Inderjeet Singh & Ors. vs State
2014 Latest Caselaw 2351 Del

*       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                     Date of Decision: 9th May, 2014

+                      CRL.A.544/1998

        INDERJEET SINGH & Ors.                            ..... Appellant
                      Through:             Mr. Sheikh Israr Ahmad and
                                           Mr. Aman Khan, Advocates

                            versus

        STATE                                             ..... Respondent
                            Through:       Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP for the
                                           State with Mr. Rakesh Sharma,
                                           Advocate
%

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA

                            JUDGMENT

: SUNITA GUPTA, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment and order on

sentence dated 28th November, 1998 and 30th November, 1998

respectively passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, New

Delhi in Sessions Case Nos.42/91 and 48/91 arising out of FIR

No.225/90, PS Kotla Mubarakpur whereby the appellants were

convicted u/s 302 IPC r/w Section 34 IPC and accused Inderjeet Singh

was also held guilty and convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act

and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of

Rs.5000/- each, in default of payment, further to undergo SI for 3

months. Accused Inderjeet Singh @ Inder was also sentenced to RI

for one year under Section 27 of Arms Act and this sentence was to

run concurrently with the sentence already awarded to him u/s 302

IPC.

2. The prosecution case in brief, as made out from the police

report sent under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is that on 3.8.1990 on receipt of

DD No. 18-A, SI Joginder Singh along with SI Gian Singh, Constable

Jai Singh and Constable Narender Pal reached at Sukhdev Market

near street which goes to Qumayun Restaurant, where in a street near

H.No. H-801 a crowd was gathered and they came to know that

injured had been removed to AIIMS in a PCR vehicle. Leaving

Constable Narender Pal at the spot, SI Joginder Singh along with

other police officials reached at AIIMS, where he came to know that

injured Devinder Singh @ Ladi was declared as "brought dead".

Parminder Singh and Amar Singh, brother of the deceased were found

present in the hospital. Parminder Singh gave his statement to SI

Joginder Singh to the effect that he has six brothers and his three

brothers, namely, Harinder Singh, Ravinder Singh and Rajinder Singh

reside with his mother Smt. Prakash Wati at H.No.826/5 Arjun Nagar.

His eldest brother Amar Singh resides at H.No.15/88, Geeta Colony

along with his family and he along with his family resides at 53/F D12

Area, Sector 4, Bangla Sahib Marg, New Delhi. His sister Saroj

resides at 98-A Baba Kharak Singh Marg along with her family.

About three years ago, one Gujjar namely Khazan Singh had been

murdered and his brother Devinder Singh @ Ladi has been arrested

for his murder and a case was pending against Devinder Singh in the

Court. Devinder Singh was released on interim bail from the Court

and he used to reside with his sister Saroj. On 3.8.1990 Devinder

Singh came to his house at 826/5, Arjun Nagar to meet his family and

his brother Amar Singh also reached there and they had their meal

together. At about 10:00 PM, he along with his brothers Devinder

Singh and Amar Singh left the house for going to their respective

houses and they were going on foot towards Taxi Stand, Sukhdev

Market. He and Amar Singh were little ahead of Devinder Singh. At

about 10:10 PM, when they reached near the corner of Sukhdev

Market, Devinder Singh raised an alarm "Bachao-Bachao" and when

they turned back, they saw that Amar Singh, S/o Likhi Chand and

Shiv Charan, S/o Pooran Chand were giving hockey blows to

Devinder Singh and Inder, S/o Khazan Singh was giving knife blow to

Devinder Singh. His brother Devinder Singh fell on the ground and

Inder gave him many knife blows. When they tried to rescue their

brother, all the above said three persons brandished their knife and

hockeys and said that whosoever will come to save Devinder Singh,

they will also kill him and all of them ran towards Bhisham Pitamah

Marg. His brother Devinder Singh became unconscious. Many

persons including Sujan Singh, S/o Ram Singh collected there. After

sometime, PCR van came and removed Devinder Singh at AIIMS,

where he was declared dead by the Doctor. On this statement, a case

was got registered and the investigation was conducted by Inspector

Richpal Singh. During investigation, Inspector got the spot

photographed, prepared site plan, seized one broken piece of hockey,

one pair of dirty white shoes, one steel strip, sample blood, blood

stained earth, sample earth from the spot. Inspector also seized the

blood stained clothes of Amar Singh and Parminder Singh, got

conducted the post mortem on the dead body of deceased, recorded

the statement of witnesses and collected the post mortem report. After

post mortem, dead body was handed over to the legal heirs of the

deceased. Inspector arrested the accused persons and recorded the

disclosure statement of accused Inderjeet Singh @ Inder, who in

pursuance of his disclosure statement, got recovered the knife, which

was used to commit the murder of Devinder Singh. Inspector also

recorded the disclosure statements of accused Amar Singh and Shiv

Charan, who got recovered the hockeys, used in commission of

offence. Inspector seized the knife and hockeys and sealed them

separately in pulandas with the seal of JS. Exhibits were sent to

CFSL. After completion of investigation, challan under section

302/506/34 IPC was filed in the Court of concerned Metropolitan

Magistrate, who committed this case to the Court of Sessions being

exclusively triable by it as such. All the accused persons pleaded not

guilty to the charge framed against them under section 302/506/34

IPC and claimed trial. Accused Inderjeet Singh was separately

charged for an offence under Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act.

3. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution had examined 27

witnesses in all. All the incriminating evidence was put to the

accused persons while recording their statements under Section 313

Cr.P.C. wherein they denied the case of prosecution.

4. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had

brought home the guilt of the accused persons and accordingly

convicted them for murder punishable under Section 302 read with

Section 34 IPC and sentenced as mentioned above. Aggrieved by the

judgment and order on sentence passed by the Trial Court, the present

appeal was filed by the appellants, namely, Inderjeet Singh, Amar

Singh and Shiv Charan. However, during the pendency of the appeal,

appellant Shiv Charan, expired on 12th April, 2008 as per the death

certificate filed by the State along with the status report. As such, the

appeal stands abated qua him.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length who have taken us though the evidence on record.

6. Appearing for the appellants, Mr. Sheikh Israr Ahmad,

Advocate submitted that there was unexplained delay not only in the

lodging of the First Information Report but also in despatching a copy

of the same to the jurisdictional magistrate. In the absence of any

cogent and acceptable explanation for the delay, the prosecution case

was rendered doubtful. Reliance was placed on Satguru Singh vs.

