Page No. 1/ vs The State Of Assam And Anr
2025 Latest Caselaw 1375 Gua

Gauhati High Court

Page No. 1/ vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 23 July, 2025

Author: Manish Choudhury

Bench: Manish Choudhury

                                                                      Page No. 1/11

GAHC010137532025




                                                               2025:GAU-AS:9449

                        THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
  (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                           Case No. : Crl. Pet./731/2025

         SAMAR DAS AND 4 ORS.
         SON OF PRADIP DAS
         R/O BULLAPAR P.S. AZARA,
         P.O. GHY AIRPORT, DIST. KAMRUP, ASSAM, PIN-781015, PH. 9706732679.

         2: MR. PRADIP DAS
         S/O LATE DANDIRAM DAS
         R/O BULLAPAR
         P.S. AZARA
         P.O. GHY AIRPORT
         DIST. KAMRUP (R)
         ASSAM
          PIN-781015

         3: MRS. MRS. NIRU DAS
         W/O PRADIP DAS
         R/O BULLAPAR
         P.S. AZARA
         P.O. GHY AIRPORT
         DIST. KAMRUP (R)
         ASSAM
          PIN-781015

         4: MR. TILAK DAS
          S/O LATE SORBESWAR DAS
          R/O BULLAPAR
          P.S. AZARA
          P.O. GHY AIRPORT
          DIST. KAMRUP (R)
         ASSAM
          PIN-781015

         5: MRS. JUPI DAS
         W/O SUKLESWAR DAS
                                                                               Page No. 2/11

            R/O BULLAPAR P.S. AZARA
            P.O. GHY AIRPORT
            DIST. KAMRUP
            ASSAM
             PIN-781010

            VERSUS

            THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
            REPRESENTED BY THE PP, ASSAM

            2:MR PRABIN CH. DAS @ PRABIN DAS
             R/O AMRANGA MEDHIPARA
             P.S. PALASHBARI
             P.O. AMRANG
             DIST. KAMRUP
            ASSAM
             PIN-78112

Advocate for the Petitioner   : MS. N CHOUDHURY, MR. M BORAH

Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, MR J DAS (R-2),MS. M BEGUM(R-2),S NATH(R-
2),MS B BORA(R-2)

                                    BEFORE
                   HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANISH CHOUDHURY

                                         ORDER

Date : 23.07.2025

Heard Ms. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. M.P. Goswami, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent no. 1; and Ms. B. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2.

2. This criminal petition under Section 528, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita [BNSS], 2023 is preferred seeking setting aside of the criminal proceedings pertaining to Palasbari Police Station Case no. 461/2022 registered for the offences under Sections 363/420/325, Indian Penal Code [IPC].

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent no. 2 have conjointly submitted that the marriage of the petitioner and daughter of the respondent no. 2 was

solemnised under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the same was registered before the Marriage Officer, Kamrup [Metro] at Guwahati on 13.03.2020. The learned counsel for the parties have referred to the Marriage Certificate no. 1223, appended to this petition at Page 29, to support the fact.

4. It has emerged that subsequently, certain disputes arose between the families of the petitioner and the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 as the informant lodged an FIR before the Officer In-Charge, Palasbari Police Station with certain allegations naming five petitioners herein as accused persons. The petitioner no. 1 was named as accused no. 1 in the said FIR. The said FIR was registered as Palasbari Police Station Case no. 461/2022 under Sections 363/420/325, IPC.

