Delhi High Court

Suneel Menon @ Mookul Maruthur ... vs State & Anr. on 12 December, 2013

Author: Sunita Gupta

$~
*        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                           DATE OF DECISION: 12th DECEMBER, 2013


+        CRL.REV.P. 568/2013 & CRL.M.A.17943/2013

         SUNEEL MENON @ MOOKUL MARUTHUR SUNEEL.....
                                                       Petitioner
                      Through Mr. Vikram Choudhary, and Mr.
                              Raktim Gogoi, Advocates.
                      versus
         STATE & ANR.                           ..... Respondent
                      Through Ms. Asha Tiwari, APP for the State.
                              Mr. Vikas Arora and Mr. Aneesh
                              Dhingra, Advocates for R-2

+        CRL.REV.P. 575/2013 & CRL.M.A.17942/2013
         SUNEEL MENON @ MOOKUL MARUTHUR SUNEEL......
                                                     Petitioner
                        Through   Mr. Vikram Choudhary, and Mr.
                                  Raktim Gogoi, Advocates.
                        versus
         STATE & ANR.                               ..... Respondent
                        Through   Ms. Asha Tiwari, APP for the State.
                                  Mr. Vikas Arora and Mr. Aneesh
                                  Dhingra, Advocates for R-2.
+        CRL.REV.P. 580/2013 & CRL.M.A.17943/2013
         SUNEEL MENON @ MOOKUL MARUTHUR SUNEEL....
                                                    Petitioner
                        Through   Mr. Vikram Choudhary, and Mr.
                                  Raktim Gogoi, Advocates.
                        versus
         STATE & ANR.                               ..... Respondent
                        Through   Ms. Asha Tiwari, APP for the State.
                                  Mr. Vikas Arora and Mr. Aneesh
                                  Dhingra, Advocates for R-2.
         CORAM:
         HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SUNITA GUPTA

                                    JUDGMENT

: SUNITA GUPTA, J.

1. Vide this common judgment, I shall dispose of three Criminal Rev.

Petitions bearing Nos. 568/2013, 575/2013, and 580/2013 u/s 397 read

with Section 482 Cr.P.C challenging the impugned judgment dated

04.10.2013 passed by learned District and Sessions Judge, Saket, New

Delhi.

2. The factual matrix of the case leading to the filing of the present

revision petitions are as under:-

3. Petitioner/accused is the Chairman of Reminiscent (India)

Television Ltd. He approached the complainant for settlement in civil suit

bearing CS(OS)No.575/2005 pending in this Court for recovery titled as

P.K.Bajaj vs. Remniscent (India) Television Ltd. for recovery of Rs. 90

lakhs. The suit was compromised for a sum of Rs.90 lakhs. The accused

issued three cheques of Rs. 30 lakhs each and handed over the same to the

complainant on 09.11.2006 in Patiala House Courts. On presentation, the

cheques were dishonoured with remarks "funds insufficient". Thereafter a

legal notice was sent to the accused by the complainant calling upon him to

make payment of the cheque amount. On failure of the accused to make

payment of the cheque amount within the stipulated period, separate

complaints u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (for short "N.I") Act

were filed.

4. The accused was summoned. Notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C was served

upon the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. After

completing trial, vide order dated 08.02.2013, learned Metropolitan

Magistrate convicted the petitioner for offence u/s 138 of the N.I Act.

Vide order dated 14.03.2013, the petitioner was sentenced to undergo

simple imprisonment for a period of 18 months and pay a compensation of

the cheque amount along with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of

filing of the complaint till that date, in default of payment of

compensation, he was to undergo further simple imprisonment for 3

months.

5. Feeling aggrieved by this order, appeals were preferred before the

learned District and Sessions Judge(South). However, the same were

dismissed vide detailed order dated 04.10.2013. Challenging the said

order, the present revision petitions have been filed.

6. During the pendency of the revision petition, an application u/s 482

Cr.P.C read with Section 147 of the N.I Act as well as 320(5) of the Cr.P.C

has been filed by the petitioner stating therein that the parties have been in

litigation with each other over certain commercial transactions which

included arbitration proceedings, two criminal cases filed against the

respondent at Mumbai and the present proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I Act

initiated by the respondent against the petitioner. Now the parties have

arrived at an amicable settlement and in pursuance thereof, a settlement

agreement has been executed on 26.11.2013. In view of the settlement

arrived at between the parties, the parties be permitted to compound the

offence and the petitioner be acquitted of the charges levelled against him.

It was further prayed that in terms of the settlement arrived at between the

parties, the Registrar General of this Court be directed to release the

amount of Rs. 30 lakhs in favour of the respondent/complainant and return

the balance amount of Rs. 30 lakhs to the petitioner out of the total amount

of Rs. 60 lakhs lying deposited with the Registrar General of this Court.

Further Trial Court be directed to release the FDR worth Rs. 30 lakhs in

favour of the petitioner.

7. Counsel for respondent No.2, Mr. Vikas Arora, submitted that in

terms of the settlement agreement, he has no objection to the disposal of

the revision petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on

K.M.Ibrahim v. K.P.Mohammed & Anr., 2009(14) Scale 262 for

submitting that offence u/s 138 of the N.I Act can be compounded at any

stage of the proceedings.

8. K.M.Ibrahim(supra) was a case where the complaint was filed u/s

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the conviction was upheld upto

the High Court. Matter went to Supreme Court. The parties settled their

disputes and it was observed as under:-

"9. The object of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which would not in the strict sense of the term apply to a proceeding under the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881, gives the parties to the proceedings an opportunity to compound offences mentioned in the table contained in the said section, with or without the leave of the court, and also vests the court with jurisdiction to allow such compromise. By virtue of Sub-section (8), the Legislature has taken one step further in vesting jurisdiction in the Court to also acquit the accused/convict of the offence on the same being allowed to be compounded. Inasmuch as, it is with a similar object in mind that Section 147 has been inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, by amendment, an analogy may be drawn as to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in Section 320(8) Cr.P.C., although, the same has not been expressly mentioned in the amended section to a proceeding under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act.

10. Apart from the above, this Court is further empowered under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass appropriate orders in line with Sub-section (8) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. in an application under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act, in order to do justice to the parties.

11. As far as the non-obstante clause included in Section 147 of the 1881 Act is concerned, the 1881 Act being a special statute, the provisions of Section 147 will have an overriding effect over the provisions of the Code relating to compounding of offences. The various decisions cited by Mr. Rohtagi on this issue does not add to the above position.

12. It is true that the application under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was made by the parties after the proceedings had been concluded before the Appellate Forum. However, Section 147 of the aforesaid Act does not bar the parties from compounding an offence under Section 138 even at the appellate stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, we find no reason to reject the application under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act even in a proceeding under Article 136 of the Constitution.

13. Since the parties have settled their disputes, in keeping with the spirit of Section 147 of the Act, we allow the parties to compound the offence, set aside the judgment of the courts below and acquit the appellant of the charges against him."

9. This view was reaffirmed subsequently in Damodar S. Prabhu v.

Sayed Babalal H.,(2010) 5 SCC 663.

9. Keeping in view the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, since

offence u/s 138 of the N.I Act can be compounded at any stage of the

proceedings and now the matter has been amicably settled between the

parties, the parties are allowed to compound the offence.

10. Learned APP for the State, however, submitted that in view of the

guidelines given by Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu(supra), the

petitioner should be directed to deposit 15% of the cheque amount in the

Legal Aid. In this regard it is submitted by learned counsel for the

petitioner that only guidelines were given, which are not mandatory in

nature. Moreover, in the instant case there were multifarious litigations

between the parties and by virtue of this litigation, all the pending

litigations have come to an end. That being so, this is not a fit case where

any such direction is warranted.

11. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 submitted that in view of the

amicable settlement between the parties, he does not press for imposition

of the cost.

12. Damodar (supra) was a case where appeals were preferred in respect

of the litigation involving the offence u/s 138 of the N.I Act, 1881. The

matter was compounded and as such the compounding was allowed. The

conviction was set aside. However, a submission was made by the

Attorney General that majority of cheque bounce cases are being

compromised or settled by way of compounding during the later stages of

litigation thereby contributing to undue delay in justice delivery, as such

certain guidelines are required to be given. As such following guidelines

were given:-

"21(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.