[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Vistra Itcl (India) Limited vs Pranav Ansal & Anr on 13 April, 2026
$~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 13.04.2026
+ OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 116/2019, EX.APPL.(OS) 939/2019
(For Dir), EX.APPL.(OS) 2/2020 (For Dir), EX.APPL.(OS)
1080/2020 (For Dir), EX.APPL.(OS) 1151/2020 (For Dir),
EX.APPL.(OS) 10/2021 (For Permission of travel out of India.),
EX.APPL.(OS) 1108/2021 (For Dir), EX.APPL.(OS)
2853/2022 (For Dir), EX.APPL.(OS) 2854/2022 (For Dir),
EX.APPL.(OS) 1368/2024 (For modification of the order dt.
04.12.2019.) & EX.APPL.(OS) 1116/2025 (For Dir)
VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LIMITED .....Decree Holder
Through: Mr. Sidhant Kumar, Ms.
Anushka Shah & Ms. Ekssha
Kashyap, Advs.
versus
PRANAV ANSAL & ANR. .....Judgement Debtors
Through: Mr. Malak Bhatt, Ms. Neeha
Nagpal, Ms. Sukanya Joshi &
Mr. Saahil Bahety, Advs. for
JD-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
EX.APPL.(OS) 2852/2022 (For Attachment and sale of properties
and issuance of Garnishee)
1. The present Application has been filed on behalf of the Decree
Holder seeking the following reliefs:
"a. Direct attachment and sale of the properties listed in
paragraph 5 and 7 of the present Application;
b. Direct attachment of the debts stated in paragraph 6 of the
Application and consequently direct the proposed Garnishees to
make payment to the Petitioner;
c. Alternatively, direct the Judgment Debtors to deposit the
awarded amount with interest which as on 27.04.2022 is Rs.
385,40,82,657/- (Rupees Three Hundred and Eighty-Five Crores,
Forty Lacs, Eighty-Two Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty-Seven
only), or furnish solvent security by means of Bank Guarantee to
the satisfaction of this Hon'ble Court; and
d. Pass any other order or orders that may be deemed fit and
proper by this Hon'ble Court in the interest of justice."
2. At the outset, Mr. Sidhant Kumar, learned counsel for the
Decree Holder, has handed over across the bar a list of properties
which, according to him, can be proceeded with for the purpose of
grant of the prayers as sought for in the present Application. The said
list of properties is reproduced for ready reference hereinunder:
S. Property details Valuation as in Reference
No. July 2022
1. Shop Space bearing INR 1,02,48,000/- PDF Pg. 1292; 003
number SGF- 10, Pleadings
Palam Triangle,
Gurugram admeasuring Index dated 1 August
79.34 sq. mtrs. and 854 2022 bearing diary
2. Shop bearing number INR 2,12,50,000/- PDG Pg. 1300; 003
UB-05, Ansal Plaza Pleadings
Commercial Complex,
Greater Noida, Uttar Index dated 1 August
Pradesh 2022 bearing diary
3. Commercial Plot FSI INR PDG Pg. 1308; 003
60800, CBD Ansal 68,71,74,000/- Pleadings
Golf City, Lucknow,
Uttar Pradesh Index dated 1 August
2022 bearing diary
4. Flat Bearing number INR 2,00,16,000/- PDG Pg. 1318; 003
UGF-12, along with Pleadings
covered car parking
space No-MB-1, Index dated 1 August
Antriksh Bhawan, 2022 bearing diary
Kasturba Gandhi Marg, number 1288598/2022
New Delhi-110001.
5. Shop bearing number INR PDG Pg. 1326; 003
UB-01, Ansal Plaza 13,79,46,000/- Pleadings
Commercial Complex,
Greater Noida, Uttar Index dated 1 August
Pradesh 2022 bearing diary
3. He, however, further submits that the property bearing Serial
No. 3 in the said list of properties may be kept out of the purview of
the present Application for the time being, as there is an apprehension
of certain issues in relation to the said property.
4. Per contra, Mr. Malak Bhatt, learned counsel for the Judgment
Debtors, vehemently objects to the continuance of the present
proceedings and the grant of the reliefs as sought for in the present
Application. He submits that in the event that this Court were to
proceed with the matter any further, then it will have repercussions
affecting the repayment plan that has been considered by the creditors.
5. In view thereof, he further submits that any order passed in
pursuance of the present Application, in respect to the properties as set
out hereinabove, would result in said properties being removed from
the scheme of the Personal Insolvency Resolution Process1, thereby
affecting the rights of the other creditors who have currently preferred
claims before the Resolution Professional2.
