Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3249 Guj
Judgement Date : 25 February, 2021
R/SCR.A/8052/2019 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8052 of 2019
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.N. KARIA
==========================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed NO to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? NO
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy NO
of the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question NO
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ?
========================================================== JAYDIP DINESHCHANDRA JOSHI Versus STATE OF GUJARAT ========================================================== Appearance:
MR. ANSHIN H. DESAI, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR. JAY M
MR. MITESH AMIN, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR(2) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.N. KARIA
Date : 25/02/2021
CAV JUDGMENT
By way of present application, petitioner has challenged
the order dated 19.02.2018 passed below an application Exh.
46 in Criminal Case No. 1188 of 2010 by the Ld. Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj, whereby the application preferred
by the petitioner u/s. 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure
praying for discharge is rejected as well as the order dated
10.12.2018 passed by Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Kutch at
Bhuj dismissing Criminal Revision Application No.28 of 2018.
The brief facts of the present case are as under:
That petitioner joined his service of State Government as
Deputy Collector. On 26.01.2001, there was an earthquake
experienced in the State of Gujarat, whereby, the epicenter
was located at Bhuj, wherein, a lot of destruction in terms of
life and property had occurred and therefore, Government had
decided to rehabilitate the affected persons and passed number
of resolutions to that effect. To classify the damage, G.1 to G.5
categories were made and category certificates were issued by
different authorities like Mamlatdar, City Survey
Superintendent, Chief Officer & Deputy Collector. It is
submitted that the grain market of Bhuj was totally affected by
the earthquake and all the affected persons, who were having
their shops, were required to be rehabilitated and accordingly
one of the trusts was granted 17 acres of lands by the
Government with various conditions, one of which as that the
trust has to obtain Collector's certificate about allottee being
earthquake affected. The Land was allotted at the market rate,
which was prevailing at that point of time vide Resolution
dated 03.09.2002. On 04.12.2003 the Collector, Bhuj, by way
of a reasoned order with various conditions, allotted land
bearing Survey No.363 paiki situated at Bhuj on paying market
value in five different installments & then possession of the
land was handed over to the trust. That, the said order was
passed by imposing number of conditions, which were binding
to the trust. That, the allotment of land was already done in
the year 2003 vide order passed by the Collector, Bhuj on
04.12.2003. That on 08.07.2005 petitioner came to be
transferred from Panchmahal to Bhuj and had joined the
posting when almost all land related process including
possession of land was already completed. That after two years
of the said transfer of the petitioner, the Collector, Bhuj wrote
a letter to the Deputy Collector, Bhuj, directing to carry out a
detailed inquiry with regard to the irregularities committed by
the trust and after carrying out the inquiry, a detailed report
was submitted by the Deputy Collector, Bhuj i.e. the petitioner.
That in pursuance to the said detailed inquiry, the Deputy
Collector, Bhuj, i.e. the petitioner submitted the first report,
wherein, the entire situation was described in detail. In the
first report itself it was clearly written that trust has not
obtained Collector's certificates & pointed out many
irregularities of the trust & suggested if someone has wrongly
sought any aid, police complaint should be filed against him.
That the said report was filed subject to further inquiry. That a
second interim report was submitted by the Deputy Collector,
Bhuj i.e. the petitioner to the Collector, Bhuj in furtherance to
the earlier report dated 15.09.2007. In the said report also the
petitioner has clearly mentioned that as per the order dated
04.12.2003 passed by the Collector and as mentioned in
condition of the said order, the certificates were to be issued at
that relevant point of time, however, the same were not done
till date. That, the said task can be carried out by a team
headed by the Deputy Collector and it can be ensured that only
those persons, who are granted certificates by the Collector are
entitled for the benefits and otherwise, the benefits already
entailed by the persons, who are not having such certificates,
can be again procured by the Government. Till then, the
further inquiry was kept pending. That final report in
furtherance of the earlier reports was submitted to the
Collector, Bhuj point wise showing breach of trust reiterating
the facts that Collector has not given certificate to the trust and
if the beneficiaries have wrongly obtained the allotment,
without fail, a police complaint is required to be filed in that
regard. So it cannot be said that the report filed by the
petitioner is for the benefit of the other accused persons. That
petitioner came to be transferred from Bhuj to Ahmedabad.
Thereafter Collector, along with the consideration of the
reports, himself issued notice to beneficiaries for the breach of
conditions to the trust wherein the trust was asked to explain
the allegations about the breach of conditions. During the said
process, the reports filed by the petitioner were also considered
by the Collector and pursuant thereto, the Collector, ordered,
that the allotment of the plots to the 317 beneficiaries are
proper and legal & the allotment of plots for 60 was cancelled.
Final report submitted by the petitioner was even considered
by the Superior Officer and at no point of time, doubt was
created with regard to the reports of the present petitioner as
the same were not challenged, by any authority. That pursuant
to the order passed by the Collector, Bhuj, a private complaint
came to be registered by a private complainant Henry James
Chako being Criminal Inquiry Case No.26 of 2007 for the
offences punishable under Section 200, 203, 217, 465, 466,
467, 471, 472, 474, 475, 485, 406, 409 and 120(B) of the IPC.
Ld. Magistrate was pleased to pass an order of investigation
u/s. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. to C.I.D. Crime Bhuj, and thereafter, the
FIR came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of 2008. Present
petitioner was not named in the FIR nor there were any
allegations leveled against the petitioner in the entire FIR.
Thereafter, during the course of investigation, the petitioner
came to be arrested. In the meantime, the investigation came
to be concluded and charge sheet came to be filed being
charge sheet No.2 of 2010, wherein, the petitioner was
arraigned as accused no.6. In the entire papers of the charge
sheet as per the say of the petitioner only cursory allegation
was made against the petitioner that the reports prepared by
the petitioner were inappropriate. The petitioner approached
the Ld. Sessions Judge praying for regular bail. However, the
same came to be rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner
approached this Hon'ble Court by way of filing Criminal Misc.
Application No. 6783 of 2010 and this Court, was pleased to
release the petitioner on regular bail by recording findings that
the petitioner had joined the post on 08.07.2005 as Deputy
Collector, Bhuj and therefore, there was no question of any
conspiracy with any other accused. A further findings was
recorded in the order by this Court that the only allegations
against the petitioner was regarding the inquiry made by the
petitioner and the report submitted, which was also considered
by the Superior Officer and no grievance was made at that
point of time. It was further observed that there is no direct or
indirect involvement of the petitioner in the present offence.
Then petitioner had approached the Ld. Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj by way of an application below Exh.
46 inter alia praying for discharging him from the Criminal
Case No.1188 of 2010 and the same came to be rejected by
way of a nonspeaking order. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied
by the order, petitioner preferred Criminal Revision
Application No.24 of 2016 before the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kutch at Bhuj and same came to be rejected
again by way of a nonspeaking order. The petitioner was
constrained to approach this Court by way of filing Special
Criminal Application No. 9982 of 2017 challenging both the
orders of the Ld. Magistrate as well as the Ld. Sessions Judge.
This Court, was pleased to quash both the orders passed by the
Courts below and was further pleased to remand the discharge
application of the petitioner to the Ld. Magistrate to decide it
afresh. Thereafter, the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate was
pleased to rehear the discharge application of the petitioner
filed below Exh. 46 and was pleased to reject the discharge
application of the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter,
challenged the order passed by the Ld. Chief Judicial
Magistrate before the Ld. Sessions Judge by way of filing
Criminal Revision Application No.28 of 2018 but the said
revision application was rejected by the Ld. Session Judge. The
petitioner was under suspension almost about nine years due
to pendency of criminal case against him, petitioner
approached this Court by way of filing Special Civil Application
No. 18344 of 2015, wherein this Court rejected the said
petition. Then petitioner filed Letters Patent Appeal
No.972/2016, wherein this Court was pleased to deliberate
upon the situation and was pleased to direct the competent
authority to consider the possibility of allowing the petitioner
to perform duties by revoking the order of suspension before
the next review and to give him a suitable posting subject to
final outcome of the said appeal. Petitioner being aggrieved
and dissatisfied by vide order dated 19.02.2018 passed by
learned Magistrate rejecting his application discharge as well
as order dated 10.12.2018 passed by learned Sessions Court
confirming the order of ld. Magistrate, he has approached this
Court.
Heard learned advocate for the petitioner and learned
Public Prosecutor for the respondentstate.
Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that orders
passed by the Courts below are illegal, erroneous and against
the provisions of law. That courts below committed a grave
error of law and facts by passing the impugned orders without
appreciating the fact that the petitioner had prepared the
reports as per the order of the Collector and had submitted the
said reports to the Superior Officer. That Superior Officer
never took any objections of the said reports. That even if all
the reports are perused, it clearly transpires that the reports
are dealing with each any every conditions of Resolution of the
Government, wherein also, the petitioner has categorically
stated that number of beneficiaries were yet to obtain
certificate from the Collector. That petitioner had given an
opportunity to all the beneficiaries of hearing as well as
producing all the evidences in support of their claim to be the
beneficiaries as per the Resolution passed by the Government.
Accordingly, the petitioner had forwarded not less than 365
files along with the documentary evidences produced by the
beneficiaries alongwith the final report dated 25.04.2008. That
when the petitioner has performed his official duty and has
also submitted the reports along with documentary evidences,
it cannot be termed that the reports filed by the petitioner are
"Hollow or Shallow" much less being a part of conspiracy,
which is hatched by the coaccused persons. That considering
the entire papers of the chargesheet, there is no iota of
evidence suggesting that the petitioner has conspired with the
main accused persons. That earthquake had taken place on
26.01.2001 and till June 2005, petitioner was not holding his
office as Deputy Collector, Bhuj. Hence there was no question
of any conspiracy with any of the accused as the petitioner had
joined as Deputy Collector at Bhuj on 08.07.2005. It is further
argued that there was no sufficient material with regard to
conspiracy against the present petitioner. That the entire
offence along with the hatching of conspiracy was over prior to
06.10.2005 and it is not the case of the prosecution that
petitioner had played any role in commission of main offences
as alleged in the FIR. That since the date of the FIR, i.e. almost
about 9 years, the petitioner was placed under suspension due
to the pendency of the criminal case against him. Hence, it was
requested by learned advocate for the petitioner to allow the
present application. In support of his arguments Ld. Advocate
for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments
referred in:
(1)2018 (1) GLR 159;
(2)2010 (2) SCC 398;
(3) 2019(2) GLR 1058;
(4) 2019 (3) SCC 330;
Learned Public Prosecutor for the respondentState has
strongly objected the submissions made by learned advocate
for the petitioner and submitted that after thorough
investigation, chargesheet was filed by the Investigating
Officer against the petitioner. That during the investigation, it
was clearly found that present petitioner had hatched criminal
conspiracy along with other coaccused persons. That it cannot
be a ground for discharge as the name of the present petitioner
was not shown in the FIR and was arraigned an accused during
the investigation. That evidence clearly shows about
involvement of the present petitioner and learned JMFC Court
as well as learned Sessions Court have rightly discussed and
appreciate the same in their orders respectively. That
investigating agency has also revealed prima facie involvement
of the present petitioner as he being a Deputy Collector of the
State Government, who has hatched criminal conspiracy with
other coaccused persons. That chargesheet was filed along
with the statements of the witnesses and documents clearly
satisfy the charges under Sections 200, 205, 217, 465, 466,
467, 471, 472, 474, 475, 485, 406, 409 and 120(B) of the
Indian Penal Code. Learned Public Prosecutor has
distinguished judgments relied upon by the learned advocate
for the petitioner, arguing that they are not applicable to the
present case. It is further argued by Ld. Public Prosecutor that
complaint was filed by the third party against earthquake
affected Bhuj Bajar Navnirman Charitable Trust. That
prosecution has never permitted/directed to any government
officer to register the FIR. That accused No.1 had also
preferred a quashing petition with a request to quash the
impugned complaint and chargesheet. That petition preferred
by the accused No.1 was rejected by this Court. That thereafter
accused No.1 challenged the order passed by this Court
rejecting his quashing petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court
by preferring SLP No.895 of 2010.That it is high time to
proceed with the file as it is pending since last more than 10
years. That in an order passed below Exh.46, learned
Magistrate has observed his satisfaction about possibility of
accused might have committed the offence. That further
scrutiny of the evince is not required to be made by this court.
That subsequently chargesheet has been filed which clearly
shows the part of the conspiracy. That revision application
preferred by the petitioner being Criminal Revision Application
No. 24 of 2016 was also dismissed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kutchh at Bhuj on 10.12.2018 and now this is
a third round of this litigation. That High Court will not re
appreciate the material placed on record. No patent error of
jurisdiction made by the learned Trial Court in dismissing the
application for discharge, which was filed by the present
petitioner. That this was the independent offence committed
by the present petitioner. That yet charge is not framed by the
concerned Trial Court. Hence, it was requested by learned
Public Prosecutor to confirm the orders passed by the learned
Trial Courts below and dismiss present application.
Having considered the facts of the case, arguments
advanced by learned advocate for the petitioner as well as
learned Public Prosecutor for the respondentState and charge
sheet papers produced on record, it appears that on account of
earthquake experienced in the State of Gujarat on 26.01.2001,
lots of destruction in terms of life and property had occurred
including the City of Bhuj. As a part of rehabilitation, the
affected persons were given certain benefits by Government
issuing several notifications. One of the trust namely Bhuj
Bajar Navnirman Charitable Trust was granted 17 acres of
lands by the Government with various conditions, one of which
was a trust has to obtain Collector's certificate about allottee
being earthquake affected by an order of collector, Bhuj dated
04.12.2003, land bearing Survey No.363 paiki situated at Bhuj
was alloted to the trust imposing various conditions and on
paying market value in five different installments. The
petitioner thereafter came to be transferred from panchmahal
to Bhuj and joined his new posting on 08.07.2005 when almost
all land related process including possession of land was
already completed. It appears that after two years of the said
transfer of the petitioner, Collector, Bhuj wrote a letter to the
Deputy Collector, Bhuj on 08.09.2007 directing him to carry
out a detail inquiry in respect of the irregularities committed
by the trust. The Deputy Collector i.e. present petitioner, after
carrying out the inquiry, submitted detail report on
15.09.2007. In the said report, entire situation was described
that trust has not obtained certificate from the Collector &
pointed out main irregularities of the trust. In the report it was
suggested that if someone has wrongly sought any aid, police
complaint should be filed against him. The said report was
filed subject to the further inquiry. It appears from the record
that thereafter the second interim report was submitted by the
present petitioner in a capacity of Deputy Collector, Bhuj on
29.10.2007 to the Collector Bhuj in connection with the
previous report dated 15.09.2007. In the second report, it was
mentioned that as per the order dated 04.12.2003 passed by
the Collector, as per the condition No.8, certificates were to be
issued at that relevant point of time. However, the same were
not done till date. It was further pointed out that the said task
can be carried out by the team headed by the Deputy Collector
and it can be ensured that only those persons, who are granted
certificates by the Collector, were entitled for the benefits and
otherwise, the benefits already entailed by the persons, who
were not having such certificates, can be again procured by the
Government. It also appears from the record that on
25.04.2008, final report in furtherance of the earlier reports
was submitted by the petitioner to the Collector, Bhuj. In the
final report it was pointed out the breach of trust, reiterating
the facts that Collector has not given certificate to the trust and
if the beneficiaries have wrongly obtained the certificate, a
police complaint is required to be filed. Thereafter it also
appears that petitioner was transferred from Bhuj to
Ahmedabad on 23.06.2008. The Collector, after considering of
the reports submitted by the petitioner, issued notice to
beneficiaries for the breach of conditions to the trust and
sought explanation. The Collector, Bhuj, then passed an order
on 25.03.2009, stating that allotment of the plots to the 317
beneficiaries were proper and allotment of plots for 60
beneficiaries were cancelled. It also appears that reports
submitted by the petitioner was considered by the Superior
Officers and at no point of time, any doubt was created in
respect of the reports, nor it was challenged. It also appears
that pursuant to the order dated 25.03.2009 passed by the
Collector, Bhuj, a private complaint was registered by a private
complainant namely Henry James Chako being Criminal
Inquiry Case No.26 of 2007 for the offence punishable under
Sections 200, 203, 217, 465, 466, 467, 471, 472, 474 ,475,
485, 406, 409 and 120(B) of the IPC. It also appears that
learned Magistrate was pleased to pass an order of
investigation u/s. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. to C.I.D. Crime Bhuj, and
thereafter, the FIR came to be registered as M. Case No. 1 of
2008 before the C.I.D. Crime, Bhuj Branch, Rajkot Zone. It
appears that petitioner was not named in the FIR nor any
allegations were leveled against him in the entire FIR. It also
appears that during the course of investigation, petitioner was
arrested on 24.02.2010 and meanwhile, investigation was
concluded and charge sheet was filed being charge sheet No.2
of 2010 wherein petitioner was arraigned as an accused no.6
and only cursory allegations were made against the petitioner.
