Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 5941 HP
Judgement Date : 30 December, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
ON THE 30th DAY OF DECEMBER 2021.
.
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN
CIVIL ORIGINAL PETITION CONTEMPT
(TRIBUNAL) No. 467 of 2020.
Between:-
1. SH. TILAK RAJ, S/O SH. KARTAR SINGH,
R/O VILLAGE KHAL, P.O. SALETI, TEHSIL
RAKKAR, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.,
PRESENTLY WORKING AS REVENUE
CHOWKIDAR/PEON ON REGULAR BASIS
AT PATWAR CIRCLE KUDANA IN DISTRICT
KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.
2. SH. SANDEEP KUMAR, S/O SH. NAND LAL,
R/O VILLAGE DHAR KHAROTI, P.O. &
TEHSIL RAKKAR, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.,
PRESENTLY WORKING AS REVENUE
CHOWKIDAR ON REGULAR BASIS IN
PATWAR CIRCLE CHAPLAH, TEHSIL
RAKKAR, DISTRICT KANGRA, H.P.
3. SH. CHAMAN LAL, S/O SH. PROKHI RAM,
R/O COLLEGE ROAD, KANGRA, TEHSIL
& DISTRICT KANGRA (H.P.), PRESENTLY
IS WORKING AS REVENUE CHOWKIDAR
ON REGULAR BASIS IN PATWAR CIRCLE
KANGRA CITY, DISTRICT KANGRA (H.P.).
4. SH. SURESH KUMAR, S/O SH. SIDHU RAM,
R/O TIKA MAUJA ANSOLI, P.O. MATAUR,
TEHSIL & DISTRICT KANGRA (H.P.),
PRESENTLY WORKING AS REVENUE
CHOWKIDAR ON DAILY WAGE BASIS
IN PATWAR CIRCLE MATAUR, DISTRICT
KANGRA (H.P.). ......PETITIONERS/
APPLICANTS.
(BY SH. ONKAR JAIRATH, ADVOCATE)
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AND
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1. SMT. MANISHA NANDA, ADDITIONAL
CHIEF SECRETARY-CUM-FINANCE
COMMISSIONER, REVENUE, H.P., AT
SHIMLA-02.
2. SH. SANJEEV KUMAR, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
KANGRA, AT DHARAMSHALA (HP).
3. SH. ONKAR SHARMA, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY-
CUM-FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, REVENUE,
H.P., SHIMLA.
4. SH. RAKESH KUMAR, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
KANGRA, DHARAMSHALA.
.....RESPONDENTS/
CONTEMNORS.
(SH. ASHOK SHARMA, ADVOCATE
GENERAL WITH. SH. RAJINDER DOGRA,
SENIOR ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL,
SH. VINOD THAKUR, ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE
GENERAL AND SH. RAJAT CHAUHAN, LAW
OFFICER, FOR RESPONDENTS-1 TO 4)
This contempt petition coming on for admission
after notice this day, the Court passed the following:
ORDER
The instant contempt petition has been filed by
the petitioners under Section 17 of the H.P. Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985 read with Section 12 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, for punishing the respondents for
disobeying the orders of the erstwhile Tribunal dated
01.09.2017 passed in O.A. No. 4141 of 2017.
.
2. The petitioners approached the erstwhile
Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 4141 of 2017 for grant of the
following reliefs:-
"7 i) That the respondents may be directed to
regularize the services of the Applicants retrospectively w.e.f. 2012, the day on which they completed 8 years service on daily wage
basis with all consequential benefits.
ii) That the respondent may further be directed to release the arrears to the Applicants
w.e.f. 01.04.2012 to 30.11.2016 alongwith the interest @ 9% p.a."
3. The aforesaid O.A. came up for consideration
before the learned Tribunal on 01.09.2017 and the same
was disposed of in the following manner:-
"5. The learned counsel for the applicants submits at the very outset that the respective cases of the applicants are squarely covered under common judgment dated 20th July, 2012, Annexure A-2, rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in CWP No. 2494 of 2012, Pinju Ram Versus State of H.P. and another and the connected matters.
6. The learned Additional Advocate General states that subject to verification of records, if it is found
.
that the applicants are similarly situate as the
petitioner in CWP No. 2494 of 2012 and the connected matters, their cases shall also be
considered accordingly.
7. In view of the above, the original application is disposed of in terms of the aforementioned judgment in CWP No. 2494 of 2012 and the
connected matters, with a direction to the respondents/competent authority that subject to the above verification and on finding the applicants to
be similarly situate as above, benefit of the said
judgment, if the same has attained finality and implemented, shall also be extended to them alongwith consequential benefits, if any, as per law,
within three months from the date of production of certified copy this order before the said authority by
the applicants."
4. According to the petitioners, the judgment in
Pinju Ram's case has attained finality. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the respondents to have regularized their
services and having failed to do so, they need to be
punished for having willfully disobeyed the judgment dated
01.09.2017 passed by the learned Tribunal.
5. The respondents have filed their reply wherein it
is averred that the erstwhile Tribunal had not disposed of
O.A. No. 4141 of 2017 on merits, rather, it only directed the
respondents to examine the case of the petitioners in light
.
of the judgment in Pinju Ram's case. It is further averred
that the services of the petitioners were regularized as per
order dated 15.09.2018 in compliance to the directions
passed in O.A. No. 4141 of 2017 and in view of the
judgment in Pinju Ram's case. It is also averred that
thereafter respondent No.2 r issued a corrigendum on
29.03.2019 wherein it was clarified that in the order dated
15.09.2018 the words "with all consequential benefits"
may be read as "on notional basis" and the said
corrigendum was based on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 898-900 of 2019 arising
out of SLP(C) Nos. 37383-37385 of 2012, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court while disposing of the appeals
observed as under:-
"Having regard to this background, we are of the view that once the State Government decided o bring part time revenue chowkidars on a daily wage basis with the added stipulation that while their seniority would count from the completion of 10 years, this would be without any past financial benefits, this principle was required to be duly followed.
In the circumstances, the Hon'ble High Court ought not to have issued a direction for payment of
.
consequential monetary benefits with effect from 1 st
January, 2007. Such a direction in fact was inconsistent with the observations of the Hon'ble
High Court itself in Moti Singh (supra) which was decided on 21st April, 2011 (copy of which is annexed as Annexure R/6).
The directions contained in the impugned
order for the payment of monetary benefits with effect from 1st January, 2007 shall stand set aside. We clarify that the State Government shall abide by
the stipulations which are contained in the
communication dated 22-09-2011 issued by the Principal Secretary-cum F.C. (Revenue) to the Government of H.P. which have been noted in the
earlier part of this judgment.
We, however, clarify that the seniority of the
part time chowkidars who are granted daily wage status will be counted from the date of completion
of 10 years as part time Chowkidars though without any financial benefits for the past. For the above
reasons, we are of the view that the present appeals should be allowed They are accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any shall stand disposed off."
6. It is on the strength of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that the respondents justified their
action of granting notional benefits to the petitioners with
effect from 01.01.2012 and on actual basis from the date of
joining on regular basis.
.
7. In the given facts and circumstances, now the
moot question is whether the respondents can, prima facie,
be held guilty for having committed contempt of the orders
of the Court.
8. Once the order is passed by the Government on
the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises
a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate
forum. The order may be wrong or may be right or may not
be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a
fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail
opportunity by way of judicial review. But that cannot be
considered to be the willful violation of the order.
9. In taking this view, this Court is supported by the
judgment passed by three Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in (1996) 6 SCC 291 titled J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat
Duggar and others, wherein it was observed as under:-
"6.......... It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of
the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order....."
.
10. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971, (for short the 'Act') which is relevant for the
adjudication of this contempt petition, reads as under:
"(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;"
11. There can be no doubt that where there has
been an unequivocal, deliberate and willful disobedience to
the order of the Court, punishment for contempt of Court is
called for and should be unhesitatingly imposed upon the
party, if found guilty. But, then it should be remembered
that the Court's power to punish the contemnor in summary
proceedings is to be used sparingly and with
circumspection. In a contempt petition as indeed, in every
other case the decision must necessarily rest on the facts of
that case.
12. In Jiwani Kumari Parekh vs. Satyabrata
Chakravorty, AIR 1991 SC 326, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that unless willful or deliberate disobedience of
the order of the Court is committed, the charge of contempt
cannot be brought home. Even bona fide misinterpretation
of the Court judgment/order cannot attract contempt. A
party can be held guilty in case disobedience of the
judgment or order is willful or deliberate.
.
13. In Niaz Mohammad and others vs. State of
Haryana and others (1994) 6 SCC 332, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that the framers of the Act while
defining civil contempt have said that it must be willful
disobedience of any judgment, decree etc and, therefore,
before a contemnor is punished for non-compliance of a
direction of a Court, the Court must not only be satisfied
about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction
or writ, but should also be satisfied that such disobedience
was willful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a
particular case, the Court is satisfied that although there has
been a disobedience, but the disobedience is the result of
some compelling circumstances under which it was not
possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the
Court will not punish the alleged contemnor.
14. What would be willful disobedience was
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Paper
Kamgar Union vs. Dharam Godha and others (2003)
11 SCC 1 and it was held that 'willful disobedience' means
an act or omission which is done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the
law prohibits or with the specific intent to fail to do
.
something that law requires to be done, that is to say with
bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.
According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it signifies an act
done with an evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. It
was further observed that the acts or omissions have to be
judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each
case.
15. The legal position has been lucidly laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs.
United India Insurance Company Limited and others
(2010) 12 SCC 770, wherein it was observed as under:
" 17. This now leads us to the next question and a more relevant one, as to whether a proceeding for contempt
initiated against the appellant can be held to be sustainable merely on speculation, assumption and inference drawn from facts and circumstances of the
instant case. In our considered opinion, the answer clearly has to be in the negative in view of the well-settled legal position reflected in a catena of decisions of this court that contempt of a civil nature can be held to have been made out only if there has been a wilful disobedience of the order and even though there may be disobedience, yet if the same High Court of H.P. does not reflect that it has been a conscious and wilful disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have been made out. In fact, if an order is capable of more than one interpretation giving rise to variety of consequences, non-compliance of the same cannot be held to be wilful disobedience of the order so as to make out a case of contempt entailing the serious consequence including imposition of punishment. However, when the Courts are confronted with a question as to
whether a given situation could be treated to be a case of wilful disobedience, or a case of a lame excuse, in order to subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it may be, will
.
obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case; but while deciding so, it would not be legally correct to be too speculative based on assumption as the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 clearly postulates and emphasizes that the ingredient of wilful disobedience must
be there before anyone can be hauled up for the charge of contempt of a civil nature."
23. Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook or ignore an important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature given out u/s 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts
Act 1971 that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience to the order. Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged to have been
disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable or rational
interpretation of an order or circumstance which is the factual position in the instant matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that a party although acting due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the
Court, should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a contempt proceeding.
24. To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it would
be relevant and appropriate to take into consideration the settled legal position as reflected in the judgment and order delivered in the matter of Ahmad Ali v. Supdt.,
District Jail, AIR 1987 SC 1491 as also in B.K. Kar v. High Court of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 1367 that mere unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt and although, disobedience might have been
established,absence of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is not sufficient to justify one for holding guilty of contempt. It is further relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of contempt that casual or accidental or unintentional acts of disobedience under the circumstances which negate any suggestion of contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory only and does not render the contemnor liable to punishment and this was the view expressed also in cases reported in AIR 1954 Patna 513, State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari and AIR 1957 Patna 528, N. Bakshi Vs. O.K. Ghosh."
16. Thus, what can be taken to be settled on the
basis of the aforesaid exposition of law is that it is duty of the
.
Court to punish a person who tries to obstruct the course of
justice or brings to disrepute the institution of Judiciary.
However, this power has to be exercised not casually or
lightly, but with great care and circumspection. Contempt
proceedings serve a dual purpose of vindication of the public
interest by punishment of the contumacious conduct and
coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law
requires of him.
17. A question whether there is contempt of Court or
not is a serious one. The Court is both the accuser as well as
the judge of the accusation. It behoves the Court to act with
as great circumspection as possible making all allowances
for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate
practices in Courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case
of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises
that the contemnor must be punished. The lapse is
deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defiance of
authority. Punishment under the law of Contempt is called
for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's
duty and in defiance of authority.
18. While dealing with the contempt petitions, the
Courts are not required to travel beyond the four corners of
.
order, which is alleged to have been disobeyed or
disregarded deliberately and willfully. In this connection, it
shall be apposite to make a fruitful recapitulation of a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Kishan
vs. Tarun Bajaj and others 2014 AIR SCW 1218,
wherein it was held that:
" 9. Contempt jurisdiction conferred onto the law courts power to punish an offender for his willful
disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizens that his rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society
will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless,
thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither fair nor reasonable for the law courts to
exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi- criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence
for contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. (Vide: V.G. Nigam & Ors. v. Kedar Nath Gupta & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2153; Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 3468; Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1405; Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 942; Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 705; and National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 1299).
10 . Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is wilful. The word wilful introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of ones state of
mind. Wilful means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual,
.
accidental, bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine
inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely. Wilful act is to be distinguished
from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of
an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt
involves a degree of default or misconduct. (Vide: S. Sundaram Pillai, etc. v. V.R. Pattabiraman; AIR 1985 SC
582; Rakapalli Raja Rama Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 2185; Niaz Mohammad & Ors. etc.etc. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 308; Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, AIR 2000 SC 1880; M/s. Ashok Paper Kamgar Union & Ors. v.
