Page No.# 1/14 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 7720 Gua

Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/14 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors on 13 October, 2025

                                                                        Page No.# 1/14

GAHC010227332014




                                                                2025:GAU-AS:13690

                              THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
   (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                               Case No. : WP(C)/5850/2014

            BHODRESWAR MECH and ANR
            S/O LT. PHUKAN MECH

            2: ROHIT MECH @ ROHIT KUMAR MECH
             S/O LT. BABU MECH
             BOTH ARE R/O MANJA HAJA NOLAI
             P.S. MANJA
             DIST- KARBI ANGLONG
            ASSA

            VERSUS

            THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS
            REP. BY THE CHIEF SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, DISPUR, GHY-6

            2:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM

             HOME DEPTT.
             DISPUR
             GHY-6

            3:THE DY. COMMISSIONER
             KARBI ANGLONG DISTRICT
             DIPHU
            ASSAM

            4:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
             KARBI ANGLONG DISTRICT
             DIPHU
            ASSA

Advocate for the Petitioner   : MR.A R AGARWALA, MR.A K BARUAH,AMICUS
CURIAE,MS.T HASNU
                                                                          Page No.# 2/14

Advocate for the Respondent : MR. PN GOSWAMI, ADDL. AG,ASSAM, ,GA, ASSAM,

BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

For the Petitioners : Mr. A. K. Baruah, Advocate.

      For the Respondents           :     Mr. P. N. Goswami, Additional
                                          Advocate General, Assam.

      Date of Hearing               :     23.07.2025

      Date of Judgment & Order :          13.10.2025

             JUDGMENT & ORDER(CAV)

1. Heard Mr. A. K. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. P. N. Goswami, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, representing the State respondents.

2. Two petitioners filed the present writ petition. Petitioner No. 1 is the grandfather of Petitioner No. 2. Petitioner No. 2 is an orphaned minor.

3. The petitioner No. 2 was arrested in connection with Manja P.S. Case No. 25/2014 registered under Section 379 IPC dated 17.04.2014 (G.R. Case No. 313/2014). The present writ petition is filed, alleging illegal detention for three months in a general prison, failure to provide treatment to the petitioner, No. 2, failure to investigate by the Juvenile Police, and filing of a charge sheet before the General Criminal Court instead of trial by the Juvenile Court. The petitioner prays for the aforesaid action of the State to Page No.# 3/14

be declared unconstitutional, with a further prayer to compensate the minor suitably.

4. The facts in a nutshell, which are essential for the proper determination of the issues raised, are that one Sri Gauranga Kar, BSNL Telecom Mechanic, Manja, lodged an FIR on 17.04.2014 inter alia alleging that for one week, some unknown persons stole telephone cable from the roadside of Dimapur, Diphu and Nagaon Highway. Based on the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner No. 2 was apprehended and arrested by Manja Police Station on 19.04.2014. The accused petitioner, No. 2, was produced before the Additional District Magistrate of Karbi Anglong on 19 April 2014. There was an overwriting in the recorded age of the petitioner No. 2, and it was written as "18 years". The petitioners claim that petitioner No. 2 was a juvenile on the date of the alleged crime, being 14 years old at the time of commission of the offence.

The grandfather of the orphaned petitioner No. 2, a rustic, uneducated villager, with the help of a local NGO, filed an application on 03.07.2014, along with supporting documents, before the learned Magistrate, stating that the accused in custody is a juvenile. However, on the said date, the accused was not produced before the learned Magistrate. On the Magistrate's direction, he was produced before him on 4 July 2014. Taking note that there are some mismatches in the name of the petitioner No. 2, in his School Certificate, the learned Magistrate, under its order dated 04.07.2014, referred the issue to the Medical Board for the determination of age, directing that such a report be furnished on the next date fixed, i.e. on 09.07.2014. Unfortunately, the Magistrate remanded the petitioner No. 2 to Page No.# 4/14

judicial custody till 09.07.2014.

It is very disheartening to note that the Medical Board failed to submit its report on 09.07.2014 and thereafter, on a direction, such a report was submitted before the learned Magistrate, whereby the age of the petitioner No. 2 was estimated to be below "14 years" at that stage.

