Delhi High Court
Riazuddin vs Satish Kumar Dhall on 29 April, 2004
Author: S K Kaul
Bench: S K Kaul
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
1. The petitioner landlord had filed an eviction petition against the respondent tenant under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') seeking eviction from the tenanted premises on the ground floor and first floor of property No. 2778, Gali Gharian, Kuncha Challan, Darya Ganj, Delhi on account of the bona fide need of the petitioner.
2. The premises was stated to be let out for residential purposes and consisted of two big rooms, kitchen, covered verandah, open space at the ground floor and one room, court yard, toilet on the first floor. The petitioner had accommodation of one room, one bathroom and open space at the first floor. At the time when the petition was filed, the wife of the petitioner was alive but she passed away during the pendency of the petition. The petitioner also has two sons who are since married and two grand sons.
3. The respondent had raised the issue of the tenancy being originally in the name of Shri Ganesh Dass Dhall which was determined and thus all the legal heirs would be the tenants. However, during the course of trial, the respondent admitted that none of the other legal heirs of late Shri Ganesh Dass Dhall objected to the rent receipts being issued only in favor of the respondent. Further, the respondent alone has been living in the premises and rent receipts have been issued in his name. The trial court thus rightly did not find any merit in the objection of the respondent in this behalf. In fact, during the course of arguments, this issue has not even been re-agitated by learned counsel for the respondent.
4. In so far as the issue of purpose of letting is concerned, there was a mere allegation in the written statement that the letting purpose was residential-cum-commercial though the nature of commercial activity was not disclosed. The respondent was in fact a bank employee and his only claim is that on retirement he started business as a tea distributor. The trial court thus rightly arrived at a conclusion that the purpose of letting was residential and on this aspect also no contentions were advanced by learned counsel for the respondent.
5. The real controversy is whether the petitioner requires the premises bona fide for his use. The Additional Rent Controller has taken note of the rented accommodation with the petitioner of one room in site plan Ex.PW1/16. In so far as the property wh Additional Rent Controller thus held that the accommodation available with the petitioner consisted of two rooms on the first floor apart from the rented accommodation of one room. It was thus concluded that there were three rooms available in the two premises to accommodate the family members of the petitioner.
6. The Additional Rent Controller in terms of the impugned order dated 28.2.2001 thus dismissed the petition of the petitioner landlord.
7. The aforesaid finding of the Additional Rent Controller is defended by learned counsel for the respondent on the ground that landlord of the petitioner had not asked him to vacate the one room nor had his sons appeared in the witness box expressing their desire to live with their father. It is thus contended that in the present times where there is a nuclear family, there is no reason for the sons to stay with the petitioner.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, assails the said finding on the ground that accommodation available in a rented premises cannot be taken into account while determining the bona fide requirements of a landlord and in this behalf relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court in Maya Devi v. Amar Singh, 2000 (1) RLR 279. It was held therein that where the rented premises were not appurtenant to the premises in dispute, the accommodation available in the rented premises could not be taken into account while determining the bona fide requirement. It is not the stand of the respondent that the tenanted premises are appurtenant and thus, in my considered view, the judgment would apply on all fours.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that in M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal, (2001) 2 SCC 355, the Supreme Court held that while considering the bona fide requirement of the landlord and the alternative accommodation, the family of the landlord cannot be forced to split up. In the present case also, the Additional Rent Controller has taken into consideration the separate accommodation of the one room in the rented premises as well as the one room bifurcated into two in the building where the tenanted premises are located to combine them and come to the conclusion that the requirements of the petitioner landlord were fulfillled. This could not have been done in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.L. Prabhakar's case (supra).
10. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that first the petitioner has to be asked to vacate the tenanted premises and then only the same can be excluded. This would be contrary to the dictum in Maya Devi's case (supra). The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent is fallacious that the sons of the petitioner must be compelled to stay away from the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be permitted to take their requirement into consideration for living in the same place.
11. I am thus of the considered view that the bona fide requirement of the petitioner is made out and the Additional Rent Controller fell into an error of law while considering the rented accommodation which is not adjacent to the tenanted accommodation and also by compelling a family split up to come to the conclusion that there was sufficient accommodation available with the petitioner. In view thereof, the impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 28.2.2001 cannot be sustained and the same is hereby quashed.
12. The eviction petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and an order of eviction is passed in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent in respect of the tenanted premises mentioned aforesaid. However, a period of six months time from today is granted to the respondent to vacate the tenanted premises.
13. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
CM 176/2003 and CM 572/2004
These applications seeking early disposal do not survive for consideration in view of the disposal of the Revision Petition and are accordingly disposed of.
