Page No.# 1/2 vs Sri Bogiram Das
2025 Latest Caselaw 961 Gua

Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/2 vs Sri Bogiram Das on 14 July, 2025

                                                                      Page No.# 1/20

GAHC010104542025




                                                                 2025:GAU-AS:8961

                              THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
   (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                                   Case No. : RSA/78/2025

            SRI SADHU DAS
            SON OF LATE DULAL DAS

            2: SRI SANJU DAS
             SON OF SRI SADHU DAS

            3: SRI SANJIB DAS ALIAS MONU DAS
             SON OF SRI SADHU DAS

            4: SRI RANJAN DAS
             SON OF SRI SADHU DAS
            ALL ARE RESIDENT OF HAHCHOWA GAON
             NA BHANGA
             DIST GOLAGHAT
            ASSA

            VERSUS

            SRI BOGIRAM DAS
            SON OF LATE MULAI DAS, RESIDENT OF UTTAR DALIJOLIA GAON,
            DANICHAPORI, GOLAGHAT, ASSAM

            2:SRI PRODIP DAS
             SON OF SRI MADHU DAS
             RESIDENT OF HAHCHOWA GAON
             NABHANGA
             GOLAGHAT
            ASSA

Advocate for the Petitioner   : ATIULLAH HAWARI, MR. A K GUPTA

Advocate for the Respondent : ,
                                                                         Page No.# 2/20


                                BEFORE
                   HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN

                                      ORDER

14.07.2025

Heard Mr. A.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants.

2. In this appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants have challenged the correctness or otherwise of the judgment and decree dated 14.02.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Golaghat (first appellate court hereinafter), in Title appeal No. 05/2024.

3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and decree, dated 14.02.2025, the learned first appellate court had set aside the judgment and decree, dated 08.02.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Golaghat (trial court hereinafter) in Title Suit No. 06/2017, and decreed the suit of the plaintiff declaring their joint right, title and interest and ownership over the suit land and also by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the suit land by returning Rs.10,000/ along with interest @ 6% with effect from 27.12.2001 till 14.02.2025 to the defendants and by evicting the defendants in case the defendants failed to vacate the same.

4. For the sake of convenience, and to avoid confusion, the parties herein are referred to in the same status, as they appeared in the suit.

5. The background facts, necessary to deal with the present appeal, are briefly stated as under:-

"The respondents herein, as plaintiffs, instituted a title suit, being Title Page No.# 3/20

Suit No. 06/2017, with the following prayers:-

(a) For declaration that plaintiffs are the joint owner of the suit land and have right, title and interest over the suit land;

(b) For direction to the defendant No.1 to accept Rs.10,000/ from the plaintiff No.1 and to vacate the suit land by all the defendants, within statutory period of 60 days by removing all their structures;

(c) Decree for ejectment of the defendants, their men and agents by demolishing all structures standing thereon;

(d) For a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents or any other persons claiming under them from entering into the suit land and interfering with its peaceful possession by plaintiffs in any manner in future;

(e) Any other relief/reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled to in law and equity;

The pleaded case of the plaintiffs/respondents is that they had inherited from their father, namely, Mulai Das a plot of land measuring 3 Bighas 4 Kathas, under Dag No. 296 and Patta No. 18. Their names were mutated after the demise of Mulai Das. And they used to pay land revenue in respect of the same. Thereafter on 17.12.2001, on account of illness of the wife of the plaintiff No.1, he had borrowed Rs.10,000/ from the defendant No.1 for her treatment and as per oral agreement he had delivered possession of the suit land to him as a Page No.# 4/20

mark of interest of the borrowed money till its repayment. It is the pleaded case of the plaintiffs that at the relevant time defendant No.1 took the signature of plaintiff No.1 over two blank papers as a token of acknowledgement of receipt of money and the plaintiff No.1 signed the same in good faith as he was suffering from mental agony at that time and he had never executed any written agreement in favour of the defendant No. 1. Then in the year 2006, the plaintiff arranged Rs.10,000/ that he borrowed from the defendant No. 1 and requested the defendant to accept the same. But, Defendant No.1 refused to accept the same, instead he along with defendant No. 2, 3 and 4 started construction over the suit land and though the plaintiffs resisted the same they could not succeed. Then on 11.02.2007, the plaintiff along with some of his co-villagers went the house of the defendants and requested him to accept the borrowed amount and hand over the possession of the land. But, the defendants refused to accept the amount and to hand over the possession of the land. The plaintiffs then initiated a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure upon which Misc. Case No. 15/2007 was registered and pending for adjudication. Thereafter, the plaintiffs had sent legal notice on 21.02.2007 to return possession of the suit land after accepting the borrowed sum but the defendants sent their reply stating that he had executed an agreement on 23.12.2000 and possession of the suit land was delivered after accepting the consideration. But, in fact the plaintiff did not execute any document in favour of the defendant in respect of the suit land.

