Amjad Ali vs The Union Of India And 5 Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 8968 Gua

Gauhati High Court

Amjad Ali vs The Union Of India And 5 Ors on 28 November, 2025

Author: S.K. Medhi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Medhi

                                                                  Page No.# 1/18

GAHC010044882020




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                       THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
  (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                        Case No. : WP(C)/1699/2020

         AMJAD ALI
         S/O- ROHIM BAKSH @ BOX SK., R/O- VILL- 180 BORKOLIA NOSKARA, P.S.
         SOUTH SALMARA (NOW FAKIRGANJ), DIST.- DHUBRI, ASSAM, PRESENT
         ADDRESS- VILL- SHIALMARI, P.S. FAKIRGANJ, DIST.- DHUBRI, ASSAM

         VERSUS

         THE UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS.
         REP. BY THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, DEPTT. OF HOME, NEW
         DELHI, PIN- 110011

         2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
          REP. BY THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
          HOME DEPTT.
          DISPUR
          GHY-6

         3:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B)
          DIST.- DHUBRI
         ASSAM
          PIN- 783301

         4:THE DY. COMMISSIONER
          DIST.- DHUBRI
         ASSAM
          PIN- 783301

         5:THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA
          REP. BY THE SECY. OF THE COMMISSION
          H.Q. NEW DELHI

         6:THE STATE CO-ORDINATOR
          NRC
         ACHYUT PLAZA
                                                                                         Page No.# 2/18

                   BHANGAGARH
                   DIST.- KAMRUP (M)
                   GHY-5
                   ASSA



                                               BEFORE
                           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI

                               Hon'ble MR. JUSTICE Pranjal Das



Advocates for the petitioner           :      Shri P. C. Dey, Advocate.

Advocates for the respondents          :      Shri J. Payeng, SC, Home Deptt. & NRC

Shri P. Sarma, Addl. Sr. GA, Assam, Shri N. Kalita (on behalf of Shri A. I. Ali, SC, ECI), Ms. H. Gupta, CGC.

Date on which judgment is reserved : 20.11.2025 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 28.11.2025

Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : NA

Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes

Judgment & Order (S.K. Medhi, J.)

The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 05.11.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners' Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. 733/F/2015 (Police ref. Case No. 709/1998). By the impugned judgment, the Page No.# 3/18

petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971.

2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows:

(i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case No. 733/F/2015 (Police ref. Case No. 709/1998).

(ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner's Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement along with certain documents and had adduced evidence through himself, a cousin and an Office Assistant of Settlement Office as DWs 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

(iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners' Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971.

3. We have heard Shri P. C. Dey, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri J. Payeng, learned Standing Counsel, Home Deptt. & NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned Addl. Sr. Govt. Advocate, Assam; Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri A. I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, ECI and Ms. H. Gupta, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 15.06.2020.

4. Shri Dey, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove his case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that Page No.# 4/18

there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence on affidavit of the petitioner and following documentary evidence:

(i) Attested certified copy of NRC 1951 (Exbt-1)

(ii) Certified copy of Final Khation of village Chalakura Part 1(Exbt-2)

(iii) Certified extract copy of E/Roll, 1966 (Exbt-3)

(iv) Certified extract copy of E/Roll, 1970 (Exbt-4)

(v) Certified extract copy of E/Roll, 1977 (Exbt-5)

(vi) Certified extract copy of E/Rolf, 1985 (Exbt-6)

(vii) Certified extract copy of E/Roll, 2010 (Exbt-6(i)

(Viii) Photocopy of Voter I. Card, (Exbt-7 and X)

(ix) Certified extract copy of E/Roll, 1966 (Exbt-Y) submitted by DW-2.

5. The learned counsel has submitted that in the NRC of 1951 the names of the grandfather, father and step mother of the petitioner find place. A Khatian of 1962 has been produced containing the name of the father. The Voters List of 1966 contains the name of his father and mother and in the Voters List of 1970, there is another name of Anser Ali Sheikh along with the name of his parents. In the Voters List of 1977, the name of the petitioner appears with that of his mother, Chandrabhan Bewa. Thereafter, the Voters List of 1985 has been relied upon containing the name of his mother, himself and his wife. The next Page No.# 5/18

admissible document is a Voters List of 2010, containing the name of the petitioner with his wife. It is also contended that in the written statement so filed, the fact of shifting has been stated. It is further submitted that in the cross-examination, the petitioner had stated that his father had expired after 1970. The cousin of the petitioner, Aftab Hussain had adduced evidence of DW 2 and the final Khatian of 1962 was proved by the Office Assistant as DW 3. The learned counsel has also submitted that the learned Tribunal acted illegally in cross-examining the witnesses. He, accordingly, submits that the impugned opinion is liable to be set aside.

6. In support of his submission that a Tribunal cannot indulge in the cross- examination of the witnesses, he has relied upon the following case laws:

i) Sakina Khatun @ Sokhila Khatun Vs. The Union of India & ors. - 2025 (5) GLT 1059/2025 0 Supreme (Gau) 1631

ii) WP(C)/4496/2018 [Md. Sahjahan Ali Vs The Union of India & Ors. reported in 2024 GAU (AS) 11238 ] decided on 19.11.2024.

7. With regard to the submission that the evidence of relevant witnesses were not considered, he has relied upon the following case laws:

i) WP(C)/3677/2019 [Jahura Khatun Vs The Union of India & Ors reported in 2019 0 Supreme (Gau) 855] decided on 09.08.2019.

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ii) WP(C)/7893/2022 [Rousana Begum @ Rosona Begum Vs The Union of India & 5 Ors] decided on 07.12.2022.

iii) WP(C)/500/2017 [Joytan Bibi Vs The Union of India & Ors. ] decided on 08.05.2025.

iv) Farida Khatun Vs The Union of India & Ors . reported in (2020) 4 GLT 611.

v) Rajab Ali Vs The Union of India & Ors. reported in (2019) 1 GLT 393.

8. On the aspect of discrepancy in recording the age in the Voters List, Shri Dey, the learned counsel has relied upon the following case laws:

i) Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim Vs The State of Assam & ors. (2024) INSC 511.

ii) Motior Rahman Vs The Union of India & Ors. [2020 (1) GLT 330/2019 0 Supreme (Gau) 734.

9. Per contra, Shri Payeng, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department as well as NRC has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner and has supported the opinion dated 05.11.2019. He submits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the Page No.# 7/18

proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. He further submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may arise.

10. He has submitted that the written statement in the present case itself is highly objectionable. He has submitted that though it is incumbent upon a proceedee to state all the relevant facts including his date of birth, place of birth, details of parents, siblings etc, in the instant case there was no mention at all of any step- mother of the petitioner. By drawing the attention of this Court to the said written statement, he has submitted that one line has been inserted by hand at the end of paragraph 3 in the following manner- " OP have two mother (i) Golejan Nessa (step mother) (ii) Chandra Bhan Bibi @ Chandra Bhan Nessa Bibi (Bilogical mother)". He has also submitted that in the evidence-in- chief subsequently filed on 02.03.2019, the exact portion has been inserted by hand at the end of paragraph 1.

11. He has submitted that in the written statement there is no mention of the date/year of birth of the petitioner and there is a discrepancy with regard to the number of brothers as stated in the written statement and the chief examination. He has submitted that the Voters List of 1977 cannot be relevant inasmuch as the age difference between the petitioner and his projected mother is only 10 years. Further, in the Voters List of 1970, the age of the projected mother and one of her sons, namely Anser Ali Sheikh is the same. There are no Page No.# 8/18

pleadings at all that the said Anser Ali Sheikh is the step-brother of the petitioner.

12. The learned Standing Counsel has cited the case of Basiron Bibi Vs Union of India reported in 2018 (1) GLT 372 to contend that the documents relief upon by the proceedee are to be read as a whole.

13. On the aspect of the alleged cross-examination by the Tribunal, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the same were mere queries put by the Tribunal to the witnesses under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be termed as cross-examination. He has further contended that in any case, the replies given by the DWs have not formed the basis of the opinion. He has also refuted the contention that the evidence of DW 2 & DW 3 were not considered. By drawing the attention of this Court to the impugned opinion, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the evidence of all the witnesses including the DWs 2 & 3 were duly considered. He has submitted that the Tribunal renders an opinion and not a judgment and there is no mandatory requirement to make elaborate discussion on each and every aspect of the evidence rendered by the witnesses. In this connection, reliance has been placed on a judgement dated 19.04.2018 passed by this Court in the case of Musstt. Amina Khatun Vs Union of India [WP(C)/7339/2015] wherein it has been laid down that an opinion is to consist of a concise statement of facts and conclusions and reasons are to be cited. However, such reasons are not required to be elaborate as the proceeding itself is summary in nature.

14. The learned Standing Counsel further submits that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. He submits that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making Page No.# 9/18

process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed.

15. The learned counsel for the other respondents have supported the views of the learned Standing Counsel and have added that the impugned opinion is a reasoned one and accordingly, there is no scope for any interference.

16. The rival contentions have been duly considered. The records of the learned Tribunal placed before this Court have been carefully perused.

17. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction.

18. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023] has laid down as follows:

"49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something

important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.

50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in Page No.# 10/18

granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking.

51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not."

19. The principal ground of challenge is that the documents have not been Page No.# 11/18

properly appreciated and without there being any rebuttal evidence, the depositions made on behalf of the petitioner should have been deemed to be accepted. We have however noticed that so far as Ext. 1 is concerned, the same is an NRC of 1951 containing the names of the projected grandfather and father. It is settled law that NRC cannot be a conclusive proof of citizenship. The land document (khatian) of 1962 contains the name of the projected father and cannot be held to be a link document with the petitioner. The 1966 Voters List contains the names of the projected father and projected mother. However, in the Voters List of 1970, along with the name of the parents, there is another name Anser Ali Sheikh, whose age is the same as the age of the projected mother of the petitioner which is 29. The name of the petitioner had appeared for the first time in the Voters List of 1977 in which, however, the difference of age with his projected mother is only 10 years. It is also strange that the petitioner is unaware as to when his father had passed away and in the cross- examination he has stated that the father had expired after 1970.

20. As regards, the aspect of stating all the relevant facts in the written statement is concerned, we find sufficient force in the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents that one sentence was inserted by hand which has been mentioned above. We have noted from the records that one line has been inserted by hand at the end of paragraph 3 of the written statement in the following manner-

"OP have two mother (i) Golejan Nessa (step mother) (ii) Chandra

Bhan Bibi @ Chandra Bhan Nessa Bibi (Bilogical mother)".

21. We have also noted that the exact portion has been inserted by hand at the end of paragraph 1 of the examination-in-chief by way of affidavit. The said affidavit was filed on 02.03.2019 and therefore, it can be very well presumed Page No.# 12/18

that the aforesaid sentence was inserted at least not earlier than 02.03.2019. We have also carefully perused the order sheet of the learned Tribunal and there is no order permitting such insertion either in the written statement or the affidavit. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the learned Tribunal did not raise any objection on that aspect, we are not inclined to overlook the said aspect which goes into the root of the issue.

22. As regards the evidence adduced by DW2, we have noted that though the said DW2 has claimed himself to be the cousin of the petitioner, there is no mention of the said DW2 by the petitioner in his written statement. There is also no explanation as to whether any reliable witness with material evidence was not produced. The Voters List of 1997 enclosed to the petition is not a certified copy which is evident from the photocopy enclosed.

23. On the allegation of cross-examination by the Tribunal, we have verified the records which clearly show that certain queries were put by the learned Tribunal. We are also constrained to record in the judgment that while presenting a transcription/ typed copy "Cross of DW1" has been inserted which is not there in the original records and rather it is clearly written as "Query by Tribunal". It is a settled position of law that such a course of action is permissible under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act and cannot be termed as cross-examination. We are also of the view that the proceeding before Tribunal is summary in nature and an opinion cannot be challenged on the only ground that it is not elaborate. We reiterate that if the relevant materials before the Tribunal are considered and the conclusion arrived at is supported by reasons which are plausible and acceptable, there would be hardly any scope for interference with such opinion. Of course, in an appropriate case where the error is apparent or there is perversity, interference may be made. We find Page No.# 13/18

sufficient force in the contention advanced in this regard by the learned Standing Counsel and reliance upon the case of Musstt. Amina Khatun Vs Union of India [judgment dated 17.05.2018 WP(C)/7339/2015].

24. It is a settled law that materials fact are required to be pleaded in the written statement and cannot be introduced later. In the case of Momin Ali Vs Union of India reported in 2017 (2) GLT 1076 (supra), the following has been laid down:

"12. This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate and did not disclose any material facts. As noticed above, it was the allegation of the State that petitioner was a foreigner. Therefore, as per mandate of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, it was the bounden duty of the petitioner to have disclosed all material facts which were specifically within his knowledge in the written statement but he did not do so. Petitioner neither mentioned his date of birth nor his age. He was silent regarding the name of his mother and identity of his grandparents - both paternal and maternal. He did not mention anything about his brothers and sisters or about his marital status. On the basis of such a written statement, it cannot be said that petitioner had stated anything substantial to show that he was not a foreigner but a citizen of India.

13. It is a settled proposition of law that where a party fails to set up a case in his pleadings, he would be debarred from adducing evidence in his support at the stage of trial. As a matter of principle, variance between pleading and proof is not permissible."

25. The scope of oral evidence in a proceeding of this nature is absolutely circumscribed which is in sync with the objective of the scheme of the Act. The grave and serious issue of influx of illegal migrants in the country in general and in the State of Assam in particular is well accepted and such issue has to be Page No.# 14/18

dealt with in an appropriate manner. However, at the same time a balance has to be struck with the individual liberty of a genuine citizen. In this connection, we may remind ourselves to the opening remarks made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors. vs Union of India reported in (2015) 3 SCC 1 which reads as follows:

"A Prophet is without honour in his own country. Substitute 'citizen' for 'prophet' and you will get the gist of the various writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India assailing Section 6A of the Citizenship Act."

26. On the serious issue of influx which is country facing, certain observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal Vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 are required to be reminded which are as follows:

"32. The foremost duty of the Central Government is to defend the borders of the country, prevent any trespass and make the life of the citizens safe and secure. The Government has also a duty to prevent any internal disturbance and maintain law and order. Kautilya in his masterly work "The Arthashastra" has said that a King had two responsibilities to his state, one internal and one external, for which he needed an army. One of the main responsibilities was Raksha or protection of the state from external aggression. The defence of the realm, a constant preoccupation for the king, consisted not only of the physical defence of the kingdom but also the prevention of treachery, revolts and rebellion. The physical defensive measures were the frontier posts to prevent the entry of undesirable aliens and forts in various parts of the country. (Arthashastra by Kautilya - translated by Shri L.N. Rangarajan, who was in Indian Foreign Service and ambassador of India in several countries - published by Penguin Books - 1992 Edn. - page 676). The very first entry, namely, Entry 1 of List I of the Seventh Schedule is "Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination of effective demobilization". In fact entries 1 to 4 of List I of Seventh Schedule mainly deal with armed forces. Article 355 of the Constitution of India reads as under :-

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355. Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance. - It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution."

The word "aggression" is a word of very wide import. Various meanings to the word have been given in the dictionaries, like, "an assault, an inroad, the practice of setting upon anyone; an offensive action or procedure; the practice of making attacks or encroachments; the action of a nation in violating the rights especially the territorial rights of another nation; overt destruction; covert hostile attitudes."

The word "aggression" is not to be confused only with "war". Though war would be included within the ambit and scope of the word "aggression" but it comprises many other acts which cannot be termed as war. In Kawasaki v. Bantahm S.S. Company 1938 (3) All ER 80, the following definition of "war" as given in Hall on International Law has been quoted with approval :-

"When differences between States reach a point at which both parties resort to force, or one of them does acts of violence, which the other chooses to look upon as a breach of the peace, the relation of war is set up, in which the combatants may use regulated violence against each other, until one of the two has been brought to accept such terms as his enemy is willing to grant."

In Introduction to International Law by J.G. Starke (Chapter 18) it is said that the war in its most generally understood sense is a contest between two or more states primarily through their armed forces, the ultimate purpose of each contestant or each contestant group being to vanquish the other or others and impose its own conditions of peace. With the passage of time, the nature of war itself has become more distinctly clarified as a formal status of armed hostility, in which the intention of the parties, the so-called animus belligerendi may be a decisive factor. The modern war may involve not merely the armed forces of belligerent states but their entire population. In Essays on Modern Law of War by L.C. Green the author has said that in accordance with traditional international Page No.# 16/18

law, "war is a contention between two or more States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.". The framers of the Constitution have consciously used the word "aggression" and not "war" in Article 355."

27. The settled law in this field is that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and the said burden never shifts. The said procedure is clearly laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946 and there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow-

"9. Burden of proof.--If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person."

28. In this connection, the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035] which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow-

"22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or

with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or Page No.# 17/18

description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent."

29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 05.11.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners' Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. 733/F/2015 (Police ref. Case No. 709/1998) does not call for any interference. Accordingly, this writ petition being devoid of merits stands dismissed.

30. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow, in accordance with law.

31. The records of the aforesaid F.T. Case No. 733/F/2015 (Police ref. Case No. Page No.# 18/18

709/1998) be returned to the learned Foreigners' Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri forthwith along with a copy of this order.

                                  JUDGE               JUDGE



Comparing Assistant