H.C. Pandey vs North Delhi Power Ltd. And Delhi ...
2007 Latest Caselaw 587 Del

JUDGMENT

J.M. Malik, J.

1. The appellant was appointed as Inspector MTD (Meter Testing Department) in erstwhile Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking (in short "DESU"). The appellant was charge-sheeted for the offence stated to have been committed on 30th July, 1991, wherein, during the joint inspection, it was found that the appellant had deliberately suppressed the actual load of K. No. 128273/CLP and ignored the load of K. No. 126749/IL on Richi Rich restaurant. The said indictment was made on the inspection conducted by the Vigilance Department on 17th March, 1992. In the meantime in September 1992, the appellant was promoted as Superintendent, and re-designated as Junior Engineer, in DESU. The enquiry started on 28th June, 1994. On 24th August, 1998, V.K.Harit, Enquiry Officer exonerated the appellant of the above said charge.

2. On 24.4.2000, the AGM(A) issued a memorandum to the appellant requiring him to show cause within 15 days as to why the charges against him should not be proved in disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and as to why the penalty proposed should not be imposed upon him. The main grouse of the appellant is that he was not furnished with the enquiry report. Again, no mention of the same was made in the memorandum. The appellant ran from pillar to post requesting for supply of the copy of the enquiry findings. At long last he was supplied with the copy of findings by the Vigilance Department on 15th May, 2006, with a direction to submit a reply by 30th May, 2000. The enquiry was made and the AGM (A) awarded him punishment of reduction by two stages in a scale of pay for a period of two years vide order dated 20th July, 2000 with a further stipulation that he will not earn any increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on the expiry of that period the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay.

3. The appellant preferred an appeal on 18th August, 2000. The appellant's appeal was rejected vide order dated 6th December, 2000. In the meantime, due to the above said order, the juniors of appellant superseded him. The appellant filed a civil suit on January, 2001. The Civil Judge dismissed the civil suit on 8th May, 2002. The appeal was preferred before the learned ADJ, who also found no merit in the appeal and dismissed the same on 1st May, 2006.

4. I have heard counsel for the parties. The arguments urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant has following three prongs. Firstly, counsel submitted that the enquiry officer took undue long time in deciding the matter. He also pointed out that the enquiry did not commence on regular day to day basis but in Installments which were few and far between. In order to bring his point home, learned Counsel for the appellant has cited an authority reported in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N.Radhakishan . In this case, there was delay of nine years. The Tribunal's order quashing the enquiry was upheld by the Supreme Court. It was observed that:

Normally, the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.

5. To my mind, the period of four years is normal time in Government offices. It is well-known that inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with a note making, file pushing and passing on the buck ethoes delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. Having regard to considerable delay of procedural red tape in the decision making process of the Government, certain amount of latitude is permissible. Moreover, the appellant has failed to allege that due to this much delay, prejudice was caused to him.

6. In P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and Ors. , it was held:

26. In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal , however, this Court refused to set aside those disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated after a delay of 5 1/2 years. Distinguishing the decision of this Court in Bani Singh and Anr. , it was stated:

Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facs of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing.

27. In Additional Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan 1999 SCC (L&S) 646, this Court held:

In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen.

7. Secondly, learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the disagreement note by the AGM(A) did not state the reasons. The learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that respondents took a U-turn out of blue. In support of his case, he has cited an authority reported in Union of India v. P.N. Bhat 2006(3) AD (Delhi) 735, but he did not elaborate as to how this authority is applicable to the facts of the present case, particularly when the appellant himself admitted that he was able to procure a copy of the findings of the Vigilance Department with a direction to submit a reply by 30th May, 2000 (see page 3 of this appeal)

8. Counsel for the appellant has cited another authority reported in V.K. Jain v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited 2006 (5) AD (Delhi) 62, wherein it was held that:

Where the employee is exonerated in a departmental enquiry by the duly appointed Enquiry Officer and the competent or disciplinary authority wishes to disregard the findings and arrive at, independent conclusions contrary to those of the Enquiry Officer, but adverse to the employee, it has to necessarily (and as a matter of law) furnish fresh opportunity to the employees after issuing a separate Show Cause Notice indicating briefly the terms of disagreement with the findings recorded in the enquiry. In this case, the procedure adopted by the management was to hold a full fledged enquiry into the charges leveled, were not proved. Instead of issuing Show Cause Notice, the respondent straightaway imposed a minor penalty.

9. To the same effect is another authority reported in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra 1998 (7) SCC page 14 which was also cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant.

10. Both these authorities are also not applicable to the present case because show cause notice was issued to the appellant. The appellant did not pick up a conflict with the above said show cause notice. There is no use to raise objections merely for the sake of cavil.

11. The next submission made by learned Counsel for the appellant is that the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority is excessively harsh and vindictive instead of being commensurate with the gravity of offence. He has also cited an authority reported in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India .

12. I am of the considered view that the punishment awarded to the appellant is on the lower side. Such like activities sap the country's economical condition. Stringent action is called for in order to banish such like activities. The above cited authority has no application to the facts of this case.

13. The instant appeal is sans merits and therefore, the same is dismissed at admission stage.