[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Gauhati High Court
Smti Sarala Poddar vs Sri Gama Paswan Alias Ganga Sagar Paswan ... on 16 March, 2026
Page No.# 1/20
GAHC010049312026
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : FAO/16/2026
SMTI SARALA PODDAR
W/O SRI SURESH PODDAR, R/O AT ROAD, NEAR MMC PIOLI NAGAR, P.O.
AND P.S. MORANHAT, DIST. DIBRUGARH, ASSAM, PIN 785670
VERSUS
SRI GAMA PASWAN ALIAS GANGA SAGAR PASWAN AND ANR
S/O LATE RAM LAKHAN PASWAN, R/O PALTAN BAZAR, WARD NO 22, P.O.
JALAN NAGAR, P.S. AND DIST. DIBRUGARH, ASSAM, PIN 786005
2:DEBASHISH CHAKRABORTY
S/O LATE DIGEN CHAKRABORTY
R/O SEUJPUR
BYELANE 3
P.O.
P.S. DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN 78600
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. BHASKAR DUTTA, SENIOR ADVOCATE, MS L
RONGPIPI,MR JITENDRA DAS,MR. SAILENDRA DEKA
Advocate for the Respondent : MR. A DHAR, FOR CAVEATOR,MD F FARIDI
Linked Case : I.A.(Civil)/801/2026
SMTI SARALA PODDAR
W/O SRI SURESH PODDAR
Page No.# 2/20
R/O A T ROAD
NEAR MMC
PIOLI NAGAR
P.O. AND P.S. MORANHAT
DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN 78560
VERSUS
SRI GAMA PASWAN ALIAS GANGA SAGAR PASWAN AND ANR
S/O LATE RAM LAKHAN PASWAN
R/O PALTAN BAZAR
WARD NO 22
P.O. JALAN NAGAR
P.S. AND DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN 786005
2:DEBASHISH CHAKRABORTY
S/O LATE DIGEN CHAKRABORTY
R/O SEUJPUR
BYELANE 3
P.O.
P.S. DIST. DIBRUGARH
ASSAM
PIN 786001
------------
Advocate for : MR. BHASKAR DUTTA
SENIOR ADVOCATE
Advocate for : MR. A DHAR appearing for SRI GAMA PASWAN ALIAS GANGA
SAGAR PASWAN AND ANR
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA
ORDER
Date : 16.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. B. Dutta, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr.
J. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. A.
Dhar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.
1/caveator.
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2. This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 has been preferred by the appellant, namely, Smt.
Sarala Poddar, impugning the order dated 24.02.2026 passed by
the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh in Misc
(J) Case No. 140/2025 arising out of Title Suit No. 111/2025,
whereby, both the parties i.e., the appellant as well as the
respondent herein were directed to maintain status quo in respect
of the suit property.
3. By order dated 11.03.2026, with the consent of the learned
counsel for the appellant and the respondent No. 1, the notice to
the respondent No.2 was waived and this appeal was heard for
final disposal.
4. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in
brief, are that the respondent No. 1 had filed the Title Suit before
the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh
arraying the present appellant and the proforma respondent as
defendant therein. The said Title suit has been registered as Title
Suit No. 111/2025. In the aforesaid title suit the plaintiff had
prayed for relief of declaration, specific performance of contract,
cancellation of sale deed as well as the cancellation of the
mutation of the name of the present appellant in the records of
the rights, the prayer for eviction of the present appellant from the
suit premises as well as for permanent (prohibitory) and
mandatory injunction has also been prayed for.
5. In the plaint the present respondent No. 1, as plaintiff, has
pleaded that, on 11.07.2015, the defendant No. 1 (respondent No.
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2 herein) entered into an agreement with the plaintiff informing
him that he is the absolute owner of the suit land measuring 10
lochas covering by Dag No. 208 of periodic Patta No. 71 in
Gabharu Pather Ward Mouza in District Dibrugarh, which is more
fully described in the Schedule to the plaint. It was further stated
that the defendant No. 1 (respondent No.2 herein) had
communicated to sell the aforesaid plot of land and the plaintiff
agreed to purchase the same.
6. Accordingly, the consideration amount of Rs. 3 Lakhs was fixed
for the said sale. It is further stated in the plaint that thereafter,
the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 entered into a registered
agreement for sale bearing deed No. 1899 (Serial No. 2408) dated
11.08.2015. It was further contended in the said plaint that on the
date of execution and registration of the aforesaid agreement, the
plaintiff paid an amount of Rs. 2,80,000/- in cash to the defendant
No.1 and agreed to pay the remaining Rs. 20,000/- at the time of
registration of the sale deed.
7. It was further pleaded in the plaint that when the defendant
No. 1 did not obtain the land sale permission, the plaintiff
approached him, in the month of January 2024 and requested him
to do the needful for obtaining the land sale permission.
Thereafter, in the first week of November 2024 the plaintiff visited
the defendant No. 1 to request him again for doing the needful for
obtaining the sale permission in pursuant to the agreement to sale
between them, however, he was shocked to see that a boundary
wall was constructed over the suit land and the defendant No.1
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has taken advance amount from someone for sale of the suit land.
8. Thereafter, when the plaintiff tried to contact the defendant
No.1, he avoided the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff was
compelled to approach the Court by filing Title Suit No. 68/2024
before the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dibrugarh
seeking relief of specific performance of contract and permanent
injunction against the defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit
property. The plaintiff has also filed an application under Order 39
Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 in the aforesaid Title Suit, which was registered as Misc (J)
Case No. 80/2024. The Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Dibrugarh by its order dated 06.06.2025 directed the
defendant No. 1 not to create any other party interest over the suit
land till the disposal of Title suit No. 68/2024. It is further stated in
the plaint that on 23.06.2025 when plaintiff visited the suit land,
he found that some construction work was going on over the suit
land. Accordingly, he approached the Revenue Authority and obtain
Jamabandi of the suit land and came to know that the defendant
No.1 had sold the suit land to the present appellant. It also came
to the notice of the plaintiff that the defendant No.1 had managed
to get the partition of the suit land and new Dag Number i.e., Dag
No. 355 and Periodic Patta No. 124 were allotted against the suit
land.
9. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application for impleadment of
the present appellant in the aforesaid Title Suit and also prayed for
amendment of the plaint. However, after going through the
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documents annexed with the amended plaint by the plaintiff, the
Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Dibrugarh came to
finding that since the value of sale deed which was sought to be
cancelled was Rs. 26,75,600/- which is beyond the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Dibrugarh the plaint was returned to the plaintiff.
10. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the Title Suit No. 111/2025 before
the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh. In the
said title suit, the plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39
Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 praying for grant of temporary injunction.
11. The defendant No.1 (respondent no.2 herein) appeared in the
said suit and filed written statement as well as written objection,
wherein, the averment made in the plaint as well as the injunction
application were denied. It was also stated therein that the
defendant No. 1 along with his sisters and brother inherited land
measuring 1 katha 0.84 lochas from their mother, namely, Manju
Chakraborty. It was also stated that the defendant no. 1 and his
siblings had mutated their names in the record of rights and after
partition, they became the joint owners of the suit land. It was also
stated that he agreed to sell 5 lochas of land for a consideration
amount of Rs. 3 lakhs on false assurance given by the plaintiff that
the other joint owners have already consented to alienate their
respective share. However, he was surprised to know later on, that
the agreement to sale was drafted, by the plaintiff, in respect of
10 lochas instead of 5 lochas of land which he agreed
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with the plaintiff.
12. The present appellant also appeared before the Court of learned
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh and filed written statement
as well as written objection denying all the averments made by the
plaintiff in his plaint. It was contended by the present appellant
that the defendant No.1 along with other co-owners had
approached the appellant for selling the entire land measuring 1
katha 0.84 lochas to which the appellant agreed and, accordingly, a
sale deed was executed on 07.05.2025 at a consideration amount
of Rs. 26,75,600/-. It has also been contended that the entire
consideration amount has been paid by the appellant to the
vendors including the defendant No. 1 (present respondent No. 2).
It was also contended that thereafter, the present appellant applied
for mutation of the records of the rights before the Circle Officer
and after verifying the title of the appellant and his possession on
the suit land, the Circle Officer allowed the mutation in the name
of the present appellant in respect of the suit land. It was further
contended that thereafter, the appellant obtained the building
construction permission from the Dibrugarh Municipality and
started construction of over the suit land by investing more than
Rs.60 lakhs.
13. However, by the impugned order dated 24.02.2026 passed in
Misc (J) Case No. 140/2025, the Trial Court directed both the
parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit land till
disposal of the suit. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
instant appeal has been filed by the present appellant.
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14. Mr. B. Dutta, the learned senior counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the Trial Court had erred in passing the impugned
order by directing both the parties to maintain status quo without
considering the legal provisions and without properly assessing the
existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable loss to the plaintiff.
15. He submits that the appellant is the bonafide purchaser of the
suit land for valuable consideration. He submits that the appellant
has purchased the suit land from its lawful owners (the proforma
respondent and his siblings) by paying a consideration amount of
Rs. 26,75,600/-. He submits that the Trial Court failed to take into
consideration the provision contained in Section 54 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 relating to a contract for sale. He submits
that it has been categorically provided in the said statutory
provision that a contract for sale, does not, of itself create, an
interest in and charge on any such property about which the said
contract has been made.
16. He submits that the appellant having purchased the suit land by
way of registered sale deed for valid consideration and thereafter,
his name has also been mutated in respect of the suit property has
a better title than that of the plaintiff (respondent No. 1) whose
entire claim to the suit land was based on the agreement to sell
dated 11.08.2015 executed between him and the respondent no. 2
only, wherein other joint owners were not the parties.
17. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also submitted
that otherwise also the agreement for sale dated 11.08.2015 is not
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an executable agreement in as much as the said agreement was in
respect of 10 lochas of land, whereas the share of the defendant
No. 1 (respondent no. 2) in the land inherited from his mother
Manju Chakraborty was only to the extent of 5 lochas and hence, it
is beyond the quantum of land inherited by him.
18. He further submits that since the other co-owners of this suit
land were not made party in the agreement for sale dated
11.08.2025. The said agreement for sale is an inexecutable
agreement, hence, even if a decree is granted in Title Suit No.
111/2025 by the trial court, the said decree would remain in-
executable against the other co- owners of the suit land.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that
the order of maintaining status-quo being a discretionary relief, the
plaintiff (respondent No. 1) is not entitled to said relief in as much
as he approached the Court after more than 8 years of the date of
execution of agreement for sale. He submits that under Article 54
of the Limitation Act, 1963, the title suit filed by the applicant is
barred by limitation.
20. The learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits
that though, the respondent No.1 has claimed to have paid sum of
Rs.2,80,000/- on the date of execution of the agreement to sell
i.e., on 11.08.2015, however, he has failed to produce any valid
receipt wherein the pro-forma respondent had acknowledged the
receipt of any such advance.
21. The learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits
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that the trial court committed perversity in ignoring the materials
on record as well as statutory provisions while discussing the
existence of three golden principles i.e., prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable loss in favour of the plaintiff while
granting the order of maintaining status quo by both the parties.
22. The learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits
that the appellant has invested more than Rs. 60 lakhs in the
construction under taken over his purchased land and already
second floor of the RCC building has been completed and at this
stage if the appellant had to stop the construction work over his
own land, he would suffer the irreparable loss as such, he is even
ready to undertake before this Court in the event of respondent
No. 1 (plaintiff) succeeding in the suit pending before the Trial
Court, she is ready to demolish the construction made over the suit
land.
23. The learned senior counsel for the appellant also submitted that
the Title Suit No.68/2024, which was filed by the respondent No.1
at the first instance before the Court of Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Dibrugarh proceeded ex-parte against the defendant
(Respondent No.2) hence, the embargo of Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would not be applicable against him.
He further submits that since the present appellant was not a party
to the aforesaid suit the restriction under Section 52 of the Transfer
of the Property Act, 1882 is not applicable to him also.
24. He further submits that the Trial Court did not consider the fact
that the respondent No.1 was indolent and approached the Court
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on specific performance of contract after more than 8 years of
execution of the said contract. He submits that the Trial Court did
not consider the fact that while seeking an equitable and
discretionary relief of temporary injunction, the respondent No.1
was not diligent and that all the conditions necessary for grant of
temporary injunction in the form of status quo order were not fully
satisfied.
25. The learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits
that it is the present appellant who shall have to face more
comparative hardship as a result of the restrain put on him by the
status quo order for thereby putting halt to the construction of
building in which he has already invested a huge sum of money.
He further submits that since by putting a halt on the construction
work of RCC building, it would incur huge loss to the appellant, she
is also ready to give an undertaking before this Court that if in the
event the plaintiff is able to succeed in the pending Title Suit No.
111/2025, she will demolish the construction made over the suit
land at her own expenses. The learned senior counsel for the
appellant, accordingly, prays for setting aside the impugned order
dated 24.02.2026 passed in Misc (J) Case No. 140/2025 by the
Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dibrugarh.
26. On the other hand, Mr. A. Dhar, the learned counsel for the
respondent No.1/caveator submits that there is no infirmity or
illegality in the impugned order dated 24.02.2026 passed by the
Trial Court in Misc (J) Case No. 140/2025 and no interference by
this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is warranted in
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this case.
27. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has submitted that
the suit filed by the respondent No. 1 is not barred by limitation in
as much as agreement to sell entered into between the respondent
No. 1 and the respondent No. 2 does not specify any date of
completion of the sale, hence, the three-year limitation does not
begin from the date of the contract. Rather, it begins when the
plaintiff has noticed that the performance is refused, which was
done impliedly by the respondent No. 2. When on 23.06.2024, he
found that some construction work was going on in the suit land
and the respondent No. 2 had taken advance money from a third
party for selling the land. He, therefore, submits that the case of
the respondent No. 1 falls within the second limb of Article 54 of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. He further submits that the question of limitation is a mixed
question of fact and law, therefore, the same may be decided only
in the suit and not in the miscellaneous proceedings under Order
39, Rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In support of his
submission, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has cited
a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of "Urvashiben Vs.
Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi" reported in 2019 (13) SCC
372. He has also cited another ruling of the Apex Court in the case
of "Ahmmadsahab Abdul Mulla (dead) By Prop. LRS Vs.
Bibijan and Others" reported in 2009 (5) SCC 46.
29. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has further submitted
that since the sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the
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present appellant was executed by the respondent No. 2 and other
co-owners during the pendency of the Title Suit No.68/2024, the
aforesaid sale is hit by embargo of Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882.
30. He further submits that though, the aforesaid title suit was
proceeding ex-parte against the respondent No. 2, however, from
the order dated 28.02.2025 passed in Title Suit No.68/2024, it is
clear that the defendant (respondent No. 2) was aware about the
pendency of the aforesaid title suit as he failed to appear before
the Trial Court in spite of receiving of the summons by him. Hence,
he cannot take the plea that he was unaware about the pendency
of the aforesaid Title Suit, therefore, he submits that the embargo
of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would be
applicable in alienation of the suit property made by the
respondent No. 2 during the pendency of the aforesaid suit.
31. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has further
submitted that the respondent No. 1 had entered into agreement
for sale with the respondent No. 2 in respect of the suit property
and has paid the advance amount of Rs. 2,80,000/- as the
consideration amount at the time of entering into the said
agreement. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has
further submitted that the Trial Court had granted the order of
maintaining status quo in respect of suit property after considering
the existence of all the three golden principles for grant of
compensation. He submits that while granting the order to
maintain status quo, the Trial Court has found a prima facie case in
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favor of the respondent No. 1 and also found that balance of
convenience in favour of the respondent No.1. It also found that
the respondent No. 1 would suffer irreparable loss and injury if the
order of status quo is not granted as continuous construction over
the suit land would change the nature of the suit land.
32. Hence, he submits that the Trial Court has rightly considered the
three golden principles before passing on the status quo order. He
submits that in exercise of powers on the Appellate Court under
Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the
appellate court cannot substitute its own discretion in place of the
discretion of the trial court. It cannot interfere, in the exercise of
discretion by the trial court unless said discretion is found to be
exercised arbitrarily or in contrary to the accepted principles for
granting or rejecting temporary injunction. He submits that in this
case, there is no perversity and no flouting of the settled principles
of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions,
hence, there is no scope for any interference by the appellate
court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the
respondent No.1 has cited following ruling:
i. "Ramakant Ambalal Choksi Vs. Harish Ambalal
Choksi and Others" reported in (2024) 11 SCC 351
ii. Sudha Dugar Vs. Chiranjeeb Sarma Roy reported
in (2025) 0 Supreme (Gau) 637.
33. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
for both sides and have gone through the materials on record. I
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have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for
both sides in support of their respective submissions.
34. On perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that
the agreement to sell between the respondent No. 2 herein and
the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was executed on 11.08.2015.
Though, it was specifically mentioned in paragraph No.6 of the said
agreement that the vendor shall execute final sale deed after
obtaining sale permission as soon as possible, however, it appears
from the plaint filed by the respondent No.1, that he approached
the respondent No. 2, for claiming execution of the agreement to
sale in the month of January 2024 only. Before the said date, there
is no specific mention as to whether the plaintiff had approached
the respondent No.2 seeking execution of the agreement to sale
on any earlier occasion. Thus, apparently the execution of the
agreement for sale was sought by the plaintiff after a delay of
more than 8 years. However, as regards the question of limitation
in filing the suit by the respondent No. 1 is concerned, since no
specific date of execution of the sale deed has been mentioned in
the agreement to sell, the period of limitation of 3 years may have
to be computed from the date when the plaintiff had the notice of
refusal by the respondent No. 2 to execute the said sale deed.
Hence, it is a mixed question of law and facts and as such, at the
stage of deciding an Interlocutory Application for grant or refusal
of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2, the issue of
limitation under the facts and circumstances of this case may not
be decided at this stage. The same has to be decided in the suit
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after adducing of the evidence by the parties.
35. The same would be the course in deciding the question of
applicability of embargo of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 in this case. As regards the Title Suit No.68/2024
proceeding ex parte against respondent No. 2, though, there is a
finding by the Trial Court that the summons issued to the
defendant in Title Suit No.68/2024 were received by the defendant.
However, many other factors like whether the defendant had also
received the copy of plaint, whether he was aware about the
subject matter of the Title Suit are questions of fact, which can
only be ascertained during the trial of the Title Suit No. 68/2024.
The fact that ultimately, Title Suit No. 68/2024 was returned and a
new suit i.e., Title Suit No. 111/2025 was filed will also have
repercussions on the question of applicability of the embargo of
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in this case.
36. The main question to be considered in this appeal is as to
whether the Trial Court while granting the order of status quo has
rightly considered the settled principles of law regulating the grant
or refusal of interlocutory relief. This Court shall also have to
consider as to whether there was any perversity or arbitrariness in
directing both the parties to maintain status quo.
37. On perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that
though, the Trial Court had, by the impugned order, directed both
the parties to maintain status quo, in respect of the suit land,
however, in effect, it was only a grant of temporary injunction
against the present appellant. More so, when there is nothing on
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record to indicate that the respondent No.1 had possession of a
suit land at any point of time. His only claim is that he entered into
an agreement with respondent No.2 for purchase of the suit land
and had paid an advance amount of Rs. 2,80,000/- against
consideration. It also appears for the same, no receipt or any
documentary acknowledgment could be shown by the
plaintiff/respondent No.1. As the respondent No.1 is in no way
having any control or possession over the suit land, he is required
to do nothing for maintaining status quo in respect of the suit land.
38. Whereas, the appellant had already constructed a building over
the scheduled plot of land and to a considerable extent and had
already completed the construction of slab of the second floor.
Thus, the impugned order of status quo has, in fact, only put a
restraint on the respondent No.1.
39. One of the basic principles of law is that an owner cannot be
injuncted to do any lawful thing over his own property. In this
case, whereas, the appellant is claiming ownership right over the
suit property by virtue of the sale deed which has been executed in
his favor by the respondent No.2 and the other co-owners of the
land, on the other hand, the respondent No.1 is claiming right over
the suit property on the strength of an agreement for sale dated
11.08.2025.
40. As regards the legal position regarding the difference between a
sale deed and an agreement for sale is concerned, the Apex Court
in the case of "Ramesh Chand (D) through legal heirs Vs.
Suresh Chand and Another" reported in 2025 SCC online SC
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1879 has observed as follows:
"15. There is a difference between a
sale deed and an agreement for sale, or
a contract for sale. A contract for sale of
immovable property is a contract that a
sale of such property shall take place on
terms settled between the parties.
While a sale is a transfer of ownership;
a contract for sale is merely a document
creating a right to obtain another
document, namely a registered sale
deed to complete the transaction of sale
of an immovable property. Section 54 in
its definition of sale does not include an
agreement of sale and neither confers
any proprietary rights in favour of the
transferee nor by itself create any
interest or charge in the property. If
after entering into a contract for sale of
property, the seller without any
reasonable excuse avoids executing a
sale deed, the buyer can proceed to file
a suit for specific performance of the
contract."
41. On a cursory perusal of the aforesaid observation made by the
Apex Court, it appears that whereas a sale deed is a deed of
conveyance of ownership from one person to another, an
agreement for sale is not such a deed of conveyance and does not
create any ownership right in respect of the intending purchaser.
As such, it appears that under the facts and circumstances of this
case, the appellant has the better title over the suit land than that
of the respondent No.1 who does not have any ownership right
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over the same. His right over the suit land is contingent only upon
decreeing of the suit for specific performance of contract filed by
him.
42. However, as on today, it is the appellant who has the better title
over the suit land than that of respondent No. 1. This aspect was
not considered by the Trial Court while discussing the golden
principles more specifically, the balance of convenience, while
granting the order of status quo. As such, an element of
arbitrariness appears to be there in the impugned order of the Trial
Court while directing both the parties to maintain status quo in
respect of the suit property.
43. Further, it appears that the appellant has already made a
considerable amount of construction over the land over which, as
on date, she has the ownership rights. Otherwise also, there is
already a construction over the suit land and in the event, the suit
for specific performance and eviction against the appellant is
allowed, the appellant shall have to deliver vacant possession of
the same. The respondent No. 1 would not suffer any loss if
ultimately suit is decreed in his favour, as he will have get vacant
khas possession of the suit land and the construction thereon shall
have to be demolished at the expenses of the present appellant.
However, on the other hand, if the suit fails, the appellant who
otherwise have all attributes of title over the suit land and
presently appears to be owner of the suit land, would suffer
unnecessarily in spite of having better title and possession of a suit
land. As such, this Court is of considered opinion that the trial
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court erred in assessing the comparative inconvenience, of both
the parties, in directing both the parties to maintain status quo in
respect of the suit land. This Court is of the considered opinion
that under the facts and circumstances of this case, this is not a fit
case for grant of an equitable relief of maintenance of status quo
in respect of suit land against the appellant during the pendency of
the Title Suit No. 111/2025.
44. In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the
foregoing paragraphs, this Court is of considered opinion that the
impugned order of directing both the parties to maintain status
quo in respect of the suit land was passed without considering
settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory
injunction, as such same is liable to be set aside.
45. Accordingly, the impugned order is hereby set aside, and this
appeal is allowed.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