Dharam Godha & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 105; State of Orissa & Ors. v. Md. Illiyas, AIR 2006 SC 258; and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, Raipur, (2013) 9 SCC 753).
11. In Lt. Col. K.D. Gupta v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1989 SC 2071, this Court dealt with a case wherein direction
was issued to the Union of India to pay the amount of Rs. 4 lakhs to the applicant therein and release him from defence service. The said amount was paid to the applicant after deducting the income tax payable on the
said amount. While dealing with the contempt application, this Court held that withholding the amount cannot be held to be either malafide or was there any scope to impute that the respondents intended to violate the direction of this Court.
12. In Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293, the Court while dealing with the issue whether a doubt persisted as to the applicability of the order of this Court to complainants held that it would not give rise to a contempt petition. The court was dealing with a case wherein the statutory authorities had come to the conclusion that the order of this court was not applicable to the said complainants while dealing with
the case under the provision of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.
.
13. It is well settled principle of law that if two
interpretations are possible, and if the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be maintainable. The effect and purport of the order is to be taken into consideration and the same must be read in its
entirety. Therefore, the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. (See: Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retd.), AIR 2008 (Supp-2) SC 1837; and Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.C.E.S.C. Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 735): (2008 AIR SCW 7951)."
19.
Similar view has been taken by this Court in
Contempt Petition No. 415 of 2014, titled Rulda Ram Vs.
Rakesh Kanwar, decided on 28th February, 2015.
20. The discussion on the subject would be
incomplete unless and until the reference is made to a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avishek Raja
and others vs. Sanjay Gupta (2017) 8 SCC 435,
wherein the law on the subject was culled out as under:-
"20. The contours of power of the Court so far as commission of civil contempt is concerned have been elaborated upon in
a number of pronouncements of this Court. Illustratively, reference may be made to the following observations in Kapildeo Prasad Sah versus State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 569 (SCC pp.573-74, paras 9-11).
9. For holding the respondents to have committed contempt, civil contempt at that, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience of the judgment or order of the court. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear violation of the court's order. Since notice of contempt and punishment for contempt is of far reaching consequence [and] these powers should be invoked only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court's order has been made out.
Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are to be properly understood and
.
complied with. Even negligence and carelessness can
amount to disobedience particularly when the attention of the person is drawn to the court's orders and its implications....
10..... Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who refuses to comply with the order of the court or disregards the order continuously. .....
11. No person can defy court's order. Willful would
exclude casual, accidental bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. A petitioner who complains breach of court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order."
21. Similar is the view expressed by this Court in Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1, Anil Kumar Shahi v. Prof. Ram Sevak Yadav (2008) 14 SCC 115, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly (2002) 5 SCC 352, Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV (2006) 1 SCC 613,
Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop.Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami (2008) 5 SCC 339 and Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati (2001) 7 SCC 530. In view of the consistency in the opinions rendered therein, it will not be necessary to
burden this order by any detailed reference to what has been held in the above cases except to reiterate that the standard of proof required to hold a person guilty of contempt would
not be the same as in a criminal proceedings and the breach alleged shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt(Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati).
22. More recent in point of time is the view expressed by this court in Noor Saba v. Anoop Mishra (2013) 10 SCC 248 wherein the scope of the contempt power in case of a breach of a court's order has been dealt with in para 14 of the Report in the following manner (SCC pp. 252-53) .
"14.To hold the respondents or anyone of them liable for contempt this Court has to arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction is summary in nature and an adjudication of the liability of the alleged contemnor for wilful disobedience of the Court is normally made on admitted and undisputed facts. In the present case not only has there been a shift in the stand
of the petitioner with regard to the basic facts on which commission of contempt has been alleged even the said new/altered facts do not permit an adjudication in
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consonance with the established principles of exercise of
contempt jurisdiction so as to enable the Court to come to a conclusion that any of the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court....."
23. Similarly, in Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran (2014) 3 SCC 373 the issue has been dealt with in a manner which may be of relevance to the present case. Para 19 of the Report is as follows:(SCC p-381)
19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this
Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act , 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of
the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise
the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not, therefore,
travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such
directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been
any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the
Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above."
21. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, I have
no difficulty to conclude that the instant contempt
proceedings are clearly misconceived as there is no proof or
even a case made out to conclude that the respondents
have deliberately and willfully, that too, with an evil intent
.
or a bad motive or purpose, disobeyed the orders of the
Court. The same are accordingly dismissed. Notice
discharged. However, the petitioners are at liberty to avail
of such remedy, as may be available to them, under the
law.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan) Judge
30th December, 2021.
(krt)
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