Page No.# 1/13 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 1035 Gua

Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/13 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors on 15 July, 2025

                                                                      Page No.# 1/13

GAHC010223642024




                                                                 2025:GAU-AS:9129

                              THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
   (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                               Case No. : WP(C)/5575/2024

            AL AMIN ZAKARIA
            S/O- LATE HABIB ALI, VILLAGE- BARHAILAKANDI PART-III, P.O.-
            BARHAILAKANDI, DISTRICT- HAILAKANDI, ASSAM, PIN- 781354

            VERSUS

            THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS
            REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM,
            EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (ELEMENTARY), DISPUR, GUWAHATI-06

            2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION
            ASSAM
             KAHILIPARA
             GUWAHATI

            3:THE DISTRICT LEVEL SELECTION COMMITTEE
             REPRESENTED BY THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
             KARIMGANJ
            ASSAM

            4:THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER
             KARIMGANJ
             DIST.- KARIMGANJ
            ASSA

Advocate for the Petitioner   : MR. A B T HAQUE,

Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, SC, ELEM. EDU

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:::BEFORE:::

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR

Date of hearing: 15.07.2025 Date of Judgment & Order: 15.07.2025

Judgment & order(Oral)

Heard Mr. A. B. T. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Arunav Phukan, learned standing counsel, Elementary Education Department, and Ms. U. Sharma, learned Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of their respective respondents.

2. The petitioner, herein, by way of instituting the present proceeding, has assailed the rejection of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground by the District Level Committee, Karimganj, in its meeting held on 12.08.2024. The petitioner has made a further prayer for a direction upon the respondent authorities to place his application before the jurisdictional District Level Committee for a fresh consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground.

3. As projected in the writ petition, the father of the petitioner, Late Habib Ali, while serving as an Assistant Teacher at Manikbond M.E. School, died-in-harness, on 17-06-2004. At the time of death of the father of the petitioner; the petitioner, herein, was aged around 7(seven) years. Accordingly, the mother of the petitioner submitted an application for appointment on compassionate ground. The application of the mother of the petitioner was considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee Page No.# 3/13

in its meeting held on 17-06-2013. However, the same could be rejected on the ground of late submission. The said decision of the jurisdictional District Level Committee was, however, not challenged by the mother of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner, on attaining the age of majority, submitted an application on 04-07-2016, before District Elementary Education Officer (DEEO), Karimganj, for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground. The consideration of the case of the petitioner having not been made by the jurisdictional District Level Committee, the petitioner, herein, again, vide his application, dated 29-03- 2023, prayed before the District Elementary Education Officer (DEEO), Karimganj, for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground.

4. The applications so submitted by the petitioner having not been considered in the manner required, he approached the Court by way of instituting a writ petition being WP(c)7003/2023. This Court, vide order, dated 06-12-2023, disposed of the said writ petition by directing the District Elementary Education Officer(DEEO), Karimganj, to place the application of the petitioner, dated 04-07-2016, before the next available District Level Committee, Karimganj, for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground. It was further provided that if the application of the petitioner was earlier placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee, the outcome, thereof, be communicated to the petitioner and in such event, there would be no requirement to place it again before the jurisdictional District Level Committee. The application of the petitioner was placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 12-08-2024. The jurisdictional District Level Committee, on consideration of the same and noticing that the application Page No.# 4/13

submitted by the mother of the petitioner was rejected earlier by the Committee in its meeting held on 17-06-2013, and such rejection not having been challenged by the mother of the petitioner, herein; proceeded to reject the claim of the petitioner.

5. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted the present proceeding before this Court.

6. Mr. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner, after reiterating the facts noticed hereinabove, has submitted that the case of the petitioner was not given its due consideration by the jurisdictional District Level Committee and accordingly, a direction is called upon to be issued by this Court to the respondent authorities to have the case of the petitioner, herein, placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee for consideration of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground, on merits.

7. Mr. Haque, learned counsel, has further submitted that the rejection of the application of the mother of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, would be of no consequence, inasmuch as, the same was so rejected on a technical ground. The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner, herein, having submitted the application for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground, immediately, after attaining the age of majority; such application was required to be given its due consideration by the respondent authorities.

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8. In support of his submission, Mr. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Govinda Janardan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra & ors.[Civil Appeal No. 7489 of 2023, dated 06-11-2023].

9. Per contra, Mr. Phukan, learned standing counsel, Elementary Education Department, and Ms. Sharma, learned Government Advocate, have submitted that the delay occasioning in the matter, has rendered the application submitted by the petitioner, herein, to be a stale one, and the same would not mandate a consideration by the respondent authorities. It was further submitted that the policy in place, mandates consideration of the application of any one member of the family of the deceased employee and the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner having already been considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee and the same having been rejected, further application from the same family would not be mandated to be submitted. It was also submitted that the rejection of the application of the mother of the petitioner, herein, was never assailed at any point of time and the same has, therefore, attained its finality. Accordingly, it was submitted that the claim made by the petitioner, herein, for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground, would not mandate an acceptance by this Court.

10. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record.

11. The facts, noticed hereinabove, is not in dispute. The mother of the petitioner, herein, had submitted an application for consideration of her Page No.# 6/13

case for appointment on compassionate ground after the death of the father of the petitioner. The said application was duly considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-06-2013, however, the same came to be rejected. The rejection of the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner by the jurisdictional District Level Committee was not challenged by the mother of the petitioner and/or by any other family member of the deceased Government employee. However, the petitioner, herein, on attaining the age of majority, had, for the first time, submitted an application for appointment on compassionate ground on 04-07-2016. The said application of the petitioner, herein, in pursuance of the directions passed by this Court in WP(c)7003/2023; came to be rejected by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 12-08-2024, on noticing the rejection of the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner in the matter by the Committee in its meeting held on 12-06-2013.

12. It is to be noted at this stage that the appointment on compassionate ground is for the purpose of mitigating the hardship faced by the family of a deceased employee on account of the premature death of the bread- earner of the family. The mother of the petitioner, herein, having applied for appointment on compassionate ground and her case having been duly considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee and the same having been rejected and such a rejection not being challenged by her, further application for appointment on compassionate ground from the same family; would not be mandated. The rejection of the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-06-2013 not being challenged either by the mother of the petitioner, and/or, by the petitioner, herein, the same Page No.# 7/13

has, therefore, attained its finality.

13. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the subsequent application submitted by the petitioner, herein, after rejection of the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner in terms of the policy in place; would not mandate a consideration. Having drawn the said conclusion, the prayer of the petitioner for a direction upon the respondent authorities for placing his case before the jurisdictional District Level Committee for a fresh consideration for appointment on compassionate ground, is now being considered.

14. As noticed hereinabove; the father of the petitioner had died-in- harness on 17-02-2004. The claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground, in view of the long delay occasioning in the matter since the date of death of the father of the petitioner has been rendered stale and accordingly, the prayer of the petitioner for a direction upon the respondent authorities for a fresh consideration of the application submitted by the petitioner, herein, in the matter, would not mandate acceptance by this Court.

15. The petitioner, in the present proceeding, having also prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground; it is to be noted that such a consideration would now be required to be so directed to be made after around 21 years having elapsed since the date of the death of the government servant involved.

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16. It is a settled position of law that public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of an application and on merits. The appointment on compassionate ground cannot be a source of recruitment. It is merely an exception to the requirement of law keeping in view the fact of the death of the employee while in service, leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases, the object is to enable the family to get over the sudden financial crises. Such appointments on compassionate ground, therefore, have to be made in accordance with the Rules, Regulations, or, administrative instructions taking into consideration, the financial condition of the family of the deceased. The favourable treatment to the dependent of the deceased employee must have a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved thereby i.e. relief against destitution. At the same time, however, it should not be forgotten that as against the destitute family of the deceased employee, there are millions and millions of other families which are equally, if not more, destitute. The exception to the Rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the service rendered by him and the legitimate expectation, and the change in the status and affairs of the family endangered by the erstwhile employment, which are suddenly upturned. The claims for of appointment on compassionate ground would mandate that there be no delay in effecting such appointment, the object being to mitigate the hardships faced by the family due to the death of the bread earner.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision rendered in the case of State of W.B. v. Debabrata Tiwari & ors. [reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 219], on the issue involved in the present proceeding, has drawn the following conclusions:

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"32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge:

i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.

ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.

iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over.

iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years.

v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source.

33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration.

34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate Page No.# 10/13

appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter.

35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.

36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 P.C. 221 as under:

"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."

37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

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38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words:

"9.... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, In its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Itwas pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."

39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.

40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were made:

"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time."

18. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and applying the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of the Debabrata Tiwari(supra) to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the petitioner for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground, would not mandate acceptance on the ground that the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner was rejected in the year 2013 and the same not being Page No.# 12/13

challenged, has attained its finality and a subsequent application from the members of the same family; would not mandate a consideration by the respondent authorities. Further, the delay occasioning in the matter since the date of death of the father of the petitioner, occasioning on 17-06- 2004, having rendered the claim of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground, to be a stale one; no direction is called upon to be issued by this Court to the respondent authorities for consideration of the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment in respect of the petitioner, herein, has been lost. Entertaining the claim at this point of time would be of no avail, because, admittedly, the petitioner has been able to eke out a living even though he was not favoured with an appointment on compassionate ground. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground be considered or entertained by the respondent authorities.

19. At this stage, the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in the case of Govinda Janardan Gaikwad(supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner would require to be so considered.

20. On perusal of the said decision, it is seen that the mother of the appellant, therein, had also applied for appointment on compassionate ground. However, her case was not considered by the authorities and accordingly, the appellant, therein, on attaining age of majority, had applied for substitution of his name in place of the name of his mother. However, in the instant case, the application submitted by the mother of Page No.# 13/13

the petitioner was duly considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee and the same was rejected. The rejection, however, was not assailed by the mother of the petitioner, and/or, by the petitioner, herein, or, any of his family members and the same has already attained its finality. Accordingly, the said decision, in the considered view of this court; would not advance the case of the petitioner, herein.

21. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the issue involved in the present proceeding being a stale issue, it would not be permissible for this Court to issue any direction requiring consideration of the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground in pursuance to death of his father, in harness, occasioning in the year 2004.

22. In the above view of the matter; this writ petition is held to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant