[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
District Panchayat vs Ghusabhai Kanjibhai Chotalia Since ... on 24 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/677/2026 ORDER DATED: 24/02/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 677 of
2026
In F/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION/2817/2026
In R/SECOND APPEAL/37/2000
With
F/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2817 of 2026
In
R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 37 of 2000
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DISTRICT PANCHAYAT & ANR.
Versus
GHUSABHAI KANJIBHAI CHOTALIA SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HEIRS
& ORS.
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Appearance:
MR RITURAJ M MEENA(3224) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
MR VISHAL B MEHTA(5319) for the Respondent(s) No. 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 24/02/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. By way of this application filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 (in short "the Act"), the applicant has prayed to condone
the delay of 558 days in filing the Restoration Application to
restore Second Appeal which came to be dismissed for non
prosecution on 19.06.2024.
2. The appellant has filed Second Appeal under section 100 of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'CPC) against judgment
and decree dated 07.01.2000 passed by learned Assistant Judge,
Junagadh in Regular Civil Appeal No.22 of 1997, whereby,
learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and reversed the
judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court in Regular
Civil Suit No.126 of 1992 dated 07.02.1997.
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3. The Second Appeal was listed for hearing on 19.06.2024
and this Court has passed following order :-
"When the matter is taken up for hearing, learned advocate
for the appellant is absent. Even on the last occasion, this
Court has recorded the absence of learned advocate for the
appellants vide order dated 12.06.2024. It seems that the
appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal. The
appeal stands dismissed for non-prosecution."
4. In this circumstances, the applicant has filed Civil
Application to condone delay in preferring Restoration
Application as well as restoration application to restore Second
Appeal.
5. Learned advocate for the applicant submits that applicant
had filed Restoration Application being Misc. Civil Application
No.25815 of 2024 on 03.09.2024 and pursuant to filing of Misc.
Civil Application, the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 06.02.2025
was pleased to direct the learned advocate of the applicant to
remove office objections within period of two weeks. It is
submitted that since office objections were not removed within
time, application for Restoration No.25815 of 2024 was
dismissed for non prosecution. Learned advocate for the
applicant submits that Officer of applicant recently came to
know about the passing of the aforesaid order and tried to
contact earlier advocate, however, since there was no response,
the applicant has engaged another advocate for filing restoration
and to proceed further with the matter. Thereafter, advocate of
applicant without any delay prepared application after seeking
necessary information from the applicant, however, in the
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meantime period of limitation expired. It is submitted that thus
there is delay in preferring Restoration Application. It is also
submitted that there was no intention to abandon the
proceedings. Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that
applicant has good case on merits, it should not be jettisoned on
technical ground. It is submitted that delay is sufficiently
explained and thus, the Court should take liberal view and
condone delay. Thus, it is submitted to allow Civil Application as
well as Restoration Application.
6. Learned advocate Mr.Mehta for the other side submitted
that earlier this Court has passed order on 06.02.2025 and
directed the applicant to remove office objections within time,
which the applicant did not comply. It is submitted that this fact
itself indicates that applicant is negligent in prosecuting lis. It is
submitted that delay is required to be explained by adding
sufficient cause; the Court may not insist for day to day
explanation but at the same time, delay should be sufficiently,
explained which may inspire confidence of the Court. It is
submitted that in the present case, since necessary pleadings
are completely missing, the Court may not exercise discretion to
adopt liberal approach and condone delay.
6.1. Upon above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Mehta
submitted to dismiss the applications.
7. At the outset let refer Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963
which reads as under :-
" 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-
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"Any appeal or any application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after
the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period.
Explanation- The fact that the appellant or the applicant
was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High
Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period
may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this
section."
8. Plain reading of provision of law suggest that, the
applicants were obliged to satisfactorily demonstrate and
explicate the colossal delay and to convince the Court that
sufficient cause existed for not preferring the appeal application
or moving the requisite application within the statutorily
prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts adopt a liberal
approach while considering applications for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, provided that the
delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause. Delay cannot be
condoned by a mere invocation of "liberal approach," "justice-
oriented approach", or "substantial justice." These oft-quoted
expression cannot be deployed in jettison or emasculate the
substantive law of limitation.
9. Rule of limitation is based upon principles of sound
public policy and principles of equity Indeed expression
'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice. This proposition comes into picture
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide in
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imputable to party seeking condonation of delay Whether
explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause or not
will depend on facts of each case and there cannot he
straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation
furnished for delay caused in taking steps. While considering
the matter, the Court is also required to consider all the fact
that why party has not taken steps within time prescribed. The
Court should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps
within the time prescribed time, valuable right has accrued to
other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning
delay in routine like manner.
10. Theory of liberal approach should he adjudicated-on
theory of due diligence. In the present case, length of delay is
3040 days. It is quite long delay and on going through
application as well as arguments, it remains unexplained. They
are propelled by the applicants, it does not seem to be germane
one and none of the reasons prevented the applicants from filing
Second Appeal within time period. It is to he remembered that
pleadings and reasons are not backed out by any documentary
evidence.
