Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/16 vs Sir Haladhar Deka And Anr on 26 June, 2025
Page No.# 1/16
GAHC010107382025
undefined
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/1833/2025
THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANR
REPRESENTED BY THE SECY., MINISTRY OF RAILWAY, 1 RAISINA ROAD,
NEW DELHI
2: THE N.F. RAILWAY
REPRESENTED BY THE GENERAL MANAGER
MALIGAON GUWAHATI-1
VERSUS
SIR HALADHAR DEKA AND ANR
S/O LATE RASADHAR DEKA, R/O LACHIT NAGAR, ULUBARI, GUWAHATI 7
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE DIST. COLLECTOR
KAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI
Advocate for the Petitioner : MRS. R DEVI,
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, FOR CAVEATOR,MS K BORAH,MR. G C
BORAH,MR. P MEDHI,MR. A C SARMA
Page No.# 2/16
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
Date : 26.06.2025
Heard Ms. R. Devi, learned counsel for the applicants; Mr. A.C. Sarma,
learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1; and Mr. K.K. Bhattacharyya,
learned Government Advocate for the State, opposite party No. 2.
2. This application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is preferred by
the applicants for condoning the delay of 390 days in preferring the
connected LA Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22.01.2024
and 24.01.2024, passed by the learned District Judge, Kamrup (M) at
Guwahati (trial court hereinafter), in Land Acquisition (Reference) Case No.
01/2015.
3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and decree dated
22.01.2024 and 24.01.2024, the learned trial court had enhanced the
compensation for acquiring a plot of land, measuring 6 Bighas 4 Kathas 4
Lessas, situated at village Chamata Pathar of Sonapur, under Kamrup (M)
district, by Rs. 15,00,000/- per bigha with additional compensation @ 12%
and 30% per annum, under Section 23(1A) and 23(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act along with interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and
thereafter, @ 15% per annum, till the payment is made.
4. Ms. Devi, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the
applicants have decided to file an appeal against the impugned judgment
and decree so passed by the learned trial court. But, the appeal could not be
filed in time as the applicants are required to obtain approval from different
authorities and the same has been explained in paragraph Nos. 4 - 7. Ms.
Devi further submits that the delay is not deliberate one, but bona-fide one
Page No.# 3/16
and that the applicants have arguable point in the appeal, which is to be
heard on merit and as such, Ms. Devi has contended to allow the petition.
5. Per-contra, Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1,
referring to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K.
Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Another, reported in AIR
1998 Supreme Court 2276, submits that law of limitation has to be applied
with all its rigour prescribed by statute and that the courts have no power to
extend period of limitation on equitable grounds.
5.1. Mr. Sarma further referring to some decisions of this court in the
case of Union of India and Others vs. Wood Crafts Products
Limited and Another, reported in 2001 1 GLT 34; Union of India vs.
Suntta Agarwal, reported in 2004 (1) GLT 598; and State of Assam
and Others vs. Muss. Mariam Messa and Another, reported in 2002 1
GLR 140, submits that the delay petition cannot be filed at leisure
accordingly to their convenience and there must be sufficient cause and the
delay cannot be condoned due to administrative reason and the reason has
to be satisfied and that equitable considerations of hardships are out of
place in construing the provisions of law relating to limitation.
5.2. Mr. Sarma, referring to the present application, submits that no
proper explanation has been put forwarded by the applicants for delay of
390 days in filing the connected LA appeal and on such count, the same
deserve to be dismissed.
6. In reply, Ms. Devi, learned counsel for the applicants submits that if in
a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled
merely on the basis of limitation. In support of her submission, she has
referred to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inder Singh
vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, in Special Leave Petition
Page No.# 4/16
(Civil) No. 6145/2024.
6.1. Ms. Devi, referring to an another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Heirs and
Others vs. Union of India and Another, reported in 2023 0 Supreme
(SC) 1022, submits that when substantial justice and technical
considerations are against one another, former would prevail. Under such
circumstances, Ms. Devi has contended to allow this interlocutory application
as sufficient ground has been shown.
7. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the
parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents
placed on record and also perused the decisions referred by both the
parties.
8. Before directing a discussion into the points referred by the learned
counsel it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of condonation of delay presently holding
the field so to deal with the issue with greater precision.
9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
vs. Mst. Katiji: reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, has observed as
under:-
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation
Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters
on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause"
employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to
enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which sub-serves the ends of justice - that
Page No.# 5/16
being the life purpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common knowledge that
this Court has been making a justifiably liberal
approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the
message does not appear to have percolated down to all
the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in
a meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and cause of justice being
defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that
a cause would be decided on merits after
hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained"
does not mean that a pedantic approach should
be made. Why not every hour's delay, every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied
in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit
by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a
serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected
not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it
Page No.# 6/16
is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning
the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact
that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation
and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even-handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when
the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation
of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of
an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the
matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought
to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making,
file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on
its part is less difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. In any event, the State which
represents the collective cause of the community does
not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause".
So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in view to
do even- handed justice on merits in preference to the
approach which scuttles a decision on merits."
10. Again in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy: reported in
(1998) 7 SCC 123, Hon'ble Supreme Court went a step further and made
the following observations:-
"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter
Page No.# 7/16
of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can
be exercised only if the delay is within a certain
limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of
the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay
of the shortest range may be un-condonable due to a
want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain
other cases, delay of a very long range can be
condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient,
it is the result of positive exercise of discretion
and normally the superior court should not disturb
such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction,
unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly
untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is
a different matter when the first court refuses to
condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court
would be free to consider the cause shown for the
delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to
come to its own finding even untrammelled by the
conclusion of the lower court.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their
remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of
legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan
for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time
would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer
causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to
seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a
lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending
period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is
enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit
Page No.# 8/16
finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a
period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They
are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for
a legislatively fixed period of time.
It must be remembered that in every case of delay,
there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his
plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not
put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court
must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when
there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was
occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time,
then the court should lean against acceptance of the
explanation. While condoning the delay, the court
should not forget the opposite party altogether. It
must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too
would have incurred quite large litigation expenses.
It would be a salutary guideline that when courts
condone the delay due to laches on the part of the
applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite
party for his loss."
11. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee
of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., reported in (2013) 12
SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court, referring to earlier authorities, broadly
culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under:-
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non- pedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts
are not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.
Page No.# 9/16
ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
being had to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective
to the obtaining fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant
fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is
no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
a delay of short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to
the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the
first one warrants strict approach whereas the second
calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as
the fundamental principle is that the courts are
required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot
Page No.# 10/16
be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
12. To the aforesaid principles, Hon'ble Supreme Court also added some
more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case.
They are: -
a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard
manner harbouring the notion that the courts are
required to condone delay on the bedrock of the
principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be
dealt with in a routine manner on the base of
individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet
a conscious effort for achieving consistency and
collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be
Page No.# 11/16
made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to
be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
13. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil(supra), while dealing
with the issue of condonation of delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the
object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based
on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy
for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to
see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics
but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in
his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount
consideration in exercising the courts' discretion
wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes.
Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings
in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and
timely payment of compensation to the land losers
facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is
equally an integral part of public policy. Public
interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of
acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed
to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal
rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable
litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving
benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in
any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic
fact that what is acquired is not the land but the
livelihood of the land losers. These public interest
parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts
while exercising the discretion dealing with the
application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years
Page No.# 12/16
after the termination of legal proceedings would not
serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be
lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay
without there being any proper explanation of such
delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue.
It serves no public interest.
31. It is true that when the State and its
instrumentalities are the applicants seeking
condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain
amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same
for citizen and for governmental authorities. The
Limitation Act does not provide for a different period
to the Government in filing appeals or applications as
such. It would be a different matter where the
Government makes out a case where public interest was
shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or
collusion on the part of its officers or agents and
where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with
it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or
proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and
those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the
present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved
though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the
respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but
without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission
made across the Bar without there being any proper
foundation in the pleadings."
14. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid
decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize
injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay if 'sufficient cause' is being
shown. The terms 'sufficient cause' should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose and regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact- situation. The paramount and pivotal consideration is
Page No.# 13/16
substantial justice; the technical considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation of delay the
presumption is not available but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel
or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact.
The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so
that there is no real failure of justice. The approach of the court must be
liberal but at the same time it must be reasonable also. In case of inordinate
delay, strict approach is required to be taken while in case of delay of short
duration, a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being
weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
While condoning delay the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. In the case of the explanation, being offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation.
The entire gamuts of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach
should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public
body or an entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some
acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for
governmental authorities.
15. Thus, having informed ourselves about the proposition of law presently
holding the field in respect of condonation of delay, now an endeavour will
be made to ascertain how far the applicant has been able to explain the
delay of 390 days in preferring the connected LA Appeal
16. Indisputably, the judgment and decree dated 22.01.2024 and
Page No.# 14/16
24.01.2024, was passed by the learned District Judge, Kamrup (M) at
Guwahati (trial court hereinafter), in Land Acquisition (Reference) Case No.
01/2015. The delay in filing the appeal was 390 days. As submitted by Ms.
Devi the delay is explained in paragraph Nos. 4 - 7 of the application. A
careful perusal of the said paragraph and from the submission of Ms. Devi it
becomes apparent that the appeal could not be filed in time as the
applicants had to obtain approval from different authorities.
17. But, as submitted by Mr. Sharma, the explanation, so forthcoming,
appears to be vague. There is absence of any endeavor to explain when the
applicant had obtained the certified copy of the judgment and decree and
when the same was sent to the different authorities and there is also no
indication as to who the said authorities are and how much time spent in
taking the approval. It also appears that another explanation put forwarded
is that the learned counsel for the applicants had also gone for treatment
and as such the appeal court not be prepared in time. But, not a single
supporting document is enclosed with this petition.
18. It is also well settled that applicant herein is the "State" and not a
private party and the doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are entitled to same treatment. It
is well settled that the State or a public body or an entity, representing a
collective cause, are entitled to some acceptable latitude. The 'State' never
deserve any step-motherly treatment to the 'State' when it is the applicant
praying for condonation of delay. Though no one in charge of the matter is
directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal, the
methodology adopted such as note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-
buck ethos, the on account of the same is easily understandable yet, the
lackadaisical propensity so exhibited by the applicants and that too in an
absolute casual manner, cannot be approved and the attempt has to be
Page No.# 15/16
curbed. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the
community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. But, it is equally
settled that the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental
authorities.
19. Thus, this court afraid, the explanation so forthcoming for the delay
would not constitute the requirement of 'sufficient ground' as contemplated
in section 5 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Sharma, the learned counsel for the
respondent has rightly pointed this out in his argument and the decisions
referred by him also supported his contentions.
20. Though Ms. Devi submits that the delay is not deliberate, but bona-fide
one and that the applicants have arguable points in the appeal, which are to
be heard on merit, yet her submission left this court unimpressed. I have
also carefully gone through the decisions referred by her. There is no quarrel
about the proposition of law laid down in the said cases. But, in view of the
given facts and circumstances on the record the said proposition would not
advance her argument.
21. Thus, taking note of the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the
applicant relating to its inaction or negligence, this court is of the view that
the interest and right, already created by the judgment and order sought to
be impugned in the connected appeal, by the inaction of the applicant has
to be guarded and they should not be dragged to face such unnecessary
litigation.
22. Thus, considering the entire gamut of facts and analyzing the same in
the light of well settled proposition of law this is of the view that no case of
exercising the judicial discretion is made out to condon the delay of 390
days in preferring connected L.A. Appeal. And accordingl, the same stands
dismissed.
Page No.# 16/16
23. In view of above, this I.A. stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