State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 2449. It was further contended that

although prosecution case is alleged to be based on eye witness

account of the incident, however, Amar Singh PW11, brother of the

deceased, has not supported the prosecution case and it is not safe to

rely upon the solitary eye witness Parminder Singh PW1. It is further

contended that the conduct of Parminder Singh PW1 is highly

unnatural because he made no efforts to take his brother to the clinic

of Doctor Bhardwaj, which was just nearby. From the evidence of

Amar Singh PW11, it is clear that there was darkness at the time of

this incident and the accused persons have been falsely implicated. It

is also contended that another eye witness Sujan Singh PW5 has not

supported the prosecution case at all. Learned defence counsel has

drawn our attention to the MLC of the deceased Ex.PW17/A to show

that first the name of the injured is written as unknown and thereafter

Devinder has been added and in the column of name of relation, the

name of H.C. Dharam Singh of PCR is mentioned and later on "and

brothers" is added, which shows that Parminder PW1 has not taken

his brother Devinder to the hospital. It is contended that had

Parminder taken his brother to the hospital, the name of Parminder

would have been mentioned in the column of relations, which shows

that he was not present at the time of the incident. Reliance was

placed on Din Dayal v. Raj Kumar @ Raju & Ors., AIR 1999 SC

537 and State of Punjab v. Sucha Singh & Ors., 2003 (1) JCC 405.

It was also submitted that the solitary eye witness is a close relation of

deceased and it is not safe to rely upon his testimony as it is not

corroborated.

7. It was further submitted that father of the appellant Inderjeet

Singh was murdered and Devinder (since deceased) was facing trial

for the murder of father of the appellant. He had come on interim

bail. As such, since the victim was accused of murdering the father of

the appellant, as such, the brothers of the deceased had motive to

falsely implicate the appellants in this case.

8. Arrest of the accused persons and subsequent recovery at their

instance has also been challenged on the ground that there is no

independent witness to the recovery and police officials are giving

different versions. Reliance was placed on Salim Akhtar @ Mota v.

State of U.P, 2003(2) Crimes 789 and State of Punjab v. Gurnam

Singh, AIR 1984(1) SC 1799.

9. Moreover, the knife was blunt from tip, as such, the injuries as

mentioned in the post mortem report are not possible by the knife.

Even, this knife was not shown to the doctor to seek his opinion

whether injuries were possible by said type of knife or not. Recovery

of hockey at the instance of remaining two appellants has not been

believed by the learned Trial Court. As such, prosecution has failed

to bring home the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of doubt. As

such, appellants are entitled to be acquitted of offence alleged against

them.

10. Rebutting the submissions of learned counsel for the

appellants, Sh. Sunil Sharma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor

for the State submitted that prosecution case is based on eye witness

account of the incident. PW1 Parminder Singh is the author of the

First Information Report and has given the same version as given by

him in the First Information Report. This witness was subjected to

lengthy cross-examination but nothing material could be elicited to

discredit his testimony. In fact, presence of the witness at the spot has

not been challenged in cross-examination. The mere fact that DD No.

493 or DD No. 18A were recorded on the basis of information given

by some unknown person regarding a person lying in the injured

condition in front of Qumayun Hotel, Defence Colony does not mean

that the brothers of the injured were not present at the spot. In fact

both these witnesses accompanied the deceased to hospital in PCR

Van and there is no challenge to the testimony of Head Constable

Satpal, Head Constable Dharam Singh and SI Joginder Singh that the

deceased was brought to the hospital in PCR van accompanied by

brothers of the deceased. As regards MLC, it was submitted that it

has come on record that the brothers of the deceased were in the other

room and the injured was taken inside the hospital by the police

official of PCR and, therefore, initially he could not give the name of

the injured, however, when called upon to give the name of the

injured, they gave his name, and thereafter, in the MLC name of the

injured and in the column of brought by "and brothers" were

mentioned. Although, it is alleged that in the MLC subsequent

additions were made, however, even no such suggestion was given to

the concerned doctor who prepared the MLC of the injured.

Moreover, testimony of Parminder Singh finds substantial

corroboration from Amar Singh who has supported the case of

prosecution as regards the actual incident. He only turned hostile on

the point of identity of the accused. Even, in regard to the identity, he

simply deposed that he could not say if his brother was killed by the

accused or not. He has not denied their presence or assaulting his

brother. Furthermore, after the arrest of the accused on the same day,

weapon of offence, i.e., knife as well as the hockey were recovered.

Refuting the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that

since knife was blunt from tip, as such, injuries were not possible by

this knife, it was submitted that learned Trial Court had the occasion

to see the knife and it has been observed in the judgment that the

injuries were possible by this knife. Reference was also made to the

FSL report for submitting that the clothes of the deceased were

having cut marks and as per report the same could have been caused

by the knife which was sent to FSL. Clothes of brothers of the

deceased were stained with blood. Same were sent to FSL and human

blood was found on the same. Clothes of the accused were also sent

which were also found to be having human blood. No explanation

has been furnished by the accused as to how their clothes were

stained with blood. As regards delay in lodging the First Information

Report, it was submitted that there is no delay in lodging the First

Information Report as the first endeavour of the brothers of the

deceased was to provide him medical aid and, as such, he was taken

to the hospital and thereafter when the police official reached the

hospital, they recorded the statement of Parminder Singh and the First

Information Report was recorded. Although there is a noting on the

First Information Report that the copy of the First Information Report

was received by the Metropolitan Magistrate at 12:35 PM, however,

when she appeared in the witness box, no cross-examination was

done to elicit as to how the First Information Report was received at

12:35 PM. Moreover, the mere fact of slight delay in receiving the

report by Metropolitan Magistrate is not fatal to the case of

prosecution, inasmuch as, at the very first available opportunity, the

brother of the deceased had narrated the entire incident with specific

role of each and every accused and he remained consistent in his

deposition before the Court. As such, it was submitted that the

impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity which calls for

interference, as such, appeal is liable to be dismissed.

11. Firstly, dealing with the aspect of delay in despatching FIR to

the Magistrate, the incident took place at about 10:10 PM. Vide DD

No. 493, intimation was sent at 22:27 regarding one person lying in

injured condition in front of Qumayun Hotel, Defence Colony.

Information was received by Head Constable Dharam Singh, Incharge

PCR Van at about 10:30 PM and thereafter, he reached the spot and

took the injured to AIIMS. As per MLC, the injured was brought to

hospital at about 11:00 PM. On receipt of DD No. 18A, Ex. PW6/A

SI Joginder Singh along with other police officials reached the spot

where he came to know that injured has already been taken by PCR

Van to hospital. Thereafter, SI Joginder Singh went to AIIMS

hospital where he met the brothers of the deceased, namely,

Parminder Singh and Amar Singh and recorded the statement of

Parminder Singh, Ex.PW1/A. He prepared the rukka Ex.PW 16/A

and sent the same through Constable Narender Pal Singh, PW14 for

registration of the case at 1:05 AM and thereafter vide DD No.21A,

First Information Report was registered at 1:30 AM. Therefore, it

cannot be said that there is any delay in lodging the First Information

Report. However, learned counsel for the appellant laid great

emphasis on the fact that the special report was received by learned

Metropolitan Magistrate on 4th August, 1990 at 12:35 PM which

shows that the First Information Report has been ante-timed to

introduce false witness. Constable Basanta Ram, PW3 had delivered

the special report to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the

concerned senior officers at their residence. In cross-examination, he

has stated that he had delivered the special report on 4 th August, 1990

at 3:00 AM. He has first delivered the report at the residence of DCP.

Nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination as to at what time

he delivered the special report to the Metropolitan Magistrate. The

learned Metropolitan Magiatrate Ms. Sangeeta Dhingra Sehgal, PW8

has stepped into the witness box. Even in her cross-examination, it

has not been elicited at what time she received special report.

12. Moreover, dealing with the aspect of delay in sending the copy

of First Information Report to Court, Hon‟ble Supreme Court in

Bhajan Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 421, observed as

under:-

"24. In Shiv Ram and Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 49, this Court considered the provisions of the Section 157, Code of Criminal Procedure, which require that the police officials would send a copy of the FIR to the Illaqa Magistrate forthwith. The court held that if there is a delay in forwarding the copy of the FIR to the Illaqa Magistrate, that

circumstance alone would not demolish the other credible evidence on record. It would only show how in such a serious crime, the Investigating Agency was not careful and prompt as it ought to be.

25. In Munshi Prasad and Ors. v. State of Bihar this Court considered this issue again and observed:

"13....While it is true that Section 157 of the Code makes it obligatory on the officer in charge of the police station to send a report of the information received to a Magistrate forthwith, but that does not mean and imply to denounce and discard an otherwise positive and trustworthy evidence on record. Technicality ought not to outweigh the course of justice - if the court is otherwise convinced and has come to a conclusion as regards the truthfulness of the prosecution case, mere delay, which can otherwise be ascribed to be reasonable, would not by itself demolish the prosecution case.

While deciding the said case, this Court placed relied upon its earlier judgments in Pala Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and State of Karnataka v. Moin Patel.

26. In Rajeevan and Anr. v. State of Kerala this Court examined a case where there had been inordinate delay in sending the copy of the FIR to the Illaqa Magistrate and held that un-explained inordinate delay may adversely affect the prosecution case. However, it would depend upon the facts of each case.

27. A similar view was reiterated in Ramesh Baburao Devaskar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, wherein there had been a delay of four days in sending the copy of the FIR to the Illaqa Magistrate and no satisfactory explanation could be furnished for such inordinate delay. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed on earlier judgments in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Singh and Ors. and Jagdish Murav v. State of U.P. and Ors. (See also Sarwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, State of U.P. v. Gokaran and Ors. Gurdev Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, State of J and K v. Mohan Singh and Ors., N.H. Muhammed Afras v. State of Kerala, Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh and Ors. and Arun Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar.

28. Thus, from the above it is evident that the Cr.P.C provides for internal

and external checks: one of them being the receipt of a copy of the FIR by the Magistrate concerned. It serves the purpose that the FIR be not ante- timed or ante-dated. The Magistrate must be immediately informed of every serious offence so that he may be in a position to act under Section 159 Code of Criminal Procedure, if so required. Section 159 Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Magistrate to hold the investigation or preliminary enquiry of the offence either himself or through the Magistrate subordinate to him. This is designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation so as to enable him to control investigation and, if necessary, to give appropriate direction.

29. It is not that as if every delay in sending the report to the Magistrate would necessarily lead to the inference that the FIR has not been lodged at the time stated or has been anti-timed or anti-dated or investigation is not fair and forthright. Every such delay is not fatal unless prejudice to the accused is shown. The expression 'forthwith' mentioned therein does not mean that the prosecution is required to explain delay of every hour in sending the FIR to the Magistrate. In a given case, if number of dead and injured persons is very high, delay in dispatching the report is natural. Of course, the same is to be sent within reasonable time in the prevalent circumstances.

30. However, un-explained inordinate delay in sending the copy of FIR to the Magistrate may affect the prosecution case adversely. An adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution when there are circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of manipulation in the FIR by falsely roping in the accused persons after due deliberations. Delay provides legitimate basis for suspicion of the FIR, as it affords sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments. Thus, a delay in dispatch of the FIR by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the prosecution's case in its entirety, particularly when the prosecution furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay in dispatch of the report or prosecution case itself is proved by leading unimpeachable evidence."

13. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Satguru

Singh (supra). In that case, there was inordinate delay of 10 days in

lodging First Information Report. No explanation except that efforts

for compromise were on by respectable inhabitants of the village and

therefore First Information Report was not lodged earlier. None of the

respectables of the village have, however, been examined in support

of such version. It was observed that this delay affects the credibility

of the injured coupled with the fact that name of the assailants were

not disclosed at the first opportunity, evidence of eye witness suffered

from infirmities hence accused was given benefit of doubt and

conviction was set aside.

14. In the instant case, there was no delay in lodging the First

Information Report and in the absence of any effective cross-

examination of Constable Basanta Ram, PW3 who has deposed that

he has delivered the special report at about 3:00 AM and no

suggestion to the effect that in fact it was delivered to the

Metropolitan Magistrate at about 12:45 PM or eliciting from the

Metropolitan Magistrate as to the actual time when she received the

special report, it cannot be said that there is any delay in dispatch of

the First Information Report. The first limb of the argument advanced

by counsel for the appellant has, therefore, failed and is hereby

rejected.

15. That brings us to the question whether Parminder Singh was an

eye witness of the incident and if so, whether he is a reliable witness

being the brother of the deceased and whether the conviction of the

appellant can be based on the solitary testimony of this witness.

Presence of this witness has been challenged on the ground that had

he been present at the spot and witnessed the incident, he being

brother of the deceased would have come forward to save him.

Moreover, the clinic of Dr. Bhardwaj was nearby the place of incident

and the first endeavour of the witness would have been to take his

brother to the clinic of Dr. Bhardwaj which was not done. Moreover,

the police machinery swung into action on the basis of DD No. 493

given by some unknown person regarding a person lying injured in

front of Qumayun Hotel, Defence Colony. Had he been present at the

spot, he would have intimated the police about the incident. Further,

he did not accompany the injured to hospital which is reflected from

the MLC where in the column of "brought by" name of Head

Constable "Dharam Singh PCR" has been mentioned and in the

column of name of injured, "unknown" was mentioned and it was

only subsequently that the name of the injured and in the column of

"brought by" "and brothers" were added. None of the submission

made by the learned counsel for the appellant has any force as it has

come in the testimony of Parminder Singh (PW1) that on 3rd August,

1990, he had gone to the house of his mother at 826/5 Arjun Nagar,

Kotla Mubarakpur. His elder brother Amar Singh and another brother

Ladi were also there. At about 10:00 PM, all the three brothers left

the mother‟s house for their respective houses. He and his brother

Amar Singh were walking ahead of Davinder Singh @ Ladi. When

they reached Sukhdev market, they heard cries of Ladi "bachao

bachao". They turned around and saw that Ladi who was at a distance

of about 10 paces from them, was being attacked by the three

accused. Inder Singh was armed with a knife while Amar Singh and

Shiv Charan were armed with hockey sticks. They were attacking

Ladi with these weapons. All the accused were well known to him

from before as they lived in Kotla Mubarakpur where he lived for 30

years. When they tried to intervene to save their brother Devinder @

Ladi, all the three accused aimed their weapons on them and

threatened that in case, they intervene, they would also be killed. In

his presence and in presence of his other brother, the accused persons

inflicted knife and hockey blow on the person of Ladi. Due to the

assault by the accused persons, Ladi fell down on the ground and

almost became unconscious. The accused persons fled from the spot

and while fleeing, they declared that they had avenged the death of

Khazan. While they were taking care of their brother, the police Van

arrived at the spot in which they removed Ladi to AIIMS. In the

hospital, Ladi was declared dead. His statement Ex. PW1/A was

recorded by the police in the hospital which bears his signature at

point „A‟. As such, the testimony of the witness makes it clear that

when he came to the rescue of his brother, the accused persons

wielded their weapon at them and threatened that in case they

intervene, they would also be killed. That being the reason, the

witness and his brother could not come to the rescue of their brother

Devinder @ Ladi.

16. As regards the submission as to why the witness did not take

his brother to the clinic of Dr. Bhardwaj which was nearby the place

of incident, Parminder PW1 has not been cross-examined to elicit as

to why he did not take his brother to the clinic of Dr. Bhardwaj. The

incident is alleged to have taken place at about 10:00 pm and

possibility of the clinic being closed by that time cannot be ruled out.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it was the residence-

cum-clinic of Dr. Bhardwaj. However, this fact is not borne out from

the record. In any case, in the absence of any cross-examination in

this regard, no adverse inference can be drawn regarding the presence

of the witness at the spot. The mere fact that some unknown person

sent information regarding a person lying injured in front of

Qumayun hotel on the basis of which DD No. 493 and thereafter DD

No. 18A was recorded ipso facto is not sufficient to conclude that the

witness was not present at the spot as it has come in the testimony of

the witness that they were taking care of their brother and therefore, if

somebody else had informed the police, again no adverse inference

can be drawn. As regards the removal of injured to the hospital, the

witness has deposed that the police van arrived at the spot in which

they removed their injured brother to the hospital. A perusal of the

MLC Ex.PW17/A goes to show that in the column of name first

„unknown‟ is mentioned and thereafter Devinder @ Ladi is written

and in the column of relative "Head Constable Dharam Singh,

Incharge-PCR and brothers" is written. The MLC was prepared by

Dr. Romesh Lal, PW 17 and this witness has not been cross-examined

by the appellants. He was the best person to explain under what

circumstances, in the column of name the word "unknown" and then

Devinder Singh and in the column of "brought by", "Head Constable

Dharam Singh and brothers" was written. On the other hand, it has

come in the statement of Parminder that he had informed the name of

his brother Ladi to the doctor. Similarly, Head Constable Dharam

Singh, Incharge PCR van has stated that relatives of the deceased had

accompanied him in the PCR van to AIIMS. Head Constable Satpal

PW13, who was posted as duty constable at AIIMS has also stated

that Devinder @ Ladi was brought by his two brothers to AIIMS at

11:00 PM. All these witnesses have not been cross-examined by the

appellants. Under the circumstances, there is unchallenged testimony

of Dr. Romesh Lal PW17, Head Constable Dharam Singh, Incharge

(PCR Van), PW 15 Head Constable Satpal, PW13 all of whom have

deposed that Devinder @ Ladi was brought to the hospital by his

brothers. In the absence of putting any question to these witnesses,

the appellant cannot take any benefit.

17. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Laxmibai (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. and

Anr. v. Bhagwantbuva (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. and Ors., AIR 2013 SC

1204 examined the effect of non-cross examination of witness on a

particular fact/circumstance and held as under:

"40. Furthermore, there cannot be any dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition, that if a party wishes to raise any doubt as regards the correctness of the statement of a witness, the said witness must be given an opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it, which has been objected to by the other party, as being untrue. Without this, it is not possible to impeach his credibility. Such a law has been advanced in view of the statutory provisions enshrined in Section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which enable the opposite party to cross- examine a witness as regards information tendered in evidence by him during his initial examination in chief, and the scope of this provision stands enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be questioned, inter-alia, in order to test his veracity. Thereafter, the unchallenged part of his evidence is to be relied upon, for the reason that it is impossible for the witness to explain or elaborate upon any doubts as regards the same, in the absence of questions put to him with respect to the circumstances which indicate that the version of events provided by him, is not fit to be believed, and the witness himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a party intends to impeach a witness, he must provide adequate opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to give a full and proper explanation. The same is essential to ensure fair play and fairness in dealing with witnesses."

18. Substantially similar view was taken in Rohtash Kumar v.

State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434, and Gian Chand and Ors. v.

