Soshil Kumar Jain And Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors.
2015 Latest Caselaw 5524 Del

$~39

        THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                                      Judgment delivered on: 03.08.2015

+       W.P.(C) 3447/2015 & CM 6158/2015


SOSHIL KUMAR JAIN AND ANR.                                    ... Petitioners


                                        versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.                                       ... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners                    : Ms Rachna Agrawal with Mr Vinod Thakur
For the Respondent L&B/LAC             : Mr Siddharth Panda
For the Respondent DDA                 : Mr Dhanesh Relan with Mr Arush Bhandari


CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

                             JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

1. The counter affidavit handed over by Mr Panda on behalf of

respondent Nos. 4 and 5 is taken on record. The learned counsel for the

petitioners does not wish to file any rejoinder affidavit inasmuch as all the

necessary averments are contained in the writ petition.

2. By way of this writ petition the petitioners seek the benefit of

Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in

Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter

referred to as the "2013 Act") which came into effect on 01.01.2014. The

petitioners, consequently, seek a declaration that the acquisition

proceeding initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter

referred to as the "1894 Act") and in respect of which Award No.

10/1987-88 dated 14.05.1987 was made, inter alia, in respect of the

petitioners' land, comprised in Khasra Nos. 402 min (4-05), 399 min (4-

0) and 409 min (3-15) measuring 12 bighas in all, in village Shaoorpur,

New Delhi, shall be deemed to have lapsed.

3. In this case, it has been admitted by the concerned Land

Acquisition Collector that physical possession of the subject land has not

been taken. It is, however, contended that the compensation was

deposited in Court in CM(Main) No.1407/2013 on 30.12.2013 pursuant

to an order passed by this Court in the said matter. Insofar as the

question of deposit is concerned, the same has already been considred by

us in Gyanender Singh & Ors v. UOI & Ors.- W.P.(C) 1393/2014

decided on 23.09.2014 wherein this court held that unless and until the

compensation is tendered to the persons interested, mere depositing of the

compensation in the court would not be sufficient and cannot be regarded

as having been paid. Therefore, following the decision in Gyanender

Singh (supra) the deposit in court, in this case cannot be regarded as

compensation having been paid to the petitioners.

4. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the

second proviso to Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, which has been introduced

by virtue of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment)

Ordinance, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Ordinance"). The

newly added proviso reads as under:-

"Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the award of a tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded."

(underlining added)

5. On a plain reading of the proviso, it is evident that its purpose is to

compute the period of five years referred to in Section24(2) of the 2013

Act. Certain periods are to be excluded in computing the said period

referred to in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The periods to be excluded

are:

(1) the period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court; or (2) the period specified in the Award of a Tribunal for taking possession; or (3) such period where possession has been taken but the compensation is lying deposited in any designated account or in any account maintained for this purpose.

6. The learned counsel for the respondents are relying on the third

alternative inasmuch as it has been contended that the amount for

compensation has been deposited in court. According to the learned

counsel for the respondents, this amounts to compensation lying

deposited in a court. Consequently, it is urged that the entire period

during which this amount was lying so deposited ought to be excluded.

But one fact is lost sight of that even if this provision were to apply, the

respondents would get benefit of only one day which would not be

sufficient to disentitle the petitioner.

7. That being the position, the question of payment of compensation

will have to be construed in the light of the various decisions rendered by

the Supreme Court and this Court in:-

(i) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors: (2014) 3 SCC 183;

(ii) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564;

(iii) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014; and

(iv) Surender Singh v. Union of India and Ors.: W.P.(C) 2294/2014 decided 12.09.2014 by this Court.

In Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) it has been held that unless and

until the compensation was tendered to the persons interested, mere

deposit of the compensation amount in a court would not amount to

payment of compensation. This aspect has also been considered in

Gyanender Singh & Others v. Union Of India & Others: WP (C)

1393/2014 decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 23.09.2014.

8. As such, in the present case, neither physical possession of the

subject land has been taken nor has any compensation been paid to the

petitioners. The Award was made more than five years prior to the

coming into force of the 2013 Act. No period is liable to be excluded

inasmuch as the second proviso, which has been newly inserted by virtue

of the said Ordinance, is not applicable, as the said proviso is only

prospective in operation and does not take away any rights which vested

on the petitioner on 01.01.2014 when the 2013 Act came into force. In

any event, in this case, even if the proviso were to apply the same would

give a benefit to the respondents of one day which does not disentitle the

petitioners.

9. As a result, the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the said

acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act in respect of the

subject lands are deemed to have lapsed. It is so declared.

10. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be

no order as to costs.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J

AUGUST 03, 2015 kb