[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Ms Power Line Air Express vs Principal Commissioner Of Central ... on 16 March, 2026
$~72
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 16th March, 2026
+ W.P.(C) 3328/2026 & CM APPL. 16084/2026 & CM APPL.
16085/2026
M/S POWER LINE AIR EXPRESS
A PROPRIETORSHIP FIRM PROVIDING
COURIER AGENCY SERVICES,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT L-215, ROAD NO. 7
STREET 7B, L-BLOCK, MAHIPALPUR EXTENSION,
SOUTH WEST DELHI - DELHI - 110037
NEW DELHI
THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR, MRS. RUKMANI KUMAR
GSTIN: 07AXLPK2534M1Z5
.....PETITIONER
Through: Mr. Sparsh Bhargava,
Mr. Vishal Sinha, Ms. Tanya
Srivastava and Mr. Anmol
Kheta, Advs.
versus
1. PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL GOODS &
SERVICE TAX,
DELHI SOUTH COMMISSIONERATE,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT EIL ANNEXE BUILDING,
MAHATMA GANDHI FLYOVER, BHIKAJI CAMA PLACE,
RAMA KRISHNA PURAM, NEW DELHI- 110066
.....RESPONDENT NO. 1
2. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF GST INTELLIGENCE,
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
DELHI ZONAL UNIT,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT 53, POCKET 1,
SECTOR 6 DWARKA, DWARKA, NEW DELHI,
DELHI, 110075
.....RESPONDENT NO. 2
3. UNION OF INDIA,
THROUGH THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANKITA RAI
Signing Date:18.03.2026 W.P.(C) 3328/2026 Page 1 of 9
18:48:19
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI - 110001
.....RESPONDENT NO. 3
Through: Ms. Babita Saini, SPC for R-3
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
1. The petitioner, M/s Power Line Air Express, is a proprietorship
concern registered under the GST laws and is stated to be engaged in
providing courier agency services.
2. Summons dated 10.02.2025 under Section 70 of the Central
Goods and Services Tax Act, 20171 were issued to the petitioner in
the case of M/s Power Line Air Express, calling upon it to appear and
produce the specified documents. The schedule appended to the
summons required the petitioner to furnish the tender statement,
sample purchase and sale invoices for FY 2022-23 to 2023-24, the
purchase and sale ledger for FY 2022-23 to 2023-24, and the year-
wise ledger for FY 2019-20 to 2023-24 in respect of air freight
charges, cargo handling charges and services. The petitioner was
directed to appear on 18.02.2025 at 12 PM.
3. On 21.02.2025, the petitioner addressed a communication to the
Superintendent (AE Gr-5), Delhi South Commissionerate, stating that
the summons requiring appearance on 18.02.2025 had been received
only on 19.02.2025 and, therefore, it could not appear on the
scheduled date. The petitioner further stated that the requested
hereinafter "CGST Act"
documents would be furnished within 15 days and requested that a
convenient date and time for personal appearance be intimated
thereafter. Subsequently, on 03.03.2025, the petitioner submitted a
written response along with documents, acknowledging receipt of the
summons dated 10.02.2025, stating that it was engaged in the business
of courier services, and enclosing sample sale and purchase invoices
for FY 2022-23 and FY 2023-24, the sale and purchase ledger account
for the said period, and the ledger account of air freight services
received for FY 2019-20 to FY 2023-24.
4. The proceedings thereafter culminated in issuance of a demand-
cum-show cause notice2 dated 30.06.2025 in Form GST DRC-01 by
the office of the Principal Commissioner, Delhi South
Commissionerate, for the tax period 2018-19 to 2023-24. The notice
alleged that M/s Power Line Air Express had failed to make true
disclosure of its tax liability, had not paid due GST applicable, and
had suppressed material facts from the department. On that basis, the
petitioner was called upon to show cause, inter alia, why GST
amounting to ₹3,00,14,058/- for the period April 2018 to March 2024
should not be demanded and recovered under Section 74(1) of the
CGST Act read with Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services
Tax Act, 20173.
5. After issuance of the SCN, the petitioner, by letter dated
19.08.2025, sought supply of the relied upon documents 4 referred to
in the notice.
hereinafter "SCN"
hereinafter "IGST Act"
hereinafter "RUDs"
6. The petitioner thereafter submitted its reply to the SCN on
21.10.2025. In the said reply, the petitioner stated that it had placed on
record supporting documents including invoices, rate lists, remittance
records and representative documents relating to export and import
services. The petitioner further stated that the transaction values
disclosed in its GST returns were in accordance with the invoices
raised by it. The petitioner also set out its understanding of the nature
of Import Prepaid, Import Collect, Export Prepaid, and Export Collect
transactions, and stated that the rate list relied upon in the SCN was
outdated and not applicable to all categories of transactions referred to
in its reply.
7. The matter was thereafter adjudicated by the Principal
Commissioner of Central Goods & Service Tax, Delhi South
Commissionerate, who passed the Order-in-Original5 dated
18.12.2025. By the said order, the demand and recovery of
₹3,00,14,058/- was confirmed against the petitioner under Section
74(9) of the CGST Act read with Section 20 of the IGST Act.
8. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed the present writ
petition seeking quashing of the impugned OIO dated 18.12.2025
passed by respondent no. 1 under Section 74(9) of the CGST Act read
with Section 20 of the IGST Act, to the extent it confirms the demand
of ₹3,00,14,058/- against the petitioner; quashing of the SCN dated
30.06.2025 issued under Section 74(1) of the CGST Act; and a
direction restraining the respondents from taking coercive steps
against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned order during the
pendency of the present petition.
hereinafter "OIO"
Submission on behalf of the petitioner
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted, at the outset, that
the impugned OIO dated 18.12.2025 is liable to be set aside on the
ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. It was
contended that the very foundation of the proceedings stood vitiated
since several RUDs, which formed the basis of the SCN and the
ultimate demand, were never supplied to the petitioner despite a
specific request in that regard. It is submitted that in the absence of the
complete set of RUDs, including the documents containing the basis
of the allegations and the working of the demand, the petitioner was
denied an effective opportunity to meet the case set up against it. It
was further submitted that the proceedings were procedurally unfair
from the inception, inasmuch as the summons dated 10.02.2025 was
received only after the date fixed for appearance, while the further
summons dated 04.03.2025, referred to in the SCN, was never served
upon the petitioner.
10. Learned counsel also submitted that the impugned order also
suffers from complete non-application of mind. In this regard, it was
urged that the petitioner had, pursuant to the summons, furnished the
requisite documents on 03.03.2025 and had thereafter filed a detailed
reply to the SCN on 21.10.2025 along with supporting material,
including invoices, rate lists, remittance records and representative
documents relating to the transactions in question. However, neither
the contents of the reply nor the documents placed on record were
considered by the adjudicating authority. It was submitted that the
impugned order proceeds as though no material had been furnished by
the petitioner and, in substance, merely reproduces the allegations
contained in the SCN without independently dealing with the defence
set up by the petitioner. On this basis, learned counsel submitted that
the adjudication was reduced to an empty formality and the impugned
order stands vitiated on account of predetermination.
11. On merits, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the
valuation adopted by the department and submitted that the entire
demand proceeds on a fundamentally erroneous understanding of
Section 15 of the CGST Act. It was contended that under Section
15(1), the value of supply is the transaction value, i.e. the price
actually paid or payable, where the parties are unrelated and price is
the sole consideration. It is submitted that in the present case, the
petitioner had disclosed the transaction values reflected in its invoices
and returns, and there was no material to reject the same. It was
argued that, in the absence of any finding that the transaction value
could not be determined under Section 15(1), the respondents could
not have resorted to any alternative method of valuation. Learned
counsel further submitted that the reliance placed by the respondents
on Rule 28 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 20176 was
wholly misconceived, since the said provision applies only to supplies
between related or distinct persons, whereas the petitioner's
transactions were with unrelated parties at arm's length. Learned
counsel also questioned the reliance placed on DHL rates as a
benchmark, submitting that DHL was not a comparable entity and that
hereinafter "CGST Rules"
its rate guide could not furnish a lawful basis for re-determination of
the petitioner's taxable value.
12. Learned counsel further submitted that the invocation of
Section 74 of the CGST Act was wholly unwarranted in the facts of
the present case, there being no material to establish fraud, wilful
misstatement or suppression of facts. It was contended that the
dispute, at its highest, pertained to valuation, and could not, in the
absence of any concrete material showing concealment or evasion, be
converted into proceedings under Section 74. Further, it is submitted
that the demand has been raised on assumptions and hypothetical
benchmarking rather than on any identified discrepancy in the
petitioner's invoices, accounts or returns.
Analysis
13. Heard Mr. Sparsh Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner
and perused the documents on record.
14. At the outset, this Court deems it apposite to clarify that it is not
entering into the merits of the controversy, the same lying squarely
within the domain of the statutory appellate authority. Section 107 of
the CGST Act expressly provides an appellate remedy to any person
aggrieved by an order passed by the adjudicating authority, and such
remedy constitutes the ordinary statutory recourse against an order
passed under Section 74 of the CGST Act.
15. In the present case, an efficacious alternative remedy is
admittedly available to the petitioner by way of an appeal under
Section 107 of the CGST Act read with Rule 109A of the CGST
Rules, which has not been availed. It is equally well settled that
notwithstanding the plenary nature of the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the writ court would ordinarily
refrain from entertaining a petition where an efficacious alternate
statutory remedy exists. The recognised exceptions to this are limited,
which stands settled in a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, including Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks,
Mumbai7 and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.8
16. It is evident, upon a careful consideration of the grounds urged
in the present petition, that none of them, in substance, takes the
matter beyond the scope of the statutory appellate remedy. The
grievances raised by the petitioner with regard to the alleged non-
supply of the RUDs, delayed service of the summons dated
10.02.2025, alleged non-service of the subsequent summons dated
04.03.2025, the recording in the proceedings that no documents had
been furnished, the alleged non-consideration of the reply dated
21.10.2025, and the contention that the impugned OIO substantially
reproduces the SCN, are all matters arising from the adjudicatory
record itself. Their determination would necessarily require an
examination of the SCN, the correspondence exchanged between the
parties, the service record, the documents stated to have been
furnished by the petitioner, the reply submitted by it, and the
reasoning contained in the impugned order.
17. These are not issues which, by their very nature, fall outside the
appellate framework. On the contrary, they are matters which have
(1998) 8 SCC 1
(2003) 2 SCC 107
already been considered by the adjudicating authority while passing
the impugned OIO. If, according to the petitioner, such consideration
is erroneous or legally unsustainable, the statute provides a specific
and efficacious remedy by way of an appeal before the competent
appellate authority. Mere dissatisfaction with the manner in which the
adjudicating authority has dealt with the record cannot, by itself,
furnish a ground to bypass the statutory remedy and invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
18. We, therefore, find no cause to interfere with the impugned
OIO and grants liberty to the petitioner to avail of such remedies as
may be available to it in accordance with law.
19. This Court once again makes it clear that it has not examined or
expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and that all rights and
contentions of the parties in that regard are left open.
20. For all the aforesaid reasons, the present writ petition, along
with pending applications is dismissed.
AJAY DIGPAUL
(JUDGE)
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
(JUDGE)
MARCH 16, 2026/ar/yr
