Page No.# 1/9 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 1067 Gua

Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/9 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors on 16 July, 2025

                                                                      Page No.# 1/9

GAHC010221502023




                                                                2025:GAU-AS:9178
                         THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
  (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                          Case No. : WP(C)/5888/2023

          ABDUS SATTAR S/O- LT. SOBUR UDDIN SK., VILL.- MAJERALGA PT-II,
          P.O.- JARUAR CHAR, DISTRICT- DHUBRI, ASSAM, PIN- 783339.

          VERSUS

          THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS
          REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT.
          OF ASSAM, EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GHY-6.

          2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION
          ASSAM KAHILIPARA GHY-19.

          3:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER DHUBRI
           P.O. AND DISTRICT- DHUBRI ASSAM PIN- 781301.

          4:THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER
           DHUBRI P.O. AND DISTRICT- DHUBRI ASSAM PIN- 783301

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N HOSSAIN, MR. M MONDAL
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, ELEM. EDU, GA, ASSAM

:::BEFORE:::

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR Date of hearing: 16.07.2025 Date of Judgment & Order: 16.07.2025 Judgment & order(Oral) Heard Mr. N. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. K. Phukan, learned Government Advocate, Assam; and Mr. P. Sarma, learned standing counsel, Elementary Education Department; appearing on behalf of their respective respondents.

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2. The petitioner, herein, by way of instituting the present proceeding, has assailed the decision arrived at by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-08-2011, rejecting the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground. The petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities for a fresh consideration of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground on its merits.

3. As projected in the writ petition, the father of the petitioner, Late Sobur Uddin Sheikh, while serving as the headmaster of Chirakhowa M.V. School, died-in-harness, on 29-03-2008. The mother of the petitioner submitted an application on 12-05-2008 for appointment of the petitioner, herein, on compassionate ground. The application of the petitioner not being placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee for consideration, the petitioner approached this Court by way of instituting a writ petition being WP(c)5093/2009. This court, vide order, dated 20-11- 2009, was pleased to dispose of the said writ petition directing the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground, strictly, in accordance with the guidelines formulated in this connection.

4. In terms of the directions passed by this Court, the case of the application of the petitioner was placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-08-2011. However, the said Committee on consideration of the case of the petitioner, herein, having found him not eligible for being appointed as an Assistant Teacher, proceeded to reject his case. It is the said rejection of the case of the Page No.# 3/9

petitioner by the said District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17- 08-2011 that is being challenged in the present writ petition, which was so filed on 03-10-2023.

5. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner, by reiterating the facts as noticed hereinabove, has submitted that the jurisdictional District Level Committee had rejected the case of the petitioner by holding that he had not fulfilled the eligibility norms for being appointed as a teacher in any Upper Primary School. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner had passed his Bachelor of Arts Examination in the year 2005 and had also cleared his D.El.Ed. Examination in the year 2019. Accordingly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner is eligible for being considered for appointment as a teacher in a provincialized Upper Primary and/or a Lower Primary School.

6. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has further submitted that the rejection of the petitioner's case by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-08-2011 being solely on the ground of the petitioner not possessing the requisite eligibility criteria; the petitioner having subsequently acquired the requisite eligibility criteria for appointment as a Teacher in Upper Primary/Lower Primary Schools; his case is called to be considered afresh for appointment on compassionate ground.

7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, have submitted that the decision of the jurisdictional District Level Committee rejecting the case of the petitioner in its meeting held on Page No.# 4/9

17-08-2011 was not assailed by the petitioner for long 13 years. It was further submitted that the father of the petitioner having died-in-harness on 29-03-2008; the present writ petition having been so instituted by the petitioner, herein, after a lapse of 15 years, the said claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, has to be deemed to have been rendered stale and accordingly, would not mandate consideration by the respondent authorities.

8. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record.

9. The facts as noticed hereinabove, are not in dispute. The father of the petitioner had died-in-harness on 29-03-2008. Thereafter, the case of the petitioner was so considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-08-2011 and therein, by drawing a conclusion that the petitioner did not fulfill the eligibility criteria prescribed for appointment as a teacher in an Upper Primary School, proceeded to reject his claim for appointment on compassionate ground. It is seen that although the petitioner was in need of an employment, pursuant to the death of the sole bread-earner in the family, i.e. the father of the petitioner, herein; the petitioner and all his family members had not pursued the matter pertaining to appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground, diligently. The petitioner had sat over the matter for long 13 years after the decision of the jurisdictional District Level Committee before instituting the present proceeding before this Court on 03-10-2023.

10. The delay so occasioning in the matter even if considered from the Page No.# 5/9

date of the decision of the jurisdictional District Level Committee, has the effect of rendering the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, to be a stale one. The delay so occasioning in the matter in pursuing the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground being solely attributable to him; this Court is of the considered view that it would not be permissible for this Court to issue any direction requiring the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground.

11. Support in this connection is drawn from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of W.B. v. Debabrata Tiwari & ors.[reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 219 ]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue involved in the present proceeding, has drawn the following conclusions:

"32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge:

i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.

iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over.

iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source.

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33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration.

34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter.

35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.

36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 P.C. 221 as under:

"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be Page No.# 7/9

regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."

37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words:

"9.... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, In its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Itwas pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."

39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.

40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were made:

"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time."

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12. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and applying the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of the Debabrata Tiwari(supra) to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the petitioner for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground, would not mandate acceptance on the ground that the application submitted by the petitioner was not diligently pursued by him. Further, the delay occasioning in the matter since the date of death of the father of the petitioner, occasioning on 29-03-2008, having rendered the claim of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground, to be a stale one; no direction is called upon to be issued by this Court to the respondent authorities for consideration of the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment in respect of the petitioner, herein, has been lost. Entertaining the claim at this point of time would be of no avail, because, admittedly, the petitioner has been able to eke out a living even though he was not favoured with an appointment on compassionate ground. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground be considered or entertained by the respondent authorities.

13. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the issue involved in the present proceeding being a stale issue, it would not be permissible for this Court to issue any direction requiring consideration of the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground in pursuance to death of his father, in harness, occasioning in the year 2008.

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14. In the above view of the matter; this writ petition is held to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant