Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 5114 Del
Judgement Date : 10 November, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on : 02.11.2010
% Judgment delivered on:10.11.2010
+ RSA No. 137/2004 & C.M.7432/2004
PRAVEEN KUMAR WADHWA ........Appellant
Through: Mr. Raman Kapoor, Advocate.
Versus
M/S. ENDURE CAPITAL (P) LTD. .......Respondent
Through: Mr. B.S. Mann with Ms. Smita Mann
and Mr.H. Singh, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Yes
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1. Arguments have been heard on admission. Counsel for the
appellant has submitted that the findings in the impugned
judgment decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent under
Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Code') is a perversity in as much as the
impugned judgment has failed to appreciate that the question
about the ownership of the suit property i.e. property bearing no.
A-190, Inder Puri, New Delhi-12 was yet to be adjudicated upon.
2. It is pointed out that an execution petition had been
preferred by the decree holder, Mr. S.C. Mehta, wherein he had
sought attachment of the suit property; the judgment debtor was
Mr. P.K. Wadhwa (the present appellant) and the Objector before
the Executing Court was the respondent i.e. M/s. Endure Capital
Private Limited. Pursuant to the orders of the High Court an issue
in this regard had been framed by the Executing Court. This is
evident from the order dated 19.02.2003. It is pointed out that in
terms thereof evidence is being led and the matter is yet pending;
the question about the ownership of the respondent/Objector
therein i.e. M/s. Endure Capital Private Ltd. is yet to be decided.
In this view of the matter, a triable issue had arisen and a decree
under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code could not have been passed.
For this proposition, reliance has been placed upon various
judgments of High Court reported in 82 (1999) Delhi Law Times
281 titled as Sh. Mohan Prasad Jha Vs. Sh. Shambu Prasad Singh,
1999 (49) DRJ titled as R.S. Bakshi & Anr. Vs. H.K. Malhari & Anr.
as also another judgment of this court reported in AIR 1992 Delhi
331 titled as Smt. Radha Lal Vs. M/s. Jessop & Company. It is
pointed out that facts which require investigation and proof cannot
be the subject matter of a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the
Code; this provision cannot be resorted to cut short the litigation.
3. Arguments have been countered by the learned counsel for
the respondent. It is pointed out that no doubt an execution
petition had been filed by the decree holder i.e. Sh. S.C. Mehta
against the judgment debtor P.K. Wadhwa (appellant) seeking
attachment of the suit property (bearing no. A-190, Inder Puri, New
Delhi-12) as certain amounts were payable to the decree holder.
Respondent/Objector M/s. Endure Capital Private Ltd., had filed
objections claiming that the suit property cannot be attached as he
is the owner thereof. It was pursuant thereto that an issue had
been framed about the ownership of the suit property. It is pointed
out that those proceedings cannot come in the way of the clear and
unequivocal admission made by the appellant (defendant before
the Trial Court) wherein he had admitted that a lease had been
executed between the parties; the legal notice terminating his
tenancy had also not been disputed. The tenancy having thus
expired by operation of law, the defendant was rightfully ordered
to be ejected.
4. Arguments have been heard.
5. The plaintiff i.e. M/s. Endure Capital Private Limited had filed
a suit for recovery of possession, arrears of rent damages/mesne
profits against P.K. Wadhwa, the defendant. The contention of the
plaintiff was that he was the owner of the second floor of the
property bearing no. A-190, Inder Puri, New Delhi-12. The plaintiff
had purchased it vide a registered sale deed dated 07.09.1995.
Lease deed of the same date i.e. 07.09.1995 had been executed
between the parties i.e. the plaintiff and the defendant. Lease
deed was for a period of seven months. On the expiry of the said
period, it could be renewed for another period of 10 months w.e.f.
07.04.1996. It was a registered lease deed. Rate of rent was Rs.
6000/-. The last paid rent was up to January, 1997. The lease had
expired by the efflux of time on 06.02.1997. The defendant failed
to vacate the suit property. The tenancy of the defendant was also
terminated vide legal notice dated 06.01.1999 duly served upon
him. Defendant did not vacate the property; suit was accordingly
filed.
6. Defendant in para 3 of the written statement had admitted
that a registered sale deed of the said property was executed in
favour of Mr. Dalip Bhatia, who is the Director of the plaintiff
company. The execution of the lease deed between the parties also
stood admitted. It was also admitted that the said lease expired by
efflux of time in February 1997. Relationship of lessor and lessee
stood established. The notice dated 6.1.1999 under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as 'TPA')
terminating the tenancy of the defendant w.e.f. the midnight of
06.02.1999 was also admitted. In the written statement an
objection had been taken that Dalip Bhatia does not have the locus
standi to file the suit. However, it was not disputed that Dalip
Bhatia was the director of the plaintiff company. Another objection
in the written statement was that in 1994-95, the defendant had
entered into an agreement with the erstwhile owner of the
property i.e. Sh. Avtar Singh; however, it was not disputed that
Avtar Singh had thereafter on 7.9.1995 executed the registered
sale deed in favour of the plaintiff company.
7. These admissions were noted by the Trial Judge and
endorsed by the First Appellate Court. Decree for possession and
mesne profits had thereafter followed in favour of the plaintiff. The
impugned judgment had also taken note of the deed of
understanding purported to have been executed in favour of the
defendant on 05.10.1995 by the erstwhile owner, Avtar Singh,
which was admittedly, a transaction after the execution of the
registered sale deed dated 07.09.1995 vide which the title and
ownership of the suit property stood transferred in favour of the
plaintiff. The lease deed executed between the parties had
described the plaintiff as the landlord; the defendant was described
as the tenant; this document was admitted. There were two lease
deeds; the first lease deed was dated 07.09.1995 and the
subsequent lease deed renewing the lease for another period of 10
months was dated 07.05.1996. Both were registered documents.
8. These findings of the Trial Judge endorsed by the First
Appellate Court clearly call for no interference. Both the courts had
rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff under Order 12 Rule 6 of
the Code. The admissions of the defendant/appellant in the written
statement were clear and unambiguous. The appellant/defendant
had clearly and categorically admitted in the written statement
that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property by virtue of the
registered sale deed dated 07.09.1995. The subsequent lease
deeds executed between the parties dated 07.09.1995 and the
second which was the renewal of the initial lease dated 07.04.1996
were also admitted; they were registered documents. Legal notice
terminating the tenancy of the defendant w.e.f. midnight of
06.02.1999 was also not a disputed document. It was not the
contention of the appellant/defendant that this notice was lacking
in legal particulars. Receipt of this notice was not disputed. Rate
of rent was Rs. 6000/-. The suit property was not covered by the
provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. These concurrent
findings of the two courts below call for no interference.
9. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that
the execution proceedings pending before the executing court bar
the applicability of the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC is
clearly a misunderstood proposition. The execution petition was
filed by Sh. S.C. Mehta against the present appellant wherein the
Objector/respondent had filed his objections to ward off the
warrants of attachment which had ordered against the suit
property. The decision of these objections in the execution petition
would not in any manner affect the relationship of landlord and
tenant between the warring parties before this court. Section 116
of the Indian Evidence Act creates an estoppel; the
tenant/appellant is estoppeled from challenging this relationship.
10. Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellant are inapplicable; they are distinct on facts; in this case
the admissions of the appellant/defendant are unambiguous and
clear. There is no merit in the appeal. Appeal as also the pending
application is dismissed in limine.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
NOVEMBER 10, 2010 SS/rb
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