5. After institution of the FIR, the daughter of the respondent no. 2 filed a petition before the Family Court, Kamrup [Metro], Guwahati ['the Family Court', for short] for restitution of the conjugal rights and the said petition was registered and numbered as F.C. [Civil] Case no. 64/2023. The petitioner no. 1 herein had also filed a petition before the Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce and the said petition was registered and numbered as F.C. [Civil] Case no. 326/2023. After institution of those two petitions, the petitioner no. 1 and the daughter of the respondent no. 2 came to a settlement on mutual terms and they arrived at a decision to withdraw their respective petitions, registered as F.C. [Civil] Case no. 64/2023 and F.C. [Civil] Case no. 326/2023. As per such settlement, both the F.C. [Civil] Case no. 64/2023 and F.C. [Civil] Case no. 326/2023 came to be withdrawn. The petitioner no. 1 and the daughter of the respondent no. 2 also arrived at a mutual settlement to approach the Family Court to seek dissolution of their marriage by a decree of divorce on mutually settled terms.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent no. 2 have submitted that the petitioner no. 1 and the daughter of the respondent no. 2 have already preferred a petition before the learned Family Court under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act for dissolution of their marriage by a decree of divorce on mutually settled terms and the said petition has been registered as F.C. [Civil] Case no. 293/2025.

7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that one of the terms of settlement, agreed upon by the parties, is that a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- as permanent alimony would be paid by the petitioner no. 1 to his wife. By a money receipt [Annexure-D] issued by the daughter of the respondent no. 2, receipt of the said amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- as permanent alimony from the petitioner no. 1 has already been acknowledged.

8. The learned counsel for the parties have further submitted that the parties have decided to take necessary steps for seeking quashing of the FIR of Palasbari Police Station Case no. 461/2022 and hence, the instant criminal petition.

9. The offence under Section 363 has provided for punishment for kidnapping. Kidnapping is of two kinds, kidnapping from Indian and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. The daughter of the respondent no. 2 when her marriage was solemnised on 13.03.2020 under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, was a major and as such, prima facie, the ingredients of the offence under Section 363, that is, kidnapping from lawful guardianship against her husband appear to be absent.

10. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that as per the provision of Section 320, CrPC, the remaining offences, that is, the offences under Section 420, IPC and Section 325, IPC are compoundable as per the conditions prescribed therein.

11. The respondent no. 2 has filed an affidavit stating inter-alia that he had lodged the FIR against all the petitioners out of misunderstanding. It is further stated that since his daughter and the petitioner no. 1 have amicably settled their disputes by filing a joint petition before the Court of learned Principal Judge, Family Court at Guwahati seeking dissolution of their marriage on mutual consent, he does not have any objection in view of such subsequent developments, if FIR dated 08.12.2022, registered as Palasbari Police Station Case no. 461/2022, is closed without any action against the petitioners herein.

12. The inherent power of this Court available under Section 482, CrPC have been

discussed elaborately in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in [2012] 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court has observed and held as under :-

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: [i] to secure the ends of justice, or [ii] to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be

caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question[s] is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

13. After considering the decision in Gian Singh [supra], the Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in [2014] 6 SCC 466, has observed in the similar manner and the relevant parts of the said judgment are extracted hereunder :-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings :

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code.

No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure :

[i] ends of justice, or [ii] to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307, IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307, IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307, IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At

this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.

14. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan, reported in [2019] 5 SCC 688, the Supreme Court has further observed as under :-

15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under :

15.1.That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal

proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2.Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.

However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh [supra] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

16. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.

15. The decision in Naushey Ali and others vs. State of U.P. and another, 2025 INSC 182, is also in similar lines.

16. The provisions contained in Section 528, BNSS are pari materia to the provisions of Section 482, CrPC.

17. In view of the aforesaid fact situation obtaining in the present case and in the light of the guidelines laid down in the above decisions of the Supreme Court as regards requirement to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482, CrPC in the type of cases, this Court is of the considered view that instead of allowing the proceeding of Palasbari Police Station Case no. 641/2022 to continue further the interest of justice will be best subserved if the said proceeding is quashed and set

aside at this stage in order to enable the petitioner and the daughter of the respondent no. 2 to give a quietus to all the disputes that arose between them when they were in a matrimonial relationship for allowing them to proceed further in the future lives separately from each other.

18. Accordingly, the FIR lodged in connection with Palasbari Police Station Case no. 641/2022 and all subsequent proceeding taken thereafter, are set aside and quashed.

19. With the observations made and directions given above, this criminal petition stands disposed of. No Cost.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant