Sanjaykumar Sarmanbhai Varu vs State Of Gujarat
2021 Latest Caselaw 16446 Guj

      R/SCR.A/4605/2020                                      ORDER DATED: 21/10/2021




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

       R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4605 of 2020
                             With
 CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (FOR VACATING STAY) NO. 1 of 2020
                              In
       R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4605 of 2020
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                          SANJAYKUMAR SARMANBHAI VARU
                                      Versus
                                STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR LAXMANSINH M ZALA (5787) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR KEVALSINH B RATHOD (10250) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. AMIT R JOSHI (6682) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR PRANAV TRIVEDI, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (2) for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
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     CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI

                                    Date : 21/10/2021

                                        ORAL ORDER

1. By way of this petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside, on the basis of settlement, the impugned complaint being FIR No.11211031200203 registered with Limbadi Police Station, Surendranagar for offences punishable under Sections 323 & 504 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) & 3(2)(vii) of the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and all consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof.

2. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the parties have settled the dispute amicably outside the Court and there remains no ill- will or dispute between them. The parties are residing in the same locality. It was, therefore, prayed that the impugned complaint may be

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quashed on the basis of settlement between the parties.

3. The respondent-original complainant, who is present before the Court, has affirmed about the factum of settlement of dispute with the petitioners and has also filed an Affidavit on record to that effect. He stated that with the intervention of his elder brother, the dispute has been resolved. Before the Court and in the Affidavit also, he has consented to the quashment of the impugned complaint filed against the petitioner.

4. Learned APP submitted that any first information report should be quashed in accordance with the guidelines framed by the Apex Court and the parameters laid down therein.

5. This Court heard learned advocates on both the sides and perused the material on record. The offence alleged against the petitioner is non- compoundable but, it could be compounded with the permission of the Court. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303, the Apex Court has set out the criteria wherein the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised for quashing a First Information Report on the basis of settlement. In paragraph-61 of the said judgment, it has been observed thus:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be

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exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

6. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the issue as to whether a First Information Report lodged for

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the offences punishable under sections 307 and 34 IPC could be quashed on the basis of settlement between the parties. Para-13 reads thus:

"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: (i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non- compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; (ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; (iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; (iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or

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during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; (v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

7. In Swaran Singh and others V. State, Through Standing Counsel and Others, (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Apex Court has drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building, e.g. in a lawn outside a house and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.

8. In Prithvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India and Others, (2020) 4 SCC 727, the Apex Court (Per : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhatt) referred to the judgment rendered in case of Raghunathrao Ganpatrao vs. Union of India, 1993 (1) SCR 480 and held as under:

"In our considered opinion this argument is misconceived and has no relevance to the facts of the present case. One of the objectives of the Preamble of our Constitution is 'fraternity

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assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation.' It will be relevant to cite the explanation given by Dr. Ambedkar for the word 'fraternity' explaining that 'fraternity means a sense of common brotherhood of all Indians.' In a country like ours with so many disruptive forces of regionalism, communalism and linguism, it is necessary to emphasis and re-emphasis that the unity and integrity of India can be preserved only by a spirit of brotherhood. India has one common citizenship and every citizen should feel that he is Indian first irrespective of other basis. In this view, any measure at bringing about equality should be welcome."

9. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in another decision in the case of Nandini Sundar Vs. State of Ghhatisgarh, 2011 (7) SCC 457 wherein it has been held as under :

"The Constitution itself, in no uncertain terms, demands that the State shall strive, incessantly and consistently, to promote fraternity amongst all citizens such that dignity of every citizen is protected, nourished and promoted."

10. In the case of Prithvi Raj Chauhan (supra), while dealing with the constitutional validity of Section 18A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, it was held as under:

"12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameter, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear and no argument to the contrary has been raised."

11. In view of the discussions made herein above and the settlement arrived at between the parties, there exists no scope for further

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proceedings in the matter as the continuance of proceedings would lead to wastage of precious judicial time. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised for securing the ends of justice.

12. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned complaint being FIR No.11211031200203 registered with Limbadi Police Station, Surendranagar and all consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.

(GITA GOPI, J)

PRAVIN KARUNAN