Padam Chand Gupta vs P.O., Central Government ...
2004 Latest Caselaw 1026 Del

ORDER

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. The Petitioner is aggrieved by an Award dated April 6, 1993 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 71/1986.

2. Sometime in 1924, the Civil Justice Committee (commonly known as the Justice Rankin Committee) was set up to review the law's delays and suggest changes "for the more speedy, economical and satisfactory dispatch of the business transacted in the Courts". It was said in the report that:

"Unless a Court can start with a reasonably clean state, improvement of methods is likely to tantalize only. The existence of a mass of arrears lakes the heart out of a Presiding Judge."

Eighty long years have gone by and we are still trying to tackle the mass of arrears.

3. The disputes in the present case started in 1973 and it has taken three decades to reach this stage. The Petitioner, who is the aggrieved party, slept over his rights between 1975 and 1985 - for ten long years. But, our legal system is such that it holds this delay to be immaterial and permits a litigant to resuscitate a long forgotten dispute, and thereafter keep it alive for another almost 20 years. The Petitioner, an employee with the Respondent Bank, was served with two charge sheets, one dated May 30, 1973 and the other dated November 7, 1973. The sum and substance of the allegations in the first charge sheet was that he unauthorisedly sought to prepare a duplicate demand draft for a sum of Rs. 4,300 favoring Vanaspati Syndicates; he sought to use the unused cheque leaves of closed account for withdrawing a sum of Rs. 4,700; and he was in the habit of taking away important confidential circulars pertaining to the Respondent-Bank.

4. In the second charge sheet, it was alleged that the Petitioner had received a sum of Rs. 300 from one Mr. D.N. Sharma but he had not deposited the same immediately but misappropriated it for a few days. He was also accused of having absented himself from duty. It was finally alleged that the Petitioner had taken home certain important documents without the knowledge or permission of his superior authority. Significantly, none of these charge sheets contained the list of documents sought to be relied upon by the, Respondent-Bank to prove the charges against the Petitioner nor did any of these charge sheets contain a list of witnesses sought to be relied upon to prove the allegations.

5. Be that as it may, the Petitioner denied the allegations and a domestic inquiry was conducted which began on January 28, 1974 at about 4.30p.m. The statement of two witnesses of the Respondent-Bank were recorded and their cross-examination was conducted on behalf of the Petitioner. The record shows that the names of these witnesses were not disclosed prior to that date.

6. The inquiry was then adjourned for the next date, that is, January 29, 1974. On this date, the representative of the Petitioner objected to the propriety of holding the inquiry against the Petitioner in respect of the first charge sheet and also gave some written objections with regard to the second charge sheet. How these objections were dealt with by the Enquiry Officer is extremely important because it exposes his complete lack of knowledge of the procedures. The ruling given by the Enquiry Officer in respect of these objections reads as follows:

"The Enquiry Officer is appointed by the Management after taking into consideration all the legalities involved and the Enquiry Officer is vested with only such powers that are suitable for conducting the Enquiry. In the relevant context, / am not supposed to go into the merits of the Charge Sheets and any activities are confined only to the proper, conduct of the Enquiry. Hence I regret, the objections of the defense counsel cannot be accepted and I proceed with the Enquiry. Further, this being a domestic enquiry all the formalities of complying with the Principles of Natural Justice are not to be observed."

7. It is quite obvious from a perusal of the above ruling that the Enquiry Officer had no clue about his responsibilities and unfortunately did not even appreciate that he is required to comply with the principles of natural justice.

8. It is in this background that the report of the Enquiry Officer has to be considered because if the very foundation of the understanding of the Enquiry Officer is defective, it is extremely unlikely that he could have given a report which can be sustained in law.

9. However, it is not for me to go into the correctness or otherwise of the report of the Enquiry Officer except to mention that he concluded his inquiry on January 29, 1974 and submitted his report a few months later on August 16, 1974.

10. Surprisingly, (or perhaps in the context of the facts - not so surprisingly) the Enquiry Officer gave recommendations for punishing the Petitioner on the charges proved against him. The recommendations given by the Enquiry Officer read as follows:

"I pass on to the next phase, viz., to propose and recommend the punishment to be awarded to him:

1. For the charge of the gross misconduct of an "act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank", vide Para 1 of the Charge Sheet No. 29/337-CGT dated May 30, 1973, having been proved in the enquiry:

"Sri Padam Chand Gupta be dismissed from the service of the Bank without notice."

2. For the gross misconducts of an "act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank", vide Para 2 of the Charge Sheet No. 297 337-CGT dated May 30, 1973, having been proved in the enquiry:

"Sri Padam Chand Gupta be dismissed from the service of the Bank without notice."

3. For the gross misconduct of an "act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank", vide Para 3 of the Charge Sheet No. 29/337-CGT dated May 30, 1973, having been proved in the enquiry:

"Sri Padam Chand Gupta be dismissed from the service of the Bank without notice."

4. For the gross misconduct of an "act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank" , for having made an unauthorised credit entry in the Pass Book of the late Sri D.N Sharma, as narrated under Para 1 of the Charge Sheet No. 91/337-CGT dated November 7, 1973, having been proved in the enquiry:

" Sri Padam Chand Gupta be dismissed from the service of the Bank without notice."

5. For the minor misconduct of "absence without leave", vide Para 2 of the Charge Sheet No. 91/337-CGT dated November 7, 1973, having been proved in the enquiry:

"Sri Padam Chand Gupta be dismissed from the service of the Bank without notice."

11. To make matters worse, Along with covering letter enclosing his report, the Enquiry Officer asked the Petitioner to show cause why the proposed punishment should not be awarded to him.

12. Thereafter, the matter appears to have been considered by the disciplinary authority of the Petitioner who passed an order dated January 17, 1975 dismissing him from service. The Petitioner filed a departmental appeal, which was rejected on June 19, 1975.

13. According to learned counsel for the Petitioner, the trade union of which the Petitioner was a member, sought to settle the dispute with the Respondent-Bank but to no effect. In any case, about ten years later, the Petitioner raised an industrial dispute which came to be referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal by a reference order dated September 12/15, 1986.

14. The question that was referred for adjudication is as follows:

"Whether the action of the management of Syndicate Bank in dismissing Sri Padam Chand Gupta, Clerk vide its order dated February 11, 1975 is justified? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled?"

15. The learned Tribunal heard the matter on several dates and eventually concluded the hearing on March 5, 1991 when orders were reserved. More than a year and several months went by but the learned Tribunal did not pass any orders on the question referred. This compelled the Petitioner to file a writ petition in this Court being CWP No. 1243/1993. The writ petition was heard and disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court after noticing the fact that orders had not been passed on the reference by the learned Tribunal for more than two years. A direction was then issued on March 30, 1993 by the Division Bench to the learned Tribunal to announce the Award according to law within three weeks and report compliance. A copy of the order was directed to be given dusty to learned counsel for the parties.

16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states at the Bar that a certified copy of the above order was received on April 6, 1993 and was handed over to the learned Tribunal on the same date. The documents acknowledging receipt have been shown to me by learned counsel for the Petitioner.

17. On the same date, that is April 6, 1993, the learned Tribunal passed the Award, which is now impugned before me.

18. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has raised several contentions, during the course of his submissions.

19. It was contended that there was no occasion to hold a joint inquiry in respect of both the charge sheets and there was no order to this effect by the disciplinary authority. Relevant documents were not supplied to the Petitioner Along with the charge sheets or even before the inquiry actually commenced. It is contended that there was no list of witnesses along with the charge sheets and two of the witnesses for the Respondent Bank suddenly appeared before the Enquiry Officer on January 28, 1974 when the first hearing took place. It is finally contended that the Enquiry Officer had no authority to recommend any punishment against the Petitioner nor did he have any authority to ask the Petitioner to show cause to him with regard to the proposed punishment. Learned counsel for the Petitioner also strongly relied upon the mental make up of the Enquiry Officer as evidenced by the ruling given by him extracted above, to contend that according to the Enquiry Officer, he was not required to go into the merits of the charges but was only required to conduct a proper inquiry and his view was that he was not required to follow the principles of natural justice.

