Delhi High Court
Uttarakhand Transport ... vs Ram Sakal Mahto & Anr on 1 June, 2012
Author: G.P. Mittal
$~20
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision:1st June, 2012
+ MAC. APP. No.649/2012
UTTARAKHAND TRANSPORT CORPORATION
..... Appellant
Through: Ms. Garima Prashad, Advocate
Versus
RAM SAKAL MAHTO & ANR.
..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Manju Wadhwa with Ms.
Arpan Wadhwa, Advocates for the
Respondent No.7 Insurance
Company.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL
JUDGMENT
G. P. MITTAL, J. (ORAL)
C.M. APPL Nos.10521/2012 & 10522/2012 (Exemption)
Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
The applications stand disposed of.
MAC. APP. No.649/2012 & CM. APPL No.10523/2012
1. The Appellant Uttarakhand Transport Corporation impugns a
judgment dated 27.04.2011 passed by the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal(the Claims Tribunal) whereby while awarding
a compensation of `4,00,000/- in favour of the Respondents
No.1 to 6, the Respondent No.7 was given right to recover the
compensation from the Appellant (the insured) because of the
willful breach of the terms of the insurance policy by the
insured.
2. Along with the Appeal, an Application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has been filed for condonation of delay.
3. It is admitted case of the parties that this accident occurred on
18.02.2007 wherein deceased Ashok Kumar suffered fatal
injuries. The Claim Petition was filed on 30.04.2007. The
Appellant filed a written statement contesting the claim of the
Respondents No.1 to 6. On appreciation of the evidence, the
Claims Tribunal found that the accident was caused because of
the rash and negligent driving of Balam Singh (the First
Respondent before the Claims Tribunal), who was the driver of
bus No.UA-07M-7760 owned by the Appellant. The
compensation was computed taking the deceased's income to
be `3,470/- per month. The grounds set up for condonation of
delay in the Application are extracted hereunder:
"3. That the said Award has come to the knowledge of
the Appellant Corporation, only when the
execution filed by the Insurance Company, then the
copy of the impugned judgment along with the
legal opinion was sent to the Dehradun Regional
office of the Corporation and thereafter it was sent
to the Head office of the Corporation wherein after
obtaining requisite clearance from the concerned
legal department, the file has been received by the
Regional office for filing the present appeal. The
Regional office has thereafter given the file to its
counsel for filing the appeal.
4. That the delay is neither intentional nor caused by
any default on the part of the Appellant but has
been occasioned by reasons beyond the control of
the Appellant Corporation."
4. The Appellant is completely silent as to why the award came to
its knowledge only when the execution proceedings were
initiated by the Seventh Respondent against the Appellant
particularly when the Appellant was contesting the Claim
Petition. There is a delay of 308 days in filing the Appeal.
5. The courts normally do not throw away the meritorious lis on
hypertechnical grounds. The primary function of a court is to
adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance
substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the
Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such
time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They
are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but
seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury.
The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for
the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation
is thus founded on public policy. The idea is that every legal
remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of
time. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the
Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such
discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain
limit.
6. Principles enunciated for condonation of delay are well settled.
Expression 'sufficient cause' should be given liberal
interpretation so as to advance substantial justice between the
parties(Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010) 8 SCC 685;
State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi (Dead) By LRs and
Others (2009) 13 SCC 192; Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao
(2002) 3 SCC 195; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
(1998) 7 SCC 123; G.Ramegowda, Major and Others v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore and
Basavalingappa v. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142). It is not the length of delay
which is material for condonation of delay in filing an Appeal
but the acceptability of the explanation. There may be cases
where a few months' delay may not be condoned as an
applicant has no reasonable explanation to offer for the same,
yet there are cases where delay of several years has been
condoned(State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Others (2005) 3
SCC 752; Ramnath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195;
M.K.Prasad v. P. Arumugam 2001 (6) SCC 176; State of Bihar
v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another 2000 (9) SCC 94;
N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123). The
law that each day's delay must be explained has mellowed
down yet it has to be shown by the applicant that there was
neither any gross negligence nor any inaction, nor want of
bonafides.
7. I have already extracted above the grounds set up by the
Appellant for condonation of delay. There is not even a
whisper as to when the Appellant stopped appearing before the
Claims Tribunal and the reasons for the same. The delay of 308
days, of course, a long delay can be condoned provided there is
sufficient cause to explain the same. Since the Appellant has
failed to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the
Application cannot be allowed.
8. Otherwise also, the Appellant's case is that it had been issued a
permit under Section 103 of the Motor Vehicles Act(the Act).
This fact was required to be established by the Appellant during
inquiry before the Claims Tribunal which the Appellant failed
to do so even in spite of service of the notice under Order XII
Rule 8 CPC upon it and which was proved by R3W1 Vikram
Singh, who was examined by the Seventh Respondent.
9. In the circumstances, I do not find sufficient ground to condone
the delay. Consequently, the Application and the Appeal are
dismissed.
10. Pending Applications stand disposed of.
(G.P. MITTAL)
JUDGE
JUNE 01, 2012
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