Shailesh Babulal Bhatt vs State Of Gujarat
2021 Latest Caselaw 17822 Guj

      C/SCA/1069/2021                                  ORDER DATED: 29/11/2021




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

               R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1069 of 2021
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                            SHAILESH BABULAL BHATT
                                     Versus
                               STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR KISHAN PRAJAPATI FOR MR. KISHAN H DAIYA(6929) for the
Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR DHAWAN JAYSWAL, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
                  Date : 29/11/2021
                   ORAL ORDER

1. This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in which, the petitioner has prayed that the order of detention, if any, passed against the petitioner be quashed and set aside at pre-execution stage.

2. Heard learned advocate Mr.Kishan Prajapati appearing for learned advocate Mr.Kishan Daiya for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Dhawan Jayswal for the respondents.

3. Learned advocate for the petitioner has referred the averments made in the memo of the petition and, thereafter, he has pointed out from the record that two FIRs being C.R. No. Part-A 11210008201206 of 2020 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 447, 448, 452, 120B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 25(1-a), 25(1-b)(a) and 29 of the Arms Act and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act and C.R.

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No.Part-A 11210008201208 of 2020 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149, 447, 448, 452, 387, 506(2) and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 25(1-a), 25(1-b)(a) and 29 of the Arms Act, Sections 38, 39 and 40 of the Gujarat Money Lenders Act and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act have been filed against the petitioner.

3.1 It is submitted that the petitioner is having apprehension that on the basis of the said two FIRs, order of detention will be passed against him under the provisions of the Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 ('PASA' for short). The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition.

3.2 Learned advocate for the petitioner, at this stage, submitted that now, as per the information received by the petitioner, the respondent detaining authority has already passed an order on 23.06.2021 relying upon the aforesaid two FIRs.

3.3 It is submitted that one of the co-accused namely Hanif S/o. Allarakha Darzada has filed a petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No.16990 of 2020 challenging the order of detention dated 27.11.2020 passed against him. This Court vide order dated 09.02.2021 quashed and set aside the said order of detention passed against the co-detenue. Learned advocate for the petitioner has placed on record the said order.

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3.4 At this stage, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the present petition is maintainable and this Court can exercise powers at pre-execution stage under certain circumstances.

3.5 Learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon following decisions:

(1) Vijaysinh @ Gatti Pruthvisinh Rathod Vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in 2015 (1) GLR 703

(2) Letters Patent Appeal No.108 of 2020 in the case of Mukeshbhai Versibhai Desai Versus State of Gujarat

(3) Additional Secretary to the Government of India and Others Versus Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Another reported in 1992 (Suppl.) (1) SCC

(4) Rekha Versus State of Tamilnadu reported in 2011 (5) SCC 244

(5) Pushkar Mukherjee and Others Versus State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1970 SC 852

3.6 Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the case of the petitioner falls under the category of rare or exceptional case and, therefore, the order of detention passed by the authority be quashed and

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set aside at pre-execution stage.

4. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader has placed on record the order of detention dated 23.06.2021 passed by the respondent detaining authority against the petitioner. Learned Assistant Government Pleader after referring to the said order submitted that the detaining authority, after proper application of mind, has passed the aforesaid order considering two FIRs filed against the present petitioner. Thus, no error is committed by the respondent detaining authority while passing the impugned order and, therefore, case of the petitioner does not fall under the category of rare or exception case as contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner. Learned Assistant Government Pleader, therefore, urged that the present petition filed at pre-execution stage be dismissed.

5. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material placed on record, it would emerge that now, the detaining authority has passed the order of detention on 23.06.2021 against the present petitioner relying upon two FIRs which are placed on record. I have perused the order of detention which is passed by the respondent detaining authority. I have also perused the material placed on record. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the present petitioner is not named in the FIR being C.R. No. Part-A 11210008201206 of 2020 and the petitioner has been implicated on the

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basis of the statement of the co-accused. It is pertinent to note that co-accused Hanif S/o. Allarakha Darzada, who is shown as accused No.3 in the said FIR, has filed a petition before this Court being Special Civil Application No.16990 of 2020 challenging the order of detention dated 27.11.2020 passed against him. This Court vide order dated 09.02.2021 quashed and set aside the said order of detention passed against the co-detenue.

6. In the case of Vijaysinh @ Gatti Pruthvisinh Rathod Vs. State of Gujarat and another (supra), the Full Bench of this Court has observed in Paragraph-17 as under:

"17. As such, once the petition is found to be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the pre-execution stage against the detention order, the criteria as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.), reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496 read with the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 would apply by way of selfimposed restrictions in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but it is neither correct to say that even if the cases at the pre-execution stage are covered by the criteria as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.)(supra) and Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 (supra) and if the High Court calls for the file from the concerned authority, such would be beyond jurisdiction of the High Court or such would be wholly impermissible. At the same time, it cannot be said that even if the petition at the pre- execution stage is not covered by the criteria as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl.

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Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.)(supra) and Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 (supra), in every case, the High Court is obliged to satisfy as to whether the order of detention is passed in consonance with the scheme of enactment under which the detention order is passed or whether the detention order suffers from the vice of illegality or not."

7. Thus, from the aforesaid observation made by the Full bench of this Court, it is clear that the petition is maintainable at pre-execution stage. However, scope of interference is limited.