20. Learned counsel for the Respondent-Bank contended that no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioner because all the relevant documents were given to him at some point of time or were already in possession of the Petitioner and that the witnesses were cross-examined by the Petitioner. He submitted that Enquiry Officer arrived at the correct conclusions in the inquiry. With regard to the holding of a joint inquiry, the submission of learned counsel for the Respondent Bank is that a joint inquiry could be held and therefore the Petitioner was asked to reply to the second charge sheet directly to the Enquiry Officer who had been appointed in respect of the first charge sheet. With regard to the authority of the Enquiry Officer to recommend the punishment and to issue a show cause notice to the Petitioner on the proposed punishment, it is submitted that this was the practice being followed at the time. In this context, in the counter affidavit it has been stated that the Enquiry Officer was authorised to recommend the punishment as per the order appointing him and as per the prevailing practice. No such letter has been annexed to the counter affidavit.

21. The inquiry proceedings and the submissions made in the counter affidavit clearly show, that the Enquiry Officer had absolutely no idea as to what procedure to follow. The fact that the Enquiry Officer has mentioned that he was not required to follow the principles of natural justice is simply amazing. The Enquiry Officer did not understand his responsibility and has recorded that he was not required to adjudicate on the merits of the case but was only required to conduct a proper inquiry. How a proper inquiry can be conducted without following the principles of natural justice is completely beyond comprehension.

22. To add to the problems, the learned Tribunal did not pass orders on the industrial dispute for a little over two years. To say the least, this is scandalous. It eventually required an order of a Division Bench of this Court to persuade the Tribunal to make the Award. The unexplained and enormous delay in making the Award after arguments were heard and orders reserved, completely vitiates the proceedings before the learned Tribunal.

23. As mentioned above, the order of the Division Bench was served on the learned Tribunal on April 6, 1993 and on the very same day, the impugned Award was passed. How the learned Tribunal could have passed the Award with such alacrity is also not clear.

24. For all these unexplained, and perhaps inexplicable, errors it must be held that the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer as well as before the learned Tribunal were completely vitiated.

25. The question that now remains is with regard to the relief to be granted to the Petitioner.

26. There is no doubt that on its part, the Respondent-Bank acted promptly in conducting the inquiry. The second charge sheet was issued in November, 1973 and the Enquiry Officer gave his report in August, 1974. There is no unusual delay in this regard. The disciplinary authority took its decision in January, 1975 while the appeal was rejected by the Appellate Authority in June, 1975. Again, there is no unusual delay in this regard.

27. Thereafter, there was complete silence on the part of the Petitioner for about ten years or so when the Petitioner sought to raise an industrial dispute. The reference order was passed in September, 1986 and the proceedings concluded before the learned Tribunal in 1991, within about 4 1/2 years. Under the circumstance, it is not as if there has been any undue delay that has been caused by either of the parties in the disposal of the case except the unexplained ten years gap occasioned by the Petitioner in not raising an industrial dispute. After the Award was passed in 1993, this writ petition has come up for disposal after a lapse of about eleven years. It will thus be seen that apart from the slowness of the system, it is really the Petitioner who is to blame for a large chunk of the delay.

28. There is no doubt that employment in a bank requires the highest standards of integrity from all employees, mainly because they are dealing with hard-earned money belonging to the people. Some allegations have been made against the Petitioner touching upon his integrity. Even though they are not substantiated, there is a bit of question mark on the conduct of the Petitioner. Moreover, as mentioned above, the Petitioner has himself to blame for not taking any steps in the matter for almost ten years. Taking all this into consideration, I am not inclined to award any back wages, no argument having been made opposing reinstatement. While reaching this conclusion, I have also taken into consideration the fact that the Petitioner has not yet reached the age of superannuation, but has hardly a few years before his retirement. I think the view that I have taken on the award of back wages is supported by S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager, AIR 2003 SC 3553. In that case, there was a delay of about 4 to 5 years in raising an industrial dispute, the delay being not attributable to the workman. Yet the Supreme Court found that their reinstatement without back wages was just and reasonable. In the present case, there is a similar delay but of ten years and which is fully attributable to the Petitioner.

29. Consequently, while setting aside the impugned Award, it is directed that the Petitioner should be reinstated in service with continuity of service but without any back wages.

30. The Petitioner will approach the Manager, Zonal Officer, Bhagwan Dass Road, New Delhi on October 18, 2004 at 10 a.m. for being assigned duties.

31. The Petitioner will be entitled to costs of Rs. 15,000.