Gauhati High Court
The National Insurance Company Ltd vs Abdul Aminul on 14 November, 2025
Author: Parthivjyoti Saikia
Bench: Parthivjyoti Saikia
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GAHC010028822025
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/541/2025
THE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 3, MIDDLETON STREET, KOLKATA
AND ITS REGIONAL OFFICE AT BHANGAGARH, G.S. ROAD, GUWAHATI-
781005 REP. BY THE ITS REGIONAL MANAGER, REGIONAL OFFICE,
GUWAHATI.
VERSUS
ABDUL AMINUL
S/O. ABDUL SALAM
2:ASMINA BEGUM
W/O. ABDUL AMINUL
BOTH ARE R/O. VILL. BORDIA
P/O. JATRA
P/S. TARABARI
DIST. BARPETA
ASSAM.
3:MOUSUMI DAS
W/O. BIPUL DAS
R/O. AMINGAON
MARIA PATTY
GUWAHATI
ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. P J BARMAN,
Advocate for the Respondent : MS. S D SAIKIA (R-1), MR S DUTTA (R-1),MS K BORAH(R-
1),MR. S DUTTA(R-1),MS. S D SAIKIA(R-1)
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BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA
ORDER
14.11.2025
Heard Mr. P. J. Barman, learned counsel appearing for the applicant. Also heard Mr. S. Dutta, the
learned senior counsel, assisted by Ms. S. Mushahari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
2. This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of 101 days
in preferring the connected Miscellaneous First Appeal.
3. The applicant is the National Insurance Company Ltd. The ground of delay shown by the
applicant is that due to moving of the file in different departments as well as for the bihu vacation, the
delay happened.
4. Mr. Dutta has submitted that the delay has not been properly explained. In order to buttress his
point, Mr. Dutta has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that was delivered in the
case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment
reads as under:
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of
the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within
a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of
acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be
condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as
sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court
should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of
discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter
when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free
to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to
its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court."
5. Per contra, Mr. Barman has submitted that the insurance company is an official entity and it
deals in public money. The learned counsel has submitted that by delaying the insurance company is
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not going to achieve anything.
6. Mr. Barman has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987)
2 SCC 107. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment is quoted as under:
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or
any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to
do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient
cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -- that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to
have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted
on principle as it is realized that:
"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest
that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable
negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning
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the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking
condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law
demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the
law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly
treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience
shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or
hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology
imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the
collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore
have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced
in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in
preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter
giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order
of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is
condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the
appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides."
7. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. This court is of the
opinion that refusing to condone the delay, might result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold.
8. The delay has been satisfactorily explained by the applicant under the given circumstances.
Therefore, the delay stands condoned. The connected MFA shall be registered and listed for admission
hearing.
9. The interlocutory application stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