State of Haryana, JT 2013 (10) SC 515 and Gulam Sarbar v. State

of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401.

19. Thus, it becomes crystal clear that the defence cannot rely on

nor can the court base its finding on a particular fact or issue on

which the witness has not made any statement in his examination-in-

chief and the defence has not cross examined him on the said aspect

of the matter.

20. Din Dayal (supra) relied upon by counsel for the appellant is

distinguishable inasmuch as eye witnesses closely connected with the

accused did not accompany him to hospital nor had informed the

police about incident; after seeing the incident, they quietly went back

home; there was material improvements in the statements made

before Court, under those circumstances, it was observed that same

creates serious doubt regarding truthfulness of evidence of eye

witness. In Sucha Singh (supra) also, ocular evidence was in

contradiction with medical evidence. In the statements before police,

eye witness stated that accused inflicted eight injuries on the person

of deceased. However, the doctor who conducted the post mortem

deposed that there were 24 injuries on the body of deceased. Eye

witness made improvements in Court by saying that after inflicting

eight injuries on the deceased, accused inflicted many injuries. Under

these circumstances, presence of the eye witness at the spot was held

to be doubtful.

21. Things are entirely different in the instant case. Presence of

witness at the spot is not even challenged by the appellants, as even

no such suggestion to this effect was given In view of the discussions

made above, presence of the witness at the spot stands proved.

22. This brings us to the question whether PW1 Parminder is

reliable witness. The contention as seen earlier is that since this

witness happens to be brother of the deceased, he must be taken as

partisan witness on account of his close relation with the victim.

23. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a closely

related witness is required to be carefully scrutinized and appreciated

before any conclusion is made to rest upon it, regarding the

convict/accused in a given case. Thus, the evidence cannot be

disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to

each other or to the deceased. In case the evidence has a ring of truth

to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, it can certainly be relied

upon.

24. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, AIR 1981 SC 1390, Hon‟ble

Supreme Court held:

"7. As mentioned above the High Court has declined to rely on the evidence of P.W. 1 on two grounds: (1) she was a "highly interested" witness because she "is the wife of the deceased"......For, in the circumstances of the case, she was the only and most natural witness; she was the only person present in the hut with the deceased at the time of the occurrence, and the only person who saw the occurrence. True it is she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an 'interested' witness. She is related to the deceased. 'Related' is not equivalent to 'interested. A witness may be called 'interested' only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be 'interested'. In the instant case P.W. 1 had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the Respondents.

25. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Raju @ Balachandran and Ors.

v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 983, very recently attempted

a possible categorization of witnesses and identified broadly four

such categories in the following words:

"24. For the time being, we are concerned with four categories of witnesses - a third party disinterested and unrelated witness (such as a bystander or passer-by); a third party interested witness (such as a trap witness); a related and therefore an interested witness (such as the wife of the victim) having an interest in seeing that the accused is punished; a related and therefore an interested witness (such as the wife or brother of the victim) having an interest in seeing the accused punished and also having some enmity with the accused. But, more than the categorization of a witness, the issue really is one of appreciation of the evidence

of a witness. A court should examine the evidence of a related and interested witness having an interest in seeing the accused punished and also having some enmity with the accused with greater care and caution than the evidence of a third party disinterested and unrelated witness. This is all that is expected and required."

26. In Shanmugam and Anr. v. State Rep. by Inspector of

Police, Tamil Nadu, (2013) 12 SCC 765, it was observed that far

more important than categorization of witnesses is the question of

appreciation of their evidence. The essence of any such appreciation

is to determine whether the deposition of the witness as to the

incident is truthful hence acceptable. While doing so, the Court can

assume that a related witness would not ordinarily shield the real

offender to falsely implicate an innocent person. In cases where the

witness was inimically disposed towards the accused, the Courts

have no doubt at times noticed a tendency to implicate an innocent

person also, but before the Court can reject the deposition of such a

witness the accused must lay a foundation for the argument that his

false implication springs from such enmity. The mere fact that the

witness was related to the accused does not provide that foundation.

It may on the contrary be a circumstance for the Court to believe

that the version of the witness is truthful on the simple logic that

such a witness would not screen the real culprit to falsely implicate

an innocent. Suffice it to say that the process of evaluation of

evidence of witnesses whether they are partisan or interested

(assuming there is a difference between the two) is to be undertaken

in the facts of each case having regard to ordinary human conduct

prejudices and predilections.

27. The approach which the Court ought to adopt in such matters

has been examined by Hon‟ble Supreme Court and this Court in

several cases, reference to which is unnecessary except a few that

should suffice. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC

364, it was observed:

"26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts."

(emphasis supplied)

28. The above was followed in Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964)

8 SCR 133 where it was observed:

"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses..... The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautions in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct."

29. We may also refer to the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court

in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964) 3 SCR 397 and a more

recent reminder of the legal principles in Takdir Samsuddin

Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and Anr, (2011) 10 SCC 158 where it

was observed:

"(i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering him as the interested witness, the court must bear in mind that the term 'interested' postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some other reason. (Vide: Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar,(1996) 1 SCC 614, and Rakesh and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT 2011 (10) SC 525).

(ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity,

but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614, Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 11 SCC 367, Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 3638)."

30. To the same effect are the decisions in Amit v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 107; Bur Singh and Anr. v. State of

Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 157 and State of U.P. v. Kishanpal and Ors.,

(2008) 16 SCC 73; Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy and

Ors, AIR 2013 SC 3681.

31. In the case at hand, deposition of Parminder Singh (PW1) has

been found to be reliable by the learned Trial Court, no matter he was

closely related to the deceased. There is nothing in the cross-

examination of the witness that could be said to have adversely

affected the credibility of this witness nor is there anything to suggest

that apart from his being a relative of the deceased, he had any other

reason to falsely implicate the accused persons or anyone of them.

Moreover the presence of the witness at the spot is not even

challenged by the appellant, inasmuch as, even no suggestion was

given to him that he was not present at the spot or that he and Amar

Singh did not accompany the victim to hospital. It has further come

in his statement that in the process of removing the victim to the

hospital, his clothes as well as that of his brother were stained with

blood and the same were seized by the police. Even this fact remains

unchallenged. The witness has given a graphic account of the attack

on his brother by the accused persons. His statement is reliable,

trustworthy and consistent with the course of events and there is no

bar in basing the conviction of the accused on the testimony of this

witness.

