Gauhati High Court
Kishor Bhattacherjee vs The State Of Assam on 7 November, 2023
GAHC010158052021
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
Criminal Petition No. 554/2021
1. Kishor Bhattacherjee
S/o Late Keteki Ranjan Bhattacharjee,
R/o Second Floor, Flat 8A, HJ 20,
SL Sarani, Joramandir, P.O. & P.S. Baguiati,
Kolkata- 700159
2. Papun Bhattacharjee
W/o Kishor Bhattacharyee
S/o Late Keteki Ranjan Bhattacharjee,
R/o Second Floor, Flat 8A, HJ 20,
SL Sarani, Joramandir, P.O. & P.S. Baguiati,
Kolkata- 700159
...PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1. The State of Assam,
Represented by the P.P. Assam.
2. Shri Keshab Ch. Das
S/o Late Mukunda Ram Das
R/o House No. 3, Bye Lane No. 7
Shadabor Avenue, P.S. - Geetanagar,
Page 1 of 24
Guwahati, Kamrup (M) Assam
Pin- 781021
...RESPONDENT
:::BEFORE:::
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
For the petitioner :- Mr. M.K. Choudhury, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. S. Khound.
For the respondent No.1 :- Mr. D. Das, Addl. P.P.
For the respondent No.2 :- Mr. A. R. Bhuyan
Date of Hearing : 10.10.2023
Date of Judgment and Order : 07.11.2023
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. M.K. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr.
S. Khound, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D. Das,
learned Addl. P.P. for the respondent No.1, i.e. State of Assam and Mr.
A.R. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the private respondent No.2.
2. This petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 is preferred by Shri Kishor Bhattacharjee and Smti
Papun Bhattacharjee for quashing the First Information Report of
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Geetanagar P.S. Case No.308/2019, registered under sections
120B/385/420/468/34 IPC, lodged by informant Keshab Ch. Das on
25.07.2019.
3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, is
briefly stated as under:-
"On 25.07.2019, one Keshab Ch. Das of Zoo Narengi Road,
Guwahati, lodged one F.I.R. with the Geetanagar Police Station,
alleging inter alia amongst others that on 24.07.2019, at about
11 am, two persons came to his residence and introduced
themselves as Shri Kishor Bhattacharjee and Smti Papun
Bhattacharjee and since he and his wife were absent, they
handed over to his son some papers and demanded a sum of
Rs.14,25,000/- and asked his son to make payment immediately
else they would take action against him. On 25.07.2019, while
he reached home then he had gone through the papers and
found that the said two persons had fraudulently made the said
papers of his Firm and the signatures thereon are also not of
him. It is also stated that Kishor Bhattacharjee was working as
Asstt. Manager in Canara Bank Zonal Office situated at G.S.
Road, Guwahati and he was familiar to him as he had availed
business loans from Canara Bank from the year 2005 to 2008
and Kishor Bhattacharjee had dealt with all his papers relating to
his business loan in the name of K.C. Das & Associates and
Brahmaputra Coach Builders and at that time he was demanding
bribe from him and then he had reported the matter to the Zonal
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Manager. It is also stated that Kishor Bhattacharjee had misused
the signatures of many customers and misappropriated bank
money for which he was officially suspended and dismissed from
the bank job in the year 2008-2009. It is also stated that he was
not aware of Kunal Kumar Pant, Notary Officer and Advocate -
Mr. M.M. Alam, who had identified the money receipt and he
never visited any Notary Office in Kolkata and he had never put
any reference number in the money receipt and the same was
false and the letter head of his Firm and the seal and his
signature thereon all are forged.
Upon the said FIR, the Officer-in-Charge, Geetanagar
Police Station has registered a case, being Geetanagar P.S. Case
No.308/2019, under sections 120(B)/385/420/468/341 IPC, and
endorsed S.I. Pranab Baishya to investigate the same. The I.O.
then started the investigation by visiting the place of occurrence
and examining the witnesses."
4. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the
present petition on the following grounds:-
(i) That, the allegations made in the FIR, dated 25.07.2019,
even if taken on their face value and accepted in its
entirety, do not disclose commission of any offence under
section 468/471 IPC, by the petitioners;
(ii) That, the FIR dated 25.07.2019 is the counterblast of
Criminal Complaints filed by the petitioners against the
respondent No.2;
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(iii) That, the respondent No.2 had taken a sum of
Rs.7,00,000/- from the petitioner on different dates in the
year 2006 and another sum of Rs.14,25,000/- in the year
2011 and 2012 and issued Money Receipts, which bears his
signatures and the signature of the witness, and that there
is no elements to constitute any of the ingredients of the
offences under section 420/385/468/120(B)/34 IPC against
the petitioners;
(iv) That, there is no whisper of allegations in the FIR against
the present petitioners for commission of the offence under
which the present case has been registered and that the
petitioners have no mens-rea, which would bring their
action with in ambit of culpability of the offences
mentioned in the FIR;
(v) That, the FIR, so lodged against the petitioner is an abuse
of the process of the court and therefore, it is contended to
allow the petition.
5. Mr. M.K. Choudhury, the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioners,
reiterated the points mentioned here in above during hearing. Mr.
Choudhury submits that the FIR is the counterblast of the Complaint
Cases lodged by the petitioner against the respondent No.2. Mr.
Choudhury further submits that there was transaction of money
between the petitioner and respondent No.2 and the respondent No.2
has issued cheques and the said cheques, when presented in the Bank
for payment but the cheques were returned dishonoured and
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therefore, the petitioners have instituted the Complaint Cases against
the respondent No.2 and in the said Cases Bailable Warrants were
issued against the respondent No.2 and after appearing in the said
cases, in the Court at Kolkata, the respondent No.2 had filed the
present FIR as counterblast. Mr. Choudhury, further submits that the
present FIR is a fabricated FIR and even if the allegations made in the
said FIR, if taken at their face value, had failed to disclose any case
against the present petitioners and therefore, it is contended to allow
this petition. Mr. Choudhury also referred following case laws to
bolster his submission:-
(i) Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others vs.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others; reported in
(1988) 1 SCC 692;
6. On the other hand, Mr. A.R. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the
respondent No.2, submits that the petitioner No.1 was serving as
Canara Bank official and that the respondent No.2 had availed loan
from the Canara Bank and while availing loans the respondent No.2
had issued some cheques as security and being Bank official, the
petitioner No.1 had misused the same by filing false case under N.I.
Act. Mr. Bhuyan further submits that the respondent No.2 had never
availed any loans from the petitioners and also never issued any
cheques for repayment of the said loans. It is the further submission
of Mr. Bhuyan that the petitioner No.1 is a habitual offender and he
was terminated from the service by the Bank and he was also
convicted and sentenced by the CBI Court at Guwahati. Mr. Bhuyan
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also submits that the at the very initial stage investigation of the case
was stayed by this court and that unless the investigation is allowed to
complete, it cannot be said at this stage that no case is made out
against the petitioners. Therefore, Bhuyan has contended to dismiss
the petition. Mr. Bhuyan has also referred following case laws in
support of his submissions:-
(i) Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri & Another vs.
State of Andhra Pradesh& Another, reported in
(2007) 13 SCC 165.
(ii) M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra &Ors. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 315),
7. Per contra, Mr. D. Das, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the
State respondent submits that having perused the FIR it cannot be
said that no prima-facie case is made out against the petitioners under
sections 120(B)/385/420/468/341 IPC, and that this is not a fit case
for quashing the FIR and that the petitioner is also absconding and
has not been co-operating with the I.O., and since the investigation is
in nascent stage, it would be pre-mature to held that the allegations in
the FIR are false. Referring to a letter of the Senior Manager of Canara
Bank, dated 07.11.2019, available in the Case Diary, Mr. Das submits
that the petitioners had done many fictitious debits under various head
of accounts without any sanctions/approval/bills/vouchers and
proceeds were siphoned off by issuing Demand Drafts to various Firms
without actual supply of materials and also he had done various
fraudulent alteration of amount in the slips/vouchers, wrongful debit,
Page 7 of 24
withdrawal of cash which is in total violation of Bank‟s laid down
system and procedure and he was dismissed from service on
30.03.2010, and a CBI case being RC 1(A)/2008/GWH/CBI, dated
04.01.2008, has been registered against him. Mr. Das further submits
that this is not a fit case to exercise the power under section 482
Cr.P.C. and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the same.
8. In his reply, Mr. Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners, submits that there is no question of absconding, as this
court has stayed the further investigation of the case.
9. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both sides,
I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed
on record and the Case Diary of Geetanagar P.S. Case No. 308/2019,
so produced by Mr. D. Das, learned Addl. P.P. and also carefully gone
through the case laws referred by learned counsel for both the parties.
10. When and how the FIR and Criminal proceeding is to be
quashed, and the power of High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. is
elaborately dealt with in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. (supra), by a three Judges‟ Bench of Hon‟ble Supreme
Court as under:-
************
***********
(iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, as it has been observed, in the „rarest of
rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the
context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather
than an ordinary rule;
**********
*************
(x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial
process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice;
***********
**************
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be more
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard
being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-
restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters
laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra)
and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint;
***********
***********."
11. Again in the case of Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri
(supra) referred by Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the respondent
No.2, it has been held that -
"26. At this stage, we may also notice the parameters laid
down by this Court for exercise of power by the High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C to give effect to any order made under
the Cr.P.C or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866] this Court considered the question
whether in exercise of its power under Section 561A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 482 Cr.P.C. is parimateria
to Section 561A of the 1898 Code), the High Court could quash
criminal case registered against the appellant who along with his
mother-in-law was accused of committing offences under
Section 420, 109, 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The
appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition in the Punjab High Court
for quashing the investigation of the First Information Report
(FIR) registered against him and then filed appeal before this
Court. While confirming the High Court‟s order this Court laid
down the following proposition:
The inherent power of High Court under Section 561A,
Criminal P.C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters
specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash
proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused
person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the
High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible,
desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which
would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction.
27. This Court then carved out some exceptions to the above
stated rule. These are:
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in
respect of the offences alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction
may, for instance, furnish cases under this category;
(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged;
in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a
matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First
Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is
disclosed or not;
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do
constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal
evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In
dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or
where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly
inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is
legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support
the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry
as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is
the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be
open to any party to invoke the High Court‟s inherent jurisdiction
and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence
the accusation made against the accused would not be
sustained.
28. In State of Haryana v Bhajanlal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]
this Court considered the scope of the High Court‟s power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution to
quash the FIR registered against the respondent, referred to
several judicial precedents including those of R.P.Kapoor v. State
of Punjab (supra), State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha [1980 (1)
SCC 554] and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha
[1982 (1) SCC 561] and held that the High Court should not
embark upon an enquiry into the merits and demerits of the
allegations and quash the proceedings without allowing the
investigating agency to complete its task. At the same time, the
Court identified the following cases in which the FIR or complaint
can be quashed.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
29. The ratio of Bhajan Lals case has been consistently followed
in the subsequent judgments. In M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd. V. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (supra), this Court referred
to a large number of precedents on the subject and observed:
"11....The powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of
the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based
on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised
to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the
highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been
collected and produced before the court and the issues involved,
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in
their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for
the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the
light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a
conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be
erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted
on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the
proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does
not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive.
If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the
offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it
is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not,
however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of
the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end
in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a
whole. It if appears that on consideration of the allegations in
the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that
the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and
there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide,
frivolous or vexatious, in that even there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of
secondary importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of
the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the
informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be
the basis for quashing the proceedings.
