Delhi High Court

Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board vs Subhash on 17 November, 2025

                          *      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                                  %                    Judgment Reserved on: 13.11.2025
                                                      Judgment pronounced on:17.11.2025

                          +      W.P.(C) 10399/2018 & CM APPLs. 40510/2018, 595/2025
                                 DELHI URBAN SHELTER IMPROVEMENT BOARD.....Petitioner
                                                 Through:   Mr. Rishi Kant Singh, Mr. Manoj
                                                            Jadly and Mr. Prakhar Raj Thakur,
                                                            Advocates.
                                                 Versus

                                 SUBHASH                                     .....Respondent
                                                 Through:   Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Advocate with
                                                            respondent in person.
                          CORAM:
                          HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
                                                 JUDGMENT

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India seeking setting aside of order dated

24.02.2018 passed by the POLC/Dwarka Court, New Delhi in LIR

no.6722/16, whereby the action of the petitioner/management in

terminating the services of the respondent/claimant was held to be

illegal and so he was awarded a lump sum compensation of

₹5,00,000/- and a sum of ₹20,000/- as litigation expenses to be

paid by the former.

2. Vide Order No. F.24(1867)/05/Lab./1812-1816 dated

05.03.2007, issued by the Secretary (Labour), Government of NCT

of Delhi, a reference was sent to the Labour Court to consider

whether the services of the respondent/workman/claimant had

been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the

petitioner/management and if so, to the sum of money as monetary

relief along with other consequential benefits in terms of existing

law/govt. notification and to other relief he was entitled to.

3. Before the Labour Court, the respondent/claimant/workman

contended that in 1992, he had joined the post of Sewar Beldar in

the Delhi Development Authority (the DDA). The Slum and JJ

wing of the DDA was taken over by the Municipal (the MCD) and

accordingly his service was also transferred to the MCD with

continuity of service and all benefits of the previous service.

Pursuant to the same, the respondent/claimant/workman reported

for work before the MCD Head Quarter, Town Hall, Chandni

Chowk. However, the officials informed him that his service file

had not yet been received by the department and, therefore, he was

not allowed to resume his duties. Thereafter, he approached his

parent department. But the officials concerned told him that they

had already sent his service file to the MCD and that he must

report for duty only before the MCD. Despite several attempts

made from 21.04.1998, he was never permitted to join duty.

4. The petitioner/management contended that the

respondent/claimant/workman had not come to the court with

clean hands and that he had suppressed material facts from the

court. Vide letter dated 14.07.1998 addressed to Director (CSE) of

MCD at Town Hall, the respondent/ workman/claimant made a

request for allowing him to join duty. Thereafter, there was no

information about him, and he never turned up for duty. On

27.02.2004, the Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2003

was brought into force vide notification No. F. 25/(1)/ Sectt.

Lab/03/22 dated 27.02.2004 thereby prescribing a limitation of one

year for raising a dispute in respect of the disputes conceived

under Section 2A of the ID Act. The claim is not maintainable as it

is time barred. The respondent/claimant/workman has not given

the date of his order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or

termination. The allegation that the workman was initially

appointed in 1992 was denied. It was contended that sewer

services of Sector-1, Dwarka were transferred by the Slum & J.J.

Department to the CSE Department of the MCD.

5. On completion of pleadings, the Labour Court framed issues

which reads thus-

"1. As per the terms of reference.

2. Whether the reference as well as claim is time barred and not maintainable on the principles of delay and latches? 0PM"

6. Thereafter, both sides adduced oral and documentary

evidence. The Labour Court on a consideration of the oral and

documentary evidence and after hearing both sides answered

the issues in favour of the respondent/claimant /workman.

Aggrieved, the management has come up in appeal.

7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the

petitioner/management that the Labour Court has found issue

no.2 in favour of the respondent/claimant/workman by holding

that there was no pleading raised in the written statement

regarding delay and hence, the said contention could not be

countenanced. By referring to paragraph 4 of the reply filed by

the petitioner/management before the Labour Court, it was

submitted that the said finding is apparently wrong. It was also

pointed out that the decision relied on by the Labour Court is

not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The learned

counsel drew the attention of this Court to sub-section (4A) to

Section 10 brought into the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the

ID Act) vide Section 2 of the ID (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2003

with effect from 22.08.2023 to substantiate its argument that the

claim was time barred.

8. Per contra, it was submitted by learned counsel for the

respondent/claimant/workman by referring to Annexure P-5,

i.e., letter dated 10.12.1996 that the petitioner/management has

admitted that the respondent/claimant/workman is, infact,

working with them and therefore, the employeer-employee

relationship has been admitted. The petitioner/management has

no case that there was any disciplinary proceedings initiated

against him and therefore, the petitioner/management ought to

have permitted the respondent/claimant/workman to join his

duties, which has not been done for one reason or the other.

There is no infirmity in the impugned order calling for any

interference by this Court, goes the argument.

9. Heard both sides.

10. Going by the case of the respondent/claimant/ workman, he

is out of the job from 21.04.1998. He is seen to have sent a legal

notice to the petitioner/management on 03.02.2004, to which

the petitioner/management is stated to have failed to reply.

Pursuant to the same, the industrial dispute was raised and the

reference is seen made in the year 2007, which has been

answered by the impugned order dated 24.02.2018. Here it

would be apposite to refer to sub-section (4A) to Section 10 of

the ID Act which reads thus:

"(4A) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 9C and in this section, in the case of a dispute falling within the scope of section 2A, the individual workman concerned may, within twelve months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2003, whichever, is later, apply in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1)."

11. As noticed earlier, the specific case of the

respondent/claimant/workman is that he has not been permitted

to join duties from 21.04.1998. However, he sends a notice only

in the year 2006 and raises the industrial disputes in 2007,

which is well beyond the period of limitation contained under

Section (4A) to Section 10 of the ID Act. The finding of the

Labour Court that no contention regarding delay was raised by

the petitioner/management in their reply filed before the Labour

Court is apparently wrong. Paragraph 4 of their reply reads

thus:

"That the petition is highly time barred and not maintainable as per notification No. F.25/(1)/Sectt. Lab./03/22 dated 27.02.2004, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain cases of the workers falling within the scope of Section 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act where an individual worker may within twelve months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment of termination of the date of the commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2003 whichever is later, file his industrial dispute directly. The workman has not given the date of his order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment of termination. In para 5 of claim, workman stated that since 21.04.1998 he is on road with his family which is highly time barred...."

(Emphasis Supplied)

12. There is clear averment to the effect that the claim is time

barred. No reason(s) have been furnished for the inordinate delay

in filing the claim.

13. The Labour Court has relied on the dictum of the Apex Court

in Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-

Processing Services Society Limited, AIR 1999 SC 1351, to hold

that the stand of the petitioner/management that the present claim

and reference are time barred, is untenable. In the said decision,

the Apex Court held that a reference of industrial dispute to the

Labour Court is not subject to limitation under the Article 137 of

the Limitation Act, 1963. The said decision was rendered in the