Delhi High Court
M/S Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. vs Life Insurance Corporation on 27 March, 2012
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 27th March, 2012
+ LPA No.239/2012
% M/S KIRLOSKAR BROTHERS LTD. ....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Bahar U. Barqi, Adv.
Versus
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Mohinder Singh & Mr. Ankur
Goel, Advs.
AND
+ LPA No.240/2012
% M/S KIRLOSKAR BROTHERS LTD. ....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Bahar U. Barqi, Adv.
Versus
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Mohinder Singh & Mr. Ankur
Goel, Advs.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
JUDGMENT
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. These Intra-Court appeals impugn the common order dated
14th March, 2012 of the learned Single Judge dismissing W.P.(C) No.
1445/2012 and W.P.(C) No. 1446/20152 preferred by the appellant. The
said writ petitions were filed impugning the common judgment dated
24th February, 2012 of the District Judge exercising powers as an Appellate
Authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971, dismissing the two appeals preferred by the appellant against the
orders of the Estate Officer of the respondent LIC, of eviction of the
appellant from premises ad measuring 4448 sq. ft. situated on the ground
floor of Jeevan Tara Building, 5, Parliament Street, New Delhi and,
assessing the damages for unauthorized use and occupation thereof by the
appellant.
2. It is not in dispute that the term of the lease granted by the respondent
LIC to the appellant of the said premises expired on 31 st January, 2010. The
occupation by the appellant of the said premises thereafter was without any
authority from the respondent LIC.
3. The argument of the counsel for the appellant before us is twofold.
Firstly, it is contended that invocation of the PP Act for evicting the
appellant was in contravention of the instructions/guidelines notified by the
Central Government on 30th May, 2002; that as per the said guidelines, the
proceedings under the PP Act are to be invoked only against rank
trespassers and not against tenants whose lease has expired or has been
determined. Secondly, it is contended that the appellant has been a tenant in
the said premises since 1970 and has spent huge amounts on interiors of the
said property; that the respondent LIC as a public sector undertaking is
bound to renew the lease in favour of the appellant on increase of rent by 10
to 15% of the previous rent; reliance in this regard is placed on Mohd.
Ahmad v. Atma Ram Chauhan (2011) 7 SCC 755.
4. As far as the first of the aforesaid argument is concerned, we have
recently in judgment dated 23rd March, 2012 in LPA No.977/2011 titled
LIC of India v. Damyanti Verma held that the said instructions/guidelines
of the year 2002 are not binding and do not come in the way of the
respondent invoking the provisions of the PP Act. Notice was also taken of
the clarificatory order dated 23rd July, 2003 of the Central Government to
the effect that the guidelines dated 30th May, 2002 will not apply to affluent
tenants. The appellant was last paying rent of `2,60,625/- for the said
premises. The appellant would thus clearly fall in the category of 'affluent'.
5. To be fair, the counsel for the appellant also in view of our judgment
in Damyanti Verma (supra) has not addressed on this aspect.
6. As far as the second argument aforesaid is concerned, tenancy/lease is
but a contract. The respondent LIC cannot be compelled to enter into a fresh
lease with the appellant, especially when it has been noticed in the orders of
the District Judge as well as learned Single Judge that the rent offered by the
appellant is much below the prevalent market rents. This Court in Iyer &
Son Pvt. Ltd. V. LIC of India (2007) X AD (Delhi) 643 has held that the
duty of a State agency as LIC is to ensure that it uses its premises/properties
and resources within its control to sub serve the best objectives and which
include an obligation to ensure that it optimizes the best returns. It was thus
held that nothing wrong could be seen in the want of the LIC for better
returns from its properties.
7. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmad (supra) has also not laid down
any such proposition that a landlord or a public sector undertaking which is
a landlord is 'bound' to renew the lease on increase in rent of 10 to 15%
even though the market rent is much more. In the present case the rent last
being paid by the appellant was @ `58.50p per sq. ft. per month. It has been
found by the Estate Officer, the District Judge and the learned Single Judge
that a portion of the second floor of the same building is let out @ `255/-
per sq. ft. per month. Though the counsel for the appellant has before us
argued that the said premises are on second floor of another building and not
of the same building, the fact remains that if a premises on the second floor
is fetching the rent of `255/- per sq. ft. per month, the ground floor would
definitely fetch much more. From our own experience of life and knowledge
of the city of Delhi, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the market
rent of the premises in occupation of the appellant would be in excess of
`300 per sq. ft. per month. As against that, the appellant is offering to pay
`60/- to 65/- per sq. ft. per month. We do not see any justification for
granting such largesse to the appellant, to the prejudice and loss of the
respondent LIC which is a public sector undertaking. As far as the plea of
the appellant having spent monies in doing up the interiors of the premises
is concerned, in the face of the admitted position of the term of the lease
being till 31st January, 2010 only, the same is irrelevant. The said plea does
not constitute a ground in law or facts to defeat the right of respondent LIC
to eject the appellant who has no authority or right to continue in occupation
of the premises. Thus no merit is found in the second contention also of the
appellant.
8. We even otherwise do not find any reason to interfere with the
concurrent findings of the Estate Officer and the District Judge, affirmed by
the learned Single Judge of this Court. There is no merit in these appeals;
the same are dismissed. We refrain from imposing any costs on the
appellant.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
MARCH 27, 2012
'pp '