That the reports prepared by the petitioner were inappropriate.
Thereafter petitioner prayed for his release on bail by
preferring Criminal Misc. Application No. 6783 of 2010 before
this Court, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated
02.08.2010. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application
Exh.46 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at
Bhuj with a request to discharge him from Criminal Case
No.1188 of 2010 but the said application was rejected by order
dated 30.01.2016 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate.
Being dissatisfied with the order, a criminal Revision
Application No.24 of 2016 was preferred by the present
petitioner before the court of learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Kutch at Bhuj which was also rejected by order dated
30.11.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court
by filing Special Criminal Application No. 9982 of 2017
challenging both the orders of Ld. Magistrate as well as the Ld.
Sessions Judge. This Court vide order dated 18.01.2018 was
pleased to quash both the orders passed by the Courts below
and was pleased to remand the discharge application of the
petitioner to the Ld. Magistrate to decide it afresh. Thereafter,
the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate was pleased to rehear the
discharge application of the petitioner.
It appears from the submissions made by learned
advocate for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor for
the respondentState that the reports submitted by the
petitioner were never challenged before any of the authorities
on the ground as alleged by the prosecution in the case.
Petitioner was never subjected to any departmental inquiry in
respect of the aforesaid reports. It appears that petitioner was
proceeded under the footing that reports prepared by the
petitioner are "Hollow and Shallow". From the chargesheet
papers, there is nothing on record that petitioner has joined his
hands with the other coaccused persons as there was no
material to that effect. From the record it also appears that
since almost about 9 years petitioner was placed under
suspension due to the pendecy of the criminal case against
him. Petitioner approached this Court by filing Special Civil
Application No.18344 of 2015 wherein this Court was pleased
to reject the said petition vide order dated 18.01.2016 against
which L.P.A. No.972 of 2016 was filed by the present
petitioner wherein vide order dated 01.05.2018, this Court was
pleased to direct the competent authority to consider the
possibility of allowing the petitioner to perform his duties, by
rejecting the order of suspension and to give him a suitable
posting subject to final outcome of the said appeal. It is fact
that as per the order of Collector, Bhuj, petitioner had
prepared a report and submitted to the Superior Officer and
Superior Officer has never raised any objection on the said
report.
If we go through the reports and peruse the same, it
appaers that each and every issues were dealt with stating that
number of beneficiaries were yet to obtain certificate from the
Collector. It was also stated that an opportunity to all the
beneficiaries of hearing as well as producing the evidence in
support of their case were given to the beneficiaries. Petitioner
has performed his duties and also submitted a report which
cannot be termed that reports filed by the petitioner are
"Hollow and Shallow" being a part of the conspiracy, which
has hatched by the coaccused persons. If we consider the
entire papers of chargesheet, there is no iota of evidence
suggesting that petitioner is conspired with the main accused
persons. Earthquake had taken place on 26.01.2001 and till
June 2005, petitioner was not holding his office as Deputy
Collector, hence there was no question of any conspiracy with
any of the accused as the petitioner had joined as Deputy
Collector at Bhuj on 08.07.2005. The allegations as to
conspiracy cannot be attributed to the petitioner, prima facie,
as there cannot be any meeting of mind, a role of only
attributed regarding the inquiry made by the petitioner and
reports submitted, which have also been considered by the
Superior Officer and no grievance was made. Even as per the
case of the prosecution, the alleged conspiracy came to be
hatched prior to the entrustment of the inquiry to the
petitioner, and therefore, merely assuming the fact that the
petitioner has conspired with the other coaccused persons can
not become the basis to frame charge against him. The
essential ingredients of the offence of the "criminal conspiracy"
is the agreement between two and more persons to commit an
offence as enumerated and defined under Section 120(A) of
the Indian Penal Code. Requirement of the law would be that
there should be at least a proof to that effect that there was
such agreement in existence. If we go through the material
chargesheet papers placed on record, there is no such
material against the present petitioner in support of the said
allegations.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of John Pandian
v. State, reported in 2010 (14) SCC 129 has observed in Para
55 as under:
Inspite of the concurrent judgment of the trial and the appellate Court in this case, more particularly, against accused Nos. 2 (Sivakumar), 4(Ubaiadulla), 5 (Yusuf), 6 (Abdul Kareem), and 7 (John Pandian) we had to consider the evidence afresh as we are not satisfied with the appreciation of the evidence at the trial and appellate stage. We find from the judgment that the Courts below have committed an error in first holding the existence of conspiracy and proceeding on that basis and then taking titbits in evidence to suggest that those titbits would connect the accused with the conspiracy as the conspirators. The law on conspiracy has been stated time and again by this Court. In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1961 SC 1762, Subba Rao, J. observed:
"The gist of the offence is an agreement to break
the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act."
In Halsbury's Laws of England the definition of conspiracy is as under:
"Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied or in part express and in part implied.. and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be".
In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol.16, Page 129, the following definition of conspiracy is given: "A conspiracy is said to be an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish together a criminal or unlawful act or to achieve by criminal or unlawful means an act not in itself criminal or unlawful ... The unlawful agreement and not its
accomplishment is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy
In another case The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Keharsingh v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in
AIR 1978 SC 1883 has observed as under:
271. It will be thus seen that the most important ingredient of the offence of conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. The illegal act may or may not be done in pursuance of agreement, but the very agreement is an offence and is punishable. Reference to secs120A and 120B IPC would make these aspects clear beyond doubt. Entering into an agreement by two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means is the very quintessence of the offence of conspiracy.
272. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will of ten rely on evidence of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such evidence direct or circumstantial. But the Court must enquire whether the
two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators, but the latter is. It is however, essential that the offence of conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to Prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. Gerald Orchard of University of Canterbury, New Zealand (Criminal Law Review I974, 297 at 299 explains the limited nature of this proposition:
"Although it is not in doubt that the offence requires some physical manifestation of agreement, it is important to note the limited nature of this proposition. The law does not require that the act of agreement take any particular form and the fact of agreement may be communicated by words or conduct. Thus, it has been said that it is unnecessary to PG NO 185 prove that the parties "actually came together and agreed in terms" to pursue the unlawful object; there need never have been in express verbal agreement, it being sufficient that there was "a tacit understanding between conspirators as to what should be done."
It is undisputed fact that as per the case of the
prosecution, the entire offence alongwith hatching of
conspiracy was over prior to 06.10.2005. It is not the case of
the prosecution that petitioner had played any role in
commission of main offence as alleged in the FIR and in the
chargesheet for the offence alleged under Sections 200, 203,
217, 465, 466, 467, 471, 472, 474, 475, 485, 406, 409 and
120(B) of the IPC.
In absence of any allegations in the entire papers of the
chargesheet in relation to the said offence, petitioner cannot
be prosecuted for such offences. Considering the fact that,
material placed on record about conspiracy is not there against
the petitioner. It appears that there was no sufficient material
placed on record by the prosecution to involve the present
petitioner with the offence in question.
This Court would like to refer a judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court in case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar
Samal & another reported in 1979 SCR(2) 229) dealing with
the similar question, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as
under:
We might, state, to begin with, that so far as the present case (offences committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act) is concerned it is regulated by the procedure laid down by the Criminal Law Amendment Act under which the police has to submit, chargesheet directly to the Special Judge and the question of commitment to the Court of Session does not arise, but the Sessions Judge has nevertheless to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of sessions cases and the consideration governing the interpretation of section 227 of the Code apply mutatis mutandis to these proceedings after the chargesheet is submitted before the Special Judge.
Before interpreting and analysing the provisions of section 227 of the Code so far as pure sessions trials are concerned, two important facts may be mentioned. In the first place, the Code has introduced substantial and far reaching changes in the Code of 1898 as amended in 1955 in order to cut out delays and simplify the procedure, has dispersed with the procedure for commitment enquiries referred to m section 206 to 213 of the Code, of 1898 and has made commitment more or less a legal formality. Under the previous Code of 1898 the Magistrate was enjoined to take evidence of the
prosecution witnesses after giving opportunity to the accused to crossexamine the witnesses 2nd was then required to hear the parties and to commit the acceded to the Court of Session unless he chose to act under section 209 and found that there was no sufficient ground for committing the accused person for trial. Under the Code the Committing Magistrate has been authorised to peruse the evidence and the documents produced by the police and commit the case straightaway to the Sessions Court if the case is one which is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Thus, it would appear that the legislature while dispensing with the procedure for commitment enquiry under the Code of 1898 has conferred a dual responsibility on the Trial Judge who has first to examine the case on the basis of the statement of witnesses recorded by the police and the documents filed with a view to find out whether a prima facie case for trial has been made out and then if such a case is made out to proceed to try the same. In our view the legislature has adopted this course in order to avoid frivolous prosecutions and prevent the accused from being tried of an offence on materials which do not furnish a reasonable probability of conviction. In the instant case, as the offences alleged to have been committed by the respondents fall within the provisions
of the Act, the Special Judge has been substituted for the Sessions Judge, the procedure of the Sessions Court having been applied fully to the trial of such cases. Thus, it is manifest that the accused has not only one opportunity and that too before the Sessions Judge for showing that no case for trial had been made out. This was obviously done to expedite the disposal of the criminal cases.
Secondly, it would appear that under section 209 of the Code of 1898 the question of discharge was to be considered by a Magistrate. This power has now been entrusted to a senior Judge, namely, the Sessions Judge who is to conduct the trial himself and who has to decide before commencing the trial as to whether or not charges should be framed in a particular case against the respondents The discretion, therefore, is to be exercised by a senior and more experienced Judge so as to exclude any abuse of power. In this view of the matter, it is manifest that if the Sessions Judge exercises his discretion in discharging the accused for reasons recorded by him, his discretion should not normally be disturbed by the High Court or by this Court.
Section 227 of the Code runs thus:
"If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
The words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not A necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.:
The scope of section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar
v. Ramesh Singh(1) where Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:
"Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor pro poses to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in crossexamination or rebut ted by the defence evidence; if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial".
This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of ths Sessions
Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out.
In the case of State of Bihar vs.Ramesh Singh reported
in (1978) 1 SCR 257, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as
under:
Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the, initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. if the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to
adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in crossexamination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
In the case of Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (2002 (2) SCC135), the Hon'ble
Apex Court has observed as under:
Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some
suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
In the entire chargesheet, there is no specific role or
material attracted to the present petitioner to involve him in
the offence. There is no evidence on record to indicate that any
criminal conspiracy was hatched by the present petitioner
alongwith the accused persons. Only reports were prepared by
the petitioner as per order of the Collector, Bhuj and
thereafter, such reports were submitted. It appears that reports
submitted by the petitioner were never doubted by the
superior officer nor they were challenged, on the contrary,
under the reports submitted by the petitioner, necessary
actions were taken by the Collector, Bhuj after issuing
necessary orders.
Present petitioner was not posted at Bhuj upto
18.07.2005 till lodgment of offence was completed. Only role
played by the present petitioner was holding an inquiry as per
the directions issued by the Collector, Bhuj observing "Hollow
and Shallow" inquiry cannot made as a part of criminal
conspiracy as observed by the learned Judge below. There is
nothing on record or evidence available with the prosecution
about committing some illegal act and hatching conspiracy by
the present petitioner. Ingredients of offence of criminal
conspiracy are missing in the chargesheet. To prove the
charge under Section 120(B) of the I.P.C. read with Section 10
of the Indian Evidence Act, prima facie, prosecution has to led
the evidence against the conspirators and to afford a
reasonable ground for the Court to believe that two or more
persons are members of conspiracy. To frame a charge of
conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, read
with Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there has to
be prima facie evidence against the conspirators. In the instant
case, no prima facie case is found against present petitioner
being conspirators to establish alleged conspiracy. The
evidence produced against the petitioner is neither admissible
against him nor does it show the petitioner to be a part of any
criminal conspiracy hatched with other coaccused persons.
The learned JMFC as well as learned Sessions Judge has
committed a grave error in rejecting the discharge application
without dealing with the admissibility of the same observing
"Hollow and Shallow" inquiry allegedly made by the
petitioner.
In view of the above discussions and observations,
present application deserved to be allowed and the same is
allowed accordingly.
The order dated 19.02.2018 passed in an application
below Exh. 46 in Criminal Case No. 1188 of 2010 by the Ld.
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch at Bhuj as well as the order
dated 10.12.2018 passed by Ld. Additional Sessions Judge,
Kutch at Bhuj in Criminal Revision Application No.28 of 2018
stands quashed and set aside. An application Exh.46 shall be
allowed accordingly.
Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Registry is
directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned Court
through fax or email forthwith.
(B.N. KARIA, J) K. S. DARJI
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