Then, being left with no other option, the plaintiffs had filed the Page No.# 5/20

Title Suit No. 06/2017, praying for the aforementioned reliefs. The defendants entered appearance and contested the suit by filing their written statement, wherein they had taken a stands that there is no cause of action, and it is not maintainable in law and facts and is barred by the law of limitation and that on 23.12.2000, the plaintiff No.1 had executed an agreement of sale with defendant No.1 in respect of 3 Bighas and 3 Kathas of land under Dag No. 296 and Patta No. 18 of Hahchowa Gaon in Missamora Mouza for consideration of Rs.10,000/ and the plaintiff No. 1had received an advanced amount of Rs. 4000/, on 23/12/2000 and delivered possession of the suit land and since then, they have been possessing the same without interruption. Then on 27/12/2001, the plaintiff had received the remaining amount of consideration of Rs.6,000/ from the defendant No.1, by putting his signature on the agreement in presence of witnesses.

The defendant No.1 had also filed counter-claim for decree of declaration of right, title, interest and confirmation of possession over the suit land. Alternatively, he also prayed for perfection of his right, title and interest over the suit land by way of continuous, uninterrupted and open physical possession of the suit land and any other relief/reliefs the defendants are entitled to.

Thereafter, the learned trial court had framed following issues:-

             (i)            Whether there is cause of action for
             the suit?

             (ii)           Whether the suit is bad for non-
                                                              Page No.# 6/20

             joinder of necessary parties?
             (iii)       Whether       the    suit    is    barred     by
             limitation?
     (iv)     Whether the plaintiff No.1 borrowed a sum of
             Rs. 10,000/ from the defendant No.1 and
             delivered possession of the suit land as a mark
             of interest of the borrowed money till its
             repayment by the plaintiff No.1 to defendant
             No.1?
     (v)      Whether there was an oral contract between the
             plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1, he would
             deliver the vacant possession of the suit land
             to defendant No.1?
     (vi)     Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and
             interest over the suit land?
     (vii)    Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get
             right, title and interest over the suit
             property?
     (viii)To what relief/reliefs              the   plaintiffs       are
           entitled to?

Thereafter, the learned trial court had also framed following issues on the counter-claim:-

             (a)    Whether there is cause of action for the
             counter-claim?


             (b)     Whether the counter claim is barred by
             limitation?
             (c)    Whether the plaintiff No.1 had delivered

possession of the suit land to defendant No.1 for consideration amount of Rs. 10,000?

(d) Whether the defendant No.1 has right, title and Page No.# 7/20

interest over the suit land?

(e) Whether the defendant No.1 is entitled to protect his possession over the suit land?

(f) Whether the defendant No.1 has perfected his right, title and interest over the suit land by continuous, uninterrupted and open physical possession of the suit land against the interest of the plaintiffs for more than the statutory period?

(g) To what relief/reliefs the defendants are entitled to?

Thereafter, taking evidence and hearing of learned counsel for both the parties; the learned trial court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs with cost. Instead, decreed the counter-claim of the defendants partly by holding that the defendants are entitled to be in possession of the suit land as they were.

Being aggrieved, the defendants had filed an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 05/2024, before the learned first appellate court and the learned first appellate court had admitted the appeal and framed following points for determination:-

(i) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court in the original Title Suit(TS No.06/2017) is just and proper or need any interference in this appeal?

Thereafter, discussing the evidence on record and also considering the documents so exhibited and after hearing learned counsel for both Page No.# 8/20

the parties, the learned first appellate court had, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 14.02.2025, set aside and quashed the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Golaghat (trial court hereinafter) in Title Suit No. 06/2017, and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs declaring their joint right, title and interest and ownership over the suit land and also by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the suit land by returning Rs.10,000/ along with interest @ 6% with effect from 27.12.2001 till 14.02.2025 to the defendants and by evicting the defendants in case the defendants failed to vacate the same.

6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, so passed by the learned first appellate court, the appellants have preferred the present appeal on the following substantial questions of law:-

A. Whether the learned first appellate court is right in deciding that the counter claim is barred by limitation?

B. Whether the learned first appellate court is right in deciding the Issue No.(C) which is neither framed by the learned trial court nor during the appeal?

C. Whether the appellant is entitled to protect his possession over the suit land in view of Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act?

D. Whether the appellants had perfected his title on the basis of adverse possession?

E. Whether the judgment of the learned 1 st appellate court is perverse?

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7. During the course of hearing, Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned first appellate court had committed gross illegality or impropriety by setting aside the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Golaghat in Title Suit No. 06/2017, and in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs whereby the joint right, title and interest and ownership of the plaintiffs, over the suit land was declared and also in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the suit land by returning Rs.10,000/ along with interest @ 6% with effect from 27.12.2001 till 14.02.2025. Mr. Gupta submits that the plaintiff No.1 had entered into an agreement of the suit land, with the defendant No.1, fixing the consideration at Rs.10,000/ and received a sum of Rs.4,000/ on 23.12.2000 and another sum of Rs.6,000/ on 27.12.2001 and that he also handed over possession of the suit land to the defendants. Mr. Gupta further submits that the defendants have been possessing the suit land openly and without any interruption. It is the further submission of Mr. Gupta that the learned first appellate court failed to consider the evidence and the materials placed on record in its proper perspective and arrived at an erroneous and perverse finding in respect of Issue No. (b) that since the case was not filed within 3 years from the date of execution of agreement for sale the counter-claim is barred by the law of limitation. It is the further submission of Mr. Gupta that whether the learned first appellate court is right in deciding the Issue No.(C) which is neither framed by the learned trial court nor during the appeal. Mr. Gupta also submits that the learned first appellate court had erroneously Page No.# 10/20

discarded the agreement for sale i.e. Ext. A, and arrived at a finding that defendant had failed to prove the agreement. It is also the submission of Mr. Gupta that the learned first appellate court had erroneously decided issue No. (d) and 4 and that under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the appellant is entitled to protection of his possession since on receipt of Rs.10,000/ the plaintiff had handed over possession of the suit land to the defendant. Mr. Gupta also submits that the defendant is in possession of the suit land with the knowledge of the plaintiff and hostile to the claim of the plaintiff and since the suit was filed only in the year 2017, the defendant had perfected his title over the suit land on the basis of adverse possession and this aspect was not considered by the learned first appellate court. The learned fist appellate court also failed to consider the fact that the plaintiff did not prove his right, title and interest over the suit land. And due to no consideration of aforesaid factual and legal position, the suggested substantial questions of law arises and the same are required to be adjudicated after admitting the appeal and therefore, it is contended to admit the appeal.

8. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeal and the suggested substantial questions of law and also perused the judgment and decree dated 14.02.2025, passed by the learned first appellate court in Title Appeal No. 05/2024 and also perused the judgment and decree dated 08.02.2024, passed by the learned trial court.

9. It appears that the learned trial court had decided issue No.1, 2, 3 in favour of the plaintiffs. Then decided issue Nos. 4 and 5 in negative. Thereafter, it had decided issue Nos. 6 and 8 in negative. And while Page No.# 11/20

deciding the issues in counter claim, the learned trial court had decided issue No. (a) in affirmative, issue No. (b) in affirmative, issue Nos. (c) and (d) in affirmative and issue No. (e) in negative and issue No. (f) in affirmative and issue No. (g) in negative and issue No. (h) in affirmative and thereafter, it had dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs and decreed the counter-claim.

10. Further, it appears that learned first appellate court had, while deciding the point so formulated, had affirmed the finding of the learned trial court in respect of issue No. 1, also affirmed the finding in respect of issue No.(a) and upheld the finding of the learned trial court in respect of issue No. (2), (3) and set aside the finding of the learned trial court in respect of issue No. 6, thereafter set aside the finding of the learned trial court in respect of Issue No.(b) as the counter-claim is barred by the law of limitation. Thereafter, it had decided issue No. (c) in negative against the defendants and upheld the finding of the learned trial court in respect of issue No.5 and in respect of issue No. (d) and issue No.(4) the learned first appellate court had found the same to be redundant and in respect of issue No. (e) the learned first appellate court had decided the same against the defendant and interfered with the finding of the learned trial court in respect of issue No.(f) and interfered with the finding of the learned trial court in respect of issue No. (g) to limited extent but upheld the same. Then in respect of issue No. (7) and (8), it had set aside the findings of the learned trial court and in respect of issue No. (h), it had set aside the finding of the learned trial court and thereafter, it had decreed the suit of the plaintiff.

11. Now, coming to the first substantial question of law, so suggested Page No.# 12/20

by Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants, I find that the learned trial court had dealt with the same by framing issue No. (b) and held that the counter claim is within the period of limitation and moreover, the limitation for defendants claim started when the plaintiff brought the suit against them.

11.1. However, the learned first appellate court had found that the basis of defendants prayer for declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit land and confirmation of possession thereon is solely based on Exhibit-'A', the agreement for sale, dated 23.12.2000, allegedly executed by plaintiff No.1., and there is no specific recital as to when the sale deed is to be executed on the basis of the same. Thereafter, the learned first appellate court had observed that when the document is silent regarding the limitation for specific performance of the agreement, the limitation period may start when the buyer comes to the notice of seller's refusal to perform and Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribes three years time period for filing the suit of the specific performance of the contract from the date of refusal and that the defendant No.1 until filing of the instant suit in the year 2017, never came with the plea of specific performance of the contract and as such Exhibit-'A' automatically becomes unenforceable on expiry of three years from 23.12.2000.

12. Article 54 of the Limitation Act, provides for limitation of specific performance of contract. As per said Article, limitation to bring the suit is 3 years and the limitation begins to run from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused.

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12.1. In the instant case, from a perusal of the written statement it appears the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into agreement for sale of the suit land on 23.12.2000 and he received Rs.4000/ amount from the defendant No.1 and rest of the amount he received on 27.12.2001 by putting his signature. Indisputably, no time limit is prescribed as to when the sale deed is to be executed. And as such, time is not essence of the said agreement for sale. And that being so, the period of limitation would start when the defendant No.1 had noticed that performance is refused by the plaintiff.

12.2. The written statement also indicates that the sale permission was obtained on 12.02.2007 from the Office of District Commissioner, Golaghat and after obtaining the sale permission the plaintiff No.1 used to avoid the defendant No.1 and inspite of several request he did not come to the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Golaghat to execute the registered sale deed. But as per plaint, the plaintiff No.1 in the year 2006, had arranged a sum of Rs.10,000/ and requested the defendant to accept the same and to return the possession of the suit land. Even if we accept the statement made in the written statement that sale permission was obtained on 12.02.2007 from the Office of District Commissioner, Golaghat and after obtaining the sale permission the plaintiff No.1 used to avoid the defendant No.1 and inspite of several request he did not come to the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Golaghat to execute the registered sale deed, then the defendant had first noticed that performance is refused by the plaintiff. So, 12.02.2007 would be the date from which the limitation begins to run since the plaintiff had failed to give specific date when he offered to return the sum of Rs.10,000/ to the Page No.# 14/20

defendant and the defendant refused to accept it. If we count the limitation period of three years from 12.02.2007, then the same comes to an end on 11.02.2010. The suit was filed on 14.02.2017 and the written statement-cum-counter claim was filed on 01.06.2017 and on that day, the written statement-cum-counter claim was hopelessly barred by the law of limitation. Though, however, there appears to be mistake in counting the date from which limitation begins to run, yet there is no mistake in arriving at the finding by the learned first appellate court.

13. It is fact that the learned first appellate court has decided issue No. (C) though no such issue was framed by the learned trial Court nor such issue was framed during the appeal. It is fact that the learned trial court had framed an issue being issue No.(C) which read as under:- Whether the plaintiff No.1 had delivered possession of the suit land to defendant No.1 for consideration amount of Rs. 10,000. However, the learned first appellate court had decided an issue as issue No.(C) which read as under:- " Whether the plaintiff No.1 executed an agreement for sale with defendant No.1 in respect of suit land for consideration amount of Rs. 10,000/-?"

12.1. But, it appears that the learned first appellate court had directed the discussion in respect of the said issue and recorded a finding that the discussion made and decision arrived at this issue is redundant, and during the discussion it had considered the substance of the issue, and therefore, this court is of the view that no illegality or impropriety is committed by the learned first appellate court. In arriving such a finding this court derived authority from a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs, Page No.# 15/20

reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179, wherein it was held that a first appeal is a valuable right and unless restricted by law, the whole case would be open for rehearing before it, both on questions of fact and law, and, therefore, the judgment of the first appellate Court must reflect conscious application of mind and it must record findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the said Court. It was further observed that, while reversing a finding of fact, the first appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning of the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This, per this Court, would satisfy the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. Again in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and Others v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation , decided on May 10, 2024, in Civil Appeal Nos.16956-16957 of 2017, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that - even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient.

14. Now, coming to the third suggested substantial question of law as to whether the appellant is entitled to protect his possession over the suit land in view of Section 53(A) of the Transfer of Property Act, I find that Section 53(A) of the said Act read as under:-

53A. Part performance.--

Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing Page No.# 16/20

signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore, by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.

