Gauhati High Court
WP(C)/4350/2020 on 18 February, 2025
GAHC010139492020
2025:GAU-AS:1786
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
W.P.(C) NO.4350 OF 2020
CT/ Fitter Mufiz Uddin,
Force No. 135096897
S/ o Hazi Jia Uddin,
R/ o- Munsirgram, P/ O Daloogram, P.S-
Lakhipur, District- Cachar, Assam, PI N-
788101.
.......Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The Union of I ndia,
Represented by the Secretary to the
Government of I ndia, Ministry of
Home Affairs, Central Secretariat,
P.O. - New Delhi-110001.
2. The Director General, Central
Reserve Police Force, Central
Government Office Complex, New
Delhi- 110001.
3. The I nspector General of Police,
North Eastern Sector Central
Reserve Police Force, Shillong,
Meghalaya, PI N- 793001.
4. The Deputy I nspector General of
Police, Range HQR, Central Reserve
Police Force, Chandauli, Varanasi,
PI N- 221011.
WPC No.4350/2020 Page 1 of 15
5. The Commandant, Central Reserve
Police Force, Polo Ground, Shillong,
Meghalaya, PI N-793001.
6. The Deputy I nspector General of
Police, Group Center Central
Reserve Police Force, Guwahati,
Assam, PI N- 781023.
.......Respondents
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. R. Mazumdar, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S.K. Medhi, Standing Counsel,
CGC.
Date of Hearing : 18.02.2025.
Date of Judgment :18.02.2025.
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. R. Mazumdar, learned Counsel for the
petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned Standing
Counsel, Central Government Counsel for the respondents.
2. By way of this writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of I ndia, the petitioner is assailing inter-
alia the impugned order dated 07.07.2020 passed by the
DI GP Range HQ, CRPF, (hereinafter referred to as the
"revisional authority") whereby the petitioner was removed
from service.
3. The facts of the present case are as follows: -
Pursuant to an advertisement in the year 2013 to
the post of Constable/ Fitter issued by the Central Reserve
Force, the petitioner participated in the recruitment process
and upon being selected, he was appointed as
Constable/ Fitter. Thereafter, upon receiving a complaint
that the petitioner had submitted fake certificate regarding
the experience criteria at the time of recruitment,
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
petitioner. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer after completing
his enquiry submitted Enquiry Report on 04.03.2019 before
the disciplinary authorities, wherein the Enquiry Officer
found the petitioner guilty of the offence charged.
Thereafter, the disciplinary authorities by order dated
05.10.2019 imposed the punishment of stoppage of one
increment for 1 year without cumulative effect. Thereafter,
the revisional authority by letter dated 05.03.2020 issued a
show-cause notice to the petitioner as why the aforesaid
punishment given to him shall not be enhanced. Against
the aforesaid show-cause notice, the petitioner by letter
dated 15.03.2020 furnished his reply. After the petitioner
submitted his reply, the revisional authority by letter dated
07.07.2020 in exercise of the suo-motu revisional power
under the provisions of the Rules was pleased to enhance
the punishment with removal from service from the Force.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the revisional
authority, the present writ petition has been filed.
4. Mr. R. Mazumdar, learned Counsel for the
petitioner submits that the decision of the revisional
authority is time barred and hence is illegal and void-ab-
initio. I n view of the said submission on limitation, this
Court deems appropriate to confine the hearing at the
outset on the issue of limitation as argued. Hence, the
arguments made by Mr. Mazumdar on the other aspect of
the matter are not gone into at this stage. I n support of
the aforesaid submission on limitation, he has relied upon
the following decisions:-
(i) Commandant 110 Battalion Central Reserve Police
Force & Others Vs. Harisingh, reported in 2009 4 MLJ
60.
(ii) Narendra Singh Vs. Union of India and Others,
reported in 2023 (4) GLT 652.
5. Per Contra, Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned Standing
Counsel, Central Government Counsel for the respondents
submits that under the relevant rules, though there is a
time period for filing revision petition, however, the same
is not applicable in the case of suo-moto revision. I n
support of the aforesaid submission, he has relied upon the
decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior
Bench), in the case of Mahesh Singh Sikarwar Vs
Union of India and others, reported in (2022) 09 MP CK
0098.
He further draws the attention of this Court that
pending the writ proceeding, the appeal filed by the writ
petitioner against the impugned order of the revisional
authority has been rejected by the appellate authority vide
order dated 31.12.2020, which is enclosed as Annexure-1
to the additional affidavit filed by the writ petitioner on
19.01.2021.
6. I have given my prudent consideration to the
arguments advanced by the learned Counsels appearing
for the contending parties and have perused the material
available on record. I have also considered the case laws
cited at the bar.
7. The issue that has fallen for determination in this
writ petition is whether the impugned proceedings of the
revisional authority is time barred under the provision of
Rule 29 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955
(hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"), and if so, whether
the impugned order of the revisional authority is illegal and
void-ab-initio.
8. Apt at the outset to refer to Rule 29 of the said
Rules, which is extracted hereunder for ready reference:
"29. Revision. (a) A member of the Force whose
appeal has been rejected by a competent authority
may prefer petition for revision to the next Superior
Authority. The power of revision may be exercised
only when in consequence of some material
irregularity, there has been injustice or miscarriage
of justice or fresh evidence is disclosed.
(b) The procedure prescribed for appeals
under sub-rules (c) to (g) of rule 28 shall apply
mutatis mutandis to petitions for revision.
(c) [The next superior authority] while passing
orders on a revision petition may at its
discretion enhance punishment:
Provided that before enhancing the punishment the
accused shall be given an opportunity to show
cause why his punishment should not be
enhanced:
[Provided further that an order enhancing the
punishment shall, for the purpose of appeal, be
treated as an original order except when the same
has been passed by the Government in which case
no further appeal shall lie, and an appeal against
such an order shall lie-
(i) to the Inspector-General, if the same has
been passed by the Deputy Inspector-
General; and
[(ii) to the Special Director-General or
Additional Director-General heading Zone, if
the same has been passed by the Inspector-
General; and]
[(iii) to the Director-General, if the same has
been passed by the Special Director-General
or Additional Director-General heading Zone;
and]
[(iv) to the Central Government, if the same
has been passed by the Director General.]]
(d) [The Director General [or [special Director-
General or the Additional Director-General
heading the Zone]] or the Inspector-General]
or the Deputy Inspector General may call for
the records of award of any punishment and
confirm, enhance, modify or annual the
same, or make or direct further investigation
to be made before passing such orders:
Provided that in a case in which it is
proposed to enhance punishment, the
accused shall be given an opportunity to
show cause either orally or in writing as to
why his punishment should not be
enhanced."
9. Reading of the aforesaid rules, it is apparent that
suo-moto revisional power has been conferred upon the
authorities mentioned under sub-rule (d) of Rule 29.
Apparent further reading of the sub-rule (b) of Rule 29 that
the procedure prescribed for appeal under Sub-rule (c) to
(g) of Rule 28 shall apply to the revisional proceedings.
10. Apt to refer to Rule (c) to (g) of Rule 28 of the
said Rules:
"(c) Every appeal preferred under these rules shall
contain all material statements and arguments
relied upon by the person preferring the appeal. It
shall contain no disrespectful or improper language
or irrelevant allegations and it shall be complete in
itself. Petitions or appeals filed by members of the
Force are not chargeable with stamp duty. Copies
of other documents filed with the appeal shall be
stamped under section 6 of the Court Fees Act,
1870, unless they have to be stamped under article
24 of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
(d) Every appeal, whether the appellant is still in
the Force or not, shall be preferred through the
Commandant and shall not be sent direct to the
appellate authority.
(e) An appeal which is not filed within 30 days of
the date of the original order, exclusive of the time
taken to obtain a copy of the order or record, shall
be barred by limitation:
Provided the appellate authority may
entertain time barred appeal if deemed fit.
(f) The Commandant may withhold [an appeal to
the appellate authority senior to him] in cases.
(1) where under these rules no appeal lies;
(2) where the appeal does not comply with the
provisions of sub-rules (c), (d) or (e) above;
(3) Where it is a further appeal presented after a
final decision has been given by the competent
appellate authority and no new facts have been
brought out necessitating reconsideration of the
case: Provided that in every case in which an
appeal is withheld the person preferring the appeal
shall be informed of the fact together with brief
reasons therefor.
(g) No appeal shall lie against an order withholding
of an appeal by a competent authority:
Provided that in cases of failure to comply
with the conditions stated in sub-rule (c) or (d)
above, the appeal shall not be withheld if it is
preferred again in the prescribed form in conformity
with the rules and is not time barred."
11. Apparent reading of sub-rule (e) of Rule 28 that
the time limit prescribed under the said Rule for filing the
appeal is 30 days from the date of original order. I t further
appears that by proviso to the said sub-rule, the appellate
authority if deems fit may entertain an appeal which is
time barred. Thus, in a given case, the authority has the
power to condone the delay if it deems fit. I n view of the
foregoing, the suo-moto revisional jurisdiction can be
exercised within the time limit of 30 days stipulated under
the said Rules and in the event, there is delay, the
revisional authority is empowered to condone the said
delay by giving explanation.
12. I n the present case it appears that pursuant to
the order dated 05.10.2019 of the disciplinary authorities
imposing the punishment of stoppage of increment to the
petitioner, the revisional authority issued notice to the
petitioner on 05.03.2020 to show cause as to why the
aforesaid punishment should not be enhanced. I t further
appears that after the petitioner submitted reply to the said
show-cause notice, the revisional authority by impugned
order dated 07.07.2020 enhanced the said punishment to
that of removal from service from the Force.
13. I t is apparent from paragraph 4 of the aforesaid
impugned order that the I nspector General of Police,
Central Sector, Lucknow, by letter dated 23.10.2019
directed the DI G to review the punishment given by the
disciplinary authorities to the petitioner. Thus, it is
apparent that the respondent authority has exercised the
power of suo-moto revision as provided under Sub-rule (d)
of Rule 29 of the said Rules. I t is also apparent that the
show-cause notice for enhancing the punishment was
given on 05.03.2020 which is about 5 months since the
disciplinary authority had awarded the punishment.
14. The argument of Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned Standing
Counsel, Central Government Counsel that the time limit
provided under sub-rule (e) of Rule 28 is only in respect of
revision petition filed by a Member of the Force and not as
regards the revision which are suo-moto taken up by the
authorities mentioned under sub-rule (d) of Rule 29 of the
Rules appears to be fallacious. As stated above, it is
apparent under the Rules that the procedure prescribed for
appeals is also applicable in the case of revision under Rule
29.
15. I t appears that the time period prescribed for
filing appeal is 30 days from the order which is also
applicable in the case of suo-moto revision.
16. Apt to refer to the decision of the Division Bench
of the High Court of Madras wherein in a similar question
had arisen before the Division Bench of Madras High Court
and the High Court of Madras concluded by holding as
hereunder:
" While we approve the power o the revisional authority to
suo motu revise the orders of the original authority in
exercise of the power under Rule 29(d) of the Rules, we
hold that such power should be exercised within a
reasonable period and even in case such power is
exercised beyond a period of 30 days, the proper reason
for exercise of the power should be indicated in the order
and failure of the revisional authority to indicate such
reasons would by itself be a ground to set aside the said
order, as the order suffers from legal infirmity."
17. Apt also to refer to the decision of the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in the case of Narendra Singh
(Supra) wherein in the context of a similar facts and
circumstances, this Court has held that suo-moto revision
proceeding initiated by the revisional authority, if not is
undertaken within the stipulated time provided under Rule
28 (e), the same shall be bad in law being time barred and
without jurisdiction. Paragraph 16 to 19 of the said
judgment is extracted hereunder for ready reference:
"16. Rule 29 of the Rules of 1949 deals with power
of revision and according to Rule 29(d), the Officers'
named therein would have the power to call for the
records to award any punishment and confirm,
enhance, modify or annul the same or make of
direct further investigation to be made before such
an order, provided the accused is given an
opportunity to show cause. As per Rule 29(b), the
procedure prescribed for hearing appeals under
Rule 28(e) to (g) would be applicable mutatis
mutandis for revision. Rule 28(e) prescribes as
follows: -
'28(e) an appeal which is not filed within 30 days of
the date of the original order, exclusive of the time
taken to obtain a copy of the order or record, shall be
barred by limitation. Provided the appellate authority
may entertain time barred appeal if deemed fit.'
17. From a conjoint reading of the provisions of
Rule 29 and Rule 28(e), it is apparent that unless
the power of revision, be it on the basis of any
revision application or suo-moto under sub-rule (d),
is exercised within 30 days from the date of the
original order, such a proceeding would be barred
by limitation. The aforesaid aspect of the matter
has been discussed by the High of Juicature at
Madrass in the judgement dated 20/01/2009
rendered in the case of Commandant 110
Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force and others
Vs. Harisingh [WA No. 2989/2004] reported in
2009 4 MLJ 60. The observations made in the
aforesaid decision in paragraph 7 is extracted
herein below:
'7. It is argued by the learned counsel for the
appellants that though Rule 29 refers to the
procedure enumerated under sub-rules (c) to (g) of
Rule 28 should be followed for revisions, the same
shall not be applicable in view of the specific
provision of Rule 29 (d), which does not prohibit the
revisional authority to exercise the suo motu power to
revise the order. We are not convinced with the said
reason. A plain reading of Rule 29 (b) would show
that the procedure contemplated under Rule 28(e)
relating to the filing of the appeal within a period of
30 days is also applicable for revisions, as the said
Rule refers to "petitions for revision." The said Rule
cannot be restricted only for a petition filed for
revision by the person aggrieved of the orders in the
appeal, and it has to be extended to the power of the
Director General or the Inspector General, as the
case may be, under Rule 29(d) of the Rules as well.
Of course, under Rule 29(d), a power is conferred on
the authority to suo motu call for the records of
award of any punishment and confirm, modify or
annul the same including to enhance such
punishment, but it cannot be without any limitation,
as such an interpretation would not be in conformity
with the service jurisprudence. When the Rules
prescribe a specific limitation for the delinquent
officer, who has been found guilty, either to prefer
appeal or the consequent revision, the unfettered
power on the authorities to revise an order of
punishment and also the enhancement of punishment
cannot be without a restricted period.'
18. From a reading of the aforesaid decision, in the
light of the provisions of Rule 28(e) of the Rules of
1949, it will be evident that the jurisdiction of the
revisional authority to entertain a revision, be it at
the instance of the employee or in exercise of suo-
moto jurisdiction, would be subject to the Law of
Limitation, as prescribed under the aforesaid
provision, which is 30(thirty) days from the date of
issuing the original order. In the present case, the
first order of penalty was issued on 15/07/2009.
On 24/08/2009, notices were issued/served upon
the writ petitioner and his colleague giving them 15
(fifteen) days time to reply as to why enhanced
punishment should not be imposed upon them.
What is evident on the face of the record is the fact
that the notice dated 24/08/2009 was issued after
the expiry of 30 days from the first order of penalty
dated 15/07/2009. Therefore, the same was
evidently beyond the period of 30 days of limitation
period as prescribed under Rule 28(e).
19. Having regard to the decision in the case of
Hari Singh (Supra), I am of the view that the suo-
moto revision proceeding initiated by the revisional
authority i.e. the respondent no. 4 was bad in law,
the same being barred under the Law of Limitation.
Therefore, the impugned order dated 22/10/2009
was without jurisdiction and hence, non est in the
eyes of law."
18. Reading of the aforesaid decision, it appears that
the same squarely covers the issue in hand. I t further
appears that the Central Government has not filed any
appeal against the aforesaid decision of this Court. Hence,
the aforesaid decision of the Co-ordinate Bench has
attained finality.
19. Pertinent that Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned Standing
Counsel, Central Government Counsel has also relied upon
the Co-ordinate Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High
Court in the case of Mahesh Singh Sikarwar (Supra),
wherein the High Court refused to quash the show-cause
notice issued by the revisional authority after the expiry of
the time limit. I t appears that in the facts of the aforesaid
decision, the revisional authority had exercised the power
of condonation as provided under the provision of sub-rule
(e) of Rule 28.
20. Turning back to the facts of this case, it appears
that the show-cause notice issued by the revisional
authority as well as the impugned order of the revisional
authority does not indicate that the delay has been
condoned in respect of initiation of suo-moto revisional
proceeding. There is nothing on record to indicate that the
revisional authority has condoned the delay. Hence, the
aforesaid decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is not
applicable in the facts of the instant case.
21. I n view of the foregoing, the show-cause notice
issued by the revisional authority as well as the impugned
order dated 07.07.2020 of the revisional authority is time
barred and hence illegal and void-ab-initio.
22. That apart, under sub-rule (d) of Rule 29 of the
Rules, it is the Director General or Special Deputy Director
General or the Additional Director General heading the
Zone or the I nspector General or the Deputy I nspector
General who are conferred the power of revision. However,
in the present case it appears that the I nspector General of
Police, who is one of the competent revisional authorities
instead of exercising the powers of revision as provided
under sub-rule (d) of Rule 29 of the said Rules, directed
the DI G to review the punishment imposed by the
Disciplinary Authority. Undoubtedly, the DI G is also one of
the competent authorities to exercise the power of
revision, however, it is evident from reading of the
aforesaid rules that the power of revision has to be
independently exercised by the authority under whom such
power is conferred by the statute. Thus, the aforesaid
action of the I nspector General of Police in directing the
DI G to exercise the powers of revision appears to be not in
the manner prescribed under sub-rule (d) of Rule 29 of the
said Rules. Further, the revisional proceeding initiated by
the DI G appears to be as per the instruction of the
I nspector General of Police. Hence, there is no
independent exercise of mind which is the mandate of sub-
rule (d) of Rule 29 of the said Rules.
23. Be that as it may, this Court is not required to
go into the merits of the matter at this stage as the
impugned order of enhancement of penalty issued by the
revisional authority is interfered on the ground of being
time barred.
24. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. The
impugned show-cause notice dated 05.03.2020 and the
impugned order of the revisional authority dated
07.07.2020 stands set-aside and quashed. As such, the
appellate authority's order dated 31.12.2020 is also set-
aside and quashed.
25. I n view of the above, the respondent authorities
are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service.
26. Ordered accordingly.
27. The writ petition is accordingly, disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
