Gujarat High Court
General Manager vs Saileshbhai Ishwarbhai Patel on 4 December, 2023
Author: Ashutosh Shastri
Bench: Ashutosh Shastri
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/1801/2023 ORDER DATED: 04/12/2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 1801 of 2023
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 31204 of 2023
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GENERAL MANAGER
Versus
SAILESHBHAI ISHWARBHAI PATEL
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Appearance:
MR AJAY R MEHTA(453) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR.KURVEN DESAI, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. JAY M THAKKAR(6677) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH SHASTRI
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 04/12/2023
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH SHASTRI)
[1] Present Civil Application has been filed seeking condonation of
delay of 101 days occurred in filing the First Appeal.
[2] Heard learned advocate appearing for the respective parties.
[3] Considering the averments made in the application and in view
of the broad submissions made by learned advocates appearing for
the respective parties, it appears that delay is sufficiently explained
and in the absence of any resistance, the Court is inclined to condone
the delay more particularly we have also considered the proposition
of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another versus Mst. Katiji
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/1801/2023 ORDER DATED: 04/12/2023
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and others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 whereunder the Hon'ble
Apex Court has defined the contours under which an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to be considered. It
has been further held by the Hon'ble Apex Court:-
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by
enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to
enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of
matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the
life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach
in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to
have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a
liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
"Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be
admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within such period."
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being
thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a
cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's
delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred
for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being
done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant
does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable
of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/1801/2023 ORDER DATED: 04/12/2023
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Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal.
The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a
private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before
law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even
handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly
treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of
delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal
machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and
passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand
though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents
the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-
grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the
expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be
evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do
even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which
scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise
to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the
delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time
barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is
remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal
on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the
sides."
[4] The cause shown in the present case as extracted hereinabove
being within the proximity of truth, we are of the considered view
that delay deserves to be condoned. Accordingly, it is condoned.
The present Civil Application is allowed in terms of para 6(a). Rule is
made absolute accordingly.
(ASHUTOSH SHASTRI, J.)
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J.)
DHARMENDRA KUMAR