Then, the accused was presented before the Juvenile Justice Board on 10 July 2014, and the custody of the petitioner was given to his grandfather. Thus, the Child in Conflict with Law was kept in detention from 17.04.2014 to 11.07.2014, i.e., for a period of 80 days. It is also seen from the record that the juvenile in conflict with the law was in police custody and subsequently at Diphu Jail with hardened criminals. It is also the case of the petitioners that a verbal request was also made initially on 19.04.2014 to refer the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board; however, it was not referred.

5. The respondent State by filing an affidavit admitted that during the recording of the statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C., the petitioner No. 2, stated his age to be 18 years; however, they initially wrote the age of the petitioner No. 2 in the forwarding report to be 19 years, though corrected subsequently. It is their stand that the grandfather of the petitioner No. 2 informed them that the petitioner No. 2 was 18 years old; therefore, they forwarded the accused to the jurisdictional Magistrate. It is the Magistrate who then forwarded the petitioner No. 2 to judicial custody. They insist that in the absence of failure of the family to produce any documents or submit any proof to establish that the petitioner No. 2 was a juvenile, and therefore, the arresting authority did not produce him before the Juvenile Page No.# 5/14

Justice Board.

6. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short the Act 2000) was the law applicable at the relevant point of time.

7. The JJ Act 2000 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Children in Conflict with the Law and those in need of care and protection. It replaced the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, and was later amended to align Indian Law with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Children (UNCRC), 1989, which India ratified in 1992. The Act 2000 represents a paradigm shift, from a punitive approach to a child- centric, welfare-oriented and reformative framework.

8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Act, 2000 articulates that children are the nation's most valuable human resources and must be nurtured in an environment of dignity and understanding. It emphasises that the law should not treat a child in conflict with the law as a criminal but as a person in need of guidance, rehabilitation, and reintegration into society. The philosophy of the legislature is rooted in compassion, protection, and the belief in the capacity for reform rather than punishment.

9. The core principle of the Act 2000 is that every child, irrespective of the offence alleged, retains an inherent right to dignity and development. It reflects the constitutional vision embodied in Articles 14, 15(3), 21, 39(e) &

(f), and 45 of the Constitution of India, which collectively recognise the special status and protection required for children. The Act 2000 operationalises this vision through a specialised system of adjudication and Page No.# 6/14

care, distinct from ordinary criminal process.

10. Thus, the framework of the Act 2000 is based on three foundational pillars: recognition of age as a determinant of culpability, rehabilitation and social reintegration, and non-criminalisation of child behaviour.

11. The definition clauses in Section 2 of the Act, 2005, are vital to understanding the scope of protection. Under Section 2(k) of the Act, 2000, a "juvenile" or "child" means a person who has not completed 18 years of age. Under Section 2(d) of the Act 2000, a "child in conflict with law"

means a child alleged or found to have committed an offence. These definitions are crucial because they establish the jurisdictional boundary between the regular Criminal Courts and Juvenile Courts. Once a person is found to be below 18 years, the ordinary criminal process must immediately give way to the special procedure under this Act.

12. Section 10 is the heart of the Act 2000. It provides that whenever a Child in Conflict with the Law is apprehended, he shall be placed under the charge of the Special Juvenile Police Unit or a Child Welfare Police Officer, and under no circumstances shall such a child be placed in a police lockup or jail. Such a Section is mandatory in nature; when specified by the use of "shall", it admits no discretion. This provision is a direct safeguard against the physical and psychological harm that incarceration with adults can cause a child.

13. Section 12 of the Act, 2005, further strengthens this protection by creating a statutory presumption in favour of bail. It mandates that a juvenile shall be released on bail with or without surety, except where the Page No.# 7/14

release is likely to bring the juvenile into association with known criminals or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger. The spirit of this provision is rehabilitative, seeking to keep the child in a family or community environment, rather than a custodial one.

14. Section 49 of the Act 2000 imposes a positive duty on every authority dealing with a person who appears to be under 18 years to make a due inquiry as to their age. The obligation is proactive; not merely to respond to a claim of juvenility, but to take steps wherever a reasonable doubt arises. Failure to conduct such an inquiry vitiates subsequent proceedings.

15. Having considered the statutory framework, it becomes evident that the facts of the present case recorded hereinabove disclose a complete departure from the mandate of the Act of 2005. The petitioner, No. 2, who was arrested on 17.04.2014, was admittedly found by the medical board to be only 14 years of age on 10.07.2014 and was consequently treated as a juvenile in conflict with the law by the Juvenile Justice Board on 11.07.2014. The period between 10.07.2014 and 11.07.2014, during which the petitioner No. 2 was held in police as well as judicial custody along with adult prisoners, thus represents an interval of illegal custody, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Act, 2000.

16. The first and foremost violation arises from the police authorities' failure to comply with Section 10 of the Act 2000. This provision is couched in mandatory terms as recorded hereinabove. The use of the word "shall" leaves no scope for discretion. The legislative intent is that a child must immediately be handed over to the Special Juvenile Police or the Child Welfare Police Officer and thereafter, produce the juvenile before the Page No.# 8/14

Juvenile Justice Board without delay. In the present case, the accused was arrested; was treated as an adult recording his age as 19 years in the forwarding report, and remanded to judicial custody by regular Magistrate without ascertaining his age based on unverified entry in the arrest memo, ignoring the verbal claim of the grandfather and the statement of the accused recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., as 18 years. This omission, in the opinion of this Court, amounts to a direct contravention of Section 10 of the Act, 2005 and defeats the statutory protection against exposure to adult penal environments.

17. The admitted fact remains that the arresting authorities were informed as regards the age of the petitioner No. 2 to be 18 years, and their claim of the petitioner to be a juvenile. In such a background, the arresting authority could not have insisted on proof of such claim during investigation, rather it was their duty to produce the arrestee before the Juvenile Justice Board. The police also ignored appearance of the accused who was subsequently found to be below 14 years. In the considered opinion of this Court, such is a serious lapse on the part of police, in view of the object and mandate of the Act, 2000.

18. The Magistrate's failure to hold an enquiry before allowing judicial custody equally violates Section 49 of the Act, 2000. As discussed hereinabove, this Section casts a positive duty upon every authority dealing with an accused, whose age is in question, to conduct a due enquiry and determine whether he is a child. The appearance is also required to be looked into. And in the case in hand it is established that the accused was below 14 years of age. The duty under Section 49 of the Act, 2005 is not contingent on a formal Page No.# 9/14

claim of juvenility being raised; it operates when the accused appears to be a juvenile. The entry in the arrest memo showing the petitioner's age 18 years, despite his apparent physical appearance being aged 14 years, in the opinion of this Court, was sufficient to trigger the duty. The omission to do so, until 03.07.2014, reflects a failure to discharge a jurisdictional obligation inasmuch as juvenility is not merely a procedural issue but a jurisdictional fact that determines the very competence of the regular court to remand or try the accused.

19. This Court records that the learned Magistrate should have been more sensitive in view of the object and mandate of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. In the considered opinion of this Court, when the application was filed on 03.07.2014, the Magistrate with a very technical issue some mismatch in the school certificate, sent the petitioner No. 2 to the judicial custody, instead the matter ought to have been sent to the Juvenile Justice Board, in view of the claim of juvenility raised by the grandfather of the petitioner No. 2.

20. The third violation concern Section 12 of the Act, 2005, which mandates that a Juvenile in Conflict with the Law shall ordinarily be released on bail unless his release is likely to bring him into association with known or expose him to moral danger. The object of this provision is also to ensure minimal deprivation of liberty and to maintain the child within their familial or community setting, pending an enquiry. In this case, no effort was made to assess whether the petitioner was entitled to bail as a child in the given facts of the present case, more particularly, when on his production after arrest, there was a question as regards his age, more particularly, when it Page No.# 10/14

was within the knowledge of the arresting authority that already a verbal claim of juvenility was made, age was recorded in the 161 statement as 18 years, and in the forwarding report, as 19 years. Beyond that, when the age was subsequently determined to be below 14 years, the Magistrate ought to have been more sensitive to the apparent physical appearance of a boy of 14 years of age. However, no effort was made to assess whether the petitioner was entitled to bail as a child; instead, he was mechanically remanded to judicial custody like an adult under the code, thereby subverting the rehabilitative object of the Act, subjecting the petitioner No. 2 to unnecessary incarceration.

21. In the opinion of this Court, more particularly, under the mandate of the Act, 2000 and the rules framed thereunder, the consequences of these failures are not merely technical or procedural. They strikes at the very core of the child protection resigm envisaged under the Act, 2000.

22. The petitioner No. 2, a child of 14 years, was placed in an adult environment, deprived of education, counselling and psychological care that an Observation Home is statutorily required to provide under Section 8(3)

(g) of the Act, 2000 and Rule 40 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007. The exposure of a minor to hardened adult offenders, even for a short duration, is recognised in law as detrimental to his moral and emotional development. This is precisely the harm that the Act, 2000, seeks to prevent through the absolute prohibition of lockup or jail custody.

23. The conduct of the police and the learned Magistrate, viewed collectively, reveals a systematic disregard of the protective intent of the legislation. Their inaction resulted in the petitioner No. 2, deprivation of liberty in Page No.# 11/14

violation not only of the statute but also of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. In the present case, the procedure established by law, namely Sections 10, 12 and 49 of the Act, 2000 was not followed. The custody of petitioner No. 2, during this period, was therefore devoid of legal sanction, amounting to illegal detention per se.

24. Before parting with the record, this Court considers it necessary to reiterate that the Juvenile Justice Act is special welfare legislation; it is not a rocedural formality but a constitutional instrument for the protection of children. The obligation to safeguard the rights of every child in conflict with law is a sacred public duty, and compliance with its provision must be scrupulously ensured by all levels of the State machinery.

25. It is by now well settled that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity and free from humiliation. By confining a child below 14 years of age with adult prisoners, the State violated that right in its most basic form. Therefore, the custody of the petitioner No. 2 was not merely irregular; it was constitutionally impermissible.

26. Now coming to the claim of monetary compensation, the law by now is firmly settled that monetary compensation is an appropriate public law remedy for the violation of fundamental rights, particularly in cases of illegal detention. In Rudul Sah -Vs- State of Bihar reported in 1986 1 SCC 494, the Hon'ble Apex Court, awarded compensation to a person kept in jail for 14 years after acquittal, holding that the violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, invites judicial redress beyond mere release. In Page No.# 12/14

Bhim Singh -Vs- State of J&K, reported in 1985 4 SCC 677, compensation was awarded for unlawful arrest and detention of an MLA. Thus, by now, it is the settled constitutional doctrine of public law that compensation for deprivation of liberty without lawful authority is permissible.

27. Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that the petitioner's confinement from 17.04.2014 to 11.07.2014 lacked legal sanction both under the Act, 2000 and the Constitution of India. The failure of the police and the Magistrate to ascertain the accused's age before authorising judicial custody and the subsequent delay in referring the matter to the Medical Board, constitute acts of omission that directly freeze the petitioner's fundamental right. The State, being constitutionally responsible for the protection of children and their liberty, the ground that the error was inadvertent or bureaucratic, as no application claiming juvenility was filed, cannot be accepted, in the given facts of the present case. The violation is institutional, and therefore, the State bears vicarious liability for making reparation.

28. The period of nearly three months spent by child below 14 years in an adult jail represents a grievous miscarriage of the protective intent of the juvenile justice system. The deprivation of liberty, exposure to an alien and punitive environment and the loss of educational and development opportunities amount to a continuing injury to his dignity and self-worth. Such harm cannot be undone, but the Court has an obligation to acknowledge it through compensation and to reaffirm the constitutional promise that the rule of law protects even the smallest and most vulnerable Page No.# 13/14

citizens.

29. Accordingly, this Court holds that the detention of the petitioner No. 2, between 17.04.2014 and 11.07.2014, was illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as well as Sections 10, 12 and 49 of the Act, 2000.

30. The petitioner No. 2 is, therefore, entitled to public law compensation for violation of his fundamental right and personal liberty.

31. Considering the duration of illegal confinement, the nature of the violation and the tender age of the petitioner No. 2 at that time, this Court, thinks it just and proper to awards a sum of Rs. 3 Lakhs as compensation to the petitioner No. 2.

32. The State, more particularly, respondent Nos. 1 and 2, are directed to pay the amount within a period of three months from today.

33. The Registry shall ensure delivery of a copy of the order passed today upon the said respondents.

34. It is further directed that the District Legal Services Authority, Karbi Anglong, shall render the necessary assistance to the petitioner No. 2, so that he gets his due from the State as directed.

35. The Registry shall also furnish a copy of this order to the Member Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Karbi Anglong.

36. It is needless to say that as the petitioner No. 2 was a juvenile in conflict with law, the trial if any, is to be continued by a Juvenile Court and not by Page No.# 14/14

any Regular Criminal Court.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant