Mrs. Vijay Gupta And Ors. vs Sh. Ashok Kumar Gupta
2007 Latest Caselaw 436 Del

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The simple question of law that arises for consideration in the present appeal with regard to the pre-requisites for passing a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is existence of certain unambiguous and clear admission or even an admission which is vague, uncertain and is conditional. The appellant No. 1 is the wife while the appellants No. 2 and 3 are the sons of late Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta. Late Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta had become a member of Lok Sevak Co-operative Building Society for purchasing a plot of land on Installments out of his personal savings. He was in employment since the year 1956 and the money towards the total cost of acquiring the plot and construction of building thereupon was Rs. 46,000/- which was borne by Late Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta. The appellant No. 1 who was then married to him was also serving as a teacher in a Delhi Administration School. The construction was completed after spending an amount of nearly Rs. 1,86,000/- over a period of three years. The property bearing No. E-13, Geetanjali Enclave, New Delhi had been in exclusive possession of Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta and his family. The respondent No. 1 filed a Suit No. 2585/1996 on 15.10.1996 for partition, possession, rendition of accounts and perpetual injunction in relation to the said property. The respondent claimed that Predecessor-in-interest of the parties and he were related to each other as brothers. Sh. N.K. Gupta and his parents were living in R.K. Puram and the family was a joint family. The plaintiff-respondent and Late Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta had purchased the plot measuring about 337.8 square yards, the property in question, jointly and had raised construction. Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta died on 28.2.1994. The respondent became an engineer after getting a Mechanical Engineering degree from the Delhi College of Engineering and studying in USA. After his marriage, he went to Nigeria and started living in the property in dispute. As he was the joint owner, he claimed rendition of accounts. The suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff and was contested by the appellant/respondent, who disputed that the respondent had any share in the property. According to the appellant, the appellants had been in possession of the property, Late Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta with an intention to secure his family and himself at later years of his life had purchased the property. In the year 1970, on the advise of his elders he had requested the Society to include the name of the respondent, who had not contributed any money towards the purchase or construction and had no right to claim partition or possession of the property. Along with the suit, the respondent had filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC for grant of interim relief as well as filed an application during the pendency of the suit under Order 12 Rule 6 read with Section 151 of the CPC for passing a preliminary decree on the basis of the admission made by the appellant herein. Both these applications were disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 16.1.2003.

2. The application for injunction was disposed of with a direction that the rent received by the appellant from the tenant shall be deposited in Court so that upon passing of the final decree the entitlement of the parties can finally and conveniently be determined. The application under Order 12 Rule 6 was also allowed by holding that on the admission of the appellants, the respondent was entitled to 50% share in the suit property resulting in passing of a preliminary decree and a Local Commissioner was appointed to give his report for partition of the property by meets and bounds. Aggrieved from this order, the appellants have filed the present appeal. Wide power is vested in the Court in terms of the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 to pass a decree at any stage of the proceedings upon application or on its own accord where an admission of a fact has been made either in the pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. But one facet that is clear beyond ambiguity is that the judgment has to be in regard to such admission. In other words, a decree passed in exercise of this provision cannot be beyond the specific admission made by a party. Necessarily it follows that the admission should be certain, unambiguous and clear. Before a party can be denied the right to lead its defense or contest the case on merits, the admission should be capable of being truly accepted, as an unequivocal admission of a fact. In a case titled as Charanjit Singh v. Kehar Singh 2006 V AD (Delhi) 667 where on the basis of the conditions of a good receipt, issuance and execution of which was admitted, while partially setting aside the decree passed by the learned Trial Court under the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Court, a Division Bench of this Court held as under:

6. The powers under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code has to be exercised judicially on the facts and circumstances of each case. The admission on the basis of which the Court wishes to pass a decree has to be unambiguous, clear and unconditional. There is no doubt that in a suit there can be more than one decree passed at different stages and each decree being separate and independent is enforceable in accordance with law, was the principle stated by Chanchal v. Jalaluddin. Admission understood in its common parlance still must be a specific admission. There is very fine distinction between unambiguous and specific admission on the one hand and vague averments of facts which, if proved, could even tantamount to an admission on the part of a party to the suit. The Court has to consider the need for passing a decree on admission under these provisions only in the cases of first category and normally should decline in the cases of the later category.

7. The term 'Admission' in Section 70 of the Evidence Act relates only to admission of a party in the course of the trial of the suit and not to the attestation of a document by the party executing it. The essential feature of admission is that it should be 'Concise and deliberate act'. It must not be something which was not intended and was not the intention of the party. Pre-requisite to admission are unconditional, unambiguous and intend the same to be read and construed as admission. The scope of admission of a claim is also explained under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates that there must be a claim as laid down in the plaint which is admitted, for the ground stated therein and not simply an admission of cause of action. The legislative intent is clear from the provisions of the Code that an admission has to be unambiguous and clear. The Black's Law Dictionary explain the word 'Admission' as follows:

admission: Any statement or assertion made by a party to a case and offered against that party; an acknowledgment that facts are true.

Admission against interest. A person's statement acknowledging a fact that is harmful to the person's position as a litigant. An admission against interest must be made either by a litigant or by one in privity with or occupying the same legal position as the litigant.

8. It is also a settled principle of civil jurisprudence that judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of a Court. Where the defendant has raised objection which will go to the very root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise this discretion. The use of the words 'May' and 'make such orders' or 'give such judgment' spells out that power under these rules are discretionary and use of discretion would have to be controlled in accordance with the known judicial cannone. The cases which involves questions to be decided upon regular trial and the alleged admissions are not clear and specific, it may not be appropriate to take recourse to these provisions. In the case of Pariwar Sewa Sansthan v. Dr.(Mrs)Veena Kalra and Ors. the Court examined at length the provisions and the need for an admission to be unequivocal and positive. The admission would obviously have the consequences of arriving at that conclusion without determination of any question and evidence. The Court while relying upon the case of Balraj Taneja and Anr. v. Sunil Madan and Anr. and Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali held as under:

In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum it was held that Order 12 Rule 6 has to be read along with the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. That is to say, notwithstanding the admission made by the defendant in his pleading, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in the plaint.

Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made by a party to the suit, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the fact which has been admitted by the defendant.

At this stage it would be useful to recall some factual contentions emerging from the pleadings : In 1995 the appellant/defendant was asked to vacate and hand over possession of the suit premises, on the ground of the violation of the terms of the lease; On 25th May, 1996 a notice was alleged to have been served upon the defendant, requiring it to vacate the premises, on 12th September, 1996, tenancy is alleged to have expired by efflux of time and on 8th September, 1996, telegraphic notices were also alleged to have been served upon the defendant. The defendant had pleaded that they were the contractual tenants in respect of the basement since 12-9-90 and in respect of ground floor since 29-11-85; that the lease deeds dated 12-5-94 were never acted upon and were sham documents; two tenancies existed in respect of the ground floor and two tenancies existed in respect of the basement and plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 used to get separate cheques in their individual names, in respect of each of these portions. In fact, the plaintiffs did not deny the fact that they had been receiving the rent separately in their respective names, with regard to the ground floor and basement tenancies. However, it was pleaded that in 1995, the defendants started issuing two separate cheques in the name of each of the plaintiffs for their convenience. On the basis of these pleadings trial Court, inter alia, framed specific issues that whether the defendant is a contractual tenant or not and whether the lease was validly terminated or was terminated by efflux of time?

The question whether defendant became contractual tenant after 1995, when they were called upon to vacate the premises on the ground of alleged violation of the terms of the lase, and effect of the circumstances leading to the acceptance of the rent by the two plaintiffs individually in their respective names would require trial. These questions could not be determined without evidence and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of "unequivocal" and clear positive admission, which is an essential requirement of law for a decree on admission. Learned trial Court instead of concentrating on the question that whether there was any admission on the part of the defendant or not in its pleadings or elsewhere, proceeded to adjudicate upon some of the issues on merits by observing that the pleas raised by defendant are unbelievable, which could not have been done. There being friable issues raised going to the root of the case, the trial Court ought to have proceeded to try the suits and returned findings on merits. The impugned judgment and decrees are thus liable to be set aside and the suits deserve to be remanded for trial in accordance with law.

9. In the light of the above principles of law, now we will revert back to the facts of the present case. The learned Judge has noticed that vide letter dated 23.9.2000 the defendant No. 2 had stated that an amount of Rs. 3.97 lacs prior to the meeting with him had come down to Rs. 0.36 lacs without any payment by him. The Court also observes that they had not disputed the liability of Rs. 1,54,949/- in their letter. The learned Trial Court felt that the defendants had returned the goods worth Rs. 54949/- and they admitted their liability to pay Rs. 0.36 lacs in the letter dated 23.9.2000 thus decreed the suit taking it to be an admission on the part of the defendants to the extent of Rs. 1,90,949/-. These findings of the Court appear to be not in consonance with the settled principles.

Having noticed the above principle of law, it is clear that the admission by a party has to be in definite and clear terms. The trial court has failed to apply the principles enunciated in the case of Redington (India) Ltd. v. Modi Olivetti Ltd. , which has even noticed by the trial Court, wherein the Court observed that what is right of an unpaid seller cannot be decided under Order 12 Rule 6 because there is no clear admission.

The above referred paragraphs of the written statement do not amount to a clear and unambiguous admission. The defendant had relied upon the terms and conditions of good receipt, issuance of which he admitted and stated that in fact and in law there is no liability upon the defendant to pay the claimed amount. The preliminary objection taken in the written statement in regard to non-joinder of parties as well as the suit being vexatious would go to the very root of the case, if the defendant is able to prove these pleas during the course of trial. A plea was also taken that the defendant had not acted in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Carriers Act and no notice had been served. In para 6 of the written statement even receipt of the notice was disputed. Written statement has to be read and construed as a composite document and the Court cannot pick up a single line and treat it as an admission out of the contest in which the line is written. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that there was no privity of contract between the truck owner and the plaintiff and, therefore, there was no occasion to implead the said party. This is a question, which could only be decided after the parties had led evidence and the Court still had to examine as to what will be the effect of the preliminary objection taken by the defendant in their written statement. It is impermissible in law that only a line from the written statement could be taken up and even the entire para in which the said line is written is ignored in its entirety. What the defendant is stated is that he had issued GR and the goods were loaded to the truck and driver and goods were not traceable. What was stated in the same paragraph was that as per the terms and conditions part of the goods receipt there was no liability upon the carrier to make good the loss. This was a question of law, which required adjudication and the defendant was entitled to an opportunity to prove his pleaded case. This was certainly not a case where the Court could decree the suit by treating the above paragraph of the written statement as admission, which is unambiguous, clear and admits the claim of the plaintiff.

10. During the course of hearing it was brought to the notice of the Court that in furtherance to an interim order passed by the Court, the appellant has deposited a sum of Rs. 2.50 lakhs in the Registry of this Court.

11. In view of the detailed discussion as above, we allow this appeal partially, set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court and remand the suit to the trial Court. The Court shall proceed with the trial in accordance with law. Further to balance the equity between the parties, we direct that the amount of Rs. 2.50 lakhs deposited by the appellant before this Court shall be transmitted to the trial Court. The same will be retained by the trial Court. The Court will pass orders for disbursement of the said amount while passing the final decree.

3. Still in another case titled as Raj Kumar Chawla v. Lucas Indian Services , the Court in detail discussed the scope of the word "admission" as well as the principles governing passing of decrees of admission. The court clearly stated the principle that an admission has to be unambiguous, specific and clear to entitle a party to seek decree on 'admission'. In that case the Court had passed a decree on the basis of a letter stated to be admitting the liability towards the plaintiff. However, the latter, in view of the appellate court did not constitute an admission which could result in passing a decree, the Court upon discussion of relevant law held as under:

5. The provisions of Order XII are intended to provide expeditious grant of decree in favor of a plaintiff in a suit or proceedings where the defendant has made any admission in the pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing of any amount due. The plaintiff would be entitled to a decree on the basis of such admission without waiting for completion of the trial. The provisions of Order XII Rule 6 were incorporated by way of amendment. The legislative object of these provisions is to curtail the period for determination of disputes between the parties to a suit and ensure that a decree on admission is passed without any unnecessary hindrance. The expression 'Admission' has been given a wider meaning and connotation so as to take within its ambit admissions made by a party in pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. These provisions thus are capable of liberal construction and without imposition of any unreasonable restriction, must be permitted to operate but the Courts have to be careful while passing a decree on admission. The Court essentially should look into the fact that all essential ingredients of an admission are satisfied before such a decree is passed in favor of any of the parties to the suit. Admission has to be unambiguous, clear and unconditional and the law would not permit admission by inference as it is a matter of fact. Admission of a fact has to be clear from the record itself and cannot be left to the interpretative determination by the Court, unless there was a complete trial and such finding could be on the basis of cogent and appropriate evidence on record. Rule 6 of Order XII certainly enables a party to obtain a speedy judgment fully or partially to which according to the admission of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to. In the case of the Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. v. Union Bank of India and Ors. the Court while explaining the scope and ambit of these provisions held as under:

Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Order XII, Rule 6 comes under the heading 'admissions' and a judgment on admission could be given only after the opportunity to the other side to explain the admission, if any, made; that such admission should have been made only in the course of the pleadings or else the other side will not have an opportunity to explain such admission, that even though, the provision reads that the Court may at any stage of the suit make such order as it thinks fit effect of admission, if any, can be considered only at the time of trial; that the admission even in pleadings will have to be read along with Order VIII, Rule 5(1) of CPC and Court need not necessarily proceed to pass an order or a judgment on the basis of such admission but call upon the party relying upon such admission to prove its case independently, that during pendency of other suits and the nature of contentions raised in the case, it would not be permissible at all to grant the relief before trial as has been done in the present case; that the expression 'admissions' made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise will have to be read together and the expression 'otherwise' will have to be interpreted ejusdem generies.

As to the object of the Order XII, Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that "where a claim ia admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled." We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.

The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order XII, Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the trial Court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial Court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute. And the Court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. We think this approach is unexceptionable.

6. The powers under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code has to be exercised judicially on the facts and circumstances of each case. The admission on the basis of which the Court wishes to pass a decree has to be unambiguous, clear and unconditional. There is no doubt that in a suit there can be more than one decree passed at different stages and each decree being separate and independent is enforceable in accordance with law, was the principle stated by AIR 1971 SC 1081 Chanchal Order IX Rule 8. Jalaluddin. Admission understood in its common parlance still must be a specific admission. There is very fine distinction between unambiguous and specific admission on the one hand and vague averments of facts which, if proved, could even tantamount to an admission on the part of a party to the suit. The Court has to consider the need for passing a decree on admission under these provisions only in the cases of first category and normally should decline in the cases of the later category.

7. The term 'Admission' in Section 70 of the Evidence Act relates only to admission of a party in the course of the trial of the suit and not to the attestation of a document by the party executing it. The essential feature of admission is that it should be 'Concise and deliberate act'. It must not be something which was not intended and was not the intention of the party. Pre-requisite to admission are unconditional, unambiguous and intend the same to be read and construed as admission. The scope of admission of a claim is also explained under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates that there must be a claim as laid down in the plaint which is admitted, for the ground stated therein and not simply an admission of cause of action. The legislative intent is clear from the provisions of the Code that an admission has to be unambiguous and clear. The Black's Law Dictionary explain the word 'Admission' as follows:

admission: Any statement or assertion made by a party to a case and offered against that party; an acknowledgment that facts are true.

Admission against interest. A person's statement acknowledging a fact that is harmful to the person's position as a litigant. An admission against interest must be made either by a litigant or by one in privity with or occupying the same legal position as the litigant.

8. It is also a settled principle of civil jurisprudence that judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of a Court. Where the defendant has raised objection which will go to the very root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise this discretion. The use of the words 'May' and 'make such orders' or 'give such judgment' spells out that power under these rules are discretionary and use of discretion would have to be controlled in accordance with the known judicial cannone. The cases which involves questions to be decided upon regular trial and the alleged admissions are not clear and specific, it may not be appropriate to take recourse to these provisions. In the case of Pariwar Sewa Sansthan v. Dr.(Mrs)Veena Kalra and Ors. the Court examined at length the provisions and the need for an admission to be unequivocal and positive. The admission would obviously have the consequences of arriving at that conclusion without determination of any question and evidence. The Court while relying upon the case of Balraj Taneja and Anr. v. Sunil Madan and Anr. and Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali held as under:

In Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum it was held that Order 12 Rule 6 has to be read along with the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8. That is to say, notwithstanding the admission made by the defendant in his pleading, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in the plaint.

Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made by a party to the suit, the Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the fact which has been admitted by the defendant.

At this stage it would be useful to recall some factual contentions emerging from the pleadings : In 1995 the appellant/defendant was asked to vacate and hand over possession of the suit premises, on the ground of the violation of the terms of the lease; On 25th May, 1996 a notice was alleged to have been served upon the defendant, requiring it to vacate the premises, on 12th September, 1996, tenancy is alleged to have expired by efflux of time and on 8th September, 1996, telegraphic notices were also alleged to have been served upon the defendant. The defendant had pleaded that they were the contractual tenants in respect of the basement since 12-9-90 and in respect of ground floor since 29-11-85; that the lease deeds dated 12-5-94 were never acted upon and were sham documents; two tenancies existed in respect of the ground floor and two tenancies existed in respect of the basement and plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 used to get separate cheques in their individual names, in respect of each of these portions. In fact, the plaintiffs did not deny the fact that they had been receiving the rent separately in their respective names, with regard to the ground floor and basement tenancies. However, it was pleaded that in 1995, the defendants started issuing two separate cheques in the name of each of the plaintiffs for their convenience. On the basis of these pleadings trial Court, inter alia, framed specific issues that whether the defendant is a contractual tenant or not and whether the lease was validly terminated or was terminated by efflux of time?

The question whether defendant became contractual tenant after 1995, when they were called upon to vacate the premises on the ground of alleged violation of the terms of the lase, and effect of the circumstances leading to the acceptance of the rent by the two plaintiffs individually in their respective names would require trial. These questions could not be determined without evidence and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of "unequivocal" and clear positive admission, which is an essential requirement of law for a decree on admission. Learned trial Court instead of concentrating on the question that whether there was any admission on the part of the defendant or not in its pleadings or elsewhere, proceeded to adjudicate upon some of the issues on merits by observing that the pleas raised by defendant are unbelievable, which could not have been done. There being friable issues raised going to the root of the case, the trial Court ought to have proceeded to try the suits and returned findings on merits. The impugned judgment and decrees are thus liable to be set aside and the suits deserve to be remanded for trial in accordance with law.

9. In the light of the above principles of law, now we will revert back to the facts of the present case. The learned Judge has noticed that vide letter dated 23.9.2000 the defendant No. 2 had stated that an amount of Rs. 3.97 lacs prior to the meeting with him had come down to Rs. 0.36 lacs without any payment by him. The Court also observes that they had not disputed the liability of Rs. 1,54,949/- in their letter. The learned Trial Court felt that the defendants had returned the goods worth Rs. 54949/- and they admitted their liability to pay Rs. 0.36 lacs in the letter dated 23.9.2000 thus decreed the suit taking it to be an admission on the part of the defendants to the extent of Rs. 1,90,949/-. These findings of the Court appear to be not in consonance with the settled principles. In the letter dated 22.9.2000 the defendants had made a reference to the meeting held on 22.9.2000 wherein the company had agreed to take back old materials valued at Rs. 1,54,949/- and also agreed to release the payment of Rs. 66,415/- both of them were to be performed simultaneously. In this very letter, it was stated that the agreed settlement had not taken place till date and, therefore, the settlement could not conclude. The letter dated 22.9.2000 was written by the plaintiff to the defendant and had asked as to when the accounts can be settled. On 23.9.2000 the defendants had written a letter to the plaintiff referring to the meeting wherein definite allegations were made by him against the plaintiff stating that number of dealers were being harassed on filmsy grounds and debit notes were being issued to pressurise the dealers. The outstanding amount which was Rs. 3.97 lac prior to the meeting with the plaintiff had on its own come down to Rs. 0.36 lacs when the defendant had not paid anything to the plaintiff. This was stated by way of an example by the defendants to show as to how properly the accounts were being managed. Thereafter, reference was made to the possibilities of settlement in due course. The decree based on admission of the Trial Court is founded on these two letters. One letter is written by the plaintiff to the defendant while the other letter is written by the defendant to the plaintiff. The letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant could in no way, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as an admission of the defendant of his liability to pay to the plaintiff the amount referred in that letter. The letter dated 23.9.2000 written by the defendant to the plaintiff was a grievance raised to indicate that the plaintiff was not even maintaining the accounts regularly and as such it would not only be unfair but even unjust to treat that letter as an admission of law. This, in fact, cannot even construe on interpretation as an admission much less a direct and unequivocal admission of the defendant of any liability towards the plaintiff. In fact, prior to these letters vide letter dated 12th July, 1999 (Ex P8) the defendant had written to the plaintiff that some money was blocked. The letter dated 12th July, 1999 again is a letter which refers to various aspects of business including that the defendant has to pay some amount to the company. In that very letter it was stated that credit notes had not been issued, returned goods values had not been adjusted and the defendant had claimed a sum of Rs. 40,000/- payable to him from the plaintiff.

10. The cumulative effect of the above discussion is that there is no unambiguous, specific and clear admission by the defendant of his liability towards the plaintiff much less of any definite claim as stated in the plaint. In the written statement large factual and legal controversies have been raised which require determination by the Court of competent jurisdiction before any decree could be passed. Viewed from any angle, the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot justify passing of a decree on admission, on facts and in law.

4. In light of the above principles, now we will revert back to the facts of the present case. The learned Single Judge has passed the impugned judgment and consequent decree, primarily on two grounds:

(1) On the basis of the letter written by the Predecessor-in-interest of the appellants to the society and

(2) the averments made in the written statement filed in Court.

5. These are the pieces of evidence which weighed with the learned Single Judge in passing the decree. In the paragraphs of the preliminary objection, the appellant had stated that he had made an application to the management of the Society to include the name of the respondent as joint owner, without any consideration, and without conferring any rights upon him especially in view of the fact that he had got married. However, it would be appropriate to refer to the paragraphs of the written statement which have been relied upon by the court for passing the decree and the same reads as under:

(ii) That in the year 1970, the Late Sh. Naresh Kumar Gupta, in order to secure his rights in case of any happening to his life, at the advise of elders in the family, made an application to management of the society to include the name of the Plaintiff as a joint owner without any consideration and without conferring any rights upon him, especially in view of the fact that he was married to the Defendant No. 1 then recently on 15th July, 1967. In fact the Plaintiff never paid even a single penny to late Naresh Kumar Gupta or after his death to the Defendants. In fact the money towards the total cost acquiring the plot and of construction of building thereon was Rs. 46,000.00 which was borne by late Naresh Kumar Gupta and Defendant No. 1, who was working as a teacher in a Delhi Administration school. The Plaintiff at the said relevant time was only a student having no independent source of income and even for his living, education and maintenance, he was dependent upon late Naresh Kumar Gupta who was the only earning hand in the family, since the father of late Naresh Kumar Gupta and the Plaintiff had retired from his service in the year 1966.

(iii) That thereafter our of the savings of late Naresh Kumar Gupta and the Defendant No. 1, the second phase of the construct6ion was completed by the late Naresh Kumar Gupta by spending an amount of Rs. 1,86,000.00 approx. this construction was completed in time span of about 3 years.

(iv) The Plaintiff, therefore, does not have any right, title or interest in the property and has never been in possession of any portion thereof, which has always been in the exclusive possession of late Naresh Kumar Gupta and after his death, the defendants.

2. That the Plaintiff is estopped by conduct lapse of time from claiming ownership as he has never claimed joint ownership or any right in the property since the date of allotment.

6. As already noticed, the other basis for passing of the decree is the letter stated to have been written on 28.12.1970 by the appellant to the Society. The said letter reads as under:

I became a member of the Lok Sewak Co-operative Housing Society since its very formation in June 1959. Due to change in since then, the construction of a house in Delhi is getting more difficult. I, therefore, request that my younger brother Shri A. Gupta may be taken as a joint member of the Society with me so...of us may construct the house jointly. The plot in my name (No. ...be got registered in records in the joint name of the two brothers Kumar Gupta and Shri Ashok Kumar Gupta. Necessary affidavit for signed by both of us and duly attested by a Notary Public are...the purpose.

I, therefore, request that permission to get the... registered in the joint name of two brothers may kindly be accor... urgently.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

Naresh Kumar Gupta)

7. Now, we may examine whether either of them constitutes an unambiguous and clear admission which can form basis for passing a decree under the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As far as the letter is concerned it does not make the respondent owner of the 50% share. All it says is that the name be recorded as joint member of the Society and also that the step was being taken to enable them to construct the house jointly and he had sought permission of the Society for recording of joint names. There was nothing on record to show that the Society had actually accepted the request of joint ownership. This admission has to be seen in light of the averments that the construction was to be raised jointly which as stated in the written statement was not raised and the entire construction was raised successfully by the Predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. It has specifically been stated in the written statement and emphasized during the course of hearing by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that the respondent, in fact, was too young and was not earning when the plot was purchased and/or even when the construction was raised. These were the allegations made in the written statement and the appellant was duly entitled to prove the same in accordance with the law. The above averments either in the written statement or in the letter do not constitute an unambiguous or clear admission so as to entitle the respondent for a decree forthwith. The letter was conditional and whether such a condition was fulfillled or what was the conduct of the parties in that regard was a question which was required to be examined by the Court in accordance with law. We may also notice that the plea raised by the respondent in relation to power contained under Section 4 of the Benami Transaction Act was rejected by that Court and was held in favor of the appellant. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Meera Gupta v. Dinesh Chand. and Ors. to contend that the respondent was entitled to judgment on admission and half-share in the property. In that case the reliance was placed on the Will propounded by a party which categorically stated that the appellant and the respondent No. 3 in that case would have equal share in the estate of Late Subhash Chand while the Will was alleged to have been revoked. The Court treated the estate of the deceased as her own and thus in view of that admission held the parties entitled to half-share on admission. The main emphasis of the argument of the party in that case was that it was not a stage for passing a decree on admission as the issue had been framed and suit was to proceed with trial. This contention was rejected by the court and rightly so, as the court has the power to grant the relief on its own or on an application at any stage of the suit. This case, thus, is not of any help to the respondent. We have already discussed that there was no clear, unambiguous admission either in the pleadings or in the letter written to the Society. A pleading or a document has to be construed or read as a whole to see its effect and one or two lines cannot be permitted to be taken out of context and used as an admission of a party entitling the other for passing of a judgment upon admission. It is an accepted norm of reading and interpretation of reading that they must be read in entirety or at least in a manner which would not frustrate the very claim of the party raised in the pleadings.

8. For the reasons aforestated, we partially allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge and remand the case back to the competent Court, who may proceed with the suit in accordance with law.

9. Parties are directed to appear before the Court on 19.3.2007.