Ravi Dutt Sharma vs Central Reserve Police Force ...
2013 Latest Caselaw 617 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                                                 Date of decision: 08.02.2013
+                                  W.P.(C) 759/2013
       RAVI DUTT SHARMA                          ..... Petitioner
                    Through : Ms. Rani Chhabra, Advocate.

                          versus

       CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE THROUGH DIRECTOR
       GENERAL AND ORS                            ..... Respondents

Through : Ms. Gurjinder Kaur, Advocate with Sh. Vijaya Kumar Raut, Parivi Officer, CRPF, for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3..

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA

MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT (OPEN COURT)

%

1. The petitioner seeks a direction to the respondents that his candidature to the post of Sub-Inspector (General Duty) [hereafter referred to as "SI(GD)"], be reconsidered. The petitioner was apparently successful in the recruitment process and was offered appointment to the post, by letter dated 17.01.2012. The letter allowed him to join, on or before 17.02.2012. At that stage, the petitioner sought for extension of time for reporting, stating that he was suffering from typhoid. The respondents extended the time and allowed him to join by 03.03.2012. Before that date, he made a second representation, seeking further extension, stating that he had not fully recovered. The respondents considered his application and granted him time till 16.07.2012, i.e. a period of four months. The petitioner did not report.

W.P.(C) 759/2013 Page 1 When he did seek to join duties, by a letter dated 20.08.2012, the respondents rejected his candidature. The petitioner challenges this action, submitting that the concerned instruction, entitling the candidate to report for duties within a maximum period of six months, within which he could seek extension, is arbitrary. The respondents, appearing on advance notice, relied upon the Central Government, (Ministry of Home Affairs) Office Memorandum of 06.06.1978 (No.9/23/71-Estt (D)]. This instruction states, by clause (i), that an offer of appointment should clearly specify the period (which shall not normally exceed one or two months) after which the offer would lapse automatically.

2. Clause (ii) states that, "an offer of appointment would lapse automatically after the expiry of six months from the date of issue of the original offer of appointment". It further provides that, "the candidates who join within the above period of six months will have their seniority fixed under the seniority rules applicable to the service/post concerned to which they are appointed, without any depression of seniority".

3. Clause (iii) again suggests that the total period of extension for reporting to duties would not exceed six months.

4. The tenor of the instructions relied upon by the respondents highlight that the offer of appointment would be valid for an outer limit of 6 months within which it is open to the appointing authority to deal with the representations, keeping in view the exigencies and circumstances.

5. Clause (iv) is the only exception and states that, "an offer of appointment which has lapsed, should not ordinarily be revived later, except in exceptional circumstances and on grounds of public interest. The Commission should in all cases be consulted before such offers are

W.P.(C) 759/2013 Page 2 revived."

6. This Court is of the opinion that having regard to the nature of instructions which bind the respondents, the petitioner's claim to be allowed to join duties; and an appropriate directions under Article 226 be issued in that regard, cannot be entertained. The Office Memorandum prescribes, as a matter of policy, that the candidate should report for duties within a period of a month or two. The government authority is granted discretion to give such time as is suitable in each case, having regard to the nature of the recruitments/appointment in issue. Thereafter, it lays down a general rule that the entire offer of appointment would be valid only for a period of six months. This Court, in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot second-guess and take a different view on such a policy issue. Having said that, the Court is conscious of the fact that Clause (iv) of the Office Memorandum recognized that there may be certain exceptional circumstances where the candidate will be entitled to receive sympathetic consideration. However, even that is hedged in by the requirement of "public interest", a necessary pre-requisite which should guide every order of the concerned authority who decides to revive an offer of appointment beyond the period of six months.

7. In a similar matter titled Ajay Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P.(C) 267/2013, decided on 16.01.2013) while upholding the validity of the aforesaid Office Memorandum dated 06.06.1978 [No.9/23/71-Estt(D)], this Court has held, inter alia, as follows:

"10.......................It goes without saying that every offer of appointment should be finite in point of time, more so, in case of a public appointment. The recruiting agency and the competent authority are duty bound to follow transparent

W.P.(C) 759/2013 Page 3 selection processes consistent with the dictates of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which mean that vacancies for various posts should be advertised, the last date for entertaining applications clearly notified and the written test or other mode adopted for selection and notified well in advance. Once this stage is over, the result - in the form of a select list - is again duly notified to the concerned candidates or publically. This is followed up by an offer of appointment to all successful candidates. The need to indicate a time within which or a date by which the candidate should report for duty needs to be hardly emphasized. This is because if a given candidate applies for more than one post, either in the same recruitment process or in a different one, and is selected, he gets a choice for opting for one of them. Often candidates - who might be successful later in a recruitment process - lose interest on account of a better offer elsewhere or upon their having obtained employment before the result is notified. In other words, the time for reporting signifies both, the candidate's willingness to join duty and at the same time complete the acceptance of the offer of appointment from his end resulting in a contract of service. If this part were to be open ended, recruiting agencies would be groping in the dark as to the total number of candidates who finally elect to join duties. This will lead to anomalous and chaotic results such as inability to advertise future vacancies for the succeeding recruitment process................."

And further that;

"11. This Court sees neither arbitrariness nor discrimination in regard to the stipulation of a fixed period within which a successful candidate has to report for duties to his post. As discussed previously, if discretion is allowed to individual appointing authorities, the resultant chaos would throw out of gear the entire process of filling up of vacancies and jeopardize the management of a cadre. Besides, each department or agency in the government would be clueless about the number of vacancies it possesses and indeed the number of successful candidates who are waiting in line to join at a given point of

W.P.(C) 759/2013 Page 4 time. It is quite likely that a large number of posts would remain unmanned and unfilled awaiting individual predilections of selected candidates who would join according to their convenience. To avoid such anomalous and possibly disastrous eventualities, a uniform approach was directed by the OM of 6.6.1978 as modified by the later Memorandum of 9.8.1995. The Memorandum relied upon by the petitioner of 28.8.1997, in no way, detracts from the instructions and contents of the two previous Office Memoranda. Both are clearly reasonable and non-discriminatory."

8. In the present case, the conceded facts are that the petitioner's request for extension were granted on two occasions. He appears to have applied for extension yet again on 16.07.2012 (the copy of which has not been annexed to the present proceeding), which was rejected by the respondents, on 23.07.2012.

9. Having regard to these conspectus of facts, the Court is of the opinion that the impugned decision does not suffer from any infirmity and no ground is made out for the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly rejected.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT (JUDGE)

SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA (JUDGE) FEBRUARY 08, 2013 'ajk'

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