32. Moreover, there is ample other evidence to corroborate the

testimony of this witness. The other eye witnesses to the incident are

alleged to be PW5 Sujan Singh and PW11 Amar Singh. As regards

Sujan Singh (PW5) is concerned, this witness has not supported the

case of prosecution at all, although in the very initial statement,

Ex.PW1/A given by PW1, he claimed him to be eye witness to the

incident. There is general apathy and indifference on the part of the

public to join police proceedings as they do not want to get dragged in

police and criminal cases and want to avoid them because of long

drawn trials and unnecessary harassment. In case, he joins the

proceedings, then such is the fate as reflected in this case. In this

context, it will be advantageous to reproduce the observations of

Hon‟ble Court in Krishna Mochi vs. State of Bihar, 2002 6 SCC 81:-

"It is matter of common experience that in recent times there has been sharp decline of ethical values in public life even in developed countries much less developing one, like ours, where the ratio of decline is higher. Even in ordinary cases, witnesses are not inclined to depose or their evidence is not found to be credible by courts for manifold reasons. One of the reasons may be that they do not have courage to depose against an accused because of threats to their life, more so when the offenders are habitual criminals or high-ups in the Government or close to powers, which may be political, economic or other powers including muscle power. A witness may not stand the test of cross-examination which may be sometime because he is a bucolic person and is not able to understand the question put to him by the skilful cross-examiner and at times under the stress of cross-examination, certain answers are snatched from him. When a rustic or illiterate witness faces an astute lawyer, there is bound to be imbalance and, therefore, minor discrepancies have to be ignored. These days it is not difficult to gain over a witness by money power or giving him any other all urence or giving out threats to his life and/or property at the instance of persons, in/or close to powers and muscle men or their associates. Such instances are also not uncommon where a witness is not inclined to depose because in the prevailing social structure he wants to remain indifferent."

33. However, as regards actual incident, testimony of PW1 find

corroboration from Amar Singh (PW11). This witness has deposed on

the same lines as that of Parminder and has unfolded that on 3rd

August, 1990, he, his brothers Parminder and Devinder Singh had

gone to see their mother at 826/5 Arjun Nagar, Kotla Mubarakpur. At

about 10:00 PM, they all were returning and when they reached the

turning of Sukhdev Market, he and his brother Parminder were ahead

of Devinder Singh. Suddenly they heard cries of Devinder Singh

"Parminder mujhko bachao". They looked behind. His brother

Parminder ran towards his brother, however, he was unable to run

because of some problem in his spinal cord. When he reached there,

he found his brother Devinder lying on the ground. His brother

Parminder Singh asked him to wait and he ran after culprits who were

running. Though it was dark but since many workshops for repairing

cars were there and headlight of one of the car was on, he could see

the back of the culprits and they were three. Two of them were

carrying hockey sticks with them. However, he could not notice if

third was carrying any weapon with him. The police arrived at the

scene of occurrence at 10:45 PM. They removed their brother

Devinder to AIIMS where he was admitted. While he was carrying

the body of his brother for lifting in the vehicle, his clothes as well as

of his brother were stained with blood which were seized by the

police later on. However, as regards the identity of the accused, the

witness stated that since it was dark, therefore, he was not able to see

the faces of the culprit and could not say if the accused persons were

the same persons who had killed his brother. Under the

circumstances, except for identification of the accused persons, this

witness has corroborated the testimony of PW1 Parminder Singh

regarding the incident.

34. It is a settled legal proposition that evidence of a prosecution

witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution

chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examine him. The evidence of

such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record

altogether. The same can be accepted to the extent that their version is

found to be dependable upon a careful scrutiny thereof. In this

context, it will be worthwhile to refer to Sathya Narayanan v. State

rep.by Inspector of Police, (2012) 12 SCC 627; Mrinal Das &

Others vs. State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479; Paramjit Singh @

Pamma vs. State of Uttrakhand, AIR 2011 SC 200; Rameshbhai

Mohanbhai Koli and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)

102; Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8

SCC 624; Prithi vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536 and

Ramesh Harijan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 5 SCC 777,

Rohtash Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434, Veer

Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 455.

35. Therefore, the law permits the Court to take into consideration

the deposition of a hostile witness to the extent that the same is in

consonance with the case of prosecution and is found to be reliable in

careful judicial scrutiny. As regards the actual incident, removing

the injured to hospital and in that process, his clothes and that of his

brother Parminder got stained with blood, recording of statement of

Parminder by police in hospital goes unchallenged in the absence of

any cross-examination in these regards. As such, the testimony of PW

1 Parminder Singh finds substantial corroboration from Amar Singh,

PW11 regarding the actual incident, number of assailants being three

and that the injured was removed to hospital by them in PCR Van.

36. Further testimony of PW1 also finds corroboration from the

medical evidence. Post mortem on the dead body of Devinder @

Ladi was conducted by Dr. M.S. Sagar, PW21. On external

examination following ante-mortem injuries were noticed:-

1. Multiple contusions and abraded contusions over both forearms, both arms and dorsum of both hands.

2. CLW on right periauricular region of size 3 cm x 2 cm x 0.5 cm.

3. Contusions right mandibular region extending to neck of size 6 cm x 3 cm.

4. Incised wound on the right side of forehead 1 cm below hairline of size 1.5 x 1 cm superficial.

5. Incised wound left upper limb vertically placed of size 1.5 x 1 cm x muscle deep with clean cut inverted margins.

6. Incised wound left knee of size 5 cm x .5 cm x bone deep with clean cut inverted margins.

7. Incised wound left forearm round elbow of size 1 cm x 1 cm margins clean cut and everted.

8. Incised wound left forearm placed 6 cm below elbow joint of size 2.5 x 1x bone deep, with clean cut inverted margins, with cut impressions present on the olecraenon.

9. Incised wound left forearm anterio-medical aspect placed 5 cm below cubital fossa of size 1.5cm x 1cm x muscle deep with clean cut inverted margins underline subcutaneous tissue and muscle clean cut.

10. Incised wound right side of abdomen placed 10 cm below coastal margins in mid axillary plane 3 cm x 1 cm into muscle deep obliquely placed, margins clean cut, not penetrating the abdominal cavity.