14.1. For the Doctrine of Part Performance to apply under Section 53A, the following conditions must be satisfied:

(i) Existence of a Contract:- There must be a contract for the transfer of immovable property for consideration.

Page No.# 17/20

(ii) Written Contract:- The contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor or someone on their behalf, with terms that can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.

(iii) Transfer of Possession:- The transferee must have taken possession of the property or continued in possession in part performance of the contract.

(iv) Act in Furtherance of the Contract: - The transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract, such as making improvements to the property.

(v) Willingness to Perform:- The transferee must have performed or be willing to perform their part of the contract.

14.2. In the case of Nathulal v. Phoolchand, reported in AIR 1970 SC 546: Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transferee must be willing to perform their part of the contract to invoke the protection under Section 53A. In the case in hand, though the defendant show his willingness to perform his part of the contract but already the suit came to be barred by law of limitation. And as such, this doctrine would not come into his rescue.

15. Coming to the next substantial question of law as to whether the appellants had perfected his title on the basis of adverse possession, the learned trial court had discussed the same in issue No.(g) and held that adverse possession is not long possession of suit land by the defendant for a period of 12 years or more without intention to possess the suit land adversely to the title of the plaintiff and latter's knowledge cannot Page No.# 18/20

result in acquisition of the title by the defendant to the encroached suit land. It has also held that a possession is adverse if one holds possession by denying title of the lessor or by showing hostility by act or words in cases of trespassers as the case may be against the lessor or other owner of the property in question. It has also held that in the case in hand, the defendant No.1 possessed the suit land by virtue of agreement for sale dated 23.12.2000 and thereafter, it had decided this issue in negative. The learned first appellate court had also upheld the finding so recorded by the learned trial court except however, the part that the observation that defendant No.1 possessed the suit land by virtue of agreement for sale dated 23.12.2000, and opined that by virtue of decision in issue No. (c) the defendant No.1 possessing the suit land merely on delivery of possession thereof by the plaintiff.

15.1. It is well settled in the case of M. Radheshyamlal vs. V. Sandhya and Anr. in Civil Appeal Nos. 4322-4324 of 2024 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 19059 - 19061 of 2014, that to establish adverse possession, the plaintiff must (i) demonstrate possession adverse to the true owner, (ii) establish continuous possession known to the true owner (iii) specify the time of adverse possession initiation and (iv) show open and undisturbed possession for more than 12 years. In the case in hand, after going through the counter claim and evidence so brought on record no proper foundation for the adverse possession of the suit land appears to be made. Therefore, no fault can be found with the finding of the learned courts below.

16. Coming to the last suggested substantial question of law i.e.

whether the judgment of the learned 1st appellate court is perverse, this Page No.# 19/20

court after careful perusal of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence brought on record, found that except what had been pointed out and discussed and answered herein above nothing could be demonstrated, which could show that the finding so arrived at by the learned first appellate court is perverse.

17. It is to be noted here that in the case of Pertap Chunder Ghose vs. Mohendranath Purkait, reported in ILR (1890) 17 Cal 291 (PC), the Privy Council has observed that the limitation as to the power of the Court imposed by Sections 100 and 101 in a second appeal ought to be attended to, and an appellant ought not to be allowed to question the finding of the first appellate court upon a matter of fact. In the case of Ramgopal vs. Shamskhaton, reported in ILR (1893) 20 Cal 93 (PC), the Privy Council emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts below. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad vs. Baijnath, reported in ILR (1893) 15 All 367. The Court observed that a judge to whom a memorandum of second appeal is presented for admission is entitled to consider whether any of the grounds specified in this section exist and apply to the case, and if they do not, to reject the appeal summarily.

18. In Santosh Hazari (supra), a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has delineated the scope of Section 100 CPC, and held that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. It was also held that the word substantial, as qualifying Page No.# 20/20

'question of law', means--of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely.

19. In H.P. Pyarejan vs. Dasappa, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 496, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the judgment of High Court suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re- appreciation of evidence.

20. Thus, in the case in hand, while considering the submission of Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellants and examining the memo appeal, being presented before this court with suggested substantial question of law, in the light of the principle enunciated herein above, this court is unable to derive its satisfaction that any grounds specified in Section 100 CPC exist and apply to the present case, and no question of law, not to speak of a substantial question of law, flows out of the impugned judgment and order so passed by the learned first appellate court.

21. Accordingly, this appeal stands summarily dismissed at this motion stage itself.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant