Gauhati High Court
Abdus Samad vs The State Of Assam And Ors on 11 September, 2025
Page No.# 1/16
GAHC010004362013
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.A./51/2013
ABDUS SAMAD
S/O LATE HAJI ABDUL SAHID, R/O BENGENAATI, WARD NO. 8, NAGAON
TOWN UNDER NAGAON SADAR POLICE STATION IN THE DIST. OF
NAGAON, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM and ORS
2:MD. RAFIQUE
3:MD. MAFIQUE
BOTH SONS OF MD. ABDUL KADIR ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF VILL.
DACCAIYABASTI UNDER DHING POLICE STATION IN THE DIST OF
NAGAON
ASSAM.
4:MD. ALTABUDDIN
S/O LATE ABDUL ALI
R/O VILL. DHUPAGURI PATHAR
UNDER DHING POLICE STATION IN THE DIST. OF NAGAON
ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR.U CHOUDHURY, MR.B M CHOUDHURY,MS.S
CHOUDHURY,MR.D K KALITA
Advocate for the Respondent : MR.T C KHATRI, MR R BARUAH,MR.P C SARKAR,MR.H
SARMA,PP, ASSAM,MR S ISLAM,MR. M U MAHMUD
Page No.# 2/16
Linked Case : Crl.A./35/2013
ABDUL KADIR
S/O LATE HAZI ABDUL SAHID
VILL. DHAKAIA BASTI
POLICE STATION
DHING
DIST. NAGAON
ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
ASSAM AT GAUHATI HIGH COURT.
------------
Advocate for : MR.T C KHATRI
Advocate for : appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM
Linked Case : Crl.A./50/2013
ABDUS SAMAD
S/O LATE HAJI ABDUL SAHID
R/O BENGENAATI
WARD NO. 8
NAGAON TOWN UNDER NAGAON SADAR
P.S. IN THE DIST. OF NAGAON
ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS
2:MD. ABDUL KADIR
S/O LATE HAZI ABDUL SAHID
R/O VILL. DACCAIYABASTI UNDER DHING POLICE STATION IN THE DIST.
OF NAGAON
ASSAM.
------------
Advocate for : MR.B M CHOUDHURY
Advocate for : MR.H SARMA appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS
Page No.# 3/16
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
ORDER
Date : 11-09-2025
Heard Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. R.J.
Baruah, learned Addl. P.P. Assam appearing for the State and Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
2. The present appeal has been instituted invoking the provisions of Section 372 of
the Cr.P.C., 1973, assailing the judgment and order dated 18-12-2012, passed by the
learned Sessions Judge, Nagaon in Sessions Case No. 69/1999, acquitting the respondent
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the charges framed against them under Section 324/ 326/ 307/ 34 IPC.
3. The prosecution case is that on 25-09-1998, at around 5:30 p.m. one Jiaur
Rahman was sent by his father Abdus Samad (appellant herein) to the shop house of one
Jakir Hussain in order to purchase match box. At the relevant point of time, the appellant,
his wife and daughter were near the pond of their homestead. After Jiaur Rahman had
proceeded to the shop, they heard the alarm of Jiaur Rahman and rushed to the place of
occurrence. On reaching the place of occurrence, they saw Abdul Kadir, Abdul Rafique,
Abdul Mafique, Altabuddin and Anisur Rahman striking blows to Jiaur Rahman by means
of dao and dagger. It is further projected that on seeing the incident Abdus Samad, with a
view to save his son embraced him and then except the accused Abdul Kadir, other
accused persons fled away. However, accused Abdul Kadir also caused injuries to Abdus
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Samad by striking blows to him. The dao was reportedly snatched by the appellant,
herein, from the Abdul Kadir and then Abdul Kadir fled away. Jiaur Rahman sustained
severe injury due to the blow given by the accused. Basing on the said incident on the
following day, i.e. 26-09-1998 the appellant, herein, lodged an FIR before the Dhing
Police Station. Accordingly, Dhing P.S. Case No. 130/1998, under Section 147/ 148/149/
326 IPC came to be registered. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the police laid the
charge-sheet against Abdue Kadir, Md. Rafique (respondent No. 2), Md. Mafique
(respondent No. 3) and Md. Altabuddin (respondent No. 4), under Section 334/ 326/ 307/
34 IPC. The charge-sheet also having been filed under the provision of Section 307 IPC
and the same now being exclusively triable by the court of Sessions, the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Nagaon committed the case and accordingly, Sessions Case No.
69/1999 came to be registered.