In the aforementioned judgment, this Court set aside the
order of the Patna High Court and quashed the summons issued
by the First Class Judicial Magistrate in Complaint Case No.1613)
of 2002 on the ground that the same was barred by limitation
prescribed under Section 468 (2)) Cr.P.C.
30. In Ramesh Chand Sinhas case (supra) this Court quashed
the decision of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna to take
cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the appellants
by observing that the same was barred by time and there were
no valid grounds to extend the period of limitation invoking
section 473 Cr.P.C.
12. Thereafter, in paragraph No.31 it has been held as under:-
"A careful reading of the above noted judgments makes it clear
that the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to
interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and
should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except
when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR
does not disclose commission of any offence or that the
allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable
offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or the High
Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent
abuse of the process of the court. In dealing with such cases,
the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at
the threshold of the legal process initiated against a person
accused of committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger
public and societal interest. The people and the society have a
legitimate expectation that those committing offences either
against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to
trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while
deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or
restraining the competent authority from investigating the
allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the
trial of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and
circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint
discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court must
keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to
complete the investigation without any fetter and also refrain
from passing order which may impede the trial. The High Court
should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegations
simply because the petitioner alleges malus animus against the
author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must also
refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible
harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of
investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in
miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of
committing crimes to repeat the same. However, if the High
Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose
commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation
or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of
justice, then it may exercise inherent power under Section 482
Cr.P.C."
13. Again, in the case of Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel Vs. The
State Of Gujarat, reported in (2018) 3 SCC 104, following earlier
decision in State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Swapan Kumar Guha
& Ors., reported in (1982) 1 SCC 561, it has been held that High
Court cannot decide the issue arising out of the case like an
investigating agency or/and appellate authority decides, by little
realizing that it was exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of Swapan
Kumar Guha (supra), it was held that right of inquiry is conditioned
by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable
offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless
the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If
that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has
then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to
trench upon the lawful power to investigate into cognizable offences.
14. Now, to the case in hand, I find that following facts and
circumstances have emerged from a bare perusal of the FIR, dated
25.07.2019:-
(i) That, on 24.07.2019, the petitioners had visited the
residence of the respondent No.2.
(ii) That, on that day the petitioner and his wife were not
present in the residence.
(iii) That, the petitioners had introduced themselves as Kishor
Bhattacharjee and Papun Bhattacharjee.
(iv) That, both the petitioners have handed over some papers
to the son of the respondent No.2 and demanded a sum of
Rs.14,25,000/-, and asked his son to make payment of the
same immediately or they will take action against the
respondent No.2.
(v) That, the petitioner No.2 was working in Canara Bank
Zonal Office as Asstt. Manager and he had dealt with the
papers of the respondent No.2, who had availed business
loan in the said Bank in the name of his two Firms, namely,
K.C. Das & Associates and Brahmaputra Coach Builders
and the petitioner No.1 had demanded bribes from him
which he had refused and reported the matter to the Zonal
Manager;
(vi) That, on 25.07.2019, on going through the papers, the
respondent No.2 had found that the said two persons had
fraudulently made the said papers in the name of his Firms
and the signatures thereon are also not of him.
(vii) That, the petitioner No.1 had misused the signatures of
many customers and misappropriated bank money for
which he was officially suspended and dismissed from the
bank job in the year 2008-2009.
(viii) That, the respondent No.2 was not aware of Kunal Kumar
Pant, Notary Officer and Advocate - Mr. M.M. Alam, who
had identified the money receipt and he never visited any
Notary Office in Kolkata and he never put any reference
number in the money receipt and the same was false and
the letter head of his Firm and the seal and his signature
thereon all are forged.
15. The Case Diary also indicates that the I.O. had examined as
many as four witnesses and collected some materials in support of the
allegations made in the FIR. It also appears that the I.O. has issued
notice to the Senior Manager, Canara Bank on 05.11.2019, and
pursuant to the said Notice, the Senior Manager has issued one letter
to the Officer -In- Charge, Geetanagar P.S. on 07.11.2019, indicating
therein that the petitioner had done many fictitious debits under
various head of accounts without any
sanctions/approval/bills/vouchers and the proceeds were siphoned off
by issuing Demand Drafts to various Firms without actual supply of
materials and also he had done various fraudulent alteration of
amount in the slips/vouchers, wrongful debit, withdrawal of cash
which is in total violation of Bank‟s laid down system and procedure
and he was dismissed from service on 30.03.2010 and a CBI case,
being RC 1(A)/2008/GWH/CBI, dated 04.01.2008, has been registered
against him.
16. It is also to be noted here that the respondent No.2 has also
filed one Interlocutory Application, being I.A. No.84/2022, for vacation
of the stay order dated 04.10.2021, passed by this court. In the said
application at page No.59, as Annexure-V, the applicant has annexed
one Judgment passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam dated
30.07.2014, in CBI Case No. RC 1(A)/2008/GWH/CBI, wherein the
petitioner No.1 was convicted under sections 120B/420/471/467 IPC
and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of P.C. Act, and
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of
Rs.5000/- u/s 120B IPC and R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.10,000/-
each u/s 420/467/471 IPC and R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.10,000/-
each u/s 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of P.C. Act, with default
stipulations. These facts lends assurance to the contents of the letter
of the Senior Manager, dated, 07.11.2019, of the Canara Bank, which,
on the other hand, lends assurance to the allegations made in the FIR,
dated 25.07.2019.
17. While these facts and circumstances, that have emerged from
the FIR and from the Case Diary, are considered in the light of the
principles laid down in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. (supra), as discussed herein above, this court is left
unimpressed by the submission of Mr. Choudhury, the learned Sr.
Counsel for the petitioner, that no case is made out and that the story,
so set out in the FIR, is improbable. And accordingly, this court is
unable to record concurrence with the same. In the case in hand, the
allegations against the petitioners are under Sections
120B/385/420/468/34 of the IPC. The factual foundation of the said
offences seems to be clearly laid in no uncertain terms in the FIR. And
further it appears from the Case Diary that sufficient materials are
collected by the I.O. during investigation, in support of the same.
18. I have also considered the other submission of Mr. Choudhury
and gone through the case law Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia &
Others (supra) referred by Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel for
the petitioner, wherein, at paragraph No.7, it has been held as under:-
"When a prosecution at the initial stage is askedto be quashed,
the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations, as made, prima facie establish the
offence. It is also for the court to take in to consideration any
special features which appear in a particular case to consider
whether it is expedient and inthe interest of justice to permit a
prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court
cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the
opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak
and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by
allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court maywhile
taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash
the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
19. Since herein this case the investigation is in nascent stage, it
cannot be said at this stage that the chances of ultimate conviction is
bleak and no useful purpose will be served by allowing to continue
with the investigation. There is nothing on the record to suggest that
the legal process is utilised for any oblique purpose. Though it was
argued strenuously by Mr. Choudhury, the learned Sr. Counsel for the
petitioners that the FIR is the counterblast of the complaint cases filed
by the petitioners against the respondent No.2, yet, in the given facts
and circumstances of the case in hand, and as discussed herein above,
the said submission left this court unimpressed. Therefore, the ratio
laid down in the case law, referred by Mr. Choudhury, would not
advance the case of the petitioners.
20. On the other hand, I find substances in the submission of Mr.
Bhuyan, learned counsel for the respondent No.2 and Mr. Das, learned
Addl. P.P. and the case laws referred by Mr. Bhuyan, also strengthen
his submissions. Therefore, this court is inclined to record concurrence
with their submissions.
21. In the result, I find no merit in this petition and accordingly, the
same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own costs. Stay
granted earlier, stands vacated.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
