Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2462 Del
Judgement Date : 9 May, 2011
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 9th MAY, 2011
+ W.P.(C) 9051/2008
% M/s GOLDY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY .... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Moni Cinmoy, Adv.
Versus
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ajay Arora & Mr. Sarfraz
Ahmed, Advocates
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported No
in the Digest?
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The writ petition impugns the Circular dated 27th November,
2008 of the respondent MCD intimating to the petitioner and others
concerned of the petitioner having failed to honour its contractual
obligations under the Work Order dated 8th December, 2006 (for
construction of twelve (12) Class Rooms at M.C. Primary School,
Baljeet Nagar in Karol Bagh Zone), and of the competent authority,
vide order dated 7 th November, 2008 having debarred the petitioner
from the approved panel of MCD for a period of three years.
2. Notice of the writ petition and of the application for interim
relief was issued and counter affidavit filed by the respondent MCD. It
was inter alia the contention of the petitioner that the notice to show
cause leading to the order debarring the petitioner and the order
debarring the petitioner had not been issued by the authority
empowered to issue such a notice and order and the order debarring it
was liable to be set aside on this ground alone. The respondent MCD
filed an additional affidavit on the said aspect along with documents, to
show that the show cause notice as well as the order had been made by
the authorities empowered in that regard. Though opportunity for
filing response thereto was granted to the petitioner on 1 st December,
2009 but no response to said additional affidavit was filed by the
petitioner. This Court vide order dated 19 th January, 2010 dismissed
the application of the petitioner for interim relief. The counsels for the
parties have been heard.
3. The order dated 7th November, 2008 debarring the petitioner and
of which intimation was given vide Circular dated 27 th November,
2008, has not been filed by either of the parties. It is the contention of
the petitioner that the respondent MCD has failed to provide copy of
the said order to the petitioner. The respondent MCD in its counter
affidavit neither specifically dealt with the said plea, nor as aforesaid,
filed copy of the order debarring the petitioner. The respondent MCD
however along with its additional affidavit (though filed on the aspect
of the authority empowered to take action for debarring) has filed as
Annexure-B thereto the photocopy of its noting file which shows that
the authority empowered to so debar has not passed any speaking order
but merely appended its signatures on 7 th November, 2008 to the
proposal submitted before it for (i) forfeiting the earnest money,
(ii)rescinding and recalling the tender at the risk and cost of the
petitioner, (iii) debarring the petitioner for three years and
(iv)imposition of penalty of 10% of the tender amount on the petitioner
for delaying / not executing the work.
4. The counsel for the petitioner has referred to:
(i) Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West
Bengal AIR 1975 SC 266 laying down that blacklisting
has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege
and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the
Government for purposes of gain; the fact that a disability
is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the
relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction;
fundamentals of fair play require that the person
concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his
case before he is put on the blacklist.
(ii) M/s. Southern Painters Vs. Fertilizers & Chemicals
Travancore Ltd. AIR 1994 SC 1277 also laying down that
compliance of principles of natural justice i.e. of prior
notice and opportunity of hearing is a must before
blacklisting.
(iii) M/s. V.K. Dewan and Co. Vs. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi 1994 (29) DRJ 522 laying down that in the absence
of a provision to the said effect in the contract, no
blacklisting can be ordered.
(iv) Mekaster Trading Corporation Vs. Union of India
106(2003) DLT 573 laying down that where the order of
blacklisting is passed in a slipshod manner and does not
indicate as to what are the elements which persuaded the
competent authority to reject the contentions of the
blacklisted contractor and where the competent authority
gave no reasons for conclusion that submissions of the
blacklisted contractor were unconvincing; such order
cannot stand judicial scrutiny. It was further held that
though this Court in exercise of power of judicial review
does not sit as an appellate authority over the decision of
the competent authority and is thus not to test the merits of
the decision but the decision making process is to be
examined by the Court. In that case, the order of
blacklisting, after making recital of the events which
transpired after the show cause notice issued, i.e. filing of
replies by the petitioner therein, giving of hearings to both
the parties who explained their respective cases, in the
penultimate para merely recorded that the case had been
examined and heard and the sum and substance of the
allegations made against the petitioner in that case was
that the petitioner could not fulfill its contractual
obligations and the reasons given by the petitioner could
not be found to be convincing; the pleas taken by the
petitioner therein were not dealt with. This Court held the
order of blacklisting to be without reasons and further held
that the requirement that the reasons must meet the
substance of the principal arguments was found to be
lacking.
(v) Vinay Construction Co. Vs. MCD 116 (2005) DLT 14
where also it was held that the requirement of giving show
cause notice and hearing is not an empty formality and
there has to be detailed finding and the authority which
had to decide the question of delisting has to itself give the
hearing and reasons for delisting.
5. In my opinion in the facts of the present case, the principles laid
down in Mekaster Trading Corporation and in Vinay Construction
Co. (supra) apply on all fours. In Mekaster Trading Corporation there
was atleast an order, which was held to be without reasons. In the
present case, there is no order dated 7th November, 2008 of debarring
the petitioner. All that has been produced in the name of the order
dated 7th November, 2008 is the signature of the authority empowered
to debar, approving the action proposed by its subordinate officer. In
fact the subordinate officer also while putting up the proposal for
approval of the competent authority has not given any reason and
merely stated that the proprietor of the petitioner in the personal
hearing had agreed to start work on or before 18 th September, 2008 but
did not start the work "till date". The said proposal is dated 17 th
October, 2008. Only for the reason of the proprietor of the petitioner in
the hearing held having agreed to commence the work on or before 18 th
September, 2008 and having not so commenced the work till 17 th
October, 2008, the action aforesaid was proposed. There is no writing
of the petitioner having so agreed to commence the work. Rather it is
the case of the petitioner that it was to so commence the work subject
to certain conditions which remained uncomplied by the MCD. The
petitioner relies on contemporaneous correspondence in this regard, all
of which was not considered, neither by subordinate officer proposing
action of debarring the petitioner, nor by the authority competent to
debar. In the absence of any order by such authority, it is not known as
to what prevailed with it to approve the action of debarring the
petitioner.
6. The respondent MCD in the present case had given a notice
dated 3rd October, 2007 to the petitioner to show cause as to why
actions contemplated under Clause 3 of the Contract/Work Order i.e. of
rescission of contract, getting work done at the risk and prejudice of the
petitioner and of imposition of penalty (proposal to debar was not
mentioned therein though mentioned in subsequent letter dated 5 th
March, 2008) should not be taken against the petitioner for the reason
of having not even started the work which under the Work Order dated
8th December, 2006 was to be completed within 10 months. Thereafter
vide letter dated 2nd January, 2008 provisional extension of time for
completion of the work without prejudice to the right of the MCD to
claim liquidated damages was granted till 31 st March, 2008. It was the
case of the petitioner that the work could not be commenced since the
site was not clear, there was no vacant space for stacking the material;
a School was already functioning just adjacent to the site and the
construction work posed danger to the School children; there was hard
rock beneath the surface and due to uneven surface the foundation
could not be laid down properly and the design given was not
applicable / suitable to the site. It was further the contention of the
petitioner that none of the said obstructions / impediments to the work
were removed even while granting extension of time. It was further the
case of the petitioner that all the aforesaid facts had been brought to the
notice of the MCD immediately after the award of the work and a letter
recording the same was also issued on 12th January, 2007.
7. The respondent MCD granted further provisional extension of
time for completion of the work upto 30th June, 2008 but the petitioner
continued to complain of the obstructions / impediments aforesaid.
The respondent MCD once again vide notice dated 22 nd May, 2008
asked the petitioner to show cause as to why administrative action
should not be initiated against the petitioner.
8. The petitioner again vide its letter dated 5th June, 2008 pointed
out that the obstructions / impediments aforesaid continued to exist.
9. The respondent MCD vide letter dated 22 nd September, 2008
provisionally extended the time for completion of the work to 31 st
December, 2008 without prejudice to its rights to recover liquidated
damages. The petitioner was thereafter called for personal hearing and
thereafter as aforesaid approval of the competent authority for
debarring the petitioner was obtained.
10. Neither the proposal put up for approval nor the competent
authority while approving the same has discussed or dealt with the
reasons aforesaid given by the petitioner for being not able to
commence the work. The same would show that the action of
debarring suffers from the same malaise as in the case of Mekaster
Trading Corporation and Vinay Construction Co. and cannot stand
for the same reason.
11. Though the petitioner has in the petition also pleaded that the
action has not been taken by the competent authority but on perusal of
the documents produced, I am satisfied that the approval of the action
was obtained from the competent authority, though the competent
authority does not appear to have applied its mind before approving the
same.
12. I may also notice that though the petitioner has also filed a civil
suit with respect to the other actions approved of but during the hearing
it was informed that the proceedings in that suit are kept pending
awaiting the decision in this petition, since the same questions are
involved. The counsel for MCD has contended that the petitioner
having first filed the suit, is not entitled to maintain this writ petition.
However the petitioner has admittedly not challenged the order
debarring it in the suit. The present petition was filed within a month
of the order of debarring. The suit though entailing the same question
as to application of mind by the Competent Authority, relates to fiscal
penalties imposed. I have not found any factual controversy requiring
adjudication, as far as the question of whether any "decision" was
taking or not. The pendency of the said suit is thus not an impediment
to the maintainability or entertainability of this writ petition.
13. The petitioner has also contended that that in the agreement,
there was no provision for debarring and thus the action impugned is
bad for this reason also, as held in V.K. Dewan & Co. (supra).
However in view of the above, need is not felt to deal with the said
argument.
14. The counsel for MCD has contended that the decision of
debarring, being an administrative reason, the only enquiry in judicial
review permissible is to see that the same is not vindictive, harsh or
disproportionate; that in the present case the petitioner has persistently
defaulted / violated the contract; the petitioner having admittedly not
even started the work, is not entitled to any relief.
15. However in the present case, as aforesaid, there is no "decision"
also of the authorities empowered to debar. The obligation to give
show cause notice and hearing entails corresponding duty to give
reasons for not agreeing with the reply to the show cause notice. In the
present case, the respondent MCD has failed to discharge such duty.
So in law, there is no "decision", of which information was given vide
Circular dated 27th November, 2008.
16. The purported order of the respondent MCD debarring the
petitioner thus cannot be sustained and is set aside / quashed. The writ
petition is allowed with costs of `20,000/- payable by the respondent
MCD to the petitioner within four weeks of today.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) MAY 09, 2011 „gsr‟
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