India International Textile ... vs The India Trade Promotion ...
2006 Latest Caselaw 1795 Del

JUDGMENT

Pradeep Nandrajog, J.

1. An interesting question of law regarding limitation arises for consideration (as a preliminary issue) in the suit. The other issue involved is, whether a contract concluded between the parties and whether defendant is entitled to retain the sum of Rs. 15 lacs received by it from the plaintiff.

2. Shorn of verbose details, plaintiff a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 promotes the interest of those in textile business. Defendant, a Government of India Enterprise, is the custodian of a land in New Delhi where trade fairs are held. The complex is called Pragati Maidan.

3. Plaintiff was desirous of holding an exhibition at New Delhi and wanted defendant to license a space to it.

4. In response to the query from the plaintiff, on 18.07.1990 defendant sent a telegram stating that in principle it had agreed to provide an area of approximately 13,000 sq.meters. Rs. 25 lacs towards advance license fee was directed to be deposited. It was informed that thereafter defendant would confirm the space to be licensed and the duration of the license.

5. Thereafter letters were exchanged between the parties. Parties corresponded as to what space and which particular hall would be made available. License fee per square meter which would be charged was discussed. Issues of rebate etc. was discussed.

6. When these discussions were going on, in the month of August, October and November 1990, three payments in sum of Rs. 5 lacs each were paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.

7. Unfortunately, the covering letters under which payments were tendered have not been filed by the parties and therefore one cannot ascertain as to what was written by the plaintiff when the three amounts were tendered.

8. On 26.11.1990, defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff inter alia, recording as under:

Dear Shri Rao, Please refer to the correspondence resting with your letter dated 5th November, 1990 regarding INDIA-ITME Exhibition to be organized by your Association at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi in December 1992. We have noted that your space requirement will be varying between 15000 sq.mts. to 20000 sq.mts. We would like to know the exact space requirement of your Association for this Exhibition so that accordingly we can finalise other related details. Meanwhile, replies to the queries raised in your letters dated 3rd August, 11th September, 15th October and 5th November, 1990 are as follows:

9. On 22.12.1990, much after the three payments were received, defendant handed over to the plaintiff guidelines as per which defendant was licensing space to third party in Pragati Maidan. Inter alia, vide Clause 1(iv) guidelines stipulated that a formal agreement would have to be signed between the parties. The same reads as under:

Formal agreement will have to be signed between the licensee and India Trade Promotion Organization.

10. Correspondence continued. Parties could not agree on mutual terms. On 11.3.1991, defendant sent a telex message to the plaintiff informing as under:

FOR SHRI RAO EXECUTIVE DIRECtor FM DINESH COOMAR MANAGER TFAI(.)

KINDLY REFER TO THE MEETING MR. PARIKH AND YOU HAD WITH US ON 25TH FEB REG INDIAI TME EXHIBITION TO BE HELD AT PRAGATI MAIDAIN IN DEC '92 (.)

WE NOW CONFIRM THAT TFAI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO OFFER YOU SPACE FM 27TH NOV '92 TILL 26TH DEC '92 WITH DATES OF EXHIBITION TO BE 12TH DEC TO 20TH DEC '92(.) KINDLY CONFIRM YR ACCEPTANCE(.) REGARDS

11. No confirmation of acceptance was given by the plaintiff to the defendant. On 31.7.1991, plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant that it was no longer interested in holding an exhibition in New Delhi. Its members wanted an exhibition to be held in Bombay. Closing the chapter, plaintiff requested that sum of Rs. 15 lacs paid by it be refunded.

12. On 19.8.1991, defendant wrote back to the plaintiff informing as under:

Shri Rasik Parekh,

Chairman,

India International Textile Machinery

Exhibitions Society,

76 Mittal Tower,

B-Wing, 7th floor,

210, Nariman Point,

BOMBAY -400021.

SUB: HOLDING OF INDIA - ITME '92 EXHIBITION

Dear Sir,

Kindly refer to your letter of 31st July, 1991 indicating your desire to shift the venue of the ITME'92 Exhibition from Pragati Maidan to Goregaon, Bombay.

We regret to inform you that it will not be possible for us to refund Rs. 15 lacs in view of the guidelines and terms and conditions already communicated to you for organising fairs in Pragati Maidan, New Delhi.

Yours faithfully,

(DINESH COOMAR)

MANAGER

13. On 30.9.1991, defendant wrote another letter as under:

M/s India International Textile

Machinery Exhibitions Society (ITME)

76, Mittal Tower, B-Wing,

Nariman Point,

Bombay-400 021

Subject : Holding of ITME'92 at Bombay from 27.11.1992 to 6.12.1992

Dear Sirs,

Please refer to your telex dated 20th August on the above subject.

Trade Fair Authority of India has no objection, in principle, to the holding of ITME'92 at Bombay during the period from 27.11.92 to 6.12.92 subject to the final clearance from the Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs, Industry of Commerce.

Yours faithfully,

(Bhagwan Dass)

Deputy Manager

14. On 14.10.1991, defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff consenting to the holding of the exhibition in Bombay. The letter reads as under:

India Intl. Textile

Machinery Exhibitions

Society (ITME)

76, Mittal Tower,

B-Wing Nariman Point,

BOMBAY-400021.

SUB: INDIA-ITME'92 from Nov. 27 to Dec. 6, 1992 at Bombay.

Dear Sir,

Please refer to your letter No._______________ Dated 28th Aug,1991 on the above mentioned subject.

2. The Trade Fair Authority of India has approved the holding of the above exhibition subject to the following conditions:

i) the goods will be re-exported within a period of six months from the date of official closure of such exhibition/fair or any other period as may be stipulated by the Custom Authorities in India;

ii) furnish the requisite undertakings, bond of guarantee to the satisfaction of the Custom Authorities in India in this connection;

iii) Sale of exhibit/exhibits may be permitted on payment of duty against the valid import license only and in no case the sale of exhibits which have indigenous angle as per policy in force at the time of sale, be allowed;

iv) that the exhibition will be open to general public/only to a particular section of the general public for which it has relevance, and

v) it is being held in public interest.

3. You are requested to apply directly to the Collector of Customs, New Delhi, BOMBAY, MADRAS, CALCUTTA with 4 (four) copies of the list of exhibits indicating the name(s) of port(s) through which the exhibits are proposed to be imported for purposes of grant of exemption from the customs duty on exhibits.

While applying to the Collector of Customs, you may kindly quote this letter as reference.

4) A list of your participants duly certified by you and counter signed by this office will have to be sent to the Collector of Custom concerned.As regards consumable goods, kindly approach the CCTandE directly.

5) If foreign personnel are invited for attending the Exhibition, you are requested to furnish to the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as to the Ministry of External Affairs, the name and particulars of such foreigners of foreign firms (country wise) sufficiently in advance of their arrival, for their prior approval. A set of particulars is to be submitted to the Trade Fair Authority of India also.

6) It may please be noted that the facilities to hold the exhibition are afforded to your organisation and not to any individual person or participant in your exhibition. It may also be noted that the facilities for duty free temporary import of exhibits will be available to foreign exhibitors/participants who are registered with you by remitting space rent/participation fee in foreign exchange. No Indian Agent of foreign participants will be permitted to import exhibits/goods for exhibition when they remit the participation fee in Indian Currency.

7) TEMPORARY IMPORT FACILITY.

This is to bring to your notice that India has become signatory to the ATA Carnet system and import of goods will be governed by its rules which is applicable from 15th of August, 1990 in respect of all International Exhibitions being held in India.

(A) All participants belonging to the member countries of ATA Carnet will get ATA Carnet issued from their Chambers of Commerce or any agency authorized to issue carnet duly certified by the customs. When the goods arrive in India the temporary importation for six months will be allowed on the basis of the ATA Carnet procedure. The following categories of the items will not, however, be covered and participants are advised to file separate bills of entry as temporary import will be governed by Government of India's normal rules:

i) All consumable goods meant for distribution or sale which are not likely to be re-exported.

ii) Goods imported through the medium of post.

iii) Transit goods.

A separate Bill of entry will be required to be filed for such consignments. No import clearance will be governed by normal rules of Government of India, Customs.

(B) Participants of those countries which are not member of ATA Carnet, their temporary import will be governed as under:

i) The Participants will be required to produce a guarantee letter from their respective Embassies in India.

ii) If the exhibits are not guaranted by the Embassy, some local Indian Company acceptable to the Collector of Customs must stand guarantee before aBank Guarantee can be waived.

iii) In case the participants cannot comply with (i) and (ii) above they will have to produce a Bank Guarantee to the tune of 250% of the invoice value as per Custom rules.

8) This is issued in accordance with the Ministry of Finance (Deptt. Of Revenue) Notification No. 157/90 and 158/90-Customs both dated 28.3.91 issued by Ministry of Finance (Deptt. of Revenue).

9) Kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter.

Yours faithfully,

(Dinesh Coomar)

Manager

15. I may ignore letters written thereafter for the reason plaintiff held the exhibition at Bombay. It wrote numerous letters to the defendant to refund the sum of Rs. 15 lacs. Defendant stuck to its guns. Instant suit was filed on 17.8.1994 claiming Rs. 15 lacs paid to the defendant together with interest @21% per annum from the date of the payment. Suit amount in respect whereof decree prayed for is Rs. 27,11,983/-. Pendente lite interest @21% per annum is also prayed for.

16. According to the plaintiff, money had to be refunded since there was no concluded contract between the parties and the sum of Rs. 15 lacs paid was to be adjusted towards license fee if a contract concluded.

17. Case pleaded by the defendant is that a contract concluded between the parties. Requirement of a formal agreement under Clause 1(iv) was a condition precedent. That sum of Rs. 15 lacs was earnest money for space booking.

18. Since it would be relevant, pleadings of the defendant are as under:

11 to 13. The averments in paras 11, 12 and 13 are matters of record and hence need no reply. However, it is emphatically denied that Clause 1 (iv) of the guidelines, which stipulates that a formal agreement has to be signed between the intending licensee and the defendant, has any relevance to the question in issue. It does not, and can not, mean that a contract could not be concluded before the signing of a formal contract as per Clause 1 (iv). The correspondence relied upon by the plaintiff itself proves that a concluded.

Contract had come into existence between the parties, in terms of the guidelines. Once the payment of Rs. 15 lacs was made by the plaintiff, it wasunderstood and implied, that it was by way of earnest money for the space booking, for which defendant reserved a slot in its calender. Therefore, the non execution of formal contract was of no consequence and Clause 7 (iii) of the guidelines came into operation. It provides as under:

7(iii) In the event of cancellation of space all payment made till the cancellation will be forfeited.

In view of the above facts, the defendant forfeited the earnest money of Rs. 15 lacs.

19. On the pleadings of the parties, following six issues were framed on 8.12.1998:

1. Whether the suit is within limitation OPP

2. Whether the plaint has been signed and verified by a duly authorized person on behalf of the plaintiff? OPP

3. Whether there was no concluded contract between the parties? OPD

4. Whether the defendant had no right to forfeit the amount of Rs. 15 lacs deposited by the plaintiff? OPD

5. Whether the defendant is liable to pay interest? If so at what rate, on what amount and from which date? OPD

6. Relief.

20. On 13.2.2002, learned Counsel for the parties made a statement that formal proof of letters exchanged between the parties, which were filed in the Court, be waived. Counsel stated that the documents filed may be read in evidence.

21. Since suit has been filed under the authority of one Shri C.V. Radhakrishnan, limited evidence was recorded to prove his authority toinstitute the suit, sign and verify the pleadings.

22. PW-1, Mr. Hubert D'Souza, the secretary of the plaintiff has proved Ex. PW-1/1 the resolution passed by the steering committee of the plaintiff on 11.5.1994. Original minutes were produced by the witness (PW-1) when his statement was recorded on 14.2.2002. He has deposed that Mr. C.V. Radhakrishnan was the Hony. Executive Director of the plaintiff. Original minutes of the meeting dated 11.1.2002 were proved as Ex.PW-1/2.

23. In view of the deposition of PW-1 and in view of the Ex.PW-1/1 and PW- 1/2, I hold that the plaint has been filed by a duly authorised person. I hold that the plaint has been signed and verified by a duly authorised person.

24. Whether a contract concluded between the parties requires to bedecided as per issue No. 3.

25. I take up for decision issue No. 3.

26. A contract concludes between the parties when an offer made by one is unconditionally accepted by the other. Unless parties are ad-idem, no contract can conclude between the parties. As per the case pleaded by the parties, space in Pragati Maidan complex had to be licensed by the defendant to the plaintiff. A contract pertaining to a license requires an identification of the licensed area, license fee payable, duration of the license and the terms under which the licensee is authorized to enter upon the licensed premises.

27. Shri A.B. Dial, learned senior counsel for the defendant could not point out any letter wherefrom it could be gathered that an offer by either party was unconditionally accepted by the other. No document was shown which evidences a concluded contract.

28. On the contrary, letter dated 26.11.1990, relevant part noted in para 8 above shows that the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that as per understanding of the defendant, plaintiff require space between 1500 sq.meters to 2000 sq.meters. Defendant queried the plaintiff to let it know the exact space requirement so that defendant could finalize other related details.

29. Telex message dated 11.3.1991, contents noted in para 10 above shows that the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that it was in a position to offer space between 27.11.1992 till 26.12.1992. Confirmation of acceptance of the dates was sought from the plaintiff.

30. No such confirmations were sent by the plaintiff and on 31.7.1991 plaintiff sought refund of the amount tendered.

31. From the correspondences it is evident that parties remained at the stage of negotiations and could not crystallize a concluded contract. Neitherduration of the license, nor space identification nor license fee, much less terms of the license were finalized.

32. That apart, defendant is an undertaking of the Government of India and can act only through such persons who are competent to enter into a contract on behalf of the defendant. This is the reason why guidelines framed by the defendant required due execution of a formal contract.

33. As held by the Supreme Court in the report published as , Kollipara Sriramulu v. T. Aswatha Narayana, where parties intend that unless they execute a formal written contract, they would not be bound by what they have discussed, contract concludes only when a written contract is executed between the parties.

34. Parker J. in the report published as (1912) 1 Ch.284 Von Hatzfeldt - Wildenburg v. Alexander observed as follows:

It appears to be well settled by the authorities that if the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whetherthe execution of the further contract is a condition or term of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through. In the former case there is no enforceable contract either because the condition is unfulfilled or because the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract. In the latter case there is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal document may be ignored.

35. In other words, there may be a case where the signing of a further formal agreement is made a condition or term of the bargain, and if the formal agreement is not approved and signed there is no concluded contract. I accordingly hold that there was no concluded contract between the parties.

36. Corollary of decision on issue No. 3 would be that the defendant would have no right to forfeit the sum of Rs. 15 lacs.

37. Reason thereof is that as per Clause 7 (iii) of the guidelines, advance payment made was liable to be forfeited in the event the licensee cancelled the space which was booked.

38. Clause envisages a concluded contract followed by the act of cancellation by the licensee. I accordingly decide issue No. 4 by holding that defendant has no right to forfeit Rs. 15 lacs.

39. That leaves issue No. 1 to be decided.

40. learned Counsel for the defendant urged that limitation would be governed by Article 24 of the Limitation Act.

41. learned Counsel for the plaintiff relied upon Article 113.

42. Articles 24 and 113 read as under:

  24.  For money payable  by  the
     defendant to the plaintiff
     for money received  by the
     defendant,     for     the 
     plaintiff's use.               Three years      When the money is received.
113. Any  suit  for   which  no
     period  of  limitation  is
     provided elsewhere in this
     Schedule.                      Three years      When the right to sue accrues.
 

43. To apply, Article 24 would require money to be received by the defendant from the plaintiff for plaintiff's use. Limitation would commence the moment money is received. Limitation would be 3 years.

44. As against that, limitation of 3 years contemplated by Article 113 would commence when the right to sue accrues.

45. According to Shri A.N. Haksar, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff, cause of action accrued to the plaintiff when defendant refused to refund the amounts when letter dated 19.8.1991 was written. Suit was filed on 17.8.1994, 2 days prior to expiry of 3 years' period reckoned from 19.8.1991.

