Delhi High Court
Suresh Sharma vs Ntro Through Its Chairman & Ors. on 18 August, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 18th August, 2017
+ W.P.(C) 3937/2017
+ W.P.(C) 3948/2017
+ W.P.(C) 3950/2017
SURESH SHARMA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.M.K. Bhardwaj, Advocate.
versus
NTRO THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Arun Bhardwaj, CGSC with
Mr.Nikhil Bhardwaj, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI
VIPIN SANGHI, J (ORAL)
1. The aforesaid three writ petitions are directed against a common order
dated 06.03.2017 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in OA
No.3037/2014, 3061/2014 and 3087/2014. The common issue that arose for
consideration before the Tribunal was whether a separate and distinct
sanction/ approval while "initiating" disciplinary proceedings against the
petitioner/applicant - who is a government servant, or the sanction/ approval
of the charge memo/ charge sheet under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA)
Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") was sufficient
W.P.(C) 3937/2017 Page 1 of 36
compliance of the Rules. The Tribunal called for the relevant record, and on
that basis returned the finding that there had been due compliance of the said
rules.
2. The submission of the petitioner-when the writ petitions were filed,
was that the Tribunal had not examined for itself the relevant record to see
whether approval had been granted by the Disciplinary Authority, namely,
the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India at different stages, as contemplated
under Rule 14 of the Rules. Consequently, while issuing notice, the
respondents were directed to make available for perusal of the Court the
relevant files wherein the approval of the Prime Minister was accorded
under the Rules. The file has been produced before us, and we have perused
the same.
3. What emerges from the record is that in respect of the three charge
memos issued to the petitioner, namely, the charge memos dated
22.09.2011, 17.8.2012 and 07.09.2012, the draft charge memos were
approved by the then Prime Minister of India on 20.09.2011, 03.08.2012 and
06.09.2012 respectively.
4. Before we proceed to consider the factual position and the
submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner-on the interpretation of
Rule 14 of the Rules in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Union of India & Ors. vs. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351, it is
appropriate to extract Rule 14(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Rules which
read as follows:-
W.P.(C) 3937/2017 Page 2 of 36
"14. Procedure for imposing major penalties
(1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in
clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an
inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this
rule and rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry
is held under that Act.
(2) Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion
that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a
Government servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint
under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to
inquire into the truth thereof.
["Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual
harassment within the meaning of rule 3 C of the Central Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the complaints Committee
established in each ministry or Department or Office for
inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed to be the
inquiring authority appointed by the Disciplinary Authority for
the purpose of these rules and the Complaints Committee shall
hold, if separate procedure has not been prescribed for the
complaints committee for holding the inquiry into the
complaints of sexual harassments, the inquiry as far as
practicable in accordance with the procedure laid down in
these rules"].
EXPLANATION - 1. Where the Disciplinary Authority
itself holds the inquiry, any reference in sub-rule (7) to sub-rule
(20) and in sub-rule (22) to the inquiring authority shall be
construed as a reference to the Disciplinary Authority.
EXPLANATION - 2. Where the Disciplinary Authority
appoints a retired Government servant as inquiring authority,
any reference in sub-rule (7) to sub-rule (20) and in sub-rule
(22) shall include such authority;
W.P.(C) 3937/2017 Page 3 of 36
(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a
Government servant under this rule and rule 15, the
Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-
(i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge;
(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which
shall contain-
(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any
admission or confession made by the Government
servant;
(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of
witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are
proposed to be sustained.
(4) The Disciplinary Authority shall deliver or cause to be
delivered to the Government servant a copy of the articles of
charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which
each article of charges is proposed to be sustained and shall
require the Government servant to submit, within such time as
may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to
state whether he desires to be heard in person.
(5) (a) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the
Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the
articles of charge as are not admitted, or, if it considers it
necessary so to do, appoint, under sub-rule (2), an inquiring
authority for the purpose, and where all the articles of charge
have been admitted by the Government servant in his written
statement of defence, the Disciplinary Authority shall record
its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it
may think fit and shall act in the manner laid down in rule 15.
(b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the
Government servant, the Disciplinary Authority may itself
W.P.(C) 3937/2017 Page 4 of 36
inquire into the articles of charge, or may, if it considers it
necessary to do so, appoint, under sub-rule (2), an inquiring
authority for the purpose.
(c) Where the Disciplinary Authority itself inquires into any
article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding
an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a
Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the
"Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support
of the articles of charge.
Explanation - For the purposes of this rule, the
expression 'Government servant' includes a person who has
ceased to be in Government service." (emphasis supplied)
5. The submission of Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the Disciplinary Authority should first sanction/grant his
approval on file to the initiation of the disciplinary inquiry. He submits that
Rule 14(2) obliges the Disciplinary Authority to form his opinion that there
are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour against a Government servant. Only after such approval is
granted by the Disciplinary Authority, the question of issuance of charge
memo - to be drawn up by the Disciplinary Authority, or caused to be drawn
up by him under Rule 14(3), would arise. According to him, the drawing up
of the charge memo by, or with the approval of the Disciplinary Authority is
a stage subsequent to grant of approval/ sanction to hold the disciplinary
proceedings. He submits that the file notings and proceedings produced by
the respondent show that there was no initial approval granted by the then
Hon'ble Prime Minister of India-who is the petitioners Disciplinary
Authority, to initiate Disciplinary Proceedings. He submits that the mere
approval of the draft charge memo by the Disciplinary Authority under Rule
W.P.(C) 3937/2017 Page 5 of 36
14(3) would not tantamount to grant of approval, or the taking of a decision
by the Disciplinary Authority to initiate Disciplinary Proceedings.
6. Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj has placed reliance on the decision of B.V.
Gopinath (supra). In B.V. Gopinath (supra), the learned ASG had sought to
explain - on behalf of the Union of India, the entire procedure that is
followed in each and every case before the matter is put up before the
Disciplinary Authority (in that case the Finance Minister) "for seeking
approval for initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. Her submission, as
recorded in the judgment reads as follows:
"According to the learned Additional Solicitor General, the
procedure followed ensures that entire material is placed before the
Finance Minister before a decision is taken to initiate the
departmental proceedings. She submits that approval for initiation of
the departmental proceedings would also amount to approval of the
charge memo. According to the learned Additional Solicitor General,
CAT as well as the High Court had committed a grave error in
quashing the departmental proceedings against the respondents, as
the procedure for taking approval of the disciplinary authority to
initiate penalty proceeding is comprehensive and involved decision
making at every level of the hierarchy".
She also referred to an Office Order No.205 of 2005. This Office
Order had been issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue,
Vigilance Cell (HQ) on 27.10.2016 laying down the revised procedure for
decision making in respect vigilance/ disciplinary cases of Group 'A'
officers under the CBEC and CBDT. She submitted that Office Order
No.205 of 2005 had been misread by the Tribunal and the High Court.
7. Before we proceed to take note of the decision in B.V. Gopinath
W.P.(C) 3937/2017 Page 6 of 36
(supra), we consider it appropriate to quote the said Office Order
No.205/2005 in its entirety. The same reads as follows:
"F.No.50/10/2005-Ad.I
Government of India
Ministry of Finance
Department of Revenue
***
New Delhi, the 19 July, 2005
Office Order No. 205/2005
The insufficient delegation of power in respect of disciplinary
action cases resulting in avoidable stress on time and resources
in the Department has been drawing the attention of the
Department. In order to study the existing practice being
followed and suggest measures to improve the situation, a
Committee comprising CVO of the Department of Revenue and
CVOs of both the Boards, was constituted to make appropriate
recommendations regarding suitable delegation of powers in
this regard.
2. The Committee after studying the procedure followed in
both the Boards submitted its report recommending delegation
of powers in respect of various stages in the processing of
vigilance matters. The recommendations made by the
Committee have been examined in consultation with
Department of Personnel & Training (DOPT). Accordingly,
with the approval of the Competent Authority, the following
procedure for decision making in respect of vigilance/
disciplinary cases of both the Boards (CBEC & CBDT) is laid
down with immediate effect and until further orders:
Sl. Stages in Vigilance/ Levels of decision making
No. Disciplinary cases
1. Complaints- closure (i) CVO can file
without requirement of anonymous/ pseudonymous
reference to CVC complaints as per CVC
instructions dated
29.6.1999
(ii) In case of verifiable
facts in such complaints,
reference be made to CVC
by -
(a) for Chief
Commissioners - Secretary
(Revenue)
(b) up to Commissioners -
CVO
2. Placing an officer Finance Minister
under suspension
3. Review of suspension - Finance Minister
Quarterly/Half Yearly
4. Revocation of Finance Minister
suspension
5. Reference to CVC for (i) for Chief Commissioner
1st Stage advice level officer- Secretary
(Revenue)
(ii) for Commissioner level
officer - Chairman of the
respective Board
(iii) for officer below
Commissioner level-
Member (P) of the
respective Board
6. Reconsideration of (i) for Chief Commissioner
st
CVC's 1 stage advice level officer - Secretary
(Revenue)
(ii) for Commissioner level
officer - Chairman of the
respective Board
(iii) for officer below
Commissioner level-
Member (P) of the
respective Board
7. Approval for referring Finance Minister
the case to DOP&T in
case of disagreement
with CVC's 1st stage
advice
8. Approval for issuing Finance Minister
Charge memo/ sanction
of prosecution [While approaching
Disciplinary Authority for
approval of charge memo,
approval for taking
ancillary action e.g.
appointing of IO/ PO may
also be taken]
9. Decision on Written If simple denial of charges,
Statement of Defence CVO will appoint IO/ PO.
(WSD) regarding
further course of action If denial accompanied by
representation, Chairman
to consider WSD.
If WSD merits dropping/
modification/ amendment of
charges, then file to be put
up to Finance Minister.
10. Appointment of IO/ PO Appointment of IO/ PO
delegated to CVO.
The DOP&T instructions
state that ancillary action
can be initiated by the CVO
after Finance Minister has
approved initiation of DP.
