Gujarat High Court
Jyotiben Dilipbhai Zala vs Union Of India on 14 June, 2022
Bench: Aniruddha P. Mayee
C/FA/3150/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/06/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 3150 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE Sd/-
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed No
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No
of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question No
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
of India or any order made thereunder ?
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JYOTIBEN DILIPBHAI ZALA
Versus
UNION OF INDIA
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Appearance:
MR RATHIN P RAVAL(5013) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS ARCHANA U AMIN(2462) for the Defendant(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE
Date : 14/06/2022
ORAL JUDGMENT
The present First Appeal comes-up for final hearing today.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present First
Appeal are as follows:-
2.1 It is the case of the appellant that on 18.2.2002 at about
4.57 a.m. on platform of Bilimora Railway Station, in a freak
accident, when the appellant along with her brother had come to
the gate of the railway bogie to get off the train, suddenly, there
was a heavy jerk and the appellant and her brother had fallen
down from the railway bogie and sustained serious injuries on
the whole body. Accordingly, they had to avail medical
C/FA/3150/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/06/2022
treatment. It was claimed that the accident occurred due to
rashness and negligence on the part of the railway. In
accordance with the Railways Act, the appellant herein filed a
claim petition being I.A. No.11 of 2019 claiming compensation
with 10% interest from the date of the incident.
2.2 The appellant herein filed an application for claiming
compensation on 7.10.2003 for the injuries sustained by her in a
freak accident along with the application for condonation of
delay of 8 months and 10 days. This application was dismissed
on 5.9.2008 for want of prosecution.
2.3 Thereafter, the appellant preferred another Misc.
Application for restoration of the said application MX 0300040
which was dismissed on 5.9.2008 along with application for
condonation of delay of 5 months and 26 days vide I.A. No.11 of
2009. It is further seen that on 21.9.2011, the said matter was
adjourned to 14.11.2011 for hearing as a last opportunity. On
14.11.2011, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant
herein sought time and the matter was adjourned to 29.12.2011
subject to cost of Rs.500/-, but on 29.12.2011, none was
present on behalf of the appellant nor cost of Rs.500/- was
deposited and therefore, the learned Tribunal dismissed I.A.
No.11 of 2009 for non-prosecution and non-payment of costs.
2.4 The appellant thereafter preferred another Misc.
Application for condonation of delay for filing restoration of I.A.
No.11 of 2009. The learned Tribunal by the impugned judgment
and order dated 1.2.2013 was pleased to dismiss the said
application holding that the entire proceedings and the record
C/FA/3150/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/06/2022
show that the appellant has not been diligent in prosecuting the
claim petition and the restoration application was filed twice and
came to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Therefore, by
impugned order, the learned Tribunal dismissed the application
for delay condonation for restoration of I.A. No.11 of 2009 as not
maintainable.
2.5 Aggrieved, the appellant herein has filed present First
Appeal.
3. Heard Mr. Rathin Raval, learned advocate for the appellant
and Ms. Archana Amin, learned advocate for the respondent at
length, who has vehemently opposed the present appeal.
4. In Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. V. Mst.
Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353, it has been held as under:-
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting
Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the
Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on
'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning-
ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-
purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal
approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:-
"Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of
the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may
be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within such period."
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal
late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being
C/FA/3150/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/06/2022
thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated.
As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen
is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a
pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant
does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal.
The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not
a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality
before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant,
are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an
even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly
treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of
delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal
machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing,
and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to
understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State
which represents the collective cause of the community, does not
deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be
informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of
the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same
approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with
the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the
approach which scuttles a decision on merits."
5. Learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K.
Subbarayudu v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition)
reported in 2017 (12) SCC 840. It is submitted that the cause
for delay should receive liberal construction so as to advance
C/FA/3150/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/06/2022
substantial justice.
6. Mr. Rathin Raval, learned advocate for the appellant, upon
instructions, submits that the appellant is ready and willing to
forgo the interest on the claim amount, if any awarded, after the
adjudication of her claim petition from the date of filing of the
application till the date of adjudication.
7. A perusal of the record shows that the appellant had
suffered injuries in the accident. It is further claimed that she is
a poor and illiterate and therefore, lenient view ought to have
been taken in the matter. There was a total delay of 7 months
and 18 days for restoration of the I.A. No.11 of 2009. In the
opinion of this Court, considering the background of the
appellant, the said delay ought to have been condoned and the
claim petition of the appellant herein ought to have been decided
on merits in the interest of justice. She should not have been
non-suited on the ground of delay.
8. In view of statement of the learned advocate and in the
facts and circumstances of the case as well as considering
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of K. Subbarayudu
and Others Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (Land
Acquisition) [(2017) 12 SCC 840], subject to condition that the
appellant will not claim interest on the claim amount, if any
awarded, after adjudication of her claim petition from the date of
filing of the application till the date of the adjudication of claim
petition, the present First Appeal is allowed and the I.A. No.11 of
2009 is restored to the file of the learned Railways Tribunal,
Ahmedabad Bench.
C/FA/3150/2013 JUDGMENT DATED: 14/06/2022
8.1 It is further directed that the learned Tribunal will decide
the claim petition as expeditiously as possible and preferably
within period of 6 months from the date of receipt of copy of this
order.
Present First Appeal accordingly stands disposed of. No
order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.)
KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN
