Ramayan Mehto vs State
2012 Latest Caselaw 1967 Del

*             HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+             BAIL APPLN. 1865/2011

                                           Date of Decision : 22.3.2012

       RAMAYAN MEHTO                         ..... Petitioner
                            Through:   Mr. B.S. Chowdhary, Adv.

                     versus

       STATE                                 ..... Respondent
                            Through:   Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP

                     WITH

       BAIL APPLN. 141/2012

       PRADEEP KUMAR                        ..... Petitioner
                            Through:   Mr. B.S. Chowdhary, Adv.

                     versus

       STATE                                 ..... Respondent
                            Through:   Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP

                     WITH

       BAIL APPLN. 142/2012

       PUSHPA @HEMANTI                         ..... Petitioner
                    Through:           Mr. B.S. Chowdhary, Adv.

                     versus

       STATE                                 ..... Respondent
                            Through:   Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

V.K. SHALI, J. (ORAL)

1. These are three connected anticipatory bail applications in respect

of FIR No.345/2011 registered by PS:Burari, Delhi under Section

498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The application bearing No.1865/2011 has been filed by Mr.

Ramayan Mehto, the father-in-law; application bearing

No.141/2012 has been filed by Mr. Pradeep Kumar, the brother-in-

law and the application bearing No.142/2012 has been filed by Ms.

Pushpa @ Hemanti, the sister-in-law of the deceased.

3. The case of the prosecution against the petitioners is that Anju,

aged about 24 years, got married to one Manoj Kumar, r/o House

No.65, Gali No.4, Baba Colony, Burari, Delhi on 13.12.2009. At the

time of marriage, the father-in-law, Ramayan Mehto and the

brother-in-law, Pradeep Kumar had allegedly demanded a dowry of

Rupees 3,00,000/-, by way of cash, which was given by the parents

of the deceased. It has also been stated in the complaint that some

jewellery articles and other household goods were given at the time

of marriage, but from the date of marriage itself, Anju, the

deceased, kept complaining to her mother, as and when she would

meet her, that her brother-in-law, Pradeep Kumar, two sisters-in-

law, Pushpa and Manorama and the father-in-law, Ramayan Mehto

were subjecting her to harassment and cruelty, with a view to

demand dowry. It was also alleged in the complaint that on

10.11.2011, the mother of the deceased learnt that Manoj, the

husband, wanted the parents of the deceased to give him money for

the purchase of a 50 sq. yds. plot of land so that he could live

separately along with his wife. On 10.11.2011, at around 5:00 P.M.,

the mother of the deceased received intimation that her daughter

had hanged herself. The parents of the deceased came to Delhi

from Moradabad, UP and learnt about the alleged suicide committed

by their daughter who had hanged herself with the help of a

dupatta. The Sub Divisional Magistrate of Civil Lines, Delhi was

called by the local Police who had been given the information. He

recorded the statement of the mother and put the criminal justice

machinery into motion, because of which the FIR in question was

registered. Supplementary statements of the mother of the

deceased, Phoolwati, the father of the deceased, Lallan Mahto and

other persons were also recorded.

4. So far as the husband Manoj is concerned, he is already in custody.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that if one reads

the entire FIR, the main thrust of the allegations of the demand

of dowry and harassment are leveled against the husband, Manoj

who is already in custody. So far as the petitioners are concerned,

there are no specific allegations against them for demand of dowry

or subjecting the deceased to cruelty which can prima facie show

that an offence under Section 304-B of the IPC had been committed

by them. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the

petitioners that there has to be some proximity of time between the

demand of dowry and the date of death of the deceased so as to

enable the Court to draw a presumption against the petitioners,

while as, in the instant case, no such contingency is available.

5. The second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is

that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors.

-vs- State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 as well as in Siddharam

Satlingappa Mhetre -vs- State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2011)

1 SCC (Cri) 514 has interpreted the law regarding the grant of

anticipatory bail very liberally, as it has put very high premium on

the individuals liberty. It has been contended that a perusal of these

two judgments would show that unless and until it is immensely

imperative, an accused should not be arrested. It has been

contended that the gravity of the charge and the exact role of the

accused must be properly comprehended before he is arrested, as

the arrest brings a great deal of ignominy to the arrestee.

6. The learned APP has vehemently opposed the application for the

grant of anticipatory bail to all the three accused persons. It has

been contended by the learned APP that the death of the deceased

had taken place in less than two years from the date of her

marriage and, therefore, by virtue of Section 113-B of the Indian

Evidence Act, this presumption of the death, being a dowry death,

can be drawn. It has also been contended that the specific roles

have been attributed to the petitioners in the instant case. With

regard to Pushpa/sister-in-law, it has been contended by the

learned APP that the learned counsel for the defence is contending

that Ms. Pushpa is a married woman and living separately along

with her son, while as, in the order of the Court of Sessions, dated

25.1.2012, this fact has been conceded by the learned counsel

representing the petitioners that Ms. Pushpa is deserted by her

husband and she is living with her father in the matrimonial home

of the deceased. Therefore, it is stated that this is not correct

to urge that Ms. Pushpa, being married, was living separately. So

far as her role is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners

has drawn the attention of the Court to the averments where a

specific role of having physically abused the deceased has been

given. Same is the case with Mr. Pradeep, the brother-in-law. So far

as the father-in-law is concerned, it was contended by the learned

APP that he was living in a joint family and was subjecting the

deceased to the demand of dowry inasmuch as the father-in-law

had allegedly asked the deceased to get more dowry from her

parents and was using his son for this purpose.

7. The learned APP has also contended that so far as the judgments,

which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the

petitioners are concerned, they lay down the general principles of

the grant of anticipatory bail in different circumstances but it does

not lay down that the anticipatory bail is to be given in each and

every case, irrespective of the role attributable to an accused in the

commission of the offence.

8. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for

the parties.

9. The case is still at the threshold of investigation and the allegations

against the petitioners are very serious. If one sees the content of

the FIR and the supplementary statements, this clearly shows that

an innocent and young lady had lost her life in just less than two

years of her matrimonial alliance, without any justification. The

mother of the deceased has attributed specific role to all the parties

and, therefore, it cannot be stated that the petitioners are not

prima facie responsible for the commission of the offence. In any

case, these roles have to be investigated by the Police.

10. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that

in case where there is an unfortunate death of a woman,

everybody who is living in a joint family is sought to be enroped.

No doubt, such a tendency exists, but it cannot be said that in

each and every case, as a matter of course, all the members are

sought to be enroped and even if their names are mentioned, the

Court is under an obligation to see the role of each and every

accused before the denial or the grant of the bail.

11. In the instant case, I have gone through the contents of the FIR as

well as the supplementary statements in Court with the help of the

learned APP and it can be stated that prima facie there is a definite

role and accusation made against all the three petitioners.

12. As regards the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

two cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are

concerned, it cannot be said that as a matter of law, it has been

laid down that the bail be granted in all the cases where the

death has taken place in less than seven years of the marriage.

On the contrary, it has been specifically observed by the Court

that while considering the grant of the anticipatory bail, the Court

must look at the accusations and the specific role attributed to

such persons. The role attributed to such persons will be seen

only on the basis of the statements recorded under Section 161

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and not only on the basis

of the FIR. In the instant case, after the perusal of the statements

of the mother of the deceased, the FIR and the other connected

documents, I am of the prima facie view that there is a specific

role attributed to the petitioners which needs to be investigated

by the Courts. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in

Samunder Singh -vs- State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 SC 737,

has deprecated the practice of grant of bail in cases of dowry

deaths.

13. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, I am of the considered

view that these are not the fit cases where the grant of exercise

of discretion of anticipatory bail ought to be extended to the

petitioners. Accordingly, all the three petitions are dismissed.

V.K. SHALI, J MARCH 22, 2012 tp