11. Reference to CVC for For minor penalty
2nd stage advice
(i) for Chief Commissioner
level officer - Secretary
(Revenue)
(ii) for Commissioner level
officer - Chairman of
respective Board
(iii) for officer below
Commissioner level-
Member (P) of the
respective Board
For major penalty
Finance Minister
12. Reconsideration of For minor penalty
nd
CVC's 2 stage advice
(i) for Chief Commissioner
level officer - Secretary
(Revenue)
(ii) for Commissioner level
officer - Chairman of
respective Board
(iii) for officer below
Commissioner level-
Member (P) of the
respective Board
For major penalty
Finance Minister
13. Approval for referring Finance Minister
the case to DOP&T in
case of disagreement by
DA or UPSC with
CVC's 2nd stage advice
14. Show-Cause notice in Finance Minister
case of disagreement
with the IO's report
15. Tentative decision after Finance Minister
CVC's 2nd stage advice
on imposition of
penalty subject to
UPSC's concurrence
16. Final decision of Finance Minister
penalty
17. Revision/ Review/ Finance Minister
Memorial (Rule 29/
29A)
(Preeti Pant)
Under Secretary to the Government of India"
8. We may now refer to the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra). The
relevant extract from this decision, which is relied upon by learned counsel
for the petitioner, reads as follows:-
"40. Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India ensures that no
person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all
India service can be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The
overwhelming importance and value of Article 311(1) for the
civil administration as well as the public servant has been
considered stated and restated, by this Court in numerous
judgments since the Constitution came into effect on 19.01.1950
(sic). Article 311(2) ensures that no civil servant is dismissed
or reduced in rank except after an inquiry held in accordance
with the rules of natural justice. To effectuate the guarantee
contained in Article 311(1) and to ensure compliance with the
mandatory requirements of Article 311(2), the Government of
India has promulgated the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein
were initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule
14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an
inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule
15, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be
drawn up the charge-sheet. Rule 14(4) again mandates that
the Disciplinary Authority shall deliver or cause to be
delivered to the government servant, a copy of the articles of
charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or
misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list
of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be
proved. We are unable to interpret this provision as suggested
by the Additional Solicitor General, that once the Disciplinary
Authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary
proceedings, the charge- sheet can be drawn up by an
authority other than the Disciplinary Authority. This would
destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article
311(1) of the Constitution of India. Such procedure would also
do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article
311(2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed,
removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in
which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet
the allegations contained in the charge- sheet. Such a charge-
sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing
authority i.e. Finance Minister."
9. The Supreme Court then considered, clause by clause, the office
Order No.205 dated 19th July, 2005 issued by the Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue bearing No. F. No.50/10/2005 - Ad.I.
10. For our purpose, the observations made by the Supreme Court in B.V.
Gopinath (supra) in relation to clauses (8) an (9) of the said Office Order are
relevant, and they read as under:
"43. Clause (8) of the circular makes it abundantly clear that
it relates to approval for issuing charge memo/sanction of
prosecution. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause shows
that it relates to a decision to be taken by the Disciplinary
Authority as to whether the departmental proceedings are to
be initiated or prosecution is to be sanctioned or both are to
commence simultaneously. The competent authority for
approval of the charge memo is clearly the Finance Minister.
There is no second authority specified in the order. We do not
agree with Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor
General that the use of the word "approval of" is not an
expression distinct from "approval for" initiating major
penalty proceedings.
44. Under Clause (9), the department firstly puts up the file
before the Finance Minister seeking "approval for issuing
charge memo/sanction of prosecution." The department is
seeking an order as to whether the officer is to be proceeded
against departmentally or criminal proceedings are to be
initiated or both proceedings are to be commenced
simultaneously. When the decision is taken by the Finance
Minister that the departmental proceedings are to be held
(initiation), only then the question of approval of charge
memo arises. The department would thereafter complete the
necessary formalities and then place the file before the
Finance Minster, for "approval of" charge memo. This
provision is in harmony with the mandate contained under
Articles 311(1) and (2) that no civil servant shall be dismissed
or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed. The second limb of the same direction is that
punishment on a public servant of dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank can only be imposed when the charges have
been proved against him in a departmental enquiry held in
accordance with the rules of natural justice.
45. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules provides for holding a
departmental enquiry in accordance with the provisions
contained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Clause
(8) also makes it clear that when the Finance Minister is
approached for approval of charge memo, approval for taking
ancillary action such as appointing an inquiry
officer/presiding officer should also be taken. Clause (9) in
fact reinforces the provisions in clause (8) to the effect that it
is the Finance Minster, who is required to approve the charge
memo. Clause (9) relates to a stage after the issuance of
charge-sheet and when the charge-sheeted officer has
submitted the statement of defence. It provides that in case the
charge-sheeted officer simply denies the charges, CVO will
appoint an inquiry officer/presiding officer. In case of denial
accompanied by representation, the Chairman is to consider
the written statement of defence. In case the Chairman comes
to a tentative conclusion that written statement of defence has
pointed out certain issues which may require
modification/amendment of charges then the file has to be put
up to the Finance Minster. So the intention is clearly manifest
that all decisions with regard to the approval of charge memo,
dropping of the charge memo, modification/amendment of
charges have to be taken by the Finance Minister". (emphasis
supplied)
11. The Supreme Court then proceeded to consider the submission
advanced by the Ld. Additional Solicitor General (ASG) that an "in
principle" decision taken by the Finance Minister at the initial stage would
suffice to cover his approval of the charge memo. The Supreme Court
rejected the said submission of the Ld. ASG as follows:
"49. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned
Additional Solicitor General. Initially, when the file comes to
the Finance Minister, it is only to take a decision in principle as
to whether departmental proceedings ought to be initiated
against the officer. Clause (11) deals with reference to CVC for
second stage advice. In case of proposal for major penalties,
the decision is to be taken by the Finance Minister. Similarly,
under Clause (12) reconsideration of CVC's second stage
advice is to be taken by the Finance Minister. All further
proceedings including approval for referring the case to
DoP&T, issuance of show-cause notice in case of disagreement
with the enquiry officer's report; tentative decision after CVC's
second stage advice on imposition of penalty; final decision of
penalty and revision/review/memorial have to be taken by the
Finance Minister.
50. In our opinion, the Central Administrative Tribunal as well
as the High Court has correctly interpreted the provisions of
Office Order No. 205 of 2005. Factually also, a perusal of the
record would show that the file was put up to the Finance
Minister by the Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance)
seeking the approval of the Finance Minister for sanctioning
prosecution against one officer and for initiation of major
penalty proceeding under Rules 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(c) of the
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules against the officers
mentioned in the note which included the respondent herein.
Ultimately, it appears that the charge memo was not put up for
approval by the Finance Minister. Therefore, it would not be
possible to accept the submission of Ms Indira Jaising that the
approval granted by the Finance Minister for initiation of
departmental proceedings would also amount to approval of
the charge memo.
x x x x x x x x x x
52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Additional
Solicitor General is not factually correct. The primary
submission of the respondent was that the charge-sheet not
having been issued by the Disciplinary Authority is without
authority of law and, therefore, non est in the eye of the law.
This plea of the respondent has been accepted by CAT as also
by the High Court. The action has been taken against the
respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS(CCA) Rules which
enjoins the Disciplinary Authority to draw up or cause to be
drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges.
The term "cause to be drawn up" does not mean that the
definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not
have to be approved by the Disciplinary Authority. The term
"cause to be drawn up" merely refers to a delegation by the
Disciplinary Authority to a subordinate authority to perform
the task of drawing up substance of proposed "definite and
distinct articles of charge- sheet". These proposed articles of
charge would only be finalized upon approval by the
Disciplinary Authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in
P.V.Srinivasa Sastry & Ors. Vs. CAG has held that Article
311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must
be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, at the
same time it is pointed out that: (SCC p.422, para 4)
"4......However, it is open to the Union of India or
a State Government to make any rule prescribing
that even the proceeding against any delinquent
officer shall be initiated by an officer not
subordinate to the appointing authority."
It is further held that: (SCC p.422, para 4)
"4. Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with
Article 311 of the Constitution because it will
amount to providing an additional safeguard or
protection to the holders of a civil post."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The submission of Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, on the basis of the aforesaid
decision, is that distinct approvals are required to be granted by the
Disciplinary Authority at different stages, and the grant of the approval to
the charge memo cannot be considered as deemed approval to the
"initiation" of Disciplinary Proceedings under Rule 14(2). According to the
petitioner, an express approval has to be granted by the Disciplinary
Authority for "initiation" of the Disciplinary Proceeding, meaning thereby,
the DA has to record his opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the
truth of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour. Only thereafter, he may
draw up, or cause to be drawn up, a charge memo under Sub-Rule(3).
13. On the other hand, the submission of Mr.Arun Bhardwaj, learned
Central Government Standing Counsel is that the reliance placed on B.V.
Gopinath (supra) is misplaced. He submits that in the facts of B.V.
Gopinath (supra), the draft charge memo had not been drawn up, or caused
to be drawn up by the Disciplinary Authority, which is specifically
mandated by Rule 14(3). The submission of the Government in that case
was that a general sanction/approval accorded by the Disciplinary Authority
to initiate departmental proceedings against an employee would suffice to
meet the requirements of Rule 14(3). That submission was rejected by the
Supreme Court. He submits that the converse is, however, not true,
inasmuch, as, there is no requirement in Rule 14 that, first, there should be
an approval /sanction granted by the Disciplinary Authority to "initiate" the
Disciplinary Proceedings and, thereafter, to approve the charge memo which
may be drawn by him, or may be caused by him to be drawn up. He submits
that the approval of the draft charge memo by the Disciplinary Authority
entails, within itself, his decision to initiate the Disciplinary Proceedings
against the delinquent employee and the same is sufficient.
14. Mr. Bhardwaj submits that in Union of India & Others Vs. K.V.
Jankiraman & Others, (1991) 4 SCC 109, the Supreme Court has held that
it is only when the charge memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge-
sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to an employee, that it can be said
that the departmental proceeding/ criminal prosecution is initiated against
the employee. Departmental proceedings do not get initiated unless the
charge memo/ charge sheet are issued to the delinquent employee. There is
no statutory requirement that the sanction/ approval of the Disciplinary
Authority should be obtained on the file, even before the drawing up of the
charge memo. Mr. Bhardwaj submits that the aforesaid requirement is not
borne out from a reading of the Rules, and in particular Rule 14 thereof.
Mr.Bhardwaj submits that the purport of the decision of the Supreme Court
in B.V. Gopinath (supra) is to ensure that the delinquent employee is not
subjected to a mala fide or prejudicial departmental proceedings, without
due application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority to the charge
memorandum/ charge sheet. He submits that since the Disciplinary
Authority has approved the draft charge memos in all the three cases
initiated against the petitioner after considering the detailed note on the file,
the requirement of Rule 14 is completely met.