4. Thereafter, charges came to be framed in the matter against Abdul Kadir and the
respondent No. 2, 3 and 4, herein, under Section 324/ 326/ 307/ 34 IPC. The charges
having been read over and explained to the accused persons and they having pleaded not
guilty, a trial came to be held in the matter. During the trial the prosecution examined as
many as 10 (ten) witnesses, while the defence has examined 03 (three) witnesses. One
witness was also examined in the matter as court witness. Upon conclusion of the trial,
the learned trial court, while convicting Abdul Kadir under Section 324/ 326/ 307 IPC
proceeded to acquit the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein.
5. Being aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent No. 2, 3 and 4, the appellant,
who was the informant, had instituted the present appeal.
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6. Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
learned trial court had failed to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution witness and
the court witness in its proper perspective and accordingly, proceeded to acquit the
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in the matter. By referring to the deposition of the PW-1, PW-
2, PW-3 and the court witness, Mr. Choudhury has submitted that the said witnesses had
clearly implicated the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in the matter and it is evident from
their deposition that they had seen the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and one Anisur
Rahman along with Abdul Kadir, assaulting Jiaur Rahman. He further submits that Jiaur
Rahman (victim) who had deposed as PW-3 had also corroborated the evidences of PW-1,
PW-2 and CW-1. Mr. Choudhury has further submitted that the evidence of the medical
officer who had examined the PW-3 and the injuries as noticed on the person of PW-3
would go to reveal that the said injuries to have been so caused on account of more than
one person assaulting said PW-3, on the date of the incident. He submits that the
evidence of the PW-1, PW-2 and CW-1 had brought on record the fact that the
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein, along with Abdul Kadir were armed with dao and
dagger and were seen to be assaulting PW-3. The deposition is contended to be further
corroborated from the deposition of the PW-3, the victim who had also deposed in similar
lines. Mr. Choudhury by referring to the evidence of PW-3, Jiaur Rahman, the victim, has
contended that the said deposition brings on record materials implicating the respondent
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 along with the accused Abdul Kadir and the same also demonstrates that
the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 had assaulted him with dao and dagger along with said
Abdul Kadir. However, the learned trial court ignored to appreciate the said aspect of the
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matter and by concluding that the charges framed against respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4,
herein, were not established, proceeded to acquit them from the said charges.
7. Mr. Choudhury, in the above premises submits that the impugned judgment and
order dated 18-12-2012 would mandate an interference, with a further direction
convicting the respondents, herein, under the charges framed against them.
8. Mr. R.J. Baruah, learned Addl. P.P. by referring to the deposition of PW-3 has
submitted that the same clearly implicates the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein, with
the assault committed on the person of the PW-3 by them. Accordingly, he submits that
the said evidence brought on record by the PW-3 being corroborated by the evidence of
PW-1, PW-2 and CW-1, the acquittal of the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the matter by
the learned trial court is clearly erroneous and would mandate a reversal by this Court.
9. Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 has
submitted that the evidence brought on record by the prosecution witness, more
particularly, PW-2 and CW-1 would reveal that there were pending litigation between the
parties and the deposition as made by the PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and CW-1 in the matter
have been so made by keeping in view of the pending litigation is clearly an exaggeration,
inasmuch as, the independent witnesses have not stated anything about the presence of
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 at the place of occurrence when the Abdul Kadir had
assaulted Jiaur Rahman. Mr. Mahmud further submits that the learned trial court, on
appreciation of the evidence, had rightly concluded that the charges framed against the
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein, have not been proved, beyond reasonable doubt, and
thereby proceeded to acquit them on the benefit of doubt, such conclusion reached by
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the learned trial court being based on the evidence coming on record, the same would
not mandate reversal by this Court.
10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials
available on record.
11. The PW-1, informant, during his deposition, had deposed that on 25-09-1998 in
the evening at around 05:00 p.m. alleged occurrence had taken place and the victim Jiaur
Rahman is his son. He deposed that he had sent his son Jiaur Rahman to bring one
matchbox from the shop. He further deposed that to reach the shop house, one is
required to go through the front side of the house of accused Abdul Kadir. On hearing, cry
of Jiaur Rahman, he, his wife and daughter had rushed to the place and therein had seen
his son Jiaur Rahman lying on the ground near the accused Abdul Kadir and the accused
Abdul Kadir was assaulting him by means of a dao. PW-1 also deposed that the
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 along with one Anisur Rahman were also assaulting Jiaur
Rahman. The PW-1 further deposed that he on reaching the place of occurrence had
fallen over his son in order to save him and then except accused Abdul Kadir and other
accused including the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein, had fled away from the place.
12. PW-2 Sultana Naznin is the daughter of the informant. She had deposed that on
the relevant day at around 05:30 p.m. she, her mother Firoja and PW-1 were near the
pond of their home stay and then her elder brother Jianur Rahman was sent to bring one
matchbox from the shop house. PW-2 further deposed that they heard the cry of Jiaur
Rahman and rushed to the place of occurrence. She further disposed that they saw
accused Abdul Kadir, respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4, herein, and one Anisur Rahman striking
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blows to Jiaur Rahman. She deposed that on hearing their hulla except Abudl Kadir,
remaining accused had left the place. The wife of the PW-1 who was also present in the
place of occurrence was examined as CW (Court Witness) and she in her deposition had
deposed that that on the relevant day at around 05:30 p.m. while she, her husband and
daughter were near the pond of their house and her son gone for bringing a matchbox,
after a short time they had heard the alarm of Jiaur Rahman and had rushed to the place
of occurrence and had seen the accused Abdul Kadir and other accused persons striking
blows to Jiaur Rahman by means of dagger.
13. PW-3, Jiaur Rahman is the victim in this case. In his deposition Jiaur Rahman had
stated that while he had proceeded to the shop house to bring a matchbox, his mother,
sister and father were waiting near the pond of their house. He further deposed that
while going to the shop through the front side of the house of accused Abdul Kadir, he
found that Abdul Kadir, respondent No. 2, 3 and 4 and one Anusur Rahman waiting by the
side of their roads with their respective hands on their backside. He further deposed that
when he had crossed them, Abdul Kadir had asked him to stop and struck blows on his
head by means of dao. He then raised hulla. The PW-3 further alleged that Abdul Kadir
had struck dao blows on his abdomen, legs and his back causing serious injuries and he
fell down. He further deposed that the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein, also struck
blows on him by means of dao and dagger and he became unconscious and regained his
sense after about 02 days in the hospital.
14. PW-4 Jabin Uddin is a villager, who deposed in his deposition that at the relevant
point of time, he was in his house and on hearing cries he came out of his house and had
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gone to the place of occurrence and wherein he saw, PW-3 with injuries on his head,
abdomen and other parts of his body. He further deposed that he had found the PW-1 at
the place of occurrence and he had reported that the accused Abdul Kadir, respondent
Nos. 2, 3 and 4, herein, and one Anisur Rahman had struck blows on them.
15. PW-5, Bulbul Ahmed had also deposed that at the time of incident he was in his
pharmacy and on being informed by one Jalaluddin he had gone to Dhing PHC and had
seen Jiaur Rahman with injuries in his head and other part of the body.
16. PW-7 Abdul Salam had deposed that at the time of the incident he was in the
market and had later came to know that accused Abdul Kadir, respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4
had assaulted PW-1 and PW-3. PW-7 had in his deposition deposed that he had not gone
to the place of occurrence but was reported that the accused Abdul Kadir, respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 had assaulted Jiaur and Samad.
17. PW-8, in his deposition had deposed that he hearing the cry of Jiaur Rahman and
on reaching the place of occurrence he had seen Jiaur Rahman lying on the ground in a
pool of blood. He further deposed that there were cut injuries on head, abdomen and
back of the PW-3 and had also seen the accused Abdul Kadir running away from the place
of occurrence.
18. PW-6 is Dr. K. Goswami who had examined PW-3 at the B.P. Civil Hospital, Nagaon
and in his deposition he had specifically stated that on examination of PW-3, he had
found the following injuries that are present:
"1. One incised wound on the upper part of the right leg lateral aspect. Size
5"x1"x1".
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2. One incised wound on the left hypochondrium. Size 2"x 1 and half inch x
peritoneal deep with exposure of intestine and omentum.
3. Transverse incised wound back of left chest. Size 3"x1"x muscle deep.
4. Transverse sharp cut wound (incised) back of the left chest. Size 4"x1"x muscle
deep.
5. Deep sharp cut wound (incised wound) on the left axilla. Size 1"x half inch x
muscle deep.
6. Lacerated wound on right upper forearm post surface."
PW-6 the Doctor had further deposed that the injuries were fresh and there was
fracture of the lower ribs of the left chest and the same was caused by sharp weapons.
He further deposed that injury No. 2 was grievous and caused by sharp objects and the
rest of the injuries were also caused by sharp object and were fresh. During his cross,
PW-6 has stated that as there were fractures of ribs so he has mentioned as grievous and
had deposed that the fracture of the ribs may be caused by blunt weapon.
19. The learned trial court on appreciating the evidence brought on record during the
trial had drawn a conclusion that the medical evidence was found supportive to the
evidence of PW-3 and the evidence of PW-3 was not impeached by the defence. Having
drawn the said conclusion with regard the allegations levelled against the present
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the learned trial court had drawn the following conclusions:
".........Though PW-1 has stated that all the accused persons assaulted Jiaur
Rahman, but from his cross-examination, we come to know that before he arrived
at the place of occurrence, other accused person except Kadir left the place. The
evidence of PW-2 and CW-1 that they saw the accused persons assaulting Jiaur
Rahman is found doubtful as reveals from our earlier discussion. Other PWs also
did not seek the accused persons at the place of occurrence. That accused Rafique,
Mofique and Altabuddin assaulted Jiaur Rahman, this fact does not appear to have
been proved beyond doubt. Apart from that it reveals from the record that when
Jiaur Rahman was sent to the shop-house to purchase a match-box, then on the
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road the alleged occurrence took place. As such, according to me, it also cannot be
believed that the accused persons had common intention to assault Jiaur Rahman
or Abdus Samad since it was not known to the accused that Jiaur would come to
purchase a match-box."
20. Basing on the said findings, the learned trial court concluded that basing on the
evidence on record, the allegations against the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 cannot be held
to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, proceeded to acquit them
on the benefit of doubt and they were set at liberty.
21. Before examining the evidences coming on record along with conclusions drawn
thereon by the trial court, this Court would notice a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2007 4 SCC
415. Paragraphs 36 to 42 of the aforesaid judgment being relevant are reproduced here-
in-below for ready reference:
"36. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat 15 this Court said: (SCC p.
229, para 7)
While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first
required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial
court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably
unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the
negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed, Conversely, if the
acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it
can then and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own
conclusions.‟
37. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, referring to earlier decisions,
the Court stated: (SCC p. 63, para 7)
7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to avoid
miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the
acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a
case where the trial court has taken a view based upon conjectures and
hypothesis and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court
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to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of
ascertaining as to whether the accused has committed any offence or not.
Probable view taken by the trial court which may not be disturbed in the
appeal is such a view which is based upon legal and admissible evidence.
Only because the accused has been acquitted by the trial court, cannot be
made a basis to urge that the High Court under all circumstances should not
disturb such a finding.
38. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. the trial court acquitted the accused
but the High Court convicted them. Negativing the contention of the appellants
that the High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of the trial court
even if that view was not correct, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 89-90, para 7)
7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for
the appellants that under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the
High Court could not disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it
found that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On the basis of
the pronouncements of this Court, the settled position of law regarding the
powers of the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that
the Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of
acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with the order of
acquittal because by passing an order of acquittal the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to
the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction
limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines for
circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that
miscarriage of justice is avoided. A miscarriage of justice which may arise
from the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the
admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether
all or any of the accused has committed any offence or not.
39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. this Court
said: (SCC p. 476, para 12)
12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of
acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the
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evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not
interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view
is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The
High Court would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely
because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record
a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of
acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to
acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails
to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity.
40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha this Court observed: (SCC pp.
614-15, para 21)
21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the
evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of
acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence
of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to
the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration
of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible
evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate
the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the
purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any
offence or not.
41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P. this Court stated: (SCC pp. 317-18,
para 8)
8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the
appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals
against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the
entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of
acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the
judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is
reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court
merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also
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bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further
if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the
decision of the trial court.
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, „substantial and compelling reasons‟, „good and
sufficient grounds‟, „very strong circumstances‟, „distorted conclusions‟, „glaring
mistakes‟, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in
an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
„flourishes of language‟ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to
interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there
is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court."
22. Applying the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa
(Supra) to the present trial, this Court finds that the view taken by the learned trial court
is probable view, which is based on legal and admissible evidence. It is also settled by the
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decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court including the decision noted hereinabove that if
the trial court acts on evidence to acquit the accused person the appellate court shall not
interfere with such findings of the trial court, thus this Court while sitting in judgment
over an acquittal the paramount consideration of the Court ought to avoid miscarriage of
justice. Thus, it is only when the trial court has taken a view based on no legal evidence
or upon conjectures and hypotheses, the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the
evidence in an appeal against acquittal for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the
accused has committed any offence or not. As already held hereinabove, the view taken
by the learned trial court being a probable view and the same also being supported by
the evidences coming on record, this Court would be slow to disturb such findings of trial
court. Further, it is to be noted that in criminal cases if two views are possible on evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be accepted. This Court
does not find any compelling and substantial reason to interfere with the views taken by
the learned trial court in the matter.
23. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the considered view that the
findings recorded by the learned trial court with regard to the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4,
herein, would not mandate any interference from this Court. Accordingly, the present
appeal is held to be devoid of any merit and the same stands dismissed.
Registry to send back the trial court record, at the earliest.
JUDGE
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GS
Comparing Assistant