6. He further submits that the same runs contrary to the larger
scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20163 which
provides that the claims of creditors of various categories, including
PIRP
RP
IBC
those arising out of judgments or awards are required to be lodged
before the RP during the resolution process, as the idea behind such
proceedings is to ensure that equanimity is maintained as between the
various sets of creditors. He would submit that permitting the present
Application to proceed would disturb such parity and result in a
situation where the present Decree Holder, in effect, secures a
preferential position over other creditors, which is impermissible in
law.
7. He also submits that the amount awarded in favour of the
Decree Holder has already been accounted for and is reflected in the
proposed repayment plan. It is contended that there exists a likelihood
of inconsistency between the final determination, rendered on the
repayment plan, by the learned National Company Law Tribunal4
under PIRP and any directions that may be passed by this Court for
the present Application.
8. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the Decree Holder submits that
if the argument of the learned counsel for the Judgment Debtors were
to be accepted, then the express provisions of Section 101 of the IBC
would be rendered otiose. Section 101 of IBC is extracted for ready
reference hereinunder:
"101. Moratorium. -(1) When the application is admitted
under section 100, a moratorium shall commence in relation to all
the debts and shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of
one hundred and eighty days beginning with the date of admission
of the application or on the date the Adjudicating Authority passes
an order on the repayment plan under section 114, whichever is
earlier.
(2) During the moratorium period--
NCLT
(a) any pending legal action or proceeding in respect of any debt
shall be deemed to have been stayed;
(b) the creditors shall not initiate any legal action or legal
proceedings in respect of any debt; and
(c) the debtor shall not transfer, alienate, encumber or dispose of
any of his assets or his legal rights or beneficial interest
therein;
(3) Where an order admitting the application under section 96 has
been made in relation to a firm, the moratorium under sub-section
(1) shall operate against all the partners of the firm.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to such
transactions as may be notified by the Central Government in
consultation with any financial sector regulator."
9. In addition, for the sake of coherence and completeness,
Sections 100 and 114 of IBC, as referred to in Section 101, are also
reproduced for ready reference hereinunder:
"100. Admission or rejection of application. - (1) The
Adjudicating Authority shall, within fourteen days from the date of
submission of the report under section 99 pass an order either
admitting or rejecting the application referred to in section
94 or 95, as the case may be.
(2) Where the Adjudicating Authority admits an application under
sub-section (1), it may, on the request of the resolution
professional, issue instructions for the purpose of conducting
negotiations between the debtor and creditors and for arriving at a
repayment plan.
(3) The Adjudicating Authority shall provide a copy of the order
passed under sub-section (1) along with the report of the resolution
professional and the application referred to in section 94 or 95, as
the case may be, to the creditors within seven days from the date of
the said order.
(4) If the application referred to in section 94 or 95, as the case
may be, is rejected by the Adjudicating Authority on the basis of
report submitted by the resolution professional that the application
was made with the intention to defraud his creditors or the
resolution professional, the order under sub-section (1) shall record
that the creditor is entitled to file for a bankruptcy order under
Chapter IV."
"114. Order of Adjudicating Authority on repayment plan. -
(1) The Adjudicating Authority shall by an order approve or reject
the repayment plan on the basis of the report of the meeting of the
creditors submitted by the resolution professional under section
112:
Provided that where a meeting of creditors is not
summoned, the Adjudicating Authority shall pass an order on the
basis of the report prepared by the resolution professional
under section 106.
(2) The order of the Adjudicating Authority approving the
repayment plan may also provide for directions for implementing
the repayment plan.
(3) Where the Adjudicating Authority is of the opinion that the
repayment plan requires modification, it may direct the resolution
professional to re-convene a meeting of the creditors for
reconsidering the repayment plan."
10. In view of the above, learned counsel for the Decree Holder
submits that under Section 101 of the IBC, there is a definite period
provided for the moratorium, i.e., a period of 180 days, and upon the
expiry of said period, the field is open for any creditor or any
award/decree holder to initiate such proceedings as are permissible
under the law for the purpose of recovery of their monies/legitimate
dues.
11. He further submits that if the proceedings were to be rejected, in
variance with the moratorium provisions as provided for under
Section 101 of the IBC, it would effectively lead to a situation where
something that is not permissible under the law is being permitted.
12. In pursuance of the aforesaid, he thus submits that upon
cessation of the moratorium, the present proceedings may be
continued and adjudicated by this Court, as there being no legal
impediment or embargo thereto.
