the accused have accepted in their questionnaires that building permission order No. 58 of 2008 dated 28.04.2008 was in violation of Master Plan Srinagar 2000-2021 on various counts like Ground Coverage, Flood Space Index No. Floors, setbacks etc".

7 After discussing the outcome of investigation, the VOK in its

status report has elaborated the individual role of the petitioners in

the commission of offences alleged in the impugned FIRs. Lastly, it

was submitted that the investigation in the impugned FIRs has been

concluded as proved against all the petitioners-public servants as

well as the beneficiaries, namely Mushtaq Ahmad Gania and his two

sons and that the case which was forwarded to the Government for

accord of sanction for launching prosecution against the in-service

public servants has been received back and the competent authority

having considered the matter on merit has granted the sanction for

prosecution on being satisfied that there is enough evidence collected

by the VOK to connect the accused-public servants in the

commission of offences alleged.

Arguments and analysis.

8 Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record, I am of the considered view that no case is made out to quash

the impugned FIRs and the investigation carried pursuant thereto,

particularly at the stage when the investigation in the impugned FIRs

has since been concluded and the sanction for prosecution against the

accused public servants has been granted by the competent authority.

The grievance of the petitioners, if any, against the investigation or

even with regard to registration of FIRs can be very well examined

by the competent Court of law („trial Court‟) when the final report is

presented before it and the matter is taken up for framing of charges.

At this stage, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the due

process of law and sift the evidence collected by the investigating

agency to find out as to whether, there is sufficient material to

proceed against the petitioners.

9 Admittedly, in the instant case, the building permission in

reference to the impugned FIR has been registered, was granted by

the BOCA on 28.04.2008. It remained unnoticed till a complaint was

received against the coming up of several illegal structures and super

structures in the City of Srinagar in sheer violation of Master Plan

and the building bylaws. As a matter of fact, Peoples Welfare

Society, J&K filed a Public Interest Litigation (WPPL No. 13/2006)

to challenge the allotment of J&K CONFED land to private persons

and to stop the illegal construction activities over it. This petition

filed in public interest was dismissed by a Bench of this Court on

30.10.2007 on the ground that no public interest cause was projected

in the said petition. It may be worthwhile to notice that the petitoners

Mushtaq Ahmad Ganai and his two sons, namely Waseem Mushtaq

and Naseem Mushtaq, who had been granted four building

permissions in the year 2002 to raise four separate commercial

complexes/buildings, had raised the construction in violation of the

building permissions and instead of raising four different commercial

structures, they had amalgamated it into a single mega structure. This

integration of four building permissions granted for raising four

different structures into a construction of a mega construction

complex was found by the Srinagar Municipal Corporation

Authorities in violation of the building permission and, accordingly,

the building owners were served with a notice of demolition of the

illegally raised buildings. Feeling aggrieved, the land owners i.e

petitioners Mushtaq Ahmad Ganai and his two sons appealed before

the J&K Special Tribunal, Srinagar. While the appeal was pending

consideration of the Tribunal, the petitioners Mushtaq Ahmad Ganai

and his two sons submitted a revised plan, obviously to legitimize

and legalise the illegal structures raised by them by integrating four

different building permissions granted by SMC for raising

construction of four separate commercial structures. The BOCA, it is

alleged, instead of contesting the appeal on merits, and ensuring that

the super structure raised in violation of the building permissions and

the Master Plan is demolished, accepted the revised plan of the

petitioners Mushtaq Ahmad Ganai and his two sons and without

ensuring that the revised plan complies with the Master Plan and the

building bylaws, granted fresh building permission vide No. 58 dated

28.04.2008 in supersession of earlier four building permissions

granted. The revised plan was placed before the Tribunal and in the

light of the said revised plan sanctioned by the BOCA/SMC, the

appeal was, accordingly, disposed by the Tribunal. This is how, it is

claimed, the petitioners conspiring with each other, succeeded in

legalising and legitimising the gross violations committed by them.

The acts and omissions of the public servants aimed at conferring

wrongful benefit upon the beneficiaries would have gone unnoticed,

had the vigilant citizen not made a complaint with regard to

haphazard constructions coming up in the Srinagar city, recklessly

and in violation of the Master Plan. The complaint lodged by a

citizen prompted the authorities in the Vigilance Organization to

enter into preliminary enquiry/verification of the allegations. After

conducting thorough verification and collecting relevant records

from the different quarters, the VOK found the disclosure of

commission of cognizable offences under Sections 5(1)(d) read with

5(2) of the Act and 120-B RPC and, accordingly, registered the FIR

impugned.