11. Factual aspect in the matter indicates that Second
Appeal was dismissed for non prosecution on 19.06.2024 and
thereafter, Misc. Civil Application No.25815 of 2024 was filed to
restore Second Appeal. It appears that on 06.02.2025, Co-
ordinate Bench granted applicant time of two weeks to remove
office objections failing which the matter shall be dismissed for
non prosecution. It appears that applicant has not removed
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office objections within stipulated time period and did not
comply the order.
12. The averments explaining delay are general, vague and
specious and there is no reason much less satisfactory reasons
assigned by the applicant to explain the delay. The applicant
tried to seek condonation of delay, without considering that law
of limitation is substantive law and litigant seeking condonation
of delay needed to satisfy the Court that he / she had sufficient
reason / cause for not preferring appeal or making application
within stipulated time period.
13. According to this Court, the applicant has failed to
establish any sufficient reasons which has prevented him to file
Restoration Application within stipulated time period.
14. Let have a worthy assistance from the following
authorities / pronouncements on condonation of delay
embodied in section 5 of the Limitation Act.
14.1 In Lanka Venkateswarlu v/s. State of Andhra Pradesh
[AIR 2011 SC 1199], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
as under :-
"Generally the Courts including Supreme Court adopt a
liberty approach in considering application for condonation
of delay on ground of sufficient cause under section 5 of the
Act. However, the concept such as "liberal approach", justice
oriented approach, "substantial justice" cannot be employed
to jettison the substantial law of limitation."
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14.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India
v/s. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy [2024 (2) GLH 217], after
surveying earlier judgments in para 33 and 35 has held as under
:-
"33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v/s. Managing
committee of Raghunathpur Nagar Academy (2013) 12
SCC 649, this Court made the following observations :-
21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not
supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had
to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to
be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so
that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may
not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
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21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be
taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily
to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective
reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone
delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a
lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not
be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a
conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of
the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the
ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said
that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
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Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this
vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case."
14.3 Recently, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka
Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its aureate enunciation, has held
thus:-
"259. We are of the view that the question of limitation
is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is
abundantly clear that the High Court has erroneously
condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of
certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there
being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with
finding certain merits in the case of the respondent no.
1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant
and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate
Court. We have no hesitation"[10] It appears that the
entire blame has been thrown on the head of the
advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the
trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a
tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their
lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending
the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for
a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or
negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone
long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to
be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be
equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending
in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant,
therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire
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blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown
him at any time and seek relief."
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to
the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum
MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance
Corporation, reported in 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this
Court held as under:-
'The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to
ensure that actions are commenced within a particular
period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence
documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to
contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to
the principle that law does not assist a person who is
inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them
when challenged or disputed to remain dormant
without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle
which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the
maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura
subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are
watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the
object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a
person to exercise his right of action within a
reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress
stale, fake or fraudulent claims.' (emphasis supplied)."
in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being
"sufficient cause" as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The
High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and
authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits,
or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay
in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The
present case, however, stands on a very different
footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we
are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay
by the High Court."
15. One more judgment deserves notice is in case of Rajneesh
Kumar & Anr v. Ved Prakash, reported in 2024 (14) SCALE
406, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed the growing
tendency of throwing the blame upon the head of the learned
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advocate appearing for the petitioner while seeking the
condonation of delay. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court
reads as under:-
"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on
the head of the advocate who was appearing for the
petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period
of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their
lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the
proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a
moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or
negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long
and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be
vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally
vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not
be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the
advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek
relief."
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the
decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v.
The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in
1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
'The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to
ensure that actions are commenced within a particular
period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence
documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to
contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to
the principle that law does not assist a person who is
inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them
when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without
asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which
forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum
vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws
give help to those who are watchful and not to those who
sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations
is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within
a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress
stale, fake or fraudulent claims.' (emphasis supplied)."
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16. Thus in the facts and in circumstances, this Court is of the
opinion that applicant was not diligent in filing restoration
application. The averments made in the application seeking
condonation of delay in filing restoration application do not
inspire any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to
exercise discretion in its favour. This Court finds no bona fide
diligence on the part of the applicant. There is delay of 558 days.
The applicant did not plead any reasons which could be treated
as sufficient cause and which permit the Court to adopt rule of
liberal construction. The application is filed by the applicant as if
the applicants are taking law of limitation as joy ride.
17. The reasons which are stated by the applicant seeking
condonation of delay are insufficient and this Court is required
to refuse to condone delay.
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Civil Application for
condonation of delay, sans merits and is, accordingly, dismissed.
19. Consequently, the prayer for registration of the Restoration
Application also stands rejected.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
SATISH