15. Mr. Bhardwaj points out that the only issue that arose for
consideration in B.V. Gopinath (supra) was the one taken note of in the
opening paragraph of the said judgment. The Supreme Court noted the
central issue arising in the appeals before it in the following words:
"The central issue that arises for consideration in these appeals
is: whether the charge-sheet issued against the respondents is
without jurisdiction, in view of the fact that the Disciplinary
Authority i.e. the Finance Minister, had not given approval
for issuing the charge memo, even though he had given
approval for initiation of major penalty proceedings against
the respondents." (emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, the Supreme Court was concerned with the statutory obligation
cast on the Disciplinary Authority under Rule 14(3) of the Rules, and
nothing more. He further submits that in paragraph 55 of the said judgment,
the Supreme Court specifically observed that it has not opined on other
collateral issues which were raised by the counsels. In paragraph 55, the
Supreme Court observed as follows:
"55. Although number of collateral issues had been raised by
the learned counsel for the appellants as well the respondents,
we deem it appropriate not to opine on the same in view of the
conclusion that the charge-sheet/charge memo having not been
approved by the Disciplinary Authority was non est in the eye
of law."
17. Mr. Bhardwaj submits that the issue whether an approval/ sanction
has to be accorded by the Disciplinary Authority even prior to the approval
of the charge memo was not the issue raised, or considered in B.V.
Gopinath (supra), and the petitioner cannot seek to rely upon B.V. Gopinath
(supra) to advance the said submission. He submits that B.V. Gopinath
(supra) is not even attracted in the facts of the present case since, on facts,
the draft charge memos were approved by the Disciplinary Authority,
namely, the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India before their issuance to the
petitioner in these cases.
18. We have considered the rival submissions raised by the parties and
perused the record. We have also examined Rule 14 of the Rules and the
decision of the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra).
19. The present petitions raise a short and purely legal issue. The sole
question which needs to be decided is, whether the Disciplinary Authority is
obliged to initially grant his approval/ sanction to the "initiation" of the
disciplinary proceedings by recording his opinion that, there are grounds for
inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour
against the government servant, and thereafter once again to the charge
memo/ charge sheet under Rule 14(3), or, the sanction/ approval granted to
the charge memo/ charge sheet i.e. the substance of imputation of
misconduct or misbehaviour as definite and distinct articles of charge;
statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each
article of charge - in terms of Rule 14(3) of the Rules, would be sufficient
compliance of the Rules.
20. The other related issue which arises for consideration is whether
under the scheme of Rule 14 of the Rules, and in view of the decision in
K.V. Jankiraman (supra), the approval/ sanction accorded by the
Disciplinary Authority to the charge memo under Rule 14(3) itself
tantamounts to grant of approval/ sanction for initiation of disciplinary
proceedings and, therefore, there is no need for the Disciplinary Authority to
separately record his approval/ sanction for initiation of disciplinary
proceedings at an earlier stage.
21. We may now proceed to consider the procedural scheme contained in
Rule 14 of the Rules. Sub-Rule (1) grants protection to the Government
servant that he shall not be penalised with any of the penalties specified in
Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11, except after holding an inquiry under Rule 14
and Rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants Inquiries Act,
1850, where such inquiry is held under that Act. Thus, Rule 14(1) seeks to
codify the protection accorded to a Government servant under Article 311(2)
of the Constitution of India.
22. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 14, in substance, merely states that "whenever"
an inquiry is considered essential in the opinion of the Disciplinary
Authority to be held, the same may be held either by the Disciplinary
Authority himself, or by an Inquiry Officer appointed by him. The object of
such an inquiry is to inquire into the truth of imputations of misconduct and
misbehaviour. As would appear from our further analysis, the procedural
sequence which the Disciplinary Authority is obliged to follow, to reach the
stage of forming the opinion under Sub-rule (2), is prescribed in Sub-rules
(3) to (5) of Rule 14.
23. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 14 opens with the words "where it is proposed
to hold an inquiry against a Government servant ... ... ... ". (emphasis
supplied). Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14, therefore, deals with the manner in
which the Disciplinary Authority shall proceed when there is a "proposal"
to hold an inquiry against a government servant. The expression "proposal"
is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as "An action of stating
or propounding something"; "a course of action etc. proposed; a scheme, a
plan, a motion; a suggestion, an idea". Till the time the Disciplinary
Authority acts in accordance with sub rule (3) of Rule 14, there is no
disciplinary proceeding against the government servant, since it would be in
the realm of a "proposal" i.e. a suggestion, and nothing more. The
disciplinary proceedings would get initiated against the government servant
only when the proposal therefor is put into action by issuance of a charge
memo/ charge sheet under Rule 14(3).
24. In K.V. Jankiraman (supra), the Supreme Court, inter alia, considered
the issue "What is the date from which it can be said that disciplinary/
criminal proceedings are pending against an employee?". The said issue
was considered in the context of the adoption of the "sealed cover"
procedure by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) for
consideration of the case of an employee against whom departmental/
criminal proceedings are contemplated, or pending. The Supreme Court in
para 16 of the decision, inter alia, observed as follows:
"16. On the first question, viz., as to when for the purposes of
the sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal
proceedings can be said to have commenced, the Full Bench of
the Tribunal has held that it is only when a charge-memo in a
disciplinary proceedings or a charge-sheet in a criminal
prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that
the departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated
against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be
resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued.
The pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage
will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the
sealed cover procedure. We are in agreement with the
Tribunal on this point. The contention advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant-authorities that when there
are serious allegations and it takes time to collect necessary
evidence to prepare and issue charge-memo/charge-sheet, it
would not be in the interest of the purity of administration to
reward the employee with a promotion, increment etc. does
not impress us. The acceptance of this contention would result
in injustice to the employees in many cases. As has been the
experience so far, the preliminary investigations take an
inordinately long time and particularly when they are initiated
at the instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending
deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of any
charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are serious and
the authorities are keen in investigating them, ordinarily it
should not take much time to collect the relevant evidence and
finalise the charges. What is further, if the charges are that
serious, the authorities have the power to suspend the
employee under the relevant rules, and the suspension by
itself permits a resort to the sealed cover procedure. The
authorities thus are not without a remedy. ... ... ..." (emphasis
supplied)
25. Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 14 would then kick in, which obliges the
Disciplinary Authority to deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government
servant the charge memo, as aforesaid, and to require the Government
servant to submit - within the specified time, a written statement of his
defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.
26. The future course of action to be adopted in the matter would depend
on the nature of written statement that the Government servant may give in
response to the charge memo. The procedure in this regard is laid down by
sub rule (5) of Rule 14. In case the articles of charge are admitted by the
Government servant, the Disciplinary Authority shall record his findings on
each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit, and shall act in the
manner laid down in Rule 15. Thus, where the charges are admitted by the
government servant, the Disciplinary Authority shall not launch an inquiry
by resort to sub rule (2) of Rule 14, since there would be no question of
"inquiring into the truth of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour
against" the Government servant, as the truth thereof would have been
established by the admission made by the concerned government servant.
The Disciplinary Authority shall, however, take such evidence as it may
think fit and shall proceed to record his findings on each of the charges.
27. However, where the government servant concerned has not admitted
any of the articles of charge, or where no written statement of defence is
submitted by the government servant, under sub rules (5)(a) and (5)(b), the
Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges which are
not admitted - or in respect whereof no written statement or defence is
submitted, or appoint an inquiring authority under sub rule (2).
28. Thus, it is evident that the arrangement of the Sub-Rules in Rule 14 is
not reflective of the sequence in which the Sub-Rules of Rule 14 would be
attracted and applied. The sequence in which the said Sub-Rules would
actually play out would be that, where it is proposed to hold an inquiry
against the Government servant under either Rule 14 or Rule 15:
(a) The Disciplinary Authority shall first draw up, or cause to be
drawn up, the charge memo containing the substance of the
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour contained in definite and
distinct articles of charge; a statement of imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour in support of each article of charge containing: (i) a
statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession
made by the Government servant; (ii) a list of documents by which,
and; (iii) a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are
proposed to be sustained under Rule 14(3) of the Rules;
(b) Thereafter, the same shall be served upon the government
servant concerned in compliance with sub rule (4) requiring the
government servant to submit within the specified time his written
statement of defence and also stating whether he desires to be heard in
person;
(c) Depending upon the response of the government servant, if any,
received to the articles of charge, the future course of action to be
adopted by the Disciplinary Authority shall be determined as
prescribed under sub rule (5)(a) & (5)(b) read with sub rule (2) of
Rule 14.
A perusal of para 41 of B.V. Gopinath (supra) would also show that
the Supreme Court while discussing Rule 14 of the Rules, begins the
discussion with sub rule (3) of Rule 14 and thereafter proceeds to refer to
sub rule (4) of Rule 14. This fortifies our analysis of Rule 14, as above.
29. Thus, on a plain reading of Rule 14, it is evident that sub rule (2) of
Rule 14 does not imply that the Disciplinary Authority should first grant his
approval/ sanction on the record to "initiate" disciplinary proceedings
against the government servant. In fact, under the Rules, there is no such
requirement prescribed - obliging the Disciplinary Authority to first
sanction/ approve the "initiation" of the disciplinary proceedings, and
thereafter to again approve the charge memo/ charge sheet in terms of sub
rule (3) of Rule 14. Sub rule (2) of Rule 14, in fact, would get invoked only
after the procedure under sub rules (3) and (4) have been exhausted, and at
the stage when the procedure under sub rule (5) is being implemented by the
Disciplinary Authority.
30. When the Disciplinary Authority, after consideration of all the
relevant material, approves the charge memo, it is implicit therein that the
Disciplinary Authority has also approved the "initiation" of Disciplinary
Proceedings against the government servant. It is obvious that the
Disciplinary Authority would grant approval to the charge memo/charge-
sheet, only if he has formed the opinion that there are grounds available for
initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings against the government servant. The
general and initial approval - that the petitioner talks about on a plainly
erroneous reading of sub rule (2) of Rule 14, even if granted, would be a non
specific approval - with no clarity on the specific articles of charge that
may, or may not, eventually be framed. This is not mandated by the Rules.
On the other hand, the approval of the charge memo/ charge sheet under sub
rule (3) of Rule 14 is in respect of definite and distinct articles of charge
which are drawn up against the government servant on the basis of the
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour. The Disciplinary Authority is
obliged to draw up, or cause to be drawn up, with his approval, the
substance of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and
distinct articles of charge; the statement of the imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour in support of each articles of charge which shall contain a
statement of the relevant facts including any admission/ confession made by
the government servant, and; a list of documents by which, and a list of
witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.
31. Thus, in our view, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to
give its separate/ distinct and initial approval for "initiation" of disciplinary
proceedings. Once the Disciplinary Authority grants its approval to the
charge memo/ charge sheet after perusing the entire material, it would be
sufficient compliance of the Rules, and the same would completely
safeguard the interests of the government servant concerned.
32. Till the time a charge memo/ charge sheet is issued to the government
servant under Rule 14(3) i.e. with the approval of the Disciplinary
Authority, the preliminary exercise - to gather evidence or process the case,
that may be undertaken by the government, by itself, does not prejudice the
government servant. No government servant can raise a grievance that such
a preliminary exercise should not be taken either at the behest of the
Disciplinary Authority, or at the behest of any other authority without the
express approval of the Disciplinary Authority. In our view, it may amount
to putting the cart before the horse, to require the Disciplinary Authority to
grant his sanction/ approval to a generalised and initial decision to "initiate"
disciplinary proceedings against the Government servant. It is only when a
proposal to hold an inquiry against a government servant is prepared on the
basis of the materials and evidences that may be gathered during the
preliminary inquiry (which is an exercise undertaken to gather facts and to
determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental inquiry is
made out - See Constable Rajendra Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi &
Ors, 2009 (111) DRJ 320 (FB)), that the Disciplinary Authority would be
called upon to apply his mind to the specific, definite and distinct articles of
charge to accord his approval.
33. In the facts of B.V. Gopinath (supra), it appears that there was a
general and initial approval taken from the Disciplinary Authority to
"initiate" an inquiry against the government servant. On that basis, without
approval of the Disciplinary Authority, the charge memo/ charge sheet was
issued containing the substance of the imputations of misconduct and
misbehaviour formulated into definite and distinct articles of charge along
with the documents referred to in sub rule (3) (ii) of the Rules. It is this
procedure adopted by the government in B.V. Gopinath (supra), which was
disapproved of by the Supreme Court. The initial and general approval
granted for "initiation" of disciplinary proceedings, even if obtained in a
given case - which is not a statutory requirement, cannot be construed as an
approval to the issuance of charge memo/ charge sheet under Rule 14(3).
34. Thus, the reliance placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of B.V. Gopinath (supra) is completely misplaced as, in the said case,
the Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where there was an initial
and general approval granted by the Disciplinary Authority for initiation of
Disciplinary Proceedings, but there was no approval to the charge memo/
charge sheet by the Disciplinary Authority. It was in this backdrop that the
Supreme Court held that a charge memo - which is not approved by the
Disciplinary Authority, was non-est in the eyes of law.
35. A perusal of the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra) would show that
the Supreme Court considered the submissions advanced before it in the
light of Office Order No.205/2005 which has been reproduced herein above
by us. The said Office Order, firstly, has to be read and understood in the
context of the Rules and, in particular, Rule 14 thereof. The said Office
Order was issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, and it
was relevant in the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra), since he was serving in
the Ministry of Finance and his Disciplinary Authority was the Finance
Minister. In the present case, that is not the position. As noticed herein
above, the petitioner is serving in the NTRO and the Prime Minister of India
is his Disciplinary Authority.
36. We have extracted, inter alia, para 43 and 44 of the decision in B.V.
Gopinath (supra). In the report as published in Supreme Court Cases, in the
opening line of para 44, the words as printed are "Under clause (9), the
department firstly puts up the file before the Finance Minister seeking
"approval for issuing charge memo/ sanction of prosecution" ". However,
on the reading of clauses (8) and (9) of the office order, it appears to us that
there is a typographical error, and it appears that the Supreme Court actually
referred to clause (8) in the first line of para 44, since it relates to "approval
for issuing charge memo/ sanction of prosecution", which is the subject
matter covered by clause (8), and not clause (9) of the said office order. The
aforesaid position becomes even more clear on a reading of para 45 of the
decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra) , wherein the Supreme Court discussed
the scope covered by clause (9). In that regard, the Supreme Court has
observed:
"45. ... ... Clause (9) relates to a stage after the issuance of
charge-sheet and when the charge-sheeted officer has
submitted the statement of defence. It provides that in case the
charge-sheeted officer simply denies the charges, CVO will
appoint an inquiry officer/presiding officer. In case of denial
accompanied by representation, the Chairman is to consider
the written statement of defence. In case the Chairman comes to
a tentative conclusion that written statement of defence has
pointed out certain issues which may require modification/
amendment of charges then the file has to be put up to the
Finance Minster. So the intention is clearly manifest that all
decisions with regard to the approval of charge memo,
dropping of the charge memo, modification/amendment of
charges have to be taken by the Finance Minister".
37. We find support for our view on the interpretation of Rule 14 from the
observations made by the Supreme Court, particularly in para 43 and 44 of
the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra). Para 43 begins with the words:
"43. Clause (8) of the circular makes it abundantly clear that
it relates to approval for issuing charge memo/sanction of
prosecution. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause shows that
it relates to a decision to be taken by the Disciplinary Authority
as to whether the departmental proceedings are to be initiated
or prosecution is to be sanctioned or both are to commence
simultaneously. The competent authority for approval of the
charge memo is clearly the Finance Minister. There is no
second authority specified in the order... ...".
38. The petitioner seeks to rely on the observation of the Supreme Court,
made in para 44, which reads as follows:
"44. ... ... ... When the decision is taken by the Finance
Minister that the departmental proceedings are to be held
(initiation), only then the question of approval of charge
memo arises. The department would thereafter complete the
necessary formalities and then place the file before the Finance
Minster, for "approval of" charge memo... ... ..." (emphasis
supplied)
39. Reliance is also placed by the petitioner on the observations made in
para 49, which read as follows:
"49. ... ... ... Initially, when the file comes to the Finance
Minister, it is only to take a decision in principle as to whether
departmental proceedings ought to be initiated against the
officer... ... ..."
40. In our view, reliance placed by the petitioner on the above extracts
from B.V. Gopinath (supra) has no force. The Supreme Court was not
examining the issue whether - as a matter of law, the "initial" sanction/
approval of the Disciplinary Authority is required to be obtained - failing
which the Disciplinary proceedings would be vitiated. The Supreme Court
was dealing with a fact situation where - as a matter of fact, such general/
initial sanction/ approval for "initiation" had been obtained. The
observations made by the Supreme Court, thus, have to be viewed in that
light, and in the light of the submissions advanced before it - particularly by
the learned ASG. The above observations were made in response to those
submissions, which we have taken note of herein above.
41. It is well settled that a decision is only an authority for what it actually
decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every
observation found therein, nor what logically follows from the various
observations made in it. This was so held by the Supreme Court in State of
Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, by placing reliance
on the English decision in Quinn v. Leathem, (1900-03), All ER 1 (HL).
The House of Lords in Quinn v. Leathem (supra) held as follows:
"'Before discussing Allen v. Flood [1898 AC 1 : (1895-99) All
ER Rep 52 (HL)] and what was decided therein, there are two
observations of a general character which I wish to make; and
one is to repeat what I have very often said before--that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts
proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there are not intended to be
expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified
by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions
are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority
for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be
quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically
from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is
necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must
acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.' "
(emphasis supplied)
42. The same position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ambica
Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 213, wherein the Supreme
Court observed:
"18. ... The ratio of any decision must be understood in the
background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time
ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides,
and not what logically follows from it."
43. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2
SCC 111, the Supreme Court observed:
"59. ... It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or
additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential
value of a decision."
44. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8
SCC 579, the Supreme Court held that a decision cannot be relied on,
without disclosing the factual situation. The Supreme Court held:
"9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is
placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as
Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too
taken out of their context. These observations must be read in
the context in which they appear to have been stated.
Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To
interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions
but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co.
Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at
p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D)
'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by
treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though
they were part of an Act of Parliament and
applying the rules of interpretation appropriate
thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight
to be given to the language actually used by that
most distinguished judge,...'
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004 :
(1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] (All ER p.
297g-h) Lord Reid said, 'Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be
treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require
qualification in new circumstances.' Megarry, J. in Shepherd
Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062 : (1971) 2
All ER 1267] , observed: (All ER p. 1274d)
'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved
judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act
of Parliament;'
And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972 AC 877 :
(1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 [HL (E)]] Lord
Morris said: (All ER p. 761c)
'There is always peril in treating the words of a
speech or a judgment as though they were words
in a legislative enactment, and it is to be
remembered that judicial utterances are made in
the setting of the facts of a particular case.'
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact
may make a world of difference between conclusions in two
cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a
decision is not proper.
12. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of
applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul
Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962 SC 680], AIR p. 688, para 19)
'19. ... Each case depends on its own facts and a
close similarity between one case and another is
not enough because even a single significant detail
may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases,
one should avoid the temptation to decide cases
(as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of
one case against the colour of another. To decide
therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the
broad resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive.'
***
'Precedent should be followed only so far as it
marks the path of justice, but you must cut the
dead wood and trim off the side branches else you
will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My
plea is to keep the path of justice clear of
obstructions which could impede it.' " (emphasis
supplied)
45. The aforesaid legal position has been set out by the Supreme Court in
U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey & Ors., (2007) 11
SCC 92.
46. The decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra), thus, cannot be considered as
an authority for the proposition that the Disciplinary Authority is first
obliged to accord his general approval/ sanction for initiation of disciplinary
proceedings. That was not the issue that arose for consideration before the
Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra), as noticed herein above.
47. We, therefore, find no merit in the submission of the counsel for the
petitioner that distinct approvals from the Disciplinary Authority are
required, firstly, to the "initiation" of the departmental proceedings in a
general form and, secondly, to the issuance of the charge memo/ charge
sheet. In our view, there is no such requirement of a general "initial
approval/ sanction" by the Disciplinary Authority on the file. From K.V.
Jankiraman (supra), and on a reading of Rule 14, it is clear that the
disciplinary proceedings get initiated only upon issuance of the charge
memo/ charge sheet, and not before that. Though this decision was rendered
in the context of adoption of the sealed cover procedure, we are of the view
that the same holds true even generally, as is evident from a reading of Rule
14. In the present case, as noticed herein above, in respect of all the three
charge sheets, the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India granted his approval in
compliance of Rule 14(3). Thus, there is sufficient compliance of the Rules
by the respondent.
48. We also find merit in the submissions of the counsel for the
respondents, and as noticed by the Tribunal, that the petitioner is trying to
indulge in dilatory tactics to somehow delay the Disciplinary Proceedings
against him. We are informed by the learned counsel for the respondents that
the enquiry proceedings in respect of all the three charge memos stand
completed and the matter is pending at the stage of seeking advice of UPSC
on the enquiry report. The respondents may, accordingly, proceed in the
matter is accordance with law.
49. In the above backdrop, we find absolutely no infirmity in the order
passed by the Tribunal. The present petitions are devoid of merit and
dismissed with no orders as to costs.
VIPIN SANGHI, J
REKHA PALLI, J
AUGUST 18, 2017
GM/ B.S. Rohella