8. In the case of Additional Secretary to the Government of India and Others Versus Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Another (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph-30 as under:-

"30. As regards his last contention, viz., that to deny a right to the proposed detenu to challenge the order of detention and the grounds on which it is made before he is taken in custody is to deny him the remedy of judicial review of the impugned order which right is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we find that this argument is also not well merited based as it is on absolute assumptions. Firstly, as pointed out by the authorities discussed above, there is a difference between the existence of power and its exercise. Neither the Constitution including the provisions of Art. 22 thereof nor the Act in question places any restriction on the powers of the High court and this court to review judicially the order of detention. The powers under Articles 226 and 32 are wide, and are untrammelled by any external restrictions, and can reach any executive order resulting in civil or criminal consequences.

However, the courts have over the years evolved

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certain self-restraints for exercising these powers. They have done so in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. These self-imposed restraints are not confined to the review of the orders passed under detention law only. They extend to the orders passed and decisions made under all laws. It is in pursuance of this self-evolved judicial policy and in conformity with the self-imposed internal restrictions that the courts insist that the aggrieved person First allow the due operation and implementation of the concerned law and exhaust the remedies provided by it before approaching the High court and this court to invoke their discretionary extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 respectively. That jurisdiction by its very nature is to be used sparingly and in circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available. We have while discussing the relevant authorities earlier dealt in detail with the circumstances under which these extraordinary powers are used and are declined to be used by the courts. To accept Shri Jain's present contention would mean that the courts should disregard all these time-honoured and well-tested judicial self-restraints and norms and exercise their said powers, in every case before the detention order is executed. Secondly, as has been rightly pointed out by Shri Sibal for the appellants, as far as detention orders are concerned if in every case a detenu is permitted to challenge and seek the stay of the operation of the order before it is executed, the very purpose of the order and of the law under which it is made will be frustrated since such orders are in operation only for alimited period. Thirdly, and this is more important, it is not correct to say that the courts have no , power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution. The courts have the necessary power and they have used it in a proper cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the

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courts have interfered with them at the pre- execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz., where the courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person,

(iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose,

(iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. The refusal by the courts to use their extraordinary powers of judicial review to interfere with the detention orders prior to their execution on any other ground does not amount to the abandonment of the said power or to their denial to the proposed detenu, but prevents their abuse and the perversion of the law in question."

9. In the case of Rekha Versus State of Tamilnadu (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph-30 as under:-

"30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is : Was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation ? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Indian Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal."

10. In the case of Pushkar Mukherjee and Others Versus State of West Bengal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph-8 as under:-

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"8. The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds (a), (b) and (e) served on Subhas Chandra Bose are grounds which are relevant to "the maintenance of public order". All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order. In the present case we are concerned with detention under s. 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Does the expression "public(1) [1951] S.C.R. 167. order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act. A District

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Magistrate is therefore entitled to take action under s. 3 (1) of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar(1), it was held by the majority decision of this Court that the expression "public order" was different and does not mean the same thing as "law and order". The question at issue in that case was whether the order of the District Magistrate, Patna under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 against the petitioner was valid. Rule 30 (1)(b) provided that a State Government might, if it was satisfied with respect to a person that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to 'public safety and maintenance of public order' it is necessary to do so, order him to be detained. The order of the District Magistrate stated that he was satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 'public safety and the maintenance of law and order,' it was necessary to detain him. Prior to the making of the order the District Magistrate had, however, recorded a note stating that having read the report of the Police Superintendent that the petitioner's being at large was prejudicial to 'public safety' and 'maintenance of public order', he was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained under the rule. The petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus directing his release from detention, contending that though an order of detention to prevent acts prejudicial to public order may be justifiable ,an order to prevent acts prejudicial to law and order would not be justified by the rule. It was held by the majority judgment that what was (1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709, meant by maintenance of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, whereas, the expression 'maintenance of law and order' meant prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance. At page 746 of the Report,

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Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, observed as follows in the course of his judgment: "It will thus appear that just as 'public order' in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting 'security of State', 'law and order' also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting 'public order'. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an 'act may affect public order but not security of the State. By using the expression 'maintenance of law and order' the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules." The order no doubt mentioned another ground of detention, namely, the prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety, and in so far as 'it did so, it was clearly within the rule. But the order of detention must be held to be illegal, though it mentioned a ground on which a legal order of detention could have been based, because it could not be said in what manner and to what extent the valid and invalid grounds operated on the mind of the authority concerned and contributed to the creation of his subjective satisfaction. It was accordingly held that the order of detention made by the District Magistrate was invalid and the petitioner should be set at liberty. In our opinion, the principle laid down in this case governs the decision in the present case also and the order of the District Magistrate, Howrah dated January 20, 1968 must be held to be ultra vires and illegal."

11. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, if the facts of the present case as discussed hereinabove are carefully examined, this Court is of

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the view that the case of the petitioner falls under the category of rare and exceptional case. Further, when the order of detention passed against co-detenue Hanif Allarakha Darzada is already quashed and set aside by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, I am inclined to exercise powers in favour of the petitioner.

11. The petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order being PCB/PASA/DTN/356/2021 dated 23.06.2021 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

Direct Service is permitted.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J) piyush