11. Stab wound right side of chest anterior axillary plane obliquely placed of size 3.5 cm x 1 cm, 22 cm below cavicular with clean cut everted margins passing through 7th intercoastal plane entering into left lower lobe of lung going into pericardium with presence of hemo-pericardium and incised wound left pentricle around apex of size 2 cm x 1.5 cm x whole thickness of ventricle.

12. Stab wound of size 4 cm x 1 cm x skin deep placed transversely 8 cm below injury no.11.

13. Incised wound 1 cm x 1 cm with clean cut inverted margins placed 2 cm lateral and 1.5 cm below injury no.12.

14. Stab wound left side of abdomen in posterior axillary line placed 25 cm below clavicular margins of size 4 cm x 1 cm going into abdominal cavity producing multiple incised wound of small and large intestines.

15. Incised wound of size 4 cm x 1.5 cm in left side of abdomen 6 cm below and 2 cm medial to injury no.14.

Internal examination of the deceased revealed:-

There were homo-thorax on left side with about 500 cc of blood being present. There was stab wound of left lung lower lobe of size 3 cm x 1.5 cm x 4 cm. Hemo-cardium was also present with 400 cc of blood and blood clots. There was stab wound of heart over apex of size 2.5 cm x 1 cm x whole thickness of left ventricular wall with cutting of cordae-tendenae. In the abdominal cavity, there was hemo-periteneum about 400 cc of blood and blood clots with multiple incised wound of small and large intestines.

It was opined that cause of death was shock as a result of multiple antemortem injuries produced by sharp edged weapon.

Injury no.11 and 14 are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature individually as well as collectively.

37. Under the circumstances, testimony of PW1 that accused

Inderjeet Singh assaulted the deceased with knife find corroboration

from medical evidence, as according to Dr. M.S.Sagar, cause of death

was shock as a result of ante-mortem injuries produced by „sharp

edged weapon‟. Needless to say, knife is a sharp edged weapon.

38. It is the case of prosecution that on the basis of secret

information on 4th August, 1990, all the appellants were apprehended

from Seva Nagar Railway Station and were arrested. Appellant

Inderjeet Singh made a disclosure statement Ex.PW9/D stating

therein that the knife used by him in the murder was kept by him

under the tin shed of the bathroom of the house of his uncle Mahender

Singh in Village Kher Pur which he can get recovered and that the

clothes which he was wearing at the time of murder which were

stained with blood were washed by him and lying on the rassi in his

house which he can get recovered. In pursuance to this disclosure

statement, he led police party to the house of his uncle Mahender in

Village Kher Pur and got recovered knife, Ex.P9 concealed in the

bathroom which was seized after preparing its sketch and sealing in a

pulanda vide memo Ex. PW9/H. He also got recovered one pant Ex.

PW10 and shirt Ex. P11 hanging on the rope in the courtyard of his

house situated in Village Kherpur which were seized vide seizure

memo Ex. PW9/I after sealing in a pulanda.

39. Accused Amarjeet Singh also made a disclosure statement Ex.

PW9/E that he could get recovered the danda portion of the hockey

used in the murder from the roof of his house and in pursuance to the

disclosure statement, he got recovered the back portion of the hockey,

i.e. danda from his house which was taken into possession vide

recovery memo Ex. PW9/J.

40. In pursuance to the disclosure statement Ex. PW9/F, accused

Shiv Charan got recovered one hockey from the roof of his house in

Nanak Chand Basti in village Kherpur, which was taken into

possession vide recovery memo Ex. PW9/K.

41. Seizure of knife at the instance of Inderjeet Singh and

hockey/danda portion at the instance of remaining two appellants has

been challenged by learned counsel for the appellant on the ground

that no independent witness was joined in the recovery and police

officials have not corroborated each other. Reliance was placed on

Salim Akhtar (supra) where no independent witness was joined at

the time of recovery of pistol. Pistol was not sealed on the spot nor

its number nor make etc to fix its identity was mentioned in the

recovery memo or in the First Information Report. Under those

circumstances, recovery was held to be doubtful. Reliance was also

placed on Gurnam Singh(supra) which was an appeal against

acquittal. The High Court had taken the view that it is unsafe to

convict the appellant merely on the basis of uncorroborated evidence

pertaining to the alleged recovery of weapon at the instance of

accused. The accused was, therefore, entitled to benefit of reasonable

doubt. The view taken by the High Court was plausible one, hence

appeal was dismissed. These decisions are distinguishable in the facts

and circumstances of the present case in view of discussions made

hereininafter.

42. Although it is true that there is no independent witness to the

recovery of weapon of offence at the instance of appellants, however,

that itself is not sufficient to discard the testimony of the police

officials. Prosecution has examined PW9 SI Gian Singh, PW12 HC

Chottu Ram, PW24 Const. Jai Singh, PW25 Insp. Richhpal Singh, all

of whom have deposed regarding recovery of weapon of offence at

the instance of accused person. PW 14 Constable Narender Pal Singh

and Head Constable Kesh Ram are also witnesses to the recovery of

knife at the instance of accused Inderjeet Singh. All these witnesses

have deposed regarding recovery of knife at the instance of accused

Inderjeet Singh.

43. In Girja Prasad by LRs v. State of MP, (2007) 7 SCC 625,

Hon'ble Supreme Court while particularly referring to the evidence of

a police officer, said that it is not the law that Police witnesses should

not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is

corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence.

The presumption applies as much in favour of a police officer as any

other person. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no

conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if

such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of

prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such

a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception,

it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy

nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of the

police administration.

44. Substantially similar issue came up for consideration before

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Govindraju @ Govinda vs. State by

Sriramapuram PS & Anr., 2012 III AD(SC)453 and it was observed

as under:-

"17. Wherever, the evidence of the police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. The courts have also expressed the view that no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force

and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. Rather than referring to various judgments of this Court on this issue, suffices it to note that even in the case of Girja Prasad (supra), this Court noticed the judgment of the Court in the case of Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217, a judgment pronounced more than half a century ago noticing the principle that the presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favor of a police officer as of other persons and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefore. This principle has been referred to in a plethora of other cases as well. Some of the cases dealing with the aforesaid principle are being referred hereunder."

45. Reference was made to Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC

338, where dealing with a similar question, the Court held as under:

"6. ...In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case."

46. The result of the above discussion is that the statement of a

police officer can be relied upon and even form the basis of

conviction when it is reliable, trustworthy and preferably

corroborated by other evidence on record.

47. As regards the submission that certain discrepancies appeared

in the testimony of the police witnesses as to whether the knife was

recovered from underneath the cement sheet or iron sheet, it was

rightly observed by learned Trial Court that the incident took place in

the year 1990 while the evidence of the police official came to be

recorded in the year 1997-98 and due to lapse of time, the

discrepancies are bound to occur in their testimony. However, the

discrepancies were not of such a nature which could render the entire

prosecution case not worthy of reliance.

48. Dealing with the aspect of discrepancies in Rohtash Kumar Vs.

State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 it was held as under:-

"24. It is a settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not prompt the court to reject the evidence in its entirety. Therefore, unless irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the credibility of a witness should be ignored. The court has to examine whether evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter, and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness. Thus, the court must read the evidence of a witness as a whole, and consider the case in light of the entirety of the circumstances, ignoring the minor discrepancies with respect to trivial

matters, which do not affect the core of the case of the prosecution. The said discrepancies as mentioned above, should not be taken into consideration, as they cannot form grounds for rejecting the evidence on record as a whole. (See: State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48; State rep. by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan and Anr., AIR 2009 SC 152; and Vijay @ Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191)."

49. Discrepancies pointed out by counsel for the appellant are

trivial in nature and do not go to the substratum of the case, hence

there is no reason to disbelieve the recovery of knife at the instance of

accused Inderjeet Singh.

50. As regards recovery of hockey at the instance of Amar Singh

and Shiv Charan, in view of certain discrepancies appearing in the

testimony of the witnesses, learned Trial Court observed that recovery

of broken piece of hockey is not free from doubt but it was rightly

observed that recovery of weapon of offence is only a corroborative

piece of evidence and even if the weapon of offence is not recovered,

the eye witness account cannot be discarded on that count.

51. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the

appellant for submitting that the tip of the knife was blunt and,

therefore, the injuries could not have been inflicted with such a knife

and no opinion of the doctor has been obtained as to whether the

injuries could have been caused by knife Ex. P-9.

52. A perusal of the post mortem report Ex. PW21/A reflects that

Dr. M. S. Sagar has opined that the cause of death was due to shock

due to multiple ante mortem injuries produced by sharp edged

weapon and injury No.11 and 14 were individually and collectively

sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It is true

that Investigating Officer has not obtained opinion of doctor by

showing the knife to him but this lapse on the part of the Investigating

Officer is not sufficient to discard the testimony of the eye witness.

Time and again it has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court as well as

this Court that lapses on the part of Investigating Officer should not

come in the way of accepting eye witness account, if it is otherwise

truthful and reliable. Learned Trial Court had an occasion to see the

knife Ex. P9 when it was produced before the Court and it was

observed that the tip of the knife was slightly blunt but the blade of

the knife was intact and, therefore, it cannot be said that the stab

wound and the incised wound on the person of the deceased could not

be caused by knife Ex. P9. Under the circumstances, the medical

evidence corroborates the ocular version.

53. Various articles, viz., pair of shoes, steel strip, blood stained

earth, hockey stick were seized from the spot. Blood stained clothes

of PW1 and PW 11 namely Parminder Singh and Amar Singh were

also seized. After the post mortem, the clothes of the deceased were

handed over to the police. The appellant Inderjeet Singh got

recovered the knife as well as his clothes. All these articles were sent

to FSL. A perusal of the FSL report goes to show that on most of the

articles, blood was found which was of human origin. Although the

blood group "O" was opined on the clothes of the deceased, however,

as regards remaining articles, the blood group could not be opined by

observing "no reaction‟. The fact remains that on the clothes of PW1

Parminder Singh and Amar Singh, human blood was found. The

same lend corroboration to the fact that while removing the injured to

hospital their clothes were stained with blood. Even the knife

recovered at the instance of Inderjeet Singh was found to contain

human blood.

54. Moreover, Ex. 13A and Ex. 13B were the pant and shirt of the

deceased which had cut marks. As per the report given by Sh.

Rajender Singh, Sr. Scientific Officer, the laboratory examination on

cut marks Q1 and Q2 on pant (Ex. No. 13) and cut marks Q3 to Q6 on

shirt (Ex.13b) reveal that same have been caused by a sharp edged

weapon and that the same could have been caused by knife marked

Ex. 9.

55. Clothes of the accused Inderjeet Singh sent to FSL were also

found to be having human blood for which no explanation has been

given by him as to how human blood came on his clothes. Report of

FSL is another clinching piece of evidence to connect appellants with

the crime.

56. The motive to commit crime is writ large as there is

unchallenged evidence on record that Devinder Singh @ Ladi was

facing trial in the murder of Khazan Singh, father of the accused

Inderjeet Singh and at the time of this incident, the deceased was on

interim bail. It has further come in the statement of Parminder that

prior to this incident, on the day of Dussehra in the year 1989,

accused Inderjeet Singh along with some other accused had given

beatings to Ladi and he suffered injuries in that incident. It was

submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that motive is a double

edged weapon and since the deceased was facing trial for the murder

of father of the appellant Inderjeet Singh, as such, the complainant

party had an axe to grind to falsely implicate the appellants, however,

this motive also furnishes a ground for taking revenge by the

appellants for the murder of father of Inderjeet Singh which is clear

from the fact that while fleeing away the appellants declared that they

have avenged the death of Khazan Singh. Moreover, the brother of

the deceased would not have allowed the real culprits to go scot free

and to implicate the appellants falsely in this case.

57. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the eye witness

account narration of the incident given by PW1 Parminder Singh is

cogent, reliable and inspired complete confidence. Moreover, his

testimony finds corroboration from his own brother PW11 Amar

Singh besides the medical and scientific evidence. The entire

evidence was meticulously examined by the learned Trial Court in

correct perspective and it was only thereafter, that the appellants were

convicted under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC besides holding

appellant Inderjeet Singh also guilty under Section 27 of the Arms

Act. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity or

perversity which calls for interference. As such, the appeal, being

devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

58. Sentence of the appellants was suspended during the pendency

of the appeal vide order dated 30th July, 1999.

59. The bail bonds of the appellants (Inderjeet Singh and Amar

Singh) are cancelled. Appellants are directed to surrender forthwith

to serve the remaining sentence.

Intimation be sent to the concerned Superintendent Jail. Trial

Court record be sent back immediately.

(SUNITA GUPTA) JUDGE

(KAILASH GAMBHIR) JUDGE MAY 09, 2014 rs