10 I have gone through the scanned record of investigation

provided to me by Mr. Dar, learned Sr. AAG and I find that VOK

has collected enough evidence to present the challan before the

competent Court of law. The competent authority, having considered

the entire material, has also found the accused-public servants, prima

facie, guilty of commission of offences alleged in the impugned FIR

and has, thus, granted sanction for launching prosecution against

them.

11 Mr. Z.A.Shah, learned senior counsel, appearing for the

petitioners Waseem Mushtaq and others in CRM(M) 163/2021

relying upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of

W.B and ors vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and ors, (1982) 1

Supreme Court Cases 561, submits that in terms of Section 154

CrPC, unless the information received discloses the commission of

cognizable offence, no FIR can be registered and in absence of valid

registration of FIR, the Investigating Agency does not acquire

jurisdiction to investigate the matter. Learned senior counsel would,

therefore, submit that in the instant case, having regard to the

allegations made in the impugned FIR, which, of course was

registered after verification, it cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be

said that the commission of offences under Sections 5(1)(d) read

with Section 5(2) of the Act and 120-B RPC is at all disclosed. To

the similar extent is the reliance placed by Mr. Shah, learned senior

counsel on the comparatively recent judgment of the Supreme Court

in Professor R.K. Vijayasarathy vs. Sudha Seetharam, 2019 (16)

SCC 739. Mr. Shah, in particular, would invite my attention to para

10 of the judgment supra, wherein the Supreme Court, while

referring to two judge Bench judgment in the case of Indian Oil

Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd, (1977) 2 SCC 699 has

formulated guiding principles for the exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 482 of CrPC. Mr. Shah, learned senior counsel would submit

that FIR or a complaint can be quashed where the allegations made

in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not, prima facie, constitute any offence

or make out the case alleged against the accused. He would,

therefore, submit that allowing the investigation to proceed and

consequently putting the petitioners to trial would be clear abuse of

process of the Court.

12 Mr. R.A. Jan, learned senior counsel, while echoing the

arguments of Mr. Shah, would further submit that the grant of

sanction by BOCA in the year 2008 on the basis of a revised plan

submitted by the builders is fully in consonance with law and does

not, in any manner, violate the Master Plan in vogue or the building

permission bylaws. He would take me to different provisions of

COBA Act and the relevant portion of the Master Plan to bring home

his point. It is further argued that, for any construction raised in

violation of the building permission or against the Master Plan and

the building byelaws, there is inbuilt mechanism provided under the

Act and the offending constructions can very well be demolished

after following due process of law. However, mere irregularity in the

grant of permission or even dereliction of duty by the public officers

in preventing such violations does not ipso facto constitute a criminal

offence. The public servants, while exercising their official powers

are granted immunity and cannot be prosecuted for their acts and

omissions, if any, committed by them in discharge of their official

duties.

13 Per contra, Mr. Dar, learned Sr. AAG relying upon several

pronouncements of the Supreme Court, some of the recent years,

would contend that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 CrPC

is very limited and circumscribed and could be exercised only in the

rarest of rare cases. Impugned FIR was registered in the year 2015

and the petitioners despite being aware and having participated in the

investigation never ever raised any finger about its legality or

validity. They were not aggrieved till they were expecting favourable

outcome. It is only when VOK completed the investigation and

found the case established against the petitioners, the instant petitions

have been filed to stall the presentation of challan/final report before

the competent Court of law.

14 Before the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties

are appreciated, it is necessary to first set out the relevant provisions

of Section 5 (1)(d) and 5(2) of the Act and 120-B RPC.

"5.Criminal misconduct:

(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct:-

(a) ...................................

(b).................................

(c)..................................

(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(e)................................

(2) Any public servant who commits any offence of criminal misconduct as referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (e) of sub-section (1), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 2 years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine and if he commits criminal misconduct as referred to in clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy:-

(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."

15 Section 5 of the Act defines „criminal misconduct‟ and

provides for punishment to the public servant, who commits such

criminal misconduct. As is apparent from a bare reading of Section

5(1)(d) of the Act, the public servant is said to commit the offence of

criminal misconduct in the following manner:

"(a) if he by corrupt or illegal means obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(b) if he by otherwise abusing his position as public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage".

16 In the instant case, from a plain reading of the impugned FIR,

it clearly transpires that there is a clear allegation that the accused-

public servants have adopted illegal means and have otherwise

abused their position as public servant to obtain pecuniary advantage,

may not be for themselves, but for the beneficiaries i.e the petitioners

Waseem Mushtaq and Naseem Mushtaq and others. By grant of

building permission in the year 2008 on the basis of a revised plan

submitted by the building owners aforesaid, the accused- public

servants have abused their position and adopted illegal means in

sanctioning the revised plan. It has clearly come in the allegations

made in the FIR that the beneficiaries had in gross violation

integrated four building permissions granted in their favour for

raising four different structures into a one mega commercial

complex. The competent authority had initiated action for demolition

of the illegal structures and had put the beneficiaries/builders to

notice of demolition. The matter was pending adjudication before the

Tribunal and the accused-public servants, instead of contesting the

notice of demolition impugned in the appeal on merits, accepted the

revised plan submitted by the builders to legitimize the illegalities

and violations committed by them. As a result of sanction of revised

plan, the beneficiaries, who were supposed to demolish the illegal

structures, saved the same to their benefit. Needless to say, an FIR is

not an encyclopaedia of all the events and if the information received

by the police relates to the commission of cognizable offence, it

would be sufficient to register the FIR and the investigation set in

motion.

Conclusion

17 Having gone through the contents of impugned FIR minutely,

I am of the considered view that the information collected by the

VOK during verification did disclose the commission of cognizable

offence and, therefore, the registration of impugned FIR by the VOK

cannot be found fault with, nor the investigation carried pursuant

thereto can be held to be bad in law.

18 At this stage, it would be relevant to reproduce the principles

laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil

Corporation (supra) for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482

CrPC:

"A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

(ii)........................................................

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

(iv)............................................................................................................................."

(underlined by me)

19 I also deem it appropriate to reproduce the observations made

by the Supreme Court in para 6 of R.P.Kapur vs. State of Punjab,

AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866.

"6.Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561 -A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power

of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code.

In the present case the magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under Section 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the .proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings.

There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it

manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the a11egations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561- A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke

the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and' contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point".

20 In State of Haryana and ors vs. Bhajan Lal and ors, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335, a note of caution was added that the power under

Section 482 to quash the FIR should be used sparingly and that too in

the rarest of rare cases. The category of cases, where exercise of such

inherent power may be necessitated, was given in paragraph 102 of

the judgment (supra) which, for facility of reference, is also

reproduced hereunder:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code, which we have extracted and reproduced above, Patna High Court Cr. WJC No.125 of 2016 dt.08-04-2016 we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration, wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines of rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases, wherein such power should be exercised:-

(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely, do not prima

facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegation in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

Patna High Court Cr. WJC No.125 of 2016 dt.08-04- 2016 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned act (under which criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance of the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal private grudge."

21 Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court in

the later judgment rendered in the case of State of A.P vs. Golconda

Linga Swamy and another, (2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 522

observed that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section

482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power

requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see

that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound

principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a

legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State

should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case

where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the

evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and

the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and

cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.

Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases

in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of

quashing the proceeding at any stage.

22 In the recent judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the

case of M/S Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd vs. State of

Maharashtra and ors (Cr. Appeal No. 330/2021, decided on April

13,2021, in para 23, the parameters for exercise of power under

Section 482 CrPC for quashing an RIR or a complaint have been

reiterated. The Supreme Court while drawing its conclusion has held

thus:

"(i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the „rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned

Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section

482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied".

(Emphasis supplied)

23 When the instant case is examined in the light of laid down

parameters for exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the High Court,

one would not find it a fit case for stifling the prosecution at this

stage

24 While it is true that mere arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of

official power to confer any benefit or pecuniary advantage to an

unconnected party may not be sufficient to mean that the exercise of

such power is culpable misconduct under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act.

With a view to bring the charge under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, it is

necessary for the prosecution to establish that the public servant has

abused his official position i.e., acted in a manner and for a purpose

he ought not to have; and secondly, that the official position was

abused for securing valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, either for

himself or for any other person. If any other person i.e. the third

party, who as a result of abuse of official position by the public

servant, has acquired a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage is

unconnected to the public servant, perhaps it would be difficult to

view the conduct of public servant as culpable under Section 5(1(d)

of the Act.

25 The question, as to whether the culpable act attributed to the

petitioners-pubic servants was committed in conspiracy in terms of

Section 120-B RPC, is a matter of evidence to be evaluated by the

trial Court when the accused are put on trial. In this regard, I find it

apposite to refer to paras 11 and 13 and 14 of the judgment rendered

in the case of K.R. Purushothaman vs State of Kerala, (2005) 12 SCC

631 which, for, facility of reference, are reproduced hereunder:

"11 Section 120-A of I.P.C. defines `criminal conspiracy.' According to this Section when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designed a criminal conspiracy. In Major EG Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762, Subba Rao J., speaking for the Court has said:

"The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts."

13 To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one of the conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implications. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair.

The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deducted from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence of the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the Court to keep in mind the well-known rule governing circumstantial evidence viz., each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and the circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn, and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. The criminal conspiracy is an independent offence in Indian Penal Code. The unlawful agreement is sine quo non for constituting offence under Indian Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the Plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of agreement.

14. The suspicion can not take the place of a legal proof and prosecution would be required to prove each and every circumstance in the chain of circumstances so as to complete the chain. It is true that in most of the cases, it is not possible to prove the agreement between the conspirators by direct evidence but the same can be inferred from the circumstances giving rise to conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. It is held in Noor Mohd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 885, that:

"in most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be founded on solid facts. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other factors constitute relevant material."

[underlined by me to supply emphasis]

26 From the legal position adumbrated in the aforesaid judgment

of the Supreme Court, it is trite that there may not always be direct

evidence to the conspiracy, but the same can be inferred from the

circumstances giving rise to conclusive or irresistible inference of an

agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence.

27 The allegation in the FIR, that the sanction of revised

permission legitimizing the illegalities and the violations committed

by the accused-beneficiaries, was result of a criminal conspiracy

hatched by the accused-public servants and the beneficiaries, is,

prima facie, inferable from the circumstances narrated in the

impugned FIR itself. Without saying much on the issue, I am of the

view that the aforesaid aspects should be left, to be determined by

the trial Court at appropriate stage and it could well be the stage of

framing of charges in the case.

28 With regard to the contention of Mr. Jan, learned senior

counsel that the Vigilance Organization, having once decided to

close the case as not admitted, could not have arbitrarily and without

justifiable reasons, reopened the same and vex the petitioners again,

suffice it to say that it is true that at one point of time after the

investigation in the impugned FIR, the then Superintendent of Police,

VOK recommended the case to be sent for regular departmental

enquiry against the accused-public servants. The said

recommendations were made by SSP, VOK having regard to the

development that had taken place during the pendency of

investigation. The case was not recommended to be closed as not

admitted on the ground that the investigating officer had not been

able to collect sufficient evidence to connect the accused with the

alleged offences, but for the reason that the Cabinet had come up

with a new policy providing for regularisation of illegal structures in

the Capital cities and the holy town of Katra. However, the State

Vigilance Commission, on coming to now that the Vigilance

Organization had closed certain cases under investigation had suo

motu called upon the Director, Jammu and Kashmir State Vigilance

Organization to provide a list of all the FIRs which had been closed

as not proved during the year 2017 along with final reports, legal

brief and comments of the Directors Vigilance Organization, so that

view in the matter could be taken. While the matter was pending

consideration of the State Vigilance Commission, GAD with

reference to FIR No. 11/2015 which was identical to FIR 12/2015

had vide its communication dated 15.09.2020 directed the ACB to

examine the matter afresh in the light of observations made therein.

Taking cue from the aforesaid communication of GAD, the Director

of prosecution in the Directorate of Anti Corruption Bureau vide its

communication dated 26.11.2020 called upon the Sr. SSP of Police

Station, Anti Corruption Burea, Baramulla to re-examine and further

investigate both the FIRs aforesaid. It is in these circumstances, the

matter was re-examined and subjected to further investigation. The

argument of Mr. Jan, learned senior counsel that the decision to

reopen the closed case was taken by the respondents arbitrarily is not

substantiated by the record and, therefore, cannot be accepted.

29 In view of the aforesaid discussion and without going much

into the merits of the controversy, lest it may prejudice either side, I

am of the considered view that the petitioners have not been able to

make out a case for invoking extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this

Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the impugned FIR and the

investigation carried pursuant thereto. Accordingly, CRM(M)

Nos. 186/2021, 163/2021 and 192/2021 are dismissed.

30 For the foresaid reasons and on the same analogy, the prayer

of the petitioners in CRM(M) 187/2021 for quashing of FIR

No. 11/2015 is also rejected and the same is also dismissed.

Record, if any received, be returned to the concerned.

                                                 (SANJEEV KUMAR)
                                                           JUDGE

16 .08.2021
Sanjeev PS

              Whether the order is speaking:        Yes
              Whether the order is reportable:      Yes