46. Shri A.B. Dial, learned senior counsel for the defendant cited , A. Venkatasubba Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.; and AIR 1932 Bombay 86, Abasbhai Shaikh Abdul Hussein v. Bhimji Malji Choksey to urge that limitation would be governed by Article 24 of the Limitation Act. Both decisions dealt with Article 62 of the Limitation Act 1908.

47. The fore runner of Article 24 of the Limitation Act 1963 was Article 62 of the Limitation Act 1908.

48. The words 'money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff's use' are the catch words of Article 24. The origin of the language of the said words is the form of count in vogue in England under the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. Numerous forms of pleadings known as the common indebitatus counts such as counts for money lent, money paid by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant at his request, money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff etc. were treated under one umbrella of pleadings known as common indebitatus counts.

49. The most comprehensive of the old Common Law counts was that for the money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.

50. This count was applicable where a defendant received money which in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff under circumstances which rendered the receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.

51. It's form included when the plaintiff's money had been wrongfully obtained by the defendant.

52. In A. Venkatasubba Rao's case (Supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with money suits brought against the State of Andhra Pradesh by various traders who had acted as commission or procurement agents for the government.

53. Due to scarcity of rice, procurement and selling of rice was regulated by the government. Procurement agents were appointed and were assignedrespective areas for procuring rice at rates determined by the government. They were obliged to sell to the government or at the asking of the government and at the rates prescribed by the government the rice procured by them.

54. Selling rate was higher than the procurement rate. The differential was the commission of the agent.

55. From time to time, procurement and selling rates were increased. But, the government realized that for stocks acquired at lower rates, these agents were getting the benefit of higher sale price due to price revision by the government.

56. Holding it to be a case of unjust enrichment, the differential in the procurement price notified by the government as on date of sale and the actual procurement price at which rice was procured i.e. the previous procurement price was recovered by the government as a surcharge.

57. Under pains of cancellation of the agency agreement, government recovered the differential price i.e. the surcharge.

58. Traders protested. They wrote to the government. Government did not yield any ground. Suits were filed.

59. Issue came up, whether the suits were within limitation. Action was laid when the Limitation Act 1908 was in force.

60. For, if Article 62 (corresponding to Article 24 of the 1963 Act) applied, suits were barred by limitation.

61. Noting the form of action in vogue under Common Law, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an action for recovery of money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff was goverened by Article 62 of the Limitation Act 1908.

62. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court noted the divergence of the view expressed by different High Courts but followed the view of Mookerjee, J. in the report published as 2nd 32 Calcutta 527, Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer.

63. The divergence of view reflected and as noted in the various decisions of the different High Courts was that in England, with the passing of the Supreme Court of Judicatures Act of 1873 and 1875 a distinction was recognized in the form of action in a money suit where money was wrongfully obtained and where money was not wrongfully obtained. Equities were incorporated in the English Law to take out money suits where action was based on the allegation that the defendant had wrongfully obtained the money.

64. Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that in India, law and equity are administered by the same courts and that the language of Article 62 was borrowed from the form of count in vogue in England under the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. Thus, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that cause of action as understood under English Law prior to 1873 would be the cause of action contemplated by Article 62.

65. Following observations of Mookerjee, J. were noted with approval by their Lordships of Supreme Court:

The Article, when it speaks of a suit for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, points to the well-known English action in that form; consequently the Article ought to apply wherever the defendant has received money which in justice and equity belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which in law render the receipt of it, a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.

66. After noting, with approval, observations afore noted of Mookerjee, J. their Lordships of the Supreme Court expanded as under:

In other words, the learned Judge held that it was not necessary in order to attract Article 62 that at the moment of the receipt the defendant should have actually intended to receive it for the use of the plaintiff and that it was sufficient if the receipt was in such circumstances that the law would impute to him an obligation to retain it for the use of the plaintiff and refund to him when demanded.

67. The decision of the Bombay High Court relied upon by learned senior counsel for the defendant also observes as under:

What we have got here is a sum of money paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in such circumstances that the plaintiff was bound at once to repay it to the defendant. It seems to me that that brings the case within Article 62 and that the money must be treated as received by the plaintiff for the defendant's use.

68. Relying upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (extracted in para 66 above) Sh. A.B. Dial, learned senior counsel urged that assuming that contract did not conclude, law imputes that money taken by the defendant was for use of the plaintiff.

69. I am afraid, learned senior counsel for the defendant has ignored the words 'under circumstances' used by Mookerjee, J. and the words 'the receipt was in such circumstances' used by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the words 'in such circumstances' used by the Bombay High Court.

70. What these words mean is that the receipt of money by the defendant from the plaintiff has to be in circumstances where from it flows that the receipt is to the use of the plaintiff. Meaning thereby, that the plaintiff should have a right immediately on tendering the money to seek refund there and then. Under the English Law, an action for money had and received is one of assumpsit based on an implied or imputed contract. It is in the nature of an action for damages for breach of a promise, although the promise is not a real promise but one imported by fiction of law. In other words circumstances must be such that the action is based under the English Law on contract imputed by law.

71. In para 62 of their report, Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified as under:

62. Before referring to Govind Singh's case (supra) it would be convenient to clarify the position as regards certain circumstances in which the Article would be applicable without making any exhaustive list. Where the defendant occupies a fiduciary relationship towards the plaintiff it is clear that Article 62 is inapplicable. Next even if the claim could have been comprehended under the omnibus caption of the English 'action for money had and received', still if there are other more specific articles in the Limitation Act-vide, e.g., Article 96 (mistake), Article 97 (consideration which fails) Article 62 would be inapplicable. Lastly, if the right to refund does not arise immediately on receipt by the defendant but arises by reason of facts transpiring subsequently, Article 62 cannot apply, for it proceeds on the basis that the plaintiff has a cause of action for instituting the suit at the very moment of the receipt.

72. Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that before limitation commences the cause must accrue. Indeed, if a cause has not accrued, question of limitation running does not arise.

73. Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that if the right to refund does not arise immediately on receipt by the defendant but arises by raising of facts transpiring subsequently, Article 62 cannot apply.

74. Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that Article 62 proceeds on the basis that the plaintiff has a cause of action for instituting the suit at the very moment of the receipt.

75. On facts, I may note that in A. Venkatasubba Rao's case (supra) since money was held to be illegally obtained by the Government, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the cause accrued to file the suit immediately when money was received by the government. Similar was the position in the decision of the Bombay High Court where tenant had paid a 'Pagdi' at the time of inception of tenancy. Bombay Rent (War Restriction) Act, 2 of 1918 prohibited payment of any 'Pagdi'.

76. When does a cause of action accrue?

77. In the report published as , Rukhmabai v. Laxmi Narayanan, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that cause of action accrues when a defendant clearly and unequivocally threatens to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff.

78. Evidence on record show that the sum of Rs. 15 lacs was paid by the defendant at the pre negotiation stage. There was no condition by the defendant that it would negotiate only when Rs. 15 lacs was paid to it and that the sum of Rs. 15 lacs was a consideration for the bargain itself.

79. The money was received by the defendant in trust to be utilized and adjusted towards license fee, if contract was concluded between the parties. To put it differently, money was received under circumstances that it could not be labelled as a money received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. The defendant held the money in trust. To put it differently, money was deposited pending negotiations for creation of a license. An agreement has to be implied that if negotiations failed, the money would be refunded. Cause of action would accrue when there was a refusal to refund the money.

80. I accordingly hold that Article 24 is not applicable. I hold that the suit would be governed by Article 113.

81. Limitation would commence when on 19.8.1991 defendant unequivocally, for the first time, rejected the request of the plaintiff.

82. I hold that the suit is within limitation.

83. On the issue of interest, same would be governed by the Interest Act 1978.

84. Since there was no concluded contract between the parties, question of agreed rate of interest does not arise. No evidence has been led on market usage. Taking note of rate at which Scheduled Banks were offering interest on deposits, I hold that defendant is liable to pay interest @11% p.a. from 19.8.1991 till date of payment.

85. Suit is accordingly decreed in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in sum of Rs. 15 lacs with interest @ 11% p.a. from 19.8.1991 till date of payment.

86. Costs shall follow.