Gauhati High Court
Review.Pet./134/2024 on 25 March, 2025
Author: Soumitra Saikia
Bench: Soumitra Saikia
GAHC010018652024
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 134 OF 2024
IN W.A NO. 317 OF 2019
1. Sri Tarak Gongo
Aged about 58 years,
S/O Late D Gongo,
Residence of Gongo Village, P.O & P.S.-
Daporijo, District- Upper Subansiri, Arunachal
Pradesh,
Presently serving as Assistant Engineer, P.W.D.
Division, Khonsa, District-Tirap, Arunachal
Pradesh
2. Sri Pema Norbu Khrime,
Aged about 56 years,
S/O-Late Dorjee Khrime,
Residence of Rupa, District- West Kameng,
Arunachal Pradesh.
Presently serving as Assistant Engineer, High
Way Sub-Division, P.W.D. Khonsa, District-
Tirap, Arunachal Pradesh.
........Review Petitioners
1
-Versus-
1. The State of Arunachal Pradesh
Represented by the Chief Secretary to the
Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar,
Arunachal Pradesh, PIN-891113
2. The Commissioner and Secretary to the
Government of Arunachal Pradesh,
Public Works Department, Itanagar, Arunachal
Pradesh. PIN 891113.
3. The Chief Engineer, Eastern Zone,
PWD, High Way, Mowb II, Itanagar, Arunachal
Pradesh, PIN-891113
........Respondents
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA
For the Petitioners : Mr. D. Mozumdar, Adv.
: Mr. U Dutta, Adv.
: Mr. G.R. Dutta, Adv.
: Mr. B. Dutta, Adv
For the Respondents : Mr. A Chandran, Sr. Government
Advocate, Arunachal Pradesh
Date of Hearing & Judgment : 25.03.2025
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(SOUMITRA SAIKIA, J)
This review petition is directed against the Judgment and order dated
28.03.2023 passed in a W.A. No. 317/2019.
2. The facts as urged before the writ appellate Court are that the writ
appellants having joined their services in the Public Works Department (PWD),
Government of Arunachal Pradesh as Junior Engineers in the year 1992, seek a
direction for counting their officiating services as Assistant Engineer (Civil) from
19.03.1996 to 14.02.2013 as regular service. Pursuant to the Judgment & final
order dated 16.10.2015 passed by this Court in the previous round of litigation,
i.e. in WP(C) No.339(AP)/2014 and WP(C) No.340(AP)/2014, the DPC meeting
was convened to consider the representations of the writ petitioners/appellants
and after deliberating upon the issues, DPC decided not to count the period
during which the writ petitioners/appellants were performing duties as
officiating Assistant Engineers towards regular service and consequently their
claim for seniority by counting the said period was turned down. The writ
petitions preferred by the appellants stood rejected by the learned Single Judge
vide common order dated 21.06.2018 and which Judgment of the learned
Single Judge has been assailed in W.A. No. 317/2019.
3. It was urged before the appellate Court that in view of the observations
of the learned Single Judge in an earlier round of litigation in W.P.(C) No.
339(AP)/2014 and WP(C) No.340(AP)/2014, the seniority of the appellants
were required to be counted from the respective dates of adhoc officiating
appointments as Assistant Engineer and not from the date of their
regularization in services and that officiating period has to be counted towards
their seniority.
4. The appellate Court upon examining the entire matter concluded that the
foundation of the relief sought for by the appellants is the observation of the
learned Single Judge in Paragraph No. 22 of the Judgment and Order dated
16.10.2015 passed in WP(C) No.339(AP)/2014 and WP(C) No.340(AP)/2014.
The Division Bench held that the findings of the DPC were never challenged by
the appellants in the writ petitions filed in the year 2014 nor did they furnish
details of other employees in the establishment with reference to their seniority
position. It was further held that certain observations made by an earlier
Division Bench in W.P(C). No. 1382/2006 would conclude the issue against the
appellants beyond all manner of doubt. The Division Bench therefore concluded
that a bare perusal of the observations of the said Co-ordinate Bench negated
the contentions advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners/appellants that they
were entitled to claim seniority from the date they started officiating in the post
of Assistant Engineers. There was a clear finding recorded that the appellants
were not due for regular promotions and their adhoc promotions had the affect
of causing suppression of a large number of seniors and that they were not
entitled for promotion either on officiating or on regular basis to the next
higher post of Assistant Engineers. The Division Bench concluded that the
findings of the Co-ordinate Division Bench in W.P(C) No. 1382/2006 in
Paragraphs No. 16 & 17 read with Paragraph-18 completely demolishes the
claim of the writ appellants to have their adhoc/officiating services counted for
the purpose of seniority in the cadre. In view of such findings by the Division
Bench, the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
5. Before this Court, the review was urged on several grounds. Having
heard the learned counsel for the review petitioners, we find that the counsel
could not point out any error apparent in the face of the record. The grounds
urged by the review petitioners appear to this Court to be an attempt to re-
urge the matter afresh. The same is not permissible under the review
jurisdiction of this Court as had been held in a catena of Judgments by the
Apex Court
6. The review jurisdiction of a writ Court has time and again been discussed
by the Apex Court as well as several Courts across the country including this
Court. For the present, it will be proper to refer to one such authority on this
aspect. Reference is this regard may be made to the Judgment rendered by the
Court in Sow Chandra Kante and Another -Vs- Sheikh Habib, reported in (1975)
1 SCC 674, the Apex Court explained the parameter for exercise of the review
jurisdiction under the High Courts. The Judgement of the Court must be read
as a whole and the ration there from is required to be culled out in reading the
same in its entirety and not a part of it.. The relevant paragraphs are extracted
below:-
"A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper
only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in
earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different Counsel, of old
and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or
minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very
strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the
insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a
habitual step. It is neither fairness to the Court which decided nor awareness
of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in
the queue for disposal, for Counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment
of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost.
The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation
of judicial time for 2 maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of
the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the
review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard
now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as
Counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was
capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but
review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."
7. Again in S. Nagaraj and Others -Vs- State of Karnataka and Another
reported in 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 595, the Apex Court held that :-
"19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or
reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of
human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean
strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions
both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental
mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision
and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in
which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse
of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v.
Sukhraj Rai [AIR 1941 FC 1, 2 : 1940 FCR 78 : (1941) 1 MLJ Supp 45] the
Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the
highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow
ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court
approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v.
Bijai Govind Singh [(1836) 1 Moo PC 117 : 2 MIA 181 : 1 Sar 175] that an
order made by the Court was final and could not be altered "
... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have
been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common law, the same power
which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which
have crept in .... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying
mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess
the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have
corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of
judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to
be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled
inconsistencies."
Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:
"It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is
mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice
being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any
blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently
made as if the party had been heard."
Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that
justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing
finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or
recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of
the Constitution. Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to
visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive
power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And
clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions
subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this
power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in
civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause
has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under
misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient
ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme
Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be
necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court.
The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is
satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice"
8. Coming to the facts of the present case the review petitioners have failed
to point out any error apparent on the face of the Court which calls for review
and recall of the judgment passed by the Division Bench. As had been held by
the Apex Court an error which is not self evident and is required to be detected
by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the
face of the Court justifying the Court to invoke it's review jurisdiction.
9. In view of the above discussions, we find no error apparent or any
ground to review and recall the Judgment and Order dated 28.03.2023 passed
in W.A No. 317/2019. The review petition accordingly stands dismissed.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Comparing Assistant
