Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 3491 Del
Judgement Date : 27 July, 2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
W.P. (C) 1856/2010 & CMs 3713, 5390, 5682/2010
Reserved on: July 16, 2010
Decision on : July 27, 2010
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING AND
FINANCE ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. N.K. Kaul, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Sanjay Bhatt and
Mr. Kishan Rawat, Advocates.
versus
MUKUL SRIVASTAVA ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Tej Bahadur Verma, Advocate.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? Yes
JUDGMENT
27.07.2010
1.The short question is whether the Indian Institute of Banking &
Finance, the Petitioner herein, is a `public authority‟ within the
meaning of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 („RTI
Act‟).
2. The facts in brief are that the Respondent Mukul Srivastava, an
employee of the Punjab National Bank, enrolled with the Petitioner
Institute and appeared for the Junior Associate of the Indian Institute
of Bankers („JAIIB‟) examination conducted by it under the old
syllabus in December 2003. Although, he passed in the "Single Basic
Accountancy" paper in 2004, he could not clear the remaining
subjects under the old syllabus till December 2005. Even under the
revised syllabus he could not complete the examination by December
2007. He enrolled afresh for the first block of two attempts for JAIIB
examination in May 2008. He remained absent in all three
examinations in May and December 2008. The Respondent took the
on-line examination for the paper on "Legal Aspects of Banking" on
2nd December 2007. By a letter of that date, he requested the
Petitioner for 5 grace marks. The Petitioner replied on 29th December
2007 stating that the said request could not be acceded to. He then
approached the Minister of State for Finance, Government of India
with a similar request. This letter was forwarded to the Petitioner. It
was replied to on 28th February 2008 reiterating that as per the rules of
the examination, candidates were not entitled to any grace marks. This
was followed by a legal notice and a consumer complaint filed by the
Respondent with the District Consumer Forum, New Delhi.
3. In the above background, the Respondent sent a letter dated 24 th
February 2009 to the Petitioner under the RTI Act seeking
information about all the examinees who had appeared for the JAIIB
examination on 18th November 2007 and their respective answer
sheets. In reply to the above letter, the Petitioner informed the
Respondent that the Petitioner was not a public authority under the
RTI Act. Thereafter the Respondent approached the Central
Information Commission („CIC‟).
4. By the impugned order dated 9th February 2010, the CIC held that
the Petitioner was a public authority and directed it to appoint a
Central Public Information Officer („CPIO‟) within 30 days and
provide the information sought for, to the Respondent within the same
period.
5. The summary of the order of the CIC is as under:
(i) The policy making and the executive bodies of the Petitioner
Institute "are substantially manned by the senior executives of
the Public Sector Banks and the bulk of its finances also come
directly or indirectly from those banks."
(ii) The services of the Petitioner "are largely subscribed to and
enjoyed by the Public Sector Banks and their employees."
(iii) There was "a very close relationship between the Public Sector
Banks" and the Petitioner "almost verging on mutual
dependence".
(iv) The Petitioner, "a Non-Governmental Organisation, being
substantially financed by the Public Sector Banks directly and
indirectly is nothing but a public authority".
6. Apart from the above, the CIC observed that the holding of
examinations and setting standards for the banking sector was a public
service, even if the participants had to pay a fee for taking such an
examination. According to the CIC, in this respect, the Petitioner was
no different from the Central Board of Secondary Education, the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, the Institute of Cost and
Works Accountants of India, etc. Consequently, it was held that apart
from fulfilling the condition of "substantial financing as stipulated in
Section 2(h)(d)(ii)", the Petitioner "also performs public service
covering a vast section of population". Consequently, it was
concluded that the Petitioner is a public authority under Section 2(h)
of the RTI Act.
7. While directing notice to be issued to the Respondent on 18th March
2010, this Court stayed the impugned order. The Respondent appeared
through counsel and filed an application being CM No. 5390 of 2010
for directions. Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the
same should be treated as the Respondent‟s reply. With the consent of
both the parties, the petition was taken up for final hearing.
8. This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. N.K. Kaul, learned
Senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. Tej Bahadur
Verma, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent.
9. There appears to be no dispute on the fact that the Petitioner
Institute is a non-governmental organization. Therefore, in order to
ascertain if it is a public authority, it is Section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI
Act that requires to be referred to. The said provision reads as under:-
"2(h) "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted,
-
(a)...
(b)...
(c)...
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government,
and includes any -
(i)...
(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government."
10. The question for determination, as correctly formulated by the
CIC, is whether the Petitioner is "substantially financed directly or
indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government?"
11. The Petitioner was first incorporated as the Indian Institute of
Bankers under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 on 4th April 1928 and
its initial subscribers included the Bank of India and the Imperial
Bank of India. The present Governing Council of the Petitioner
consists of a President, two Vice Presidents and 18 Members, majority
of whom are from public sector banks. One of the main activities of
the Petitioner is to conduct examinations for banking personnel.
Passing in these examinations is a pre-condition for career promotion
in public sector banks. Therefore, a majority of the candidates who
appear in these examinations are from public sector banks. The
member banks and financial institutions give an annual subscription to
the Petitioner Institute and those appearing in the examination pay a
fees to the Petitioner for the service that it provides.
12. What appears to have weighed with the CIC is that the
subscription received by the Petitioner from its member banks and the
fees collected by it from the candidates appearing in the examinations
conducted by it tantamounts to "substantial financing directly or
indirectly by the appropriate Government". S.2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI
Act as it reads is unambiguous. The substantial financing of the
Petitioner directly or indirectly has to be by "the appropriate
Government" and not by any other public authority.
13. It is possible that the member banks, for instance, the State Bank
of India („SBI‟), is itself a public authority. However, `substantial
financing‟ by the SBI would itself not make the Petitioner a `public
authority‟. It would have to be shown that the appropriate
Government itself directly or indirectly finances or has financed the
Petitioner.
14. It is nobody‟s case, and certainly not that of the Respondent, that
there is any substantial financing directly or indirectly of the
Petitioner by the appropriate Government. Counsel for the
Respondent repeatedly referred to the total amount of subscription fee
received from the members of the Petitioner Institute and submitted
that this amount was substantial enough for the Court to come to the
conclusion that the Petitioner is a public authority. This submission, in
the considered view of this Court, is misconceived. The mere
subscription received by the Petitioner from its members, some of
whom may be public authorities within the meaning of Section 2(h) of
the RTI Act and the fees collected by it from the candidates who take
the examinations conducted by it, cannot as such constitute
"substantial financing" by the "appropriate government". That is the
mandate of the statue. If the arguments of the Respondent were to be
accepted then Section 2(h)(d)(ii) should permit substantial financing
directly or indirectly through funds provided by "a public authority".
However, as the statue reads, such substantial financing has to be by
"the appropriate Government". It is not possible to read into Section
2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act words that do not exist.
15. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is not able to concur
with the impugned order of the CIC dated 9th February 2010 which is
hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed, but in the circumstance,
with no order as to costs.
16. Writ petition and the pending applications are accordingly
disposed of.
S. MURALIDHAR, J JULY 27, 2010 ak
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