Decided On: 02.05.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh
2025 Latest Caselaw 323 HP

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Decided On: 02.05.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 2 May, 2025

Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Sushil Kukreja

1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

Cr. MP No. 1221 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal No. 142 of 2025

Decided on: 02.05.2025 _____________________________________________________ Inderjeet Singh .....Appellant/applicant.

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh ......Respondent/non-applicant. _____________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

_____________________________________________________ For the applicant: Mr. Vijender Katoch, Advocate. For the non-applicant/State: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Senior Additional Advocate General, Mr. Navlesh Verma and Ms. Sharmila Patial, Additional Advocates General, with Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate General.

Sushil Kukreja, Judge.

This order shall dispose of application, filed by the

applicant/appellant Inderjeet Singh, under Section 430 of The

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking suspension of

sentence awarded by the learned Special Judge-I, Kangra at

Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., vide judgment of conviction

and order of sentence dated, 06.01.2025, in Sessions Case No.

29-D/VII/2023, for the commission of offence punishable under

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

Section 21 read with Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs &

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the

NDPS Act") and releasing him on bail.

2. The learned Counsel for the appellant/applicant

contended that the appellant/applicant had got a very good

arguable case on merits, as the evidence relied upon by the

learned Trial Court is shaky, thus not tenable in the eyes of law.

He also contended that the prosecution has failed to comply with

the mandatory provisions of the Act, which castes a doubt qua the

alleged recovery from the conscious possession of the

appellant/applicant. He further contended that there are material

contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses,

which the learned Trial Court has lightly brushed aside. He also

contended that the applicant is in custody for the last two years

and the appeal is not likely to be heard in near future, therefore, in

view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the

sentence imposed upon the appellant/application by the learned

Trial Court be suspended in the interest of justice and fair play.

3. Per contra the learned Additional Advocate General

contended that the appellant/applicant is not entitled for

suspension of sentence, as commercial quantity of 260 grams of

heroin was recovered from the exclusive and conscious 3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

possession of the appellant/applicant and the learned Trial Court

found him guilty. It is further contended that after the judgment of

conviction, there is no presumption of innocence in favour of the

appellant/applicant and the instant application, being devoid of

merits, deserves to be dismissed.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the

applicant/appellant as well as learned Additional Advocate General

and have also gone through the material available on record.

5. The perusal of the record reveals that learned Special

Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., vide

judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 06.01.2025,

convicted the applicant/appellant Inderjeet Singh and other

accused person, i.e., Sulakhan Singh under Section 21 read with

Section 29 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years each and to pay

fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each for their alleged involvement in

possessing 260 grams of heroin and in default of payment of fine

to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six

months.

6. Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by the

learned counsel for the appellant/applicant as well as learned

Additional Advocate General for the non-applicant/State, it would 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

be beneficial to refer to the settled legal position, to the effect that

when the appellant/applicant accused is convicted by the

competent Criminal Court, the initial presumption of innocence is

no more available to him.

7. In State of Maharashtra vs. Madhukar Wamanrao

Smarth, (2008) 5 SCC 721, the Hon'ble apex Court referred to the

parameters delineated in Kishori Lal vs. Rupa & others, (2004) 7

SCC 638 to be observed by the High Court while dealing with an

application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail and

reiterated the view taken in Vasant Tukaram Pawar vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 281. The relevant part runs as under:

"10. The parameters to be observed by the High Court while dealing with an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail have been highlighted by this Court in many cases. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa it was observed as follows:

"4. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short "the Code") deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.

The above position was reiterated in Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2005 (5) SCC 281)"

8. In Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr. reported in 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

(2020) 8 SCC 645, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that

for grant of post-conviction bail to a convict under Section 389 of

Code of Criminal Procedure, there has to be strong and compelling

reasons and such strong and compelling reason must be recorded

in the order granting bail. The relevant para of the aforesaid

judgments reads as under:

"35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018 3 SCC

22). However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors.

There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC."

9. In (NCT of Delhi) v. Lokesh Chadha, (2021) 5 SCC

724, it was held that the principle of bail being the rule and jail

being an exception cannot be attracted, once there is conviction

upon trial. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment reads as

under:

"10. At this stage, we will refer to the decision of a two-

judge Bench of this Court in Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. [Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 897] where Indira Banerjee, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows : (SCC 6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

p. 655, para 35)

"35. There is a difference between the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre- trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and the grant of bail, post- conviction. In the earlier case there may be a presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v.

State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise.

Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC."

10. It has further been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6

SCC 123 that while deciding the application for suspension of the

sentence, the Court should consider whether the applicant has a

fair chance of acquittal. The relevant para of the aforesaid

judgment is extracted hereunder:

""23. The principle underlying the theory of criminal jurisprudence in our country is that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is held guilty by a court of the competent jurisdiction. Once the accused is held guilty, the presumption of innocence gets erased. In the same manner, if the accused is acquitted, then the presumption of innocence gets further fortified.

24. From perusal of Section 389 of the Cr. PC, it is evident that save and except the matter falling under the category of sub-Section 3 neither any specific principle of law is laid 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

down nor any criteria has been fixed for consideration of the prayer of the convict and further, having a judgment of conviction erasing the presumption leaning in favour of the accused regarding innocence till contrary recorded by the court of the competent jurisdiction, and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be a fine distinction between the prayer for bail at the pre- conviction as well as the post-conviction stage, viz Sections 437, 438, 439 and 389(1) of the Cr. PC.

25 to 32 xxx

33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the Court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr. PC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach."

11. Taking into consideration the position of law, as can be

gathered from various judgments of the Supreme Court, it is very

clear that discretion at the time of considering the plea of the

accused for suspension of sentence pending final hearing of

appeal has to be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of

course as once the conviction is recorded, the presumption of

innocence is no longer available to the appellant. The discretion to

suspend the sentence vests in the court and it is required to be

exercised judicially keeping in view all facts and circumstances and

the nature of offence. The Court has to exercise this discretion with

utmost care and caution, balancing one's right and liberty on one 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

hand and the interest of the society on the other.

12. In the instant case, the nature of the allegations against

the accused are serious, as he, alongwith other co-accused, was

found in exclusive and conscious possession of 260 grams of

heroin, which is a commercial quantity. The learned counsel for

the appellant/applicant highlighted some contradictions in the

statements of prosecution witnesses and also contended that the

prosecution had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of

the NDPS Act, which castes a doubt qua the alleged recovery from

the conscious possession of the appellant/applicant. However, the

contentions raised by the learned counsel for the

appellant/applicant cannot be gone into in detail at the stage of

deciding the present application for suspension of sentence.

Whether these contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses are so glaring to affect the core of the prosecution case,

can only be examined at the stage of final hearing. In Om

Prakash Sahni's case (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has

clearly held that the Appellate Court should not re-appreciate the

evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr.PC and try to pick

up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the

prosecution, which would not be a correct approach.

13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12643 )

mind, the nature of conviction and sentence imposed by the

learned Trial Court, that too, after a full-fledged trial, we feel our

self persuaded to hold that the appellant/convict, at this stage, has

miserably failed to carve out a strong case for suspension of

sentence and his release on bail. The application for suspension of

sentence and release of appellant/convict on bail, therefore being

misconceived, is dismissed and stands disposed of accordingly.

14. Since the appeal pertains to the year 2025 and already

stands admitted, the appellant/applicant is at liberty to move

appropriate application(s) for early hearing of the appeal.

( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge

( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 2nd May, 2025 (virender)