13. He seeks to rely upon the Order dated 07.10.2025 passed by the
learned NCLT, wherein there is a categoric mention of the aspect that
the moratorium has ceased to have effect as per the provisions of the
IBC.
14. He further submits that although, by virtue of the said order, the
learned NCLT granted a further extension of 120 days for the purpose
of finalisation of the repayment plan, it categorically clarified, with
due circumspection, that the moratorium period ceased to exist during
the said extended period.
15. Learned counsel for the Decree Holder further relies upon the
Judgment passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban
Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India5 wherein it is clearly
set out that recovery proceedings are independent of and are separate
from proceedings under the IBC.
16. He refers to and relies upon paragraph 30 of Pioneer Urban
Land and Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) to contend that a debt holder is
not denuded of independent remedies in law, and may, at its election,
either pursue recovery proceedings or lodge its claim before the RP in
accordance with the scheme of the IBC. Paragraph 30 of Pioneer
Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) is reproduced for ready
reference herein under:
"30. As a matter of fact, the Code and RERA operate in completely
different spheres. The Code deals with a proceeding in rem in
which the focus is the rehabilitation of the corporate debtor. This is
to take place by replacing the management of the corporate debtor
by means of a resolution plan which must be accepted by 66% of
the Committee of Creditors, which is now put at the helm of
affairs, in deciding the fate of the corporate debtor. Such resolution
plan then puts the same or another management in the saddle,
subject to the provisions of the Code, so that the corporate debtor
may be pulled out of the woods and may continue as a going
concern, thus benefiting all stakeholders involved. It is only as a
last resort that winding up of the corporate debtor is resorted to, so
that its assets may be liquidated and paid out in the manner
provided by Section 53 of the Code. On the other hand, RERA
protects the interests of the individual investor in real estate
projects by requiring the promoter to strictly adhere to its
(2019) 8 SCC 416
provisions. The object of RERA is to see that real estate projects
come to fruition within the stated period and to see that allottees of
such projects are not left in the lurch and are finally able to realise
their dream of a home, or be paid compensation if such dream is
shattered, or at least get back monies that they had advanced
towards the project with interest. At the same time, recalcitrant
allottees are not to be tolerated, as they must also perform their part
of the bargain, namely, to pay instalments as and when they
become due and payable. Given the different spheres within which
these two enactments operate, different parallel remedies are given
to allottees under RERA to see that their flat/apartment is
constructed and delivered to them in time, barring which
compensation for the same and/or refund of amounts paid together
with interest at the very least comes their way. If, however, the
allottee wants that the corporate debtor‟s management itself be
removed and replaced, so that the corporate debtor can be
rehabilitated, he may prefer a Section 7 application under the Code.
That another parallel remedy is available is recognised by RERA
itself in the proviso to Section 71(1), by which an allottee may
continue with an application already filed before the Consumer
Protection Fora, he being given the choice to withdraw such
complaint and file an application before the adjudicating officer
under RERA read with Section 88. In similar circumstances, this
court in Swaraj Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Kotak Mahindra Bank
Ltd. (2019) 3 SCC 620 has held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal
proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and winding-up proceedings under
the Companies Act, 1956 can carry on in parallel streams (see
paras 21 and 22 therein)."
(emphasis supplied)
17. Learned counsel for the Decree Holder, moreover, submits that
the amount awarded in favour of the Decree Holder stands
incorporated in the draft/proposed repayment plan; however, the
approval of the said plan, in its existing form, remains uncertain.
18. Pursuant thereto, he submits that in the absence of any statutory
prohibition, this Court may proceed to grant the reliefs as sought for in
the present Application, including directing attachment and sale of the
properties enumerated hereinabove in the table.
Analysis & Decision:
19. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and, with
their able assistance, gone through the relevant documents and other
relevant materials.
20. This Court is of the view that the statute must be strictly
construed and interpreted as it stands, and there arises no occasion for
Courts to grant an expansive interpretation to a provision, especially
when nothing is expressly provided in that regard.
21. A perusal of Section 101 of the IBC clarifies that the provision
is categorical in providing that the moratorium shall cease to have
effect upon either the expiry of a period of 180 days from the date of
admission of the application, or on the date on which the learned
Adjudicating Authority passes an order on the repayment plan under
Section 114 of the IBC, „whichever is earlier'.
22. The use of the expression „whichever is earlier‟ clearly evinces
the legislative intent that the cessation of the moratorium may occur
upon either of the two aforementioned contingencies. Consequently,
even in a situation where no order on the repayment plan has been
passed, the moratorium would nevertheless come to an end upon
expiry of the prescribed period, and proceedings may thereafter be
continued in accordance with law.
23. It is noteworthy that, unlike the Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process, wherein Section 14(4) of the IBC expressly
stipulates that the moratorium shall operate from the date of the order
"till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process",
the statutory framework governing the PIRP adopts a materially
distinct approach.
24. Section 101 of the IBC, which specifically deals with
moratorium in the context of PIRP, provides in clear and
unambiguous terms that such moratorium "shall commence in relation
to all the debts and shall cease to have effect at the end of the period
of one hundred and eighty days beginning with the date of admission
of the application or on the date the Adjudicating Authority passes an
order on the repayment plan under Section 114, whichever is earlier."
Notably, the provision does not contemplate any extension or
continuation of the moratorium beyond the contingencies expressly
enumerated therein.
25. In light of the aforesaid statutory scheme, and having regard to
the plain language employed in Section 101 of the IBC, it can be
conclusively crystallised that, in the context of PIRP, which is the
situation that emerged before this Court in the present case, the
moratorium is inherently time-bound and determinable upon the
occurrence of either of the following two events:
(i) upon the expiry of a period of 180 days from the date of
admission of the application; or
(ii) upon the Adjudicating Authority passing an order approving or
otherwise dealing with the repayment plan under Section 114 of
the IBC,
whichever event occurs earlier.
26. Thus, it is evident that the cessation of the moratorium under
PIRP is automatic and self-operative upon the happening of either of
the aforesaid contingencies, leaving no scope for its continuation
beyond the statutorily prescribed limits.
27. The submissions of the learned counsel for the Judgment
Debtors, that this Court ought to stay its hands until approval of the
repayment plan by the learned Adjudicating Authority/ NCLT, is
clearly untenable in view of the express provisions of the statute,
which contemplate two distinct junctures at which the moratorium
ceases to operate, as delineated hereinabove.
28. Since the Adjudicating Authority has, till date, well beyond the
expiry of 180 days from the date of admission of the application under
Section 101 of the IBC, neither approved nor otherwise adjudicated
upon the repayment plan in terms of Section 114, the present case
squarely falls within the first stage contemplated under Section 101 of
the IBC, namely, the stage that arises upon the expiry of 180 days
from the date of admission of the application in the absence of any
decision on the repayment plan.
29. However, the submission advanced by learned counsel for the
Judgment Debtors proceeds on an entirely different footing. In
essence, it is contended that, irrespective of the statutory mandate
under the IBC, the present case ought to be examined by invoking the
second stage contemplated therein, namely, the stage at which the
moratorium ceases upon the passing of an order on the repayment
plan, even if such order is made beyond the prescribed period of 180
days.
30. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the Judgment
Debtors runs contrary to the statutory scheme of the IBC and,
therefore, cannot be accepted.
31. This Court is of the considered view that, as per the legislative
mandate, the statutory embargo operating during the subsistence of the
moratorium under Section 101 of the IBC is temporary in nature and
is intended only to preserve the estate of the debtor during the
pendency of the insolvency resolution process. Once the moratorium
ceases to operate, the bar against institution or continuation of
proceedings stands lifted, thereby restoring to creditors their ordinary
remedies in law.
32. In such circumstances, there is presently no legal impediment to
the continuation of the current proceedings or the passing of orders of
attachment against the personal guarantor.
33. To the mind of this Court, the legislature has duly contemplated
a situation such as the one occurring in the present case, and
consequently, there is no embargo on this Court to refrain from
proceeding with the present Application.
34. In view thereof, as of today, the moratorium has ceased to exist
in accordance with the Order dated 07.10.2025 of the learned NCLT,
as articulated hereinabove, meaning thereby that this Court can
proceed to pass necessary directions in the present Application.
35. Turning to the reliefs, this Court is of the view that, inasmuch as
the proceedings are liable to be continued, the properties set out
hereinabove, except the property bearing Serial No. 3, shall stand
attached.
36. For the purpose of effecting the sale of the properties tabulated
herein above, except property at Serial Number 3, Mr. Kamal
Nijhawan, Senior Advocate [Mobile No. 9810077957] is appointed
as the Court Receiver to ensure that the sale is conducted in
accordance with law within a period of six (06) months.
37. The learned Receiver shall be entitled to a remuneration of
Rs. 10,00,000/- for the purposes assigned hereinabove.
38. Accordingly, the present Application stands disposed of in the
above terms.
O.M.P. (ENF.) (COMM.) 116/2019
39. Accordingly, list on 20.07.2026.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
APRIL 13, 2026